Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1987-049

1987-049Kanag

Testo completo

ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL March 19, 1987
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 87- 49
Charles A. Peckham
Rawlins County Attorney
Atwood, Kansas 67730
Re: Constitution of the United States -- Fourth
Amendment -- Searches and Seizures
Constitution of the State of Kansas -- Bill of
Rights -- Search and Seizure
Synopsis: The Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution gives people the right to be free from
"unreasonable searches and seizures." Mandatory
)drug testing of county employees, without regard to
job performance, would violate the Fourth Amendment
prohibition against "unreasonable searches and
seizures." However, the testing of such an
employee is permissible if based upon "reasonable
suspicion." Therefore, there is no constitutional
bar to the testing of a county employee where
circumstances give the employer a reasonable uobjective basis to suspect illicit drug use by that
employee.
Mandatory drug testing of applicants, without
regard to job requirements, would violate the
Fourth Amendment. However, testing of an applicant
is permissible if it is in furtherance of a bona
fide effort to learn whether an applicant is
physically capable of performing the duties of a
particular job. Accordingly, mandatory drug
testing of all applicants for public safety
positions is permissible. Cited herein: K.S.A.
19-101; K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 19-101a; U.S. Const.,
Fourth Amend.; Ks. Const., Bill of Rights, § 15.
Dear Mr. Peckham:
As Rawlins County Attorney, you request our opinion on the
legality of a proposed drug testing plan in Rawlins County.
You inform us that details of the plan are as follows. All
county employees, other than elected officials, would be
subject to drug testing with little or no advance warning.
They would also be required to sign an agreement that as a
condition of continued employment by the county, they would
not use drugs while county employees. According to the plan,
if it is found that a county employee is using drugs, the
employee would be required to attend a drug/alcohol treatment
program. Finally, if an employee refuses to attend the
treatment program after it is found that he or she is using
drugs or alcohol, or an employee who attended the program is
subsequently found to be using drugs or abusing alcohol, then
the employee would be subject to termination of employment by
the county.
Kansas presently has no statutes related to drug testing.
Thus, it is necessary to examine the constitutionality of the
proposed plan under both the United States and Kansas
Constitutions. The Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution states in its entirety:
"The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized." (Emphasis added).
This language is repeated almost word for word in the Bill of
Rights of the Kansas Constitution, which provides at § 15:
"The right of the people to be secure in
their persons and property against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
be inviolate; and no warrant shall issue
but on probable cause, supported by oath
or affirmation, particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons
or property to be seized." (Emphasis
added).
Thus, both the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and § 15 of the Bill of Rights of the Kansas
Constitution prohibit "unreasonable searches and seizures."
Since Kansas case law has yet to address the issue of drug
testing as a search and seizure, this opinion will deal only
with the Fourth Amendment, as applied to the states through
its incorporation in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. This includes counties and county officials.
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed. 2d
1081 (1961); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 69 S.Ct. 1359,
93 L.Ed. 1782 (1949).
The fundamental legal question you ask is whether drug testing
in the workplace is compatible with the protection of
personal privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition of "unreasonable searches and seizures." Drug
testing programs are being instituted widely today as a result
of public and political reaction to highly publicized drug
abuse tragedies. Not surprisingly, such programs are often
challenged in court by the affected employees. The case law
is still developing and is unsettled. Therefore, we cannot
predict with certainty what the courts, and especially the
United States Supreme Court, will do.
In our opinion, the Board of County Commissioners of Rawlins
County has the authority, via its home rule powers (K.S.A.
19-101; K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 19-101a), to establish a drug
testing. program for applicants and current employees alike,
assuming the commission finds a link between drug abuse and -
the requirements of particular job categories. However, the
commission's exercise of this authority must be grounded in
the finding of a link between drug abuse and job performance.
In our view, the county commission does not have statutory
authority to undertake a massive drug testing program in
pursuit of broader social goals, however desirable, such as
deterring drug abuse. Moreover, the commission's authority
must be exercised in conformity with constitutional
requirements. We will address these necessary constraints
below.
A preliminary question we address is whether the collection
and testing of a urine specimen is a "search" or "seizure"
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Since other types
of testing are subject to Fourth Amendment constraints,
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767, 86 S.Ct. 1826,
1833, 16 L.Ed. 2d 908, 918 (1967) (blood); State v.
Berker, 391 A.2d 107, 111 (R.I. 1978) (breath), it seems
clear that a urine test likewise amounts to a search or
seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Courts
have held this to be true. See National Treasury Employees,
Union v. VonRaab, 649 F. Supp. 380 (E.D. La. 1986);
Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, Tenn., 647 F. Supp.
875 (E.D. Tenn. 1986); Shoemaker v. Handel, 608
F.Supp. 1151 (D.N.J. 1985), Aff'd, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d
Cir. 1986); Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F.Supp. 1507
(D.N.J. 1986); McDonnell v. Hunter, 612 F.Supp. 1122
(D.C.Iowa 1985); Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482
(N.D. Ga. 1985). We conclude that urine testing is a search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Although the taking of urine specimens for drug testing
purposes is a search under the Fourth Amendment, it is not a
per se violation of that amendment. Only "unreasonable
searches and seizures" are prohibited. Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 147, 45 S.Ct. 280, 283, 69 L.Ed. 543,
549 (1925). Accordingly, it is necessary to make a
determination of reasonableness, which requires a balancing of
the need to search against the invasion of the individual
which the search entails. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
325, 336, 105 S.Ct. 733, 740, 83 L.Ed.2d 720, 731 (1985). The
Supreme Court has said that:
"The test of reasonableness under the
fourth amendment is not capable of precise
definition or mechanical application. In
each case it requires a balancing of the
need for the particular search against the
invasion of personal rights that the
search entails. Courts must consider the
scope of the particular intrusion, the
manner in which it is conducted, the
justification for initiating it, and the
place in which it is conducted." Bell v.
,Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559, 99 S.Ct.
1861, 1884, 60 L.Ed.2d 447, 481 (1979).
There can be no doubt that Rawlins County has a compelling
interest in having its employees free from drugs. Balanced
against this interest is the extent of the invasion of the
individual's privacy rights by the kind of urine testing
proposed by the county.
Before an individual may invoke the protections of the Fourth
Amendment, he or she must have a reasonable or legitimate
expectation of privacy. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,
739, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 2579, 61 L.Ed.2d 220, 226 (1979).
Accordingly, we first examine the extent to which the
intrusion of drug testing, in the context of county
employment, compromises reasonable or legitimate expectations
of privacy. An expectation of privacy is "legitimate," in
Fourth Amendment terms, if (1) the individual actually
(subjectively) expects privacy; and (2) the individual's
subjective expectation of privacy is one which society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable. Smith v. Maryland, 442
U.S. at 740, 99 S.Ct. at 2580; Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 361, 88 S.Ct. 507, 516, 19 L.Ed.2d 576, 588 (1967).
A determination of whether county employees have an actual,
subjective expectation of privacy entails a subjective
evaluation of the intrusiveness of the urine test itself. At
least one court has found the urine test to involve a high
degree of bodily intrusion. Capua v. City of Plainfield,
643 F. Supp. at 1514. Other courts have not found the urine
tests to be so intrusive. Shoemaker v. Handel, 619 F. Supp.
at 1101, Aff'd 795 F.2d at 1142; Mack v. United States,
No. 85 Civ. 5764 slip op. at 6 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
In our view, the degree of intrusion engendered by a urine
test varies greatly depending upon the individual being
tested. However, we conclude that county employees as a group
have a cert ain degree of subjective expectation of privacy in
the act of urination. See McDonnell v. Hunter, 612
F.Supp. at 1127. The proposed testing program would,
therefore, interfere to some degree with the county employees'
subjective expectation of privacy.
We next consider whether this group's expectation of privacy
is one that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable"
under the Fourth Amendment. Whether an intrusion is
reasonable must be evaluated in the context of an individual's
place of employment. McDonnell v. Hunter, 612 F.Supp. at
1128. Since the county has never had a drug testing program,
it seems clear that, at least at the time of hiring, current
county employees had no reason to believe they would be
subjected to a urine test for drugs while on the job.
Furthermore, assuming an employee's job performance is
satisfactory, he or she would have little reason to expect an
investigation by the county into his or her personal life.
Therefore, we find the county employees' subjective
expectation of privacy to be reasonable.
In light of these personal privacy interests, we next examine
the governmental interests which could make such an intrusion
necessary. The county's interest which might justify the
testing of all county employees would be the desire to promote
efficiency by detecting those whose drug abuse poses a risk of
diminished job performance. However, the merits of the
county's efforts to assure that all county employees are free
from drug-induced impairments and capable of performing
their public service is not the issue to be decided. See
Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F.Supp. at 1516.
Rather, the question to be answered is whether the means
chosen by the county to achieve this laudable goal are
"reasonable" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Id. We are compelled to conclude that the county's
legitimate goal of achieving a drug-free work force does not
justify the use of a blanket drug testing program, as such a
program would violate the protections afforded an individual
under the Fourth Amendment. See National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab, 649 F.Supp. at 387;
Lovvorn V. City of Chattanooga, Tenn., 647 F.Supp.
at 881; Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F.Supp. at
1517.
It is our opinion that the Fourth Amendment allows the county
to demand urine of an employee "only on the basis of a
reasonable suspicion predicated upon specific facts and
reasonable inferences drawn from those facts in light of
experience." See Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643
F.Supp. at 1517; McDonnell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. at
1130. The reasonable suspicion standard requires
individualized suspicion, specifically directed to the person
who is targeted for the search. Capua v. City of
Plainfield, 643 F.Supp: at 1517. Stated another way, the
use of a "reasonable suspicion" standard allows testing if
there is a "reasonable, objective basis to suspect that a
urinalysis will produce evidence of an illegal drug use. . ."
Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005, 1009
(D.C.App. 1985).
Courts have frequently applied the "reasonable suspicion"
standard to the drug testing of public employees. In fact,
all courts which have ruled upon the validity of urine tests
for public employees have required as a prerequisite some
articulable basis for suspecting that the employee was using
illegal drugs, usually framed as "reasonable suspicion."
Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F.Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986)
(fire fighters); City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So.2d 1322
(Fla.App. 5 Dist. 1985) (police officers and fire
fighters); Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police, 500 A.2d
1005 (D.C.App. 1985) (police officers); McDonell v. Hunter,
612 F.Supp. 1122 (S.D.Iowa 1985) (correctional officers);
Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F.Supp. 482 (N.D.Ga. 1985)
(employees of City Board of Lights and Water working around
high voltage electric wires); Patchogue-Medford Congress of
Teachers v. Board of Education, 505 N.Y.S.2d 888 (N.Y.App.
Div. 1986) (teachers); Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F.Supp. 1500
(D.D.C. 1986) (school bus drivers); Caruso v. Ward, 506
N.Y.S.2d 789 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1986) (police officers in special
organized crime control bureau).
Most recently, the "reasonable suspicion" standard for the
drug testing of public employees was applied in a decision of
the district court for the eastern district of Tennessee,
Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, Tenn., 647 F.Supp.
875 (E.D. Tenn. 1986). The Lovvorn court, which
examined the validity of a mandatory drug testing plan for
city fire fighters, concluded that "while probable cause would
not be required for the city to conduct urine tests, the
balancing of the interest of the City and the individual
requires some quantum of individual suspicion before the tests
can be carried out." Id. at 880. The court denoted this
quantum as "reasonable suspicion."
While it is impossible to define "reasonable suspicion" in the
abstract, as a comparative matter "reasonable suspicion" is
less stringent than "probable cause," the traditional
prerequisite to a Fourth Amendment search and seizure. This
more relaxed standard is applied by the courts to persons who
have not entirely surrendered their Fourth Amendment rights,
but who nevertheless have a diminished expectation of
privacy. For example, the Lovvorn court applied this
standard to Chattanooga fire fighters because:
"While Chattanooga: fire fighters do not
entirely surrender their fourth amendment
rights when they become City employees,
they nevertheless as employees, as opposed
to the general citizenry, have a somewhat
diminished expectation of privacy. Allen
v. City of Marietta, 601 F.Supp. 482
(N.D.Ga. 1985); Turner v. Fraternal
Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005 (D.C.App.
1985); Mack v. United States, No. 85
Civ. 5764 slip op. at 7." 647 F.Supp.
at 880.
Two questions must be answered before a search may be found
"reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment. "First, one must
consider 'whether the . . . action was justified at its
inception,' . . . second, one must determine whether the
search as actually conducted 'was reasonably related in scope
to the circumstances which justify the interference in the
first place,' . . . ." Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga,
Tenn., 647 F.Supp. at 882, citing New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325, 340, 105 S.Ct. 733, 743, 83 L.Ed.2d 720, 734
(1985).
The drug testing plan proposed by Rawlins County does not
require any finding of "reasonable suspicion" by the employer
prior to the testing of an employee. In fact, the county has
failed to point tc any objective facts concerning deficient
job performance or physical or mental deficiencies on the part
of county employees which might lead to a finding of
"reasonable suspicion" upon which tests could be based.
Therefore, we find the proposed blanket testing program to be
unjustified at its inception, thus failing the first
requirement for a search to be "reasonable" under the Fourth
Amendment.
Furthermore, as stated above, the scope of a search, and the
measures adopted, must be reasonably related to its objectives
and not excessively intrusive. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469
U.S. at 341, 105 S.Ct. at 744, 83 L.Ed.2d at 735. Therefore,
if Rawlins County had objective facts indicating drug usage
by certain employees, such might be "reasonable suspicion" for
testing those employees. See Illionis v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). However, we
feel that testing all county employees, based upon specific
information related to a select few, would be beyond the
permissible scope of such tests. Therefore, the proposed
testing plan also fails the second requirement of a reasonable
search under the Fourth Amendment.
In light of our above observations, we find the mandatory drug
testing plan proposed by Rawlins County for all county
employees to be an unreasonable search within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment. While the goal of having county
employees free from drugs is legitimate, it is our opinion
that the means selected by the county to achieve this goal
violates the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, as well as § 15 of the Bill of Rights of the
Kansas Constitution.
A related question which you do not ask, but which we will
address, is whether applicants for county employment may be
subject to mandatory drug testing as part of the evaluation
process itself. Since the point of the application process is
for the prospective employer to learn facts pertinent to the
applicant's ability to perform the job, it is our opinion that
applicants are entitled to have relatively little overall
expectation of privacy about the hiring process. At the same
time, however, we recognize that applicants are entitled to an
expectation that their private affairs and bodily integrity
will not be searched for reasons unrelated to the needs of the
job for which they have applied.
In our view, the county's interest in requiring a drug test
for applicants turns on the link between drug abuse and job
requirements. Because the county's interest is in
ascertaining an applicant's fitness for a given job, wholesale
drug testing of all applicants, without regard to job
requirements, would violate the Fourth Amendment. However, we
see no Fourth Amendment barrier to drug testing if it is in
furtherance of a bona fide effort to learn whether an
applicant is physically capable of performing the duties of a
particular job. McDonnell v. Hunter, 612 F.Supp. at 1130
N.6. ("The Fourth Amendment . . . does not preclude taking a
body fluid specimen as part of a pre-employment physical
examination or as part of any routine periodic physical
examination that may be required of employees . . . .")
In light of McDonnell, it is our opinion that if the
physical requirements of a job are so demanding that employees
are required to take either an entry physical examination or
periodic physicals of which urinalysis is a routine
diagnostic component, there is no Fourth Amendment barrier to
testing the urine specimen for drugs. Id. In other words,
if drug abuse would prevent the performance of the duties of
the job or would present a danger to the public or to
property, an applicant may be tested to ascertain that abuse.
We note, however, that physical examinations of this kind
cannot be used as a mere pretext to conduct otherwise improper
drug testing.
This approach permits routine testing of all applicants for
public safety jobs. In our view, given the potential
consequences of drug-induced mistakes, the county has an
especially strong interest in assuring that those who are
responsible for maintaining the public safety are drug-free
and able to think clearly. Accordingly, because of the
obvious link between avoidance of drug abuse and job
requirements, we conclude that the Fourth Amendment balancing
test permits the county to require drug testing of all
applicants for public safety positions.
In regard to "public safety employees," it is impossible for
us to delineate in the abstract all types of "public safety"
jobs. The necessary line-drawing must be done by the
employer after consideration of the particular circumstances
involved. However, for purposes of this opinion, "public
safety employees" include public employees who are authorized
to carry firearms.
In summary, The Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution gives people the right to be free from
"unreasonable searches and seizures." Mandatory drug testing
of county employees, without regard to job performance, would
violate the Fourth Amendment prohibition against "unreasonable
searches and seizures." However, the testing of such an
employee is permissible if based upon "reasonable suspicion."
Therefore, there is no constitutional bar to the testing of a
county employee where circumstances give the employer a
reasonable, objective basis to suspect illicit drug use by
that employee.
Mandatory drug testing of applicants, without regard to job
requirements, would violate the Fourth Amendment. However,
testing of an applicant is permissible if it is in furtherance
of a bona fide effort to learn whether an applicant is
physically capable of performing the duties of a particular
job. Accordingly, mandatory drug testing of all applicants
for public safety positions is permissible.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEP AN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS
Barbara P. Allen
RTS:JLM:BPA:bas Assistant Attorney General

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