Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1987-096

1987-096Kanag

Testo completo

ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL June 23, 1987
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 87- 96
The Honorable Jessie M. Branson
State Representative, Forty-Fourth District
800 Broadview Drive
Lawrence, Kansas 66044-2423
Re: Labor and Industries--Kansas Acts Against
Discrimination--Unlawful Discriminatory Practices;
Application to Rotary Clubs
Synopsis: Rotary Clubs which have (1) inclusive rather than
exclusive membership practices, (2) meetings open
to visitors, (3) business attributes such as
extensive publishing activities and a complex
structure and (4) important business advantages and
opportunities are not the type of fraternal or
social associations contemplated by K.S.A.
44-1002(h) and thus are not exempt from the Kansas
Acts Against Discrimination, K.S.A. 44-1001 et
seq. Cited herein: K.S.A. 44-1001; 44-1002;
44-1009; 44-1015; 44-1110; K.A.R. 21-46-2.
*
Dear Representative Branson:
As State Representative for the Forty-Fourth District, you
request our opinion regarding the application of the Kansas
Acts Against Discrimination, K.S.A. 44-1001 et seq., to
Rotary clubs.
On May 4, 1987, the United States Supreme Court held that
California's Unruh Civil Rights Act, which entitles all
persons, regardless of sex, to full and equal accommodations,
advantages, facilities, privileges, and services in all
business establishments in the State of California, does not
violate the First Amendment to the United States Constitution
by requiring California Rotary Clubs to admit women. The
United States Supreme Court did not determine whether
California's Unruh Act does indeed extend to membership in
Rotary Clubs, that determination was made by the Court of
Appeal of California. Thus, the only issue discussed by the
United States Supreme Court was the constitutionality of
applying California's Unruh Act to California Rotary Clubs,
using as a "given" the California court's determination that
the Unruh Act does apply to Rotary Clubs. Board of
Directors of Rotary International, et al. v. Rotary Club of
Duarte et al., 55 U.S.L.W. 4606 (U.S. May 4, 1987) (No.
86-421).
You have asked whether the Kansas Acts Against Discrimination
contain provisions similar to the California Unruh Act which
would make the Kansas Act applicable to Rotary Clubs. It must
first be noted that neither the California court's
interpretation of the California Act, nor the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Rotary Club of Duarte, have
any controlling effect in a determination of the application
of the Kansas Act, other than to tell us that if the Kansas
Act is held to apply to Rotary Clubs, such an application
would not violate the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution. See Rotary Club of Duarte, 55 U.S.L.W. at
footnote 8. Though not controlling, the provisions of the
Unruh Act, the California court's application of those
provisions, and the U.S. Supreme Court's analysis of Rotary
Club characteristics may be helpful in determining the extent
of the Kansas Act's application. With this in mind, we will
proceed to analyze the applicability of the Kansas Acts
Against Discrimination to Rotary Clubs in the State of Kansas.
Kansas statutes currently prohibit discrimination against
persons in places of public accommodations, K.S.A. 44-1001
et sect ., employment, K.S.A. 44-1110 et sec., and
housing, K.S.A. 44-1015 et seq. K.S.A. 44-1001 provides
in part:
. . . It is hereby declared to be the
policy of the state of Kansas to eliminate
and prevent discrimination in all
employment relations, to eliminate and
prevent discrimination, segregation, or
separation in all places of public
accommodations covered by this act. . . .
"It is also declared to be the policy of
this state to assure equal opportunities
and encouragement to every citizen
regardless of race, religion, color, sex,
physical handicap, national origin or
ancestry, in securing and holding, without
discrimination, employment in any field of
work or labor for which he is properly
qualified, to assure equal opportunities
to all persons within this state to full
equal public accommodations, . . . without
distinction on account of race, religion,
color, sex, physical handicap, national
origin or ancestry. It is further
declared that the opportunity to secure
and to hold employment, the opportunity
for full and equal public accommodations
as covered by this act . . . are civil
rights of every citizen.
"To protect these rights, it is hereby
declared to be the purpose of this act to
establish and to provide a state
commission having power to eliminate and
prevent segregation and discrimination, or
separation in employment, in all places of
public accommodations covered by this act,
and in housing because of race, religion,
color, sex, physical handicap, national
origin or ancestry, either by employers,
labor organizations, employment agencies,
realtors, financial institutions or other
persons as hereinafter provided."
K.S.A. 44-1009 provides further:
"(c) It shall be an unlawful
discriminatory practice:
"(1) For any person, as defined herein
being the owner, operator, lessee,
manager, agent or employee of any place of
public accommodation to refuse, deny, or
make a distinction, directly or
indirectly, in offering its goods,
services, facilities, and accommodations
to any person as covered by this act
because of race, religion, color, sex,
physical handicap, national origin or
ancestry, except where a distinction
because of sex is necessary because of the
intrinsic nature of such accommodation."
"Person" and "public accommodations" are defined in K.S.A.
44-1002 as follows:
"When used in this act:
"(a) The term 'person' includes one or
more individuals, partnerships,
associations, organizations, corporations,
legal representatives, trustees, trustees
in bankruptcy, or receivers.
. . .
"(h) . . . the term 'public
accommodations' shall include any person
as defined herein, who caters or offers
goods, services, facilities, and
accommodations to the public, but shall
not include a nonprofit fraternal or
social association or corporation."
In implementing K.S.A. 44-1009(c)(1) and 44-1002(h), the
Kansas Commission on Civil Rights has promulgated K.A.R.
21-46-2 which states:
"An association or corporation shall be
deemed exempt from coverage by the Kansas
act against discrimination as a nonprofit
fraternal or social association or
corporation only if it meets all the
following requirements: (a)
Requirements. (1) It is organized in
good faith for social or fraternal
purposes;
"(2) Membership entails the payment of
bona fide initiation fees or regular dues;
"(3) There exists a regularly established
means of self-government by the members
thereof clearly set forth in a
constitution or by-laws adopted by the
membership.
"(4) There is a regularly established
means of and criteria for admitting
members and for expulsion of members by
the existing membership or by their duly
elected or appointed delegates.
"(5) It is not operated, directly or
indirectly for purposes of profit for any
individual or groups of individuals other
than the membership as a whole."
There are two apparent distinctions between the California
Unruh Civil Rights Act and the Kansas Acts Against
Discrimination relevant to this inquiry. First, the Unruh
Act specifically entitles all persons to full and equal
advantages and privileges in all business establishments of
every kind as well as equal accommodations, facilities and
services in such businesses. By contrast, the Kansas Act only
specifies entitlement to equal goods, services, facilities and
accommodations offered to the public. K.S.A. 44-1002(h).
Second, the Unruh Act does not exclude non-profit
fraternal or social associations or corporations from its
provisions as does the Kansas Act. Thus, if we are to use the
reasoning of the Court of Appeal of California, we must first
determine that these two distinctions are irrelevant.
Though the Kansas Acts Against Discrimination do not
specifically entitle all persons to equal advantages and
privileges in all business establishments, they do provide
that it is the policy of the state "to assure equal
opportunities and encouragement of every citizen . . . in
securing and holding, without discrimination, employment in
any field of work or labor which he is properly qualified" and
"to assure equal opportunities to all persons within this
state to full and equal public accommodations," K.S.A.
44-1001. In finding that both Rotary International and the
Duarte Rotary Club are "business establishments" subject to
the provisions of the Unruh Act, the California Court of
Appeal noted that "business concerns are a motivating factor
in joining local clubs," and that "business benefits [are]
enjoyed and capitalized upon by Rotarians and their
businesses or employers." Rotary International v. Rotary
Club of Duarte, 55 U.S.L.W. at 4607, citing App. to
Juris. Statement C-26, 178 Cal.App.3d 1035, 1051,
Cal. Rptr. (1986). It was also found by the
California court that the Duarte Club provides goods,
services and facilities to its members, as well as privileges
and advantages. These goods and services include magazines
and conferences which teach managerial and professional
techniques. We agree with these findings and it is therefore
our opinion that, though the Kansas Act does not specifically
require equality in the offering of business privileges and
advantages, it does so impliedly in K.S.A. 44-1001, and
further that Rotary Clubs offer goods, services and
facilities, as well as business advantages and privileges, to
their members thus bringing them squarely within the
provisions of K.S.A. 44-1009(c)(1). Our conclusion is
supported by the Kansas Supreme Court case of Kansas
Commission on Civil Rights v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 216
Kan. 306 (1975), which emphasized the court's tendency to
give the Act a broad interpretation to the end of "eradicating
the cancer of discrimination from our society." 216 Kan. at
313.
In the Sears case, the Kansas Supreme Court interpreted the
term "public accommodations" to mean "those places which are
held out as open to the general public and [to] which members
of the public generally are invited to patronize or otherwise
visit." 216 Kan. at 313. The court went on to state:
"Viewing Kansas Civil Rights legislation
in the perspective of recent history, we
discern a continuing intent on the part of
the legislature to strengthen civil rights
statutes to enlarge the areas of their
coverage. We harbor little doubt that
places of public accommodations were
intended to include places where general
retail trade is conducted and that in
those places, distinctions are now not to
be made based on race, religion, sex,
physical handicap, ancestry or national
origin." 216 Kan. at 316, 317.
Though the court was discussing a retail business
establishment in this case, we believe its reasoning would
extend to organizations such as Rotary Clubs which offer
business advantages, opportunities and services as discussed
above, and which virtually open their doors to public
admittance. See Rotary International v. Rotary Club of
Duarte, 55 U.S.L.W. at 4608, 4609. See also United
States Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764 (Minn.
1981). (Construing a statute very similar to K.S.A.
44-1009(c)(1), the Minnesota Supreme Court determined that
Jaycees organization is a "place of public accommodation.")
These characteristics of Rotary Clubs are also important in
determining whether such clubs would be exempt from the
provisions of the Kansas Acts Against Discrimination as
"nonprofit fraternal or social associations or corporations."
Rotary International is a non-profit corporation. In
determining whether the Rotary Club of Duarte was private or
public in nature, the United States Supreme Court considered
factors such as size, purpose, selectivity, and whether
nonmembers are excluded from critical aspects of the
relationship. Finding no upper limit on the membership of any
local Rotary Club, a relatively high turnover rate in
membership, a purpose of producing "an inclusive, not
exclusive, membership" (1 Rotary Basic Library, Focus on
Rotary 60-61, App. 84), and a purpose of aiding the
community and raising the standards of the members' businesses
and professions, the Court determined that these
characteristics do not "suggest the kind of private or
personal relationship to which we have accorded protection
under the First Amendment." Rotary Club of Duarte, 55
U.S.L.W. at 4609. Neither do they suggest the kind of
association or corporation which is organized for social or
fraternal purposes, but rather for business purposes.
Using these findings and others of the United States Supreme
Court as a basis for our opinion (having no specific facts
before us), we conclude that Rotary International and its
member clubs which are similarly situated to the Rotary Club
of Duarte are not purely private fraternal or social
associations or corporations and thus are not exempt from the
provisions of the Kansas Acts Against Discrimination. A club
which (1) is far from exclusive in its membership
requirements, (2) virtually opens its meetings to the public,
including women, (3) has many business attributes and (4)
offers valuable business opportunities and advantages is not
the type of "nonprofit fraternal or social association or
corporation" contemplated by K.S.A. 44-1002(h).
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
Julene L. Miller
Deputy Attorney General
RTS:JLM:jm

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