Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1987-037

1987-037Kanag

Testo completo

ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL. February 24, 1987
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 87- 37
Mr. Gary F. Caldwell
Clay County Sheriff
P.O. Box 115
Clay Center, KS 67432
Re: Counties and County Officers -- Sheriff -- Budget;
Limitation of Personnel Action
Counties and County Officers -- County
Commissioners; Powers and Duties -- Control Over
Expenditures
Public Health -- Alcoholism and Intoxication
Treatment -- County Alcohol and Drug Program
Synopsis: The general authority over county expenditures
vested in a board of county commissioners pursuant
to the county commissioner statutes (K.S.A. 19-212;
19-229) may be limited by competing statutory
provisions and the discretion which county
officials are entitled to exercise over
specifically allocated budget amounts.
A county may use funds raised under K.S.A. 65-4060
to purchase portable breath testers for
prescreening D.U.I. suspects, as D.U.I.
enforcement is a program the principal purpose of
which is related to the treatment and/or prevention
of alcohol or drug abuse. Cited herein: K.S.A.
1986 Supp. 8-1567; K.S.A. 19-212; K.S.A. 1986
Supp. 19-805; K.S.A. 65-4060; 79-2927; 79-2929a;
79-2934.
Dear Sheriff Caldwell:
As sheriff of Clay County, you request our opinion concerning
the relationship between the board of county commissioners and
the sheriff in regard to the sheriff's budget and county
personnel policies. For purposes of clarity, we will analyze
your various questions separately.
1) You first inquire as to whether the board of county
commissioners can reserve the right to grant prior approval
for purchases over $200 when the amount is provided for within
the previously approved budget. Your inquiry relates to the
proper interpretation of K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 19-805(c), which
provides:
"The sheriff shall submit a budget for the
financing of the operation of the
sheriff's office to the board of county
commissioners for their approval."
The authority and responsibility for the control of county
expenditures is clearly vested in the board of county
commissioners. K.S.A. 19-212 provides in part:
"The board of county commissioners of each
county shall have the power, at any
meeting:
"Second. To examine and settle all
accounts of the receipts and expenses of
the county, and to examine and settle and
allow all accounts chargeable against the
county; and when so settled, they may
.issue county orders therefor, as provided
by law.
"Sixth. To represent the county and
have the care of the county property, and
the management of the business and
concerns of the county, in all cases where
no other provision is made by law."
In addition, K.S.A. 19-229 provides:
"The boards of county commissioners of the
several counties of this state shall have
exclusive control of all expenditures
accruing, either in the publication of the
delinquent tax lists, treasurer's notices,
county printing, or any other county
expenditures." (Emphasis added).
A review of these statutes, along with a Kansas Supreme Court
decision and several previous opinions of this office, leads
one to conclude that little remains outside the scope of the
county commission's power regarding financial matters of the
county. See Attorney General Opinion No. 82-85 and
Hackler v. Board of County Commissioners, 189 Kan. 697,
698 (1962). However, while the board of county commissioners
possesses broad powers over county expenditures, these powers
are not without limitation. See Attorney General Opinions
No. 80-69; 84-53; 86-166.
Opinion No. 80-69 found that as a general rule the board of
county commissioners is vested with the authority and
responsibility for overseeing the expenditure of county
funds. However, the opinion also noted that an exception to
the general rule exists when the expenditure or obligation is
necessary in order for an elected official to carry out his
or her statutorily imposed duties or obligations.
Therefore, Opinion No. 80-69 concluded that while the
commission's general authority over county expenditures
prevails in the area of optional or discretionary
expenditures, circumstances may exist where the general rule
must give way to competing statutory provisions which require
expenditure of county funds. Accordingly, determining the
nature of the expenditure is crucial in deciding whether it
is necessary to obtain the prior approval of the commission
before expending county funds.
In Attorney General Opinion No. 84-53, we were asked whether
the language in K.S.A. 19-805(b) limits the general authority
of county commissioners regarding the expenditure of county
funds. After reviewing the conclusions reached in Opinion No.
80-69, Opinion No. 84-53 found that a sheriff's authority
under subsection (b) to attend or require attendance at
meetings or seminars which are deemed beneficial to the
operations of the office does not entirely fit into either the
"directly necessary" or "discretionary" category.
Attorney General Opinion No. 86-166 concurred with the
conclusions reached in Opinions No. 80-69 and 84-53. We
concluded that in light of our earlier interpretation that
funds expended by a sheriff under K.S.A. 1986 Supp.
19-805(b) are neither "directly necessary" nor
"discretionary," a policy of "shared discretion" (i.e. a grant
of limited authority regarding expenditures from the board of
county commissioners to the official) is both appropriate and
required by the terms of K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 19-805(b).
Since your inquiry relates to prior approval by the board of
county commissioners of all items purchased by the sheriff
which cost more than $200, it is impossible for us to
determine the nature of each expenditure for which the
commissioners wish to require prior approval. As a general
rule, if the expenditure is optional or discretionary, the
commissioner's general authority over county expenditures will
prevail, and the commission can reserve the right to grant
prior approval for items purchased with the sheriff's budget.
Alternatively, if the expenditure is necessary for the sheriff
to carry out his or her statutorily imposed duties (see,
e.g., K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 74-5607a), the general rule must
give way to competing statutory provisions which require
expenditure of county funds, and the commission will be
prohibited from requiring prior approval. See Attorney
General Opinion No. 80-69.
We recognize that many expenditures by the sheriff's office do
not entirely fit into either the "directly necessary" or
"discretionary" category, as they may be . important to the
efficient operation of the sheriff's office even though they
are not "necessary" in the strict sense of the word.
Therefore, we once again recommend the policy of "shared
discretion" described in previous opinions of this office.
See Attorney General Opinions No. 80-69; 84-53; 86-166.
Shared discretion could effectively reconcile the competing
interests of the county commissioners and the sheriff under
K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 19-805. If the commission would approve a
specific sum for every line item in each annual budget, there
would be no need for the sheriff to seek approval from the
commission before expending such sums. Thus, the sheriff
would retain authority to manage his or her office, while the
county commissioners would retain annual budget control and
consequently, the overall fiscal management of the county.
In our opinion, a sheriff must have control over the funds
allocated to his or her office by the county commission in
order to effectively perform his or her job. If the
commissioners approve a budget in general terms which does not
include specific sums for each line item and then require
prior approval before the sheriff may expend money for any
item over $200, the grant of authority to the sheriff found in
K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 19-805 is effectively cancelled. In that
we do not believe this was the intention of the legislature,
it is our opinion that the only means of reconciling the
competing interests of the sheriff and the commissioners in
regard to funds expended in the sheriff's budget is through
the policy of "shared discretion" described above.
2) You next ask under what circumstances during the fiscal
year can the county commissioners take away spending authority
granted by the budget. Responding to this question
necessarily involves an examination of the Budget Law, K.S.A.
79-2925 et seq.
K.S.A. 79-2927 requires the governing body of each taxing
subdivision or municipality to formulate a budget annually.
If a governing body which is subject to the Budget Law wishes
to amend its adopted current budget during the year in which
such budget is in effect, K.S.A. 79-2929a requires it to be
subject to the same publication, notice and public hearing
requirements required by K.S.A. 79-2929. That statute
provides in part:
"Prior to the filing of the adopted budget
with the county clerk, the governing body
of each taxing or political subdivision or
municipality shall meet for the purpose of
answering and hearing objections of
taxpayers relating-to the proposed budget
and for the purpose of considering
amendments to such proposed budget. The
governing body shall give at least 10
days' notice of the time and place of the
meeting by publication in a weekly or
daily newspaper of the county having a
general circulation therein. Such notice
shall include the proposed budget and
shall set out all essential items in the
budget except such groupings as
designated by the director of accounts and
reports on a special publication form
prescribed by the director of accounts and
reports and furnished with the regular
budget form." (Emphasis added).
After examining the Budget Law, Attorney General Opinion No.
85-147 determined that the board of county commissioners could
reduce the salary of a county attorney if it first followed
the publication, notice, and hearing requirements of K.S.A.
79-2929a. Likewise, it is our opinion that the board of
county commissioners has been granted the power under the
county commissioner statutes (K.S.A. 19-212; 19-229) to alter
the approved budget of the sheriff, thus taking away spending
authority granted by that budget, as long as it follows the
procedures to amend the budget set forth in K.S.A. 79-2929a.
3) Your third question concerns whether the sheriff needs
county approval to hire additional staff if the budget
permits. K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 19-805(a) empowers the sheriff
of each county "to appoint, promote, demote and dismiss
additional deputies and assistants necessary to carry out the
duties of the office," while K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 19-805(d)(4)
states that any personnel action taken by the sheriff shall be
subject to "the budget for the financing of the operation of
the sheriff's office as approved by the board of county
commissioners." Therefore, the statute gives the sheriff
hiring power, subject to the limitation that any expenditures
made in this regard stay within the budget for the sheriff's
office as approved by the county commissioners.
In Attorney General Opinion No. 87-14, we concluded "that once
a board of county commissioners has designated county funds to
a particular line item within the sheriff's budget, the
sheriff has the authority to spend those funds for that line
item as he or she sees fit." However, in light of the
limitation in K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 19-805(d)(4), as well as the
county commissioner statutes which vest authority and
responsibility for the control of county expenditures in the
board of county commissioners, we also concluded that the
sheriff may not transfer monies from one line item to another
without the consent of the county commission.
We concur with Attorney General Opinion No. 87-14, and
reemphasize that once a board of county commissioners has
designated county funds to a particular line item within the
sheriff's budget, the sheriff has the authority to spend those
funds for that line item as he or she sees fit. If a county
were to specifically designate a certain amount of funds for
each line item in the sheriff's budget, it would be following
our recommendation fora policy of "shared discretion"
described earlier in this opinion. (See question no. 1) A
specific amount allotted to the sheriff for salaries and wages
would automatically reconcile the competing interests of the
county commissioners and the sheriff. The sheriff could
exercise the grant of authority for hiring additional staff
within his or her budget found in K.S.A. 1986 Supp.
19-805(a), while the commissioners would retain their grant of
authority over personnel action taken by the sheriff, via the
budget, found in K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 19-805(d)(4).
We believe that the legislature intended to subject the
sheriff's hiring practices to the commission's approval only
with regard to budgetary limitations. Thus, theoretically,
the sheriff should be free to hire additional staff without
the commission's prior approval, as long as he or she does not
exceed his or her budget for a given year. However, in light
of our previous interpretation of K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 19-805
and relevant county commissioner statutes, we recognize that
the commission may require prior approval of all expenditures
by the sheriff's office (including additional staff), unless
the commissioners have chosen to implement a policy f "shared
discretion."
4) You next ask what type of county work rules the county
commission may require of elected officers, and whether,
within budget limitations, a sheriff can establish different
pay scales within his office without prior board approval.
K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 19-101a grants the board of county
commissioners the power to "transact all county business and
perform all powers of local legislation and administration it
deems appropriate," and thereby authorizes the commission to
deal with all personnel matters involving county officers and
employees. See Attorney General Opinion No. 79-264. This
power is, of course, subject - to acts of the legislature which
apply uniformly to all counties. K.S.A. 1986 Supp.
19-101a(1).
The adoption of county personnel policies and pay plans is
clearly a matter of "county business." Therefore, subject to
uniform state laws, it is our opinion that the board of county
commissioners is authorized to enact both legislative and
administrative standards and directives governing the
personnel policies of the county. Said policies could apply
to both elected county officials and to county employees. For
example, the board is authorized to determine the number of
persons to be employed in the offices of other county elected
offices, to fix the compensation of officers and their
employees, to prescribe the operating hours of the county
officers and their employees [see Whitmer v. House, 198
Kan. 629 (1967)), and to prescribe other conditions of
employment such as sick leave policies and rules concerning
absenteeism. See Attorney General Opinion No. 77-113.
To answer your question on pay scales, we refer once again to
K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 19-605(d). The subsection provides:
"Any personnel action taken by the sheriff
under this section shall be subject to the
following: (1) Personnel policies and
procedures established by the board f
county commissioners for all county
employees other than elected officials;
(2) any pay plan established by the board
of county commissioners for all county
employees other than elected officials;
(3) any applicable collective bargaining
agreements or civil service system; and
(4) the budget for the financing of the
operation of the sheriff's office as
approved by the board of county
commissioners."
This language clearly states that any personnel action taken
by the sheriff under this section shall be subject to county
personnel policies and pay plans established by the board of
county commissioners for all county employees except elected
officials. In the absence of personnel policies or agreements
affecting personnel, it is our opinion that a sheriff can
establish different pay scales for positions within his office
without the prior approval of the board of county
commissioners, as long as the sheriff stays within the budget
allocated to his office by the commissioners. See also
Attorney General Opinion No. 84-30.
5) You next ask whether property acquired with funds in the
sheriff's budget is subject to transfer by the commission to
other county offices.
K.S.A. 19-1212 provides in part:
"The board of county commissioners f each
county shall have the power, at any
meeting:
"Sixth. To represent the county and
have the care f the county property, and
the management f the business and
concerns of the county, in all cases where
no other provision is made by law."
(Emphasis added).
As noted previously in this and other Attorney General
Opinions, the statutory powers f the board of county
commissioners over county expenditures are broad, but they are
not without limitation. See Attorney General Opinions No.
80-69; 84-53; 86-166; 87-14.
In Opinion No. 87-14, we articulated the general proposition
that "once the commissioners have approved funds within an
officer's budget for a particular purpose (i.e. personnel),
the officer may spend the funds for that purpose as he or
she sees fit."
In light of the competing interests of the county
commissioners and the sheriff in regard to county property
purchased with funds in the sheriff's budget, we feel this
question can best be answered by looking at whether the
commissioners have chosen to implement a policy of "shared
discretion" in the county for management of the sheriff's
budget. If the board of county commissioner has specifically
approved a line item amount for equipment in the sheriff's
budget, we believe the commissioners would be overreaching
their statutory powers regarding the financial matters of the
county if they attempted to transfer equipment in the
sheriff's office purchased with line item "equipment" funds to
another county office. On the other hand, if the board of
county commissioners has approved the sheriff's budget in
general terms only, we recognize that the commissioners would
have the authority, via their general powers over county
expenditures and specifically over the care of county property
(K.S.A. 19-212; 19-229), to transfer equipment in the
sheriff's office purchased with general funds to other county
offices.
6) Finally, you ask in a separate letter whether the purchase
of portable breath testers for prescreening D.U.I. suspects
is within the spirit of K.S.A. 65-4060, which establishes a
fund under the board of county commissioners' control for use
in drug and alcohol education and intervention programs. You
inform us that the Clay County Attorney has ruled that
previous purchases of an intoxilyzer breath tester and a
video tape system were proper, under the assumption that
D.U.I. enforcement is an intervention program and that, under
K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 8-1567, it is often the first step in
placing someone in a treatment program.
K.S.A. 65-4060, the statute which provides a procedure by
which the board of county commissioners may create special
county alcohol and drug programs, states at subsection (d):
"All moneys received pursuant to this
act shall be deposited in a special
alcohol and drug programs fund which shall
be under the direction and control of the
board of county commissioners and shall
be expended only for the purchase,
establishment, maintenance or expansion of
services or programs whose principal
purpose is alcoholism and drug abuse
prevention and education, alcohol and drug
detoxification, intervention in alcohol
and drug abuse, treatment of persons who
are alcoholics or drug abusers or are in
danger of becoming alcoholics or drug
abusers and rehabilitation of the family
of persons who are alcoholics or drug
abusers or are in danger of becoming
alcoholics or drug abusers." (Emphasis
added).
Thus, subsection (d) specifically limits the use of moneys
received pursuant to K.S.A. 65-4060 to services or programs
whose principal purpose is related to the treatment and/or
prevention of alcohol or drug abuse.
K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 8-1567(d)(2) provides that, upon a first
conviction of a D.U.I. offense, the court shall enter an order
which:
"requires that the person enroll in and
successfully complete an alcohol and drug
safety action program or a treatment
program as provided in K.S.A. 8-1008 and
amendments thereto, or both the education
and treatment programs."
Since a D.U.I. offender must first be convicted before he or
she must enroll in an appropriate education and/or treatment
program, and D.U.I. enforcement equipment assists the
arresting officer in gathering evidence sufficient to convict,
it is our opinion that acquisition f the aforementioned
equipment would fall within the parameters of the expenditure
limitations specified in K.S.A. 65-4060 for funds raised under
that act. Accordingly, in our opinion, the portable breath
testers can be purchased with funds accumulated under K.S.A.
65-4060.
In summary, the general authority over county expenditures
vested in a board of county commissioners pursuant to the
county commissioner statutes (K.S.A. 19-212; 19-229) may be
limited by competing statutory provisions and the discretion
which county officials are entitled to exercise over
specifically allocated budget amounts.
A county may use funds raised under K.S.A. 65-4060 to purchase
portable breath testers for prescreening D.U.I. suspects, as
D.U.I. enforcement is a program the principal purpose f which
is related to the treatment and/or prevention of alcohol or
drug abuse. Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS
Barbara P. Allen
Assistant Attorney General
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