Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1987-147

1987-147Kanag

Testo completo

ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 87-147
Mr. Timothy J. Chambers
Reno County Attorney
Law Enforcement Center
210 West First Street
Hutchinson, Kansas 67501
Re: Counties and County Officers -- Sheriff --
Transporting Inmates to Civil Proceedings
State Departments; Public Officers and Employees --
Department of Corrections -- Transportation of
Inmates to Civil Proceedings
Synopsis: The primary responsibility for transporting a
prisoner to court in a civil case under a writ of
ad testificandum lies with the custodian. In
the absence of statutory or judicial direction,
there is no authority to cause third parties who
are neither custodians nor parties to the
litigation to bear the costs of transporting a
prisoner. Cited herein: K.S.A. 19-812; 60-1503;
75-5201; 28 U.S.C. 7S§ 2241 and 2243.
Dear Mr. Chambers:
As Reno County Attorney, you have requested our opinion
concerning the transportation of prisoners to court.
Specifically, you inquire whose responsibility it is to
transport a prisoner in the custody of the Secretary of
Corrections when that prisoner is needed to appear in court in
a civil case.
You indicate that in criminal cases the Department of
Corrections transports the prisoner if the crime occurred
within their institution. When the crime is one that occurred
in Reno county, outside K.S.I.R., the sheriff's office
transports the prisoner to court. Thus, the problem of
transporting a prisoner arises only when a civil proceeding is
involved. You further indicate that it is undisputed that
both the Department of Corrections and the Sheriff, as
officers of the court, must obey the mandate of the court and
transport prisoners if the court so orders. K.S.A. 75-5201
et seq. and K.S.A. 19-812. However, because the
transportation of prisoners to civil proceedings causes a
hardship on both, you request our opinion.
There are no statutes or case law in our state specifically
setting forth the relative responsibilities of transporting
prisoners to civil proceedings. As such, the question
presented is one appropriately for the legislature. However,
because we are presented with an issue of substantial
practical importance (who must bear the costs of transporting
prisoners when directed by our courts), we are persuaded to
answer your question in the context of a writ of habeas
corpus ad testificandum.
A writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum is an order calling
for the production as a witness of one lawfully
incarcerated. Courts issue these writs when it is necessary
to bring a person who is confined in a prison or jail into
court to testify in a pending case. U.S. v. Bailey, 585
F.2d 1087, 1090, (D.C. Cir. 1978). Although subject to
regulation by statute, the power to issue the writ is inherent
in the courts. When such a writ is served, the sheriff,
jailer or other custodian of such person is bound to bring
him into court to give his testimony. 97 C.J.S. Witnesses
§30 (1957).
The Supreme Court of the United States has had occasion to
answer whether third parties, who are neither custodian nor
parties to the litigation, should bear the cost of producing
prisoners in a federal court under a common-law writ of
habeas corpus ad testificandum. In PA. Bureau of
Correction v. U.S. Marshals Service, 474 U.S. 34, 106 S. Ct.
355, 88 L.Ed.2d 189 (1985), the United States Marshals Service
was ordered by the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania to transport a prisoner from
the county jail to the federal court. This decision was
reversed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit. On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court
affirmed, holding that in the absence of exceptional
circumstances, neither a magistrate nor a district court has
the authority to order the Marshals to transport state
prisoners to the federal courthouse in an action brought by a
state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. §1983 [a civil action] against
county officials. (But c.f., Justice Steven's dissent).
The holding in this case is predicated in part on the habeas
corpus statute found in 28 U.S.C. §2243. It provides in
pertinent part that the writ "shall be directed to the person
having custody of the person detained." The Supreme Court
agreed with the Court of Appeals that there was no basis in
the habeas corpus statute for the District Court's authority
to direct a writ ad testificandum to a non-custodian. The
Supreme Court reasoned:
"We find no evidence in the language of
§2241 and §2243, in their legislative
history, or in the common-law writ ad
testificandum to suggest that courts are
also empowered to cause third parties who
are neither custodians nor parties to the
litigation to bear the cost of producing
the prisoner in a federal court. We
therefore conclude that there is no basis
in the habeas corpus statute for a federal
court to order the Marshals to transport
state prisoners to the federal
courthouse." PA. Bureau of Correction v.
U.S. Marshals Service 474 U.S at 39, 106
S.Ct. at 359, 88 L.Ed.2d at 194-195
(1985). (Emphasis added.)
While not directly on point (because it deals with federal
marshals' duties), the Supreme Court case is useful by
analogy. The Kansas statute dealing with general writs of
habeas corpus is found at K.S.A. 60-1503, which states:
"(b) Form. The writ shall be directed
to the party having the person under
restraint and shall command him or her to
have such person before the judge at the
time and place specified in the writ."
The statute makes it clear that general writs are to be
addressed to the custodian and that the custodian is charged
with bringing the person before the judge. Applying this
statute to writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum, we
conclude that the custodian is the proper entity to be charged
with the transportation.
Accordingly, it is Our opinion that the custodian of the
prisoner is the appropriate entity to be charged with the
transportation of a prisoner to a civil action until such time
as the legislature further clarifies the relative
responsibilities. See also Note, "Transportation of State
Prisoners to their Federal Civil Rights Actions," 53 Fordham
L. Rev. 1211, 1228-29 (1985), cited in U.S. v. Sokolov,
814 F. 2d 864 (2nd Cir. 1987).
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS
Guen Easley
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:JLM:GE:jm

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