Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1987-026

1987-026Kanag

Testo completo

ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL February 9, 1987
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 87- 26
John Lamb, Director
Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control
Kansas Department of Revenue
700 Jackson, 2nd Floor
Topeka, Kansas 66612
Re: Intoxicating Liquors and Beverages--Miscellaneous
Provisions--Minimum Markups
Synopsis: In 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, the Supreme Court
of the United States held that the State of New
York's statutory scheme for maintenance and control
of retail liquor prices was in violation of Section
1 of the Sherman Act. The Court also held that New
York's pricing system would not be saved under the
"state-action exemption" from the antitrust laws
(due to the fact that the state did not actively
supervise the pricing system) or the Twenty-first
Amendment to the United States Constitution
(because the asserted state interests were not
substantiated and did not suffice to afford such
immunity).
In Kansas, distributors are to file current bottle
and case prices with the Director of the Division
of Alcoholic Beverage Control. The Alcoholic
Beverage Control Board is required to establish a
minimum markup to be added on to the bottle price
on file at the time of retail sale. The Board does
not regulate the prices posted by distributors and
has not adjusted the markup percentage for
distilled spirits for approximately ten years.
The pricing system for alcoholic liquor sales in
Kansas is so closely aligned with that of New York
that it too is in violation of antitrust laws. As
a practical matter, prices are set by private
industry and the State does not "actively"
supervise the pricing system. Additionally, the
United States Supreme Court held that
unsubstantiated claims that the system promotes
temperance and protects small liquor retailers are
not sufficient to afford immunity under the
Twenty-first Amendment. Cited herein: K.S.A.
41-1101; 41-1111; 41-1114; 41-1115; 41-1116;
41-1117; 41-1118; K.A.R. 13-4-2; 15 U.S.C. §1.
Dear Mr. Lamb:
As Director of the Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control
(ABC) for the State of Kansas, you request our opinion
concerning §1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §1. Specifically,
you are concerned with the "minimum markup" pricing system for
alcoholic beverages and the enforcement of current Kansas law.
On January 13, 1987, the United States Supreme Court issued
324 Liquor Corp. d/b/a Yorkshire Wine & Spirits v. Duffy,
et al., No. 84-2022, U.S. , 107 S.Ct. 720, 55
U.S.L.W. 4094 (1987). The Court held that §101-bb of the
New York Alcoholic Beverage Control Law was inconsistent with
§1 of the Sherman Act.
Section 101-b(3) of the New York law provides, in part:
"No brand of liquor or wine shall be sold
to or purchased by a retailer unless a
schedule, as provided by this section, is
filed with the liquor authority, and is
then in effect."
Section 101-bb(2) provides, in part:
"No licensee authorized to sell liquor at
retail for off-premises consumption
shall sell, offer-to sell, solicit an
order for or advertise any item of liquor
at a price which is less than cost. As
used in this section, the term:
"(b) 'cost' shall mean the price of such
item of liquor to the retailer plus twelve
percentum of such price, which is
declared as a matter of legislative
determination to represent the average
minimum overhead necessarily incurred in
connection with the sale by the retailer
of such item of liquor."
"Price," in turn, is defined as the posted bottle price in
effect at the time the retailer sells the item. §101-bb(2).
The Court determined that these statutes were invalid because
they "mandated resale price maintenance, an activity that
has long been regarded as a per se violation of the
Sherman Act." Duffy, No. 84-2022 at 6, citing Rice v.
Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 102 S.Ct. 3294, 73 L.Ed.2d
1042 (1982) (emphasis in original). Therefore, it was held
that the retail price maintenance scheme under the New York
statutes could not be legal unless the scheme met the
requirement for state-action immunity from federal antitrust
laws, or was a protected exercise of the state's right to
regulate alcoholic beverages under the Twenty-first Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States.
The Court found that the New York statutes did not meet the
requirements for state-action immunity because the liquor
pricing system was not actively supervised by the state.
Duffy, supra, at 7. Further, New York's statutes were
held not to be protected under the Twenty-first Amendment
because New York's asserted, and unsubstantiated, state
interests were not sufficient to override the policies of the
Sherman Act. Id. at 16.
The Kansas statutes in question provide as follows:
"No retailer licensed under this act shall
purchase any alcoholic liquor from any
distributor licensed under this act unless
the distributor files with the director
[of the division of alcoholic beverage
control] a written statement sworn to by
the distributor, or in case of a
corporation by one of its principal
officers, agreeing . . . to file price
lists showing the current bottle and case
price in the office of the director as
often as may be necessary or required by
the director but at least once each three
months. . . ." K.S.A. 41-1101(b);
and
"No retailer shall sell, directly or
indirectly, any alcoholic liquor at less
than its current posted bottle cost plus
minimum mark-up without first having
obtained from the director a permit so to
do. . . ." K.S.A. 41-1117(2). [This
statute proceeds to outline the situations
in which the director may grant a permit
to sell other than at posted-price plus
mark-up. These exceptions are not
relevant to our present inquiry.]
This portion of Kansas' law is virtually identical to that of
New York cited above. The distributors post the prices and
mandatory markup is based on the posted bottle price. Thus,
the Kansas statutory scheme for regulating retail liquor
prices, like the New York law, establishes a system of resale
price maintenance that would violate the antitrust laws in the
absence of state-action immunity or a valid Twenty-first
Amendment justification.
In considering whether the New York statues met the
requirement for state-action immunity from federal antitrust
laws, the Court stated as follows:
"Our decisions have established a
two-part test for determining immunity
under Parker v. Brown, [317 U.S. 341
(1943)]. 'First, the challenged restraint
must be "one clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed as state policy";
second, the policy must be "actively
supervised" by the State itself.'
California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn.
v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., supra, at
105 [quoting City of Lafayette v.
Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S.
389, 410 (1978) (plurality opinion)]. New
York's liquor pricing system meets the
first requirement. The state legislature
clearly has adopted a policy of resale
price maintenance. Just as clearly,
however, New York's liquor pricing system
is not actively supervised by the State.
As in Midcal, the State 'simply
authorizes price setting and enforces the
prices established by private parties.'
445 U.S., at 105. New York 'neither
establishes prices nor reviews the
reasonableness of the price schedules.'
Ibid. New York 'does not monitor market
conditions or engage in any "pointed
reexamination" of the program.' Id., at
106 [quoting Bates v. State Bar of
Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 362 (1977)]. Each
wholesaler sets its own 'posted' prices;
the State does not control
month-to-month variations in posted
prices. Nor does the State supervise the
wholesaler's decision to 'post off,' the
amount of the 'post off,' the
corresponding decrease, if any, in the
bottle price, or the frequency with which
a wholesaler posts off. The State has
displaced competition among liquor
retailers without substituting an adequate
system of regulation. 'The national
policy in favor of competition cannot be
thwarted by casting such a gauzy cloak of
state involvement over what is essentially
a private price-fixing arrangement.'
445 U.S., at 106." Duffy, No.
84-2022, at 7, 8, 9.
Of importance to our present inquiry, and in comparing the law
struck down in Duffy to Kansas law, is footnote six of the
opinion:
"A simple 'minimum markup' statute
requiring retailers to charge 112 percent
of their actual wholesale cost may satisfy
the 'active supervision' requirement, and
so be exempt from the antitrust laws under
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
See Morgan v. Division of Liquor
Control, 664 F. 2d 353 (CA2 1981)
(upholding a simple markup statute).
Section 101-bb, however, is not a simple
minimum markup statute because it imposes
a markup on the 'posted bottle price,' a
price that may greatly exceed what the
retailer actually paid for the liquor. As
we have explained, supra, at 3-4,
Bulletin 471 permits wholesalers to reduce
the case price--the price actually paid by
most retailers--without reducing the
bottle price. The New York Court of
appeals expressly held that Bulletin 471
'is consistent with Alcoholic Beverage
Control Law §101-b(3) which does not
mandate any price ratio between scheduled
case and bottle prices.' J.A.J. Liquor
Store v. New York State Liquor Auth.,
supra, at 523, 479 N.E.2d, at 790. We
may not 'construe a state statute contrary
to the construction given it by the
highest court of a State.' O'Brien v.
Skinner, 414 U.S. 524, 531 (1974).
Appellees nevertheless argue that
invalidation of Bulletin 471 does not
require invalidation of §101-bb.
Appellees contend that §101-bb does not
prevent the SLA from establishing a
relationship between case price and bottle
price; indeed, Rule 16.4(e) establishes
such a relationship. Brief for Appellees
24-25 n. 37. Invalidation of Bulletin 471
alone, however, would not prevent
wholesalers from selling large quantities
at low prices in one month, and then
requiring retailers to charge abnormally
high markups by raising bottle prices in
subsequent months. See supra, at 3. We
cannot accept appellees' suggestion that
such unsupervised price fixing should be
tolerated as a reasonable accounting
method or as a hedge against inflation.
See App. to Juris. Statement 101A
(advertising a guaranteed 31.3 percent
markup on liquor purchase din August, 1984
and sold in September, 1984). We thus
have no occasion to consider whether a
simple minimum statue would be entitled to
antitrust immunity under Parker v. Brown.
"Some States completely control the
distribution of liquor within their
boundaries. E.g., Va. Code §§4-15,
4-28 (1983). Such comprehensive
regulation is immune under Parker v.
Brown because the State substitutes its
own power for 'unfettered business
freedom.' See New Motor Vehicle Bd. of
Cal. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S.
96, 109 (1978." Duffy, supra at 7,
8.
As with the New York law, K.S.A. 41-1111(b) clearly
articulates Kansas' policy "that minimum markups on alcoholic
liquor sold by retailers licensed in this state should be
determined and regulated by law," thereby satisfying the first
part of the Parker v. Brown test by affirmatively expressing
the State's policy of restraining price competition. The
second part of the test, whether Kansas law would meet the
requirements of state-action immunity, hinges upon whether
the State's policy is "actively supervised" by the State
itself.
Kansas statutes, and rules and regulations promulgated under
the authority of those statutes, provide a mechanism by which
the State can establish the minimum markup rate and adjust
that rate over time. K.S.A. 41-1114; 41-1115; 41-1116;
41-1117; 41-1118; K.A.R. 13-4-2. The alcoholic beverage
control board meets quarterly to review the minimum percentage
markup. K.S.A. 41-1117(1). You have informed us, however,
that only one adjustment has been made to the minimum markup
percentage for specialties and wines since February 28, 1983,
and that the markup percentage for distilled spirits has
remained unchanged for approximately ten years. In footnote 7
of the Duffy opinion, the Court stated that "neither the
'monitoring' by the SLA, nor the periodic reexaminations by
the State Legislature, exerts any significant control over
retail liquor prices or markups." Duffy, supra at 9
(footnote 7). We must conclude, therefore, that though a
mechanism does exist by which the State could control the
minimum markup percentages, as a practical matter the State
has not actively done so.
Further, adjustment of the minimum markup percentages does not
guarantee control over ultimate prices. Under Kansas law, as
under the stricken New York law, wholesale distributors are
required to file their current bottle and case prices with the
regulatory agency (in Kansas, the ABC) and to sell their
products at such prices to all retailers in the State without
discrimination. K.S.A. 41-1101(b). The established minimum
markup is then applied to the "posted" bottle price.
Distributors are free to change case and bottle prices "as
often as may be necessary . . . but at least once each three
months" by filing new price lists with the director. It is
our understanding that case prices can be changed without a
corresponding change in the bottle price. As a result, both
the retail price and the margins received by retailers who buy
in case lots can be changed by the distributors by simply
filing new bottle price lists. Similarly, distributors may
control retail price and the margins received by retailers by
selling to retailers at one bottle price in one month, and
then raising the "posted" bottle price in the following month
when the retail sale takes place. This is because retailers
must sell at the bottle price posted at the time of retail
sale (plus markup) rather than at actual price plus markup.
These are exactly the two problems discussed by the Duffy
Court in footnote 6 (quoted above). Even with the ability to
adjust markup percentages the State would be hard put to keep
up with fluctuation in posted prices. Since, as a practical
matter, it is private industry which sets the prices rather
than the State itself, the statutory scheme for maintenance
and control of retail liquor prices in Kansas does not meet
the second prong of the state-action immunity test.
According to the Supreme Court decision rendered in Duffy,
Kansas law is not made valid under the Twenty-first Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States either.
"Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment
reserves to the States the power to
regulate, or prohibit entirely, the
transportation or importation of
intoxicating liquor within their borders.
Section 2 'grants the State virtually
complete control over whether to permit
importation or sale of liquor and how to
structure the liquor distribution
system.' Midcal, 445 U.S., at 110.
The States' Twenty-first Amendment powers,
though broad, are circumscribed by other
provisions of the Constitution. See
Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459
U.S. 116, 122, n. 5 (1982) (Establishment
Clause); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
204-209 (1976) (Equal Protection Clause);
Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S.
433, 436 (1971) (procedural due process);
Department of Revenue v. James Beam Co.,
377 U.S. 341, 345-346 (1964)
(Export-Import Clause). Although §2
directly qualifies the federal commerce
power, the Court has rejected the view
'that the Twenty-first amendment has
somehow operated to "repeal" the Commerce
Clause wherever regulation of intoxicating
liquors is concerned.' Hostetter v.
Idlewild Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324,
331-332 (1964). Instead, the Court has
engaged in a 'pragmatic effort to
harmonize state and federal powers.'
Midcal, supra, at 109. The question
in each case is 'whether the interests
implicated by a state regulation are so
closely related to the powers reserved by
the Twenty-first Amendment that the
regulation may prevail, notwithstanding
that its requirements directly conflict
with express federal policies.' Capital
Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S.
691, 714 (1984)." Duffy, supra at
9, 10, 11.
The Court held that New York's asserted interests in
protecting the economic position of small liquor retailers and
promoting temperance, particularly when unsubstantiated, did
not suffice to afford immunity from the Sherman Act under the
Twenty-first Amendment. [It is interesting to note that
studies cited by the New York court concluded that higher
prices do not decrease consumption of liquor. J.A.J. Liquor
Store v. New York State Liquor Auth., 479 N.E.2d 779, 788,
n. 2 (N.Y. 1985), citing Moreland Commission Report No. 1,
at 3, 17.] K.S.A. 41-1111 sets forth the State's interest as
promoting the orderly sale and distribution of alcoholic
liquor, fostering temperance and promoting the public
welfare. Again, without proof that these interests are
furthered by the price maintenance system now in place in
Kansas, they are not sufficient justification to immunize the
State from federal antitrust laws.
In conclusion, the pricing system for alcoholic liquor sales
in Kansas is so closely aligned with that of New York which
was struck down in 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy that it too
is in violation of antitrust laws.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
JuleneL.Miller
Deputy Attorney General
RTS:JLM:jm

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