Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1987-094

1987-094Kanag

Testo completo

ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL June 19, 1987
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 87- 94
John R. Stanley
Hamilton County Attorney
P.O. Box 870
301 North Main
Syracuse, Kansas 67878
Re: Public Health -- Alcoholism and Intoxication
Treatment -- Emergency Hospitalization; Authority
of Law Enforcement Officer
Probate Code -- Care and Treatment for Mentally Ill
Persons -- Emergency Observation; Authority of Law
Enforcement Officer
Synopsis: In order to act under the emergency hospitalization
provisions of K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 59-2908 or K.S.A.
65-4027, the officer need not observe first-hand
all elements required for such hospitalization.
Rather, the statutory purpose is best served by
allowing the officer to act when the totality of
circumstances, which necessarily include the
officer's observations, indicate the necessity of
emergency action. Supplemental information may
increase the reasonableness of such emergency
action. Cited herein: K.S.A. 1986 Supp.
59-2902, 59-2908, 59-2909; 65-4003; K.S.A. 65-4027.
* *
Dear Mr. Stanley:
As County Attorney for Hamilton County, you have requested our
opinion regarding the authority of a law enforcement officer
to take a person into custody for emergency observation or
hospitalization. Specifically, you have inquired whether the
phrase "reasonable belief upon observation by the officer"
means actual firsthand knowledge that the individual may be
harmful to himself or others. The authority to take an
individual into custody when the officer has a reasonable
belief upon observation of circumstances indicating a
likelihood that such individual will be dangerous to himself
or others is enumerated in K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 59-2908 and
K.S.A. 65-4027.
The Act for Obtaining Treatment for a Mentally Ill Person,
K.S.A. 59-2901 et seq., and the Act for Alcoholism and
Intoxication Treatment, K.S.A. 65-4001 et seq., are
devices by which the state exercises its police power for the
protection of others, and by which the state acts in its role
of parens patriae for the protection of individuals from
themselves. The two acts, while serving both functions, apply
to separate categories of persons.
Article 29 of Chapter 59 provides the procedure for initiating
treatment of mentally ill persons. A mentally ill person is
defined as one who suffers from a "severe mental disorder" in
need of treatment, is unable to understand the nature and
effects of treatment and make an informed decision regarding
such treatment, and is "likely to cause harm to himself or
others." K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 59-2902(h). A "severe mental
disorder" does not include a condition which results from the
use of alcohol or drugs. K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 59-2902(o).
Pursuant to K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 59-2908, a law enforcement
officer may take a person into custody for observation which
may ultimately result in the individual's release or in the
commencement of civil commitment proceedings.
In comparison, Article 40 of Chapter 65 provides the procedure
for initiating treatment of persons who are intoxicated or
incapacitated by alcohol. An intoxicated person is "an
individual whose mental or physical functioning is
substantially impaired as a result of the use of alcohol."
K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 65-4003(10). A person who is
incapacitated by alcohol is either incapable of making a
decision regarding treatment for the condition, or is
incapable of making responsible decisions regarding the
individual's well-being or estate. K.S.A. 1986 Supp.
65-4003(8). Such an individual, if likely to cause harm to
self or others if allowed to remain at liberty, may be taken
into custody pursuant to K.S.A. 65-4027.
Whether an officer acts under authority of K.S.A. 1986 Supp.
59-2908 or K.S.A. 65-4027, the initial requirements are the
same for all practical purposes. First, the person must be
either a mentally ill person or intoxicated or incapacitated
by alcohol within the meaning of the respective acts. Second,
the person must be likely to cause harm to himself or others.
Third, these circumstances must reasonably be believed by the
officer to exist, and that belief must arise out of
observations made by the officer. We believe that the
qualifier "upon observation" does not mean that the officer
must actually witness individual acts of violence to self or
others as a condition precedent to exercising the authority
specified in K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 59-2908 or K.S.A. 65-4027.
However, we believe that the officer may not act solely on
statements of others.
Individuals have a substantial liberty interest in remaining
free from custody, whether the confinement is for penal or for
civil commitment purposes. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S.
418, 425-26, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 60 L.Ed.2d 323, 330-31 (1979).
The state may infringe on that liberty interest under its
parens patriae power or under its police power. 441 U.S. at
426, 60 L.Ed.2d at 331. This state interest becomes
compelling when persons threaten violence to themselves or
others, and thus emergency procedures for hospitalization may
be used without a prior hearing. Lessard v. Schmidt,
349 F. Supp. 1078, 1091 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (vacated and
remanded on other grounds), 414 U.S. 473, 94 S.Ct. 713, 38
L.Ed.2d 661 (1974), reinstated, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D.
Wis. 1974) (vacated and remanded on other grounds), 421 U.S.
957, 95 S.Ct. 1943, 44 L.Ed.2d 445 (1975), reinstated 413 F.
Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
The legislature has determined that the state's authority may
be exercised when the officer acts upon a "reasonable belief
upon observation" of events justifying such emergency
confinement. The language of the statute is a clear directive
that the officer must have more than mere probable cause, but
need not observe all pertinent events first-hand. While
each incident must be determined on a case-by-case basis,
other statutes give some guidance. If the only information
available to the officer at the scene is the statement of a
witness, then the procedures set forth in K.S.A. 1986 Supp.
59-2909(c) (detention upon application of any individual) are
preferred. This procedure may be inadequate when the
individual exhibits behavior indicating that time is of the
essence in order to prevent harm. The purpose of the statutes
would not be served if conditions exist which indicate that
the emergency procedure is appropriate to protect the
individual and/or the public, but the officer could not act
because he did not observe the incident first hand. Such a
reading of the statute would do little to diffuse the dangers
involved in an emergency situation. We do not believe that
the legislature intended to limit law enforcement officers to
a requirement that in every case they observe first-hand
both mental illness, or intoxication or incapacitation by
alcohol, and a likelihood of harm to self or others.
Rather, we believe the intent of the legislature was to
authorize law enforcement officers to take persons into
custody when the officer's observations would lead a
reasonable person to believe such necessity exists.
Information from witnesses may be useful to strengthen the
reasonability of the officer's belief.
Our opinion effectuates, rather than nullifies the statutory
language. If an officer acted only upon information from a
witness, the phrase "upon observation" and the procedure in
K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 59-2909(c) would be meaningless.
Likewise, if an officer acted only upon first-hand
information, the phrase "reasonable belief" would be negated,
and the danger to the individual, as well as the public, would
not be diminished. The language of the statute indicates that
neither was the intent of the legislature.
In conclusion, it is our opinion that, in order to act under
the emergency hospitalization provisions of K.S.A. 1986 Supp.
59-2908 or K.S.A. 65-4027, the officer need not observe
first-hand all necessary elements required for such
hospitalization. Rather, the purpose sought to be served by
these statutes is best furthered by allowing the officer to
act when the totality of circumstances, which necessarily
includes observations by the officer, indicate the necessity
of emergency action. Supplemental information may be used to
support the reasonableness of such action.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS
JuleneL.Miller
Deputy Attorney General
RTS:JLM:MWS:bas

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