Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1987-126

1987-126Kanag

Testo completo

ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL August 28, 1987
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 87- 126
The Honorable Vernon L. Williams
State Representative, Ninety-First District
2402 Coolidge Avenue
Wichita, Kansas 67204
Re: Automobiles and Other Vehicles--Licensure of
Vehicle Dealers and Manufacturers--Brokers
Synopsis: 1987 Senate Bill No. 115, if passed into law, would
prohibit vehicle brokers from conducting business
within the State of Kansas. We do not believe that
this proposed prohibition is reasonable under the
circumstances in that it is so oppressive that it
prohibits the conduct of a lawful business for
stated purposes that may be achievable by less
oppressive means. For this reason we believe 1987
Senate Bill No. 115 in its current form would
offend the guarantees of equal protection found in
the United States and Kansas Constitutions. If,
however, the legislature could show a substantial
relationship between the prohibition and the
promotion of public health, safety and welfare, and
that the prohibition is necessary to achieve such
goal, 1987 Senate Bill No. 115 may be able to
withstand constitutional challenge. Cited herein:
1987 Senate Bill No. 115; K.S.A. 8-2401; K.S.A.
8-2402; Kan. Const., Bill of Rights, §§1, 2,
U.S. Const., Fourteenth Amendment.
Dear Representative Williams:
As State Representative for the Ninety-First District, you
request our opinion regarding the constitutionality of 1987
Senate Bill No. 115. Specifically, you inquire as to whether
a law prohibiting automobile brokers from conducting business
in the State of Kansas can survive constitutional scrutiny.
1987 Senate Bill No. 115 amends the Vehicle Dealers' and
Manufacturers' Licensing Act, K.S.A. 8-2401 et seq. The
term "broker" is defined in Section 1(ff) of the bill as
follows:
"'Broker' means any person who, for
commission, money or other thing of value,
is engaged in the business of: (1)
Selling or buying vehicles or
mobile homes for other persons as
an agent, middleman or negotiator; or (2)
bringing buyers and sellers of vehicles
or mobile homes together,
but such term shall not include any person
engaged in a business in which the acts
described in this subsection are only
incidentally performed. . . ." (Emphasis
added.)
Section 2(q) of 1987 Senate Bill No. 115 provides:
"From and after the effective date of this
act, no person shall act as a broker in
the sale of any new or used vehicle."
Thus, section 2(q) would have the effect of outlawing
automobile brokers in the State of Kansas if 1987 Senate Bill
No. 115 is passed into law.
The State, through the exercise of its police power, may enact
laws to promote the health and welfare of its citizens.
However, a law which is unreasonable and arbitrary is not a
proper and valid exercise of that police power, and may
violate constitutional equal protection guarantees.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution prevents
the states of the union from denying to any person within
their jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. The
Kansas Supreme Court has held that the provisions of the
Kansas Constitution declaring that all men are possessed of
equal and inalienable natural rights and that all free
governments are instituted for the equal protection and
benefit of the people are the Kansas counterparts to the equal
protection guarantees found in the Fourteenth Amendment.
Kan. Const., Bill of Rights, §§1, 2; Stephens v. Snyder
Clinic Association, 230 Kan. 115 (1981).
The basic principles which must be applied in determining the
constitutionality of a statute are set forth in City of
Baxter Springs v. Bryant, 226 Kan. 383, 385-86 (1979);
"'The constitutionality of a statute is
presumed, all doubts must be resolved in
favor of its validity, and before the
statute may be stricken down, it must
clearly appear the statute violates the
constitution. [Citations omitted.]
"'In determining constitutionality, it is
the court's duty to uphold a statute under
attack rather than defeat it and if there
is any reasonable way to construe the
statute as constitutionally valid, that
should be done. [Citations omitted.]
"'Statutes are not stricken down unless
the infringement of the superior law is
clear beyond substantial doubt.
[Citations omitted.]
"'The propriety, wisdom, necessity and
expedience of legislation are exclusively
matters of legislative determination and
courts will not invalidate laws, otherwise
constitutional, because the members of the
court do not consider the statute in the
public interest of the state, since,
necessarily, what the views of members of
the court may be upon the subject is
wholly immaterial and it is not the
province nor the right of courts to
determine the wisdom of legislation
touching the public interest as that is a
legislative function with which courts
cannot interfere. [Citations omitted.]'
State ex rel. Schneider v. Kennedy,
225 Kan. 13, 20-21 (1978)."
The fixed rule and basic standard by which the validity of all
exercises of the police power is tested is set forth in State
v. Pendarvis, 181 Kan. 560, 566 (1957), in which the
court states,
"The police power of the state extends
only to such measures as are reasonable
and . . . all police regulation must be
reasonable under all circumstances."
See also City of Junction City v.
Mevis, 226 Kan. 526, 535, 535 (1979).
In Delight Wholesale Co. v. City of Overland Park, 203
Kan. 99, Syl. 14 (1969), the limitation on the police
power was stated as follows:
"While the police power is wide in its
scope and gives a governmental body broad
power to enact laws to promote the health,
morals, security and welfare of the
people, and further, a large discretion is
vested in it to determine for itself what
is deleterious to health, morals or is
inimical to public welfare, it cannot
under the guise of the police power enact
unreasonable and oppressive legislation or
that which is in violation of the
fundamental law." See also Gilbert
v. Mathews, 186 Kan. 672, 677 (1960);
Little v. Smith, 124 Kan. 237 (1927).
Later, in Delight Wholesale Co. v. City of Prairie Village,
208 Kan. 246, Syl. 12 (1971), the Kansas Supreme Court
said,
"The police power is wide in scope and
gives the governmental body broad powers
to enact laws to promote the health,
morals, security, and welfare of the
people. Broad discretion is vested in the
governing body to determine for itself
what is deleterious to the health or
morals, or which is inimical to pubic
welfare. However, the governing body does
not possess plenary power to pass
legislation that is arbitrary, oppressive,
and capricious, and which bears no
substantial relationship to the public
safety and welfare."
In the above mentioned Delight Wholesale Co. cases, city
ordinances which had the effect of prohibiting a legitimate
business operation were struck down as being unreasonable and
arbitrary. The prohibitive ordinances were not proper and
valid exercises of police power and were held to violate the
14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and
Section 1 of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the
State of Kansas.
The brokering of vehicles, specifically automobiles, has been
a legitimate business in Kansas for several years. However,
the right of doing business is not absolute and may be
regulated or withheld, if necessary, for public safety and
welfare. In the present case it is necessary to determine
whether the prohibition of a legitimate business, automobile
brokering, is reasonably necessary to protect the general
welfare of the citizens of Kansas.
The proponents of 1987 Senate Bill No. 115 feel that the
prohibition on automobile brokers is necessary to combat fraud
and to protect consumers from such things as odometer
tampering. These proponents also feel that possible sales tax
revenue could be lost due to the brokering of automobiles.
See Attachment #1 of the March 30, 1987 House Transportation
Committee minutes. These concerns, however, do not appear to
be substantiated as there is no documented evidence contained
in the legislative history of 1987 Senate Bill No. 115 which
supports these conclusions.
As mentioned earlier, the brokering of automobiles has been,
and is currently, a legitimate business. Brokers are licensed
and regulated pursuant to the Vehicle Dealers' and
Manufacturers' Licensing Act, K.S.A. 8-2401 et sea.
Within K.S.A. 8-2402 is a declaration of public policy
pertaining to this Act. K.S.A. 8-2402 provides:
"It is hereby declared to be the public
policy of this state to provide for fair
and impartial regulation of those persons
engaged in manufacturing, distributing or
selling of vehicles or mobile homes. The
provisions of this act which are
applicable to such activities shall be
administered in such a manner as will
continue to promote fair dealing and
honesty in the vehicle industry or the
mobile home industry and among those
engaged therein without unfair or
unreasonable discrimination or undue
preference or advantage. It is further
declared to be the policy of this state to
protect the public interest in the
purchase and trade of vehicles and mobile
homes, so as to insure protection against
irresponsible vendors and dishonest or
fraudulent sales practices." (Emphasis
added.)
This declaration of public policy seeks to put all parties
concerned on equal footing. A plain reading of K.S.A. 8-2402
would seem to weigh against a total ban or prohibition which
is imposed only on one particular market participant, such as
the automobile brokers. This type of prohibition would be
compatible with K.S.A. 8-2402 only if such a ban is truly to
protect consumers against "irresponsible vendors and dishonest
or fraudulent sales practices." Based on the available
evidence, it does not appear that automobile brokers present
any more of a threat to consumers than do any other persons or
entities who facilitate the sale of automobiles. This type of
total prohibition of a legitimate business would seem to be an
arbitrary exercise of the State's police power since it
clearly discriminates against one market participant while
aiding another, and since the adoption of further regulatory
statutes could satisfy the consumer protection goals of the
legislature. Furthermore, in the case of Fairmont Creamery
Co. v. Minnesota, 274 U.S. 1, 47 S.Ct. 506, 71 L.Ed. 893, 897
(1926), it was said:
"It is not permissible to enact a law
which, in effect, spreads an all-inclusive
net for the feet of everybody upon the
chance that, while the innocent will surely
be entangled in its meshes, some wrongdoers
also may be caught."
In conclusion, it is our opinion that 1987 Senate Bill No.
115, Section 2(q) would be an invalid exercise of the State's
police power because, based on the available information, the
prohibition on automobile brokers does not appear to be
reasonably related to the protection of the public welfare.
Rather, the provision is arbitrary and unreasonable in that it
is so oppressive that it prohibits the conduct of a lawful
business, i.e. automobile brokers, for stated purposes that
may be achievable by less oppressive means. Thus, it is our
opinion that 1987 Senate Bill No. 115 in its current form
violates the Constitution of the United States and the State
of Kansas.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
JuleneL.Miller
Deputy Attorney General
RTS:JLM:jm

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