Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1988-008

1988-008Kanag

Testo completo

ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL January 28, 1988
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 88- 8
Roger W. Lovett
Chief Legal Counsel
Commission on Civil Rights
Landon State Office Building, 8th Floor
900 S.W. Jackson St., Suite 851 S.
Topeka, Kansas 66612-1258
Re: Labor and Industries--Kansas Acts Against
Discrimination--Waiver of Jurisdiction Over Certain
Claims; Equal Protection
Synopsis: Assuming the Kansas Commission on Civil Rights
(KCCR) otherwise has the authority to waive
jurisdiction over employment and housing
discrimination complaints filed by its employees,
it is our opinion that the KCCR would not be
precluded by the Equal Protection Clause from doing
so. Cited herein; K.S.A. 44-1001 et seq.;
44-1111 et seq.; 42 U.S.C.S. §§2000e-5, 3610;
24 C.F.R. §§105.18, 105.20 (1977); U.S. Const.,
Amend. XIV.
Dear Mr. Lovett:
As Chief Legal Counsel for the Kansas Commission on Civil
Rights (KCCR) you request our opinion regarding Fourteenth
Amendment restraints on the ability of the KCCR to waive
jurisdiction over certain complaints of unlawful
discrimination.
You advise that the KCCR is responsible for processing
complaints filed pursuant to the Kansas act against
discrimination (K.S.A. 44-1001 et seq.) and the Kansas age
discrimination in employment act (K.S.A. 44-1111 et
seq.). On occasion employees of the KCCR have filed such
complaints, thus presenting the KCCR with the following
potential problems: the parties against whom such complaints
are filed claim they are prejudiced by the complainant's
position in the agency; following an investigation which
results in a determination of no probable cause to credit the
allegations of the complaint, ill will develops between the
complaining party employee and the investigator. In view of
the fact that complaints alleging violations in the areas of
employment and housing may also be processed administratively
by federal agencies (the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, EEOC, and the Department of Housing and Urban
Development, HUD, respectively), you question whether a
policy to waive the KCCR's right to initial processing of
such complaints would be appropriate. Your specific questions
are as follows:
"1. Does a procedure which delays the processing of certain
complaints constitute a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment rights of the affected complainants?
"2. Do the appearances of impropriety and the potential of
internal discord inherent in regular processing of the
complaints filed by [KCCR] employees justify an invasion
of Fourteenth Amendment rights?"
You do not ask whether the act against discrimination or the
age discrimination in employment act would permit the KCCR
to waive processing of such complaints.
Title VII of the Civil rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.S. §§2000e
et seq.) provides that a complainant must attempt to
exhaust any state or local remedies available before filing a
complaint with the EEOC. 42 U.S.C.S. §2000e-5. See
also Ashworth v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 389 F.Supp. 597
(D.C. Va. 1975); Willis v. Chicago Extruded Metals
Company, 358 F. Supp. 848, 850, 851 (N.D. Ill. 1973). A
similar procedure exists with regard to complaints filed with
HUD. 42 U.S.C.S. §3610(c); 24 C.F.R. §§105.18, 105.20
(1977). The purpose of the exhaustion provision in Title VII,
and presumably of that in Title VIII as well, is to "avoid
federal action whenever possible by making the state a partner
in the enforcement" of these acts. EEOC v. Wah Chang
Albany Corp., 499 F.2d 187, 189 (9th Cir. 1974). The
exhaustion provision is dependent upon state law and procedure
and, consequently, deferral is not required in all instances.
Greenlow v. California Dept. of Benefit Payments, 413 F.
Supp. 420 (E.D. Cal. 1976). "[A] state agency's judgment
that it has been given a meaningful opportunity to act on a
discrimination complaint is entitled to considerable if not
conclusive weight." Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
v. Deleware Trust Company, 416 F. Supp. 1040, 1044 (D. Del.
1976). Thus, it would appear that as long as the state or
local administrative agency is given the opportunity to
consider discrimination complaints 'over which it has
authority, the deferral/exhaustion provisions in Title VII and
Title VIII would be met regardless whether the state or local
agency actually processes the complaint. See Willis v.
Chicago Extruded Metals Company, supra at 851 (state
commission waived right to proceed due to overloaded docket);
EEOC v. Deleware Trust Co., supra at 1043, 1044;
Greenlow, supra at 423 (state commission waived
jurisdiction over complaints concerning alleged retaliation
for the prior filing of a complaint with EEOC). While these
cases do not address the issue of equal protection, they do
indicate recognition by the courts that state agencies may
waive jurisdiction over employment and housing discrimination
complaints in certain circumstances.
We turn now to the specific question of whether the KCCR's
decision to not process discrimination complaints filed by its
own employees would constitute a violation of those employees'
right to equal protection under the law.
"[A]dministrative agencies must execute
the law committed to them fairly and
honestly and treat everyone alike
according to the standards and rules of
action prescribed. Failure in this
respect, if it extends beyond the
rudimentary requirements of fair play,
enters the realm of unreasonable and
arbitrary action from which the courts
will grant relief. Rules and regulations
should be uniform and framed to avoid
unequal operation on persons in the same
class. Where individuals or classes of
individuals are treated differently on the
basis of classification established by
statute or administrative rule, the equal
protection clause requires that such
classifications be reasonable and based
upon some principle of public policy, and
that they be not arbitrary or capricious.
"A regulation or order which involves a
classification on a reasonable basis does
not deny equal protection of the laws or
create any improper discrimination. All
legal restrictions which curtail the civil
rights of a single racial group are
immediately suspect. That is not to say
that all such restriction's are
unconstitutional. It is to say that
courts must subject them to the most rigid
scrutiny. Pressing public necessity may
sometimes justify the existence of such
restrictions; racial antagonism never
can." 2 Am.Jur.2d Administrative Law
§193 (1962) (footnotes omitted).
The class of individuals to be treated differently in this
case is composed of employees of the KCCR. While certain of
these employees may also belong to other classifications which
would be deemed suspect, their affiliation with the group of
KCCR employees does not necessarily render that
classification as suspect. These people are to be separated
out for differential treatment based on their connection with
the KCCR, not their race, nationality, etc. Thus, the
distinction does not require the strict scrutiny necessary
when dealing with suspect classes.
Neither do we believe that the right involved here constitutes
a fundamental right. While access to the courts has been
deemed a constitutionally protected right, 1 Antineau,
Federal Civil Rights Acts: Civil Practice 134 (2d ed.
1980), we do not believe access to this particular
administrative agency under these circumstances rises to that
level. The individuals to be affected are not without
administrative remedy, for they may file claims with the
federal counterparts to the KCCR. Though these federal
agencies may not process claims as quickly as the KCCR, we
do not believe that this alone would render access to KCCR
processing a fundamental right.
Where there is no suspect class or fundamental right involved,
equal protection requirements are satisfied if the agency can
show a rational basis for the differential treatment, and that
the means selected have a real and substantial relation to the
the objective sought. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,
425-26, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961); Manhattan
Buildings Inc. v. Hurley, 231 Kan. 20, 30 (1982). The
basis given for this differential treatment is to avoid the
appearance of impropriety inherent in processing the complaint
of a fellow worker, and to lessen the internal discord which
develops when a co-employee's complaint is found to be
without merit. We can well imagine the discomforts felt when
asked to investigate oneself, and believe there may even exist
a possible conflict when doing so. We therefore conclude that
the basis alleged is rational. Further, the means selected-
waiver of jurisdiction over certain complaints filed by KCCR
employees - is substantially related to the objective sought.
In conclusion, assuming the KCCR otherwise has the authority
to waive jurisdiction over employment and housing
discrimination complaints filed by its employees, it is our
opinion that the KCCR would not be precluded by the Equal
Protection Clause from doing so.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
JuleneL.Miller
Deputy Attorney General
RTS:JLM:jm

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