Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1987-008

1987-008Kanag

Testo completo

ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
January 16, 1987
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 87- 8
The Honorable Phil Martin
State Senator, Thirteenth District
Room 564-N, State Capitol
Topeka, Kansas 66612
Re: Constitution of the State of Kansas--Constitutional
Amendment and Revision--Proposals by Legislature;
Approval by Electors; Reclassification
Taxation--Property Valuation, Equalizing
Assessments, Appraisers and Assessment of
Property--Statewide Reappraisal of Real Property
Synopsis: Pursuant to Article 14, Section 1 of the Kansas
Constitution, the legislature submitted a
constitutional amendment to a vote of the electors
of Kansas by means of a concurrent resolution
passed by both houses. The constitutional
amendment passed and requires that classification
be implemented on January 1, 1989. Regardless of
the interrelationship between the ongoing
reappraisal process and the implementation date of
the classification scheme, there is no legal basis
to delay the classification amendment date. Cited
herein: K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 79-1476; L. 1985, ch.
364; Kansas Constitution, Art. 14, §1.
Dear Senator Martin:
You have requested our opinion concerning the interdependence
of the completion date of the ongoing reappraisal process
(K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 79-1476) and the implementation date of the
property classification for taxation purposes amendment (1985
House Concurrent Resolution No. 5018, L. 1985, ch. 364) to
the Kansas Constitution. Specifically, you inquire whether
the classification scheme, to be implemented on January 1,
1989, will be delayed if the reappraisal process is not
completed by the statutorily required date of January 1, 1989.
Though under differing circumstances, this subject has been
addressed in Attorney General Opinion No. 85-110. In that
opinion a member of the Kearney County Board of
Commissioners was concerned that the resources of the counties
might not be up to the task of completing reappraisal by the
statutorily required date of January 1, 1989, which in turn
would create problems with implementing the new system of
classification to become effective January 1, 1989. The
request therefore inquired whether the 1986 Legislature could
amend 1985 House Concurrent Resolution No. 5018, dealing with
classification, to eliminate the specific deadline and replace
it with wording designed to implement classification only upon
completion of reappraisal. Our office concluded that the
legislature could, by two-thirds affirmative vote, alter the
terms of the proposed classification amendment contained in
Chapter 364 of the 1985 Session Laws, in accordance with the
procedure in Article 14, Section 1 of the Kansas Constitution.
However, the legislature did not address any changes to be
made to the proposed classification amendment during the 1986
legislative session. Senate and House Action Report, 1986.
Thus, the proposed classification amendment was submitted to
and passed by voters with the effective date of January 1,
1989. The result of the legislature's action, or the lack
thereof, indicates that the legislature's intent was to make
classification effective January 1, 1989 upon voter approval
of the constitutional amendment.
The legislature is but a conduit to changing the constitution,
since it is the voters who make the ultimate decision.
Prohibitory Amendment Cases, 24 Kan. *700, *712 (1881).
The role of the legislature in placing a constitutional
question before the voters was discussed in the Prohibitory
Amendment Cases:
"Again, in constitutional changes the
popular voice is the paramount act. While
to guard against undue haste and temporary
excitement, to prevent unnecessary and
frequent appeals for constitutional
amendments, the assent of two-thirds of
the legislature is prescribed as a
condition precedent, yet after all, that
which determines constitutional changes is
the popular will. This is a government by
the people, and whenever the clear voice
of the people is heard, legislatures and
courts must obey." 24 Kan. at *711.
See also Moore v. Shanahan, 207
Kan. 645, 651 (1971).
Alternatively, the people cannot alter, change, or modify a
proposed amendment as agreed to by the legislature and
submitted to the popular vote. The people must accept or
reject the amendment as submitted. 16 C.J.S. Constitutional
Law §14 (1984). See Kan. Const., Art. 14, §1; State
ex rel. v. Sessions, 87 Kan. 497, 501 (1912) ("The right [of
the legislature] to determine what form a proposed amendment
on a particular subject shall take implies the right to reject
a proposal submitted at a former session, and this implies the
right to control absolutely the matter of amendment to be
submitted at the ensuing election.") The combined action of
the legislature and the electorate resulted in an amendment to
the Kansas Constitution. Such an amendment can be changed
only by the constitutionally prescribed procedure for amending
the Constitution. Kansas Const., Art. 14, §1.
An examination of the legislative history closely ties
classification to reappraisal. Report on the Kansas
Legislative Interim Studies to the 1979 Legislature pp.
72-73; Report on the Kansas Legislative Interim Studies to
the 1980 Legislature, Special Committee, pp. 31-32;
Report on the Kansas Legislative Interim Studies to the 1982
Legislature, Special Committee, p. 46; Report on the Kansas
Legislative Interim Studies to the 1986 Legislature, p. 41.
However, in adopting an effective date for classification the
legislature clearly intended that the voters determine when
classification would come into effect. We cannot conclude
from the inclusion of a specific date that the action of the
legislature in presenting the issue in this fashion is somehow
unconstitutional, or that the voters cannot approve it in this
format.
The state constitution is the paramount and fundamental law of
Kansas and limits the powers of the people's government,
rather than conferring such powers. Kansas Bill of rights,
§§2, 20; Lemons v. Noller, 144 Kan. 813, 816-17 (1936);
Atkinson v. Woodmansee, 68 Kan. 71 (1904);
Prohibitory Amendment Cases, 24 Kan. *700, *711-12
(1881). Accordingly, while a statute may be found to be
inconsistent with the grant of power made by the people to the
legislature, a constitutional amendment cannot be
unconstitutional, unless the procedures used in adopting it
themselves contravene those set forth in the constitution for
such amendments [Kansas Constitution, Article 14, Section 1;
Moore v. Shanahan, 207 Kan. 645, 651-55 (1971)1, or the
amendment is in conflict with the United States Constitution
or the Federal Bill of Rights. Van Sickle v. Shanahan,
212 Kan. 426, 449-51 (1973). In such cases, the proposition
submitting the amendment to the people is void, and the
election is of no effect. Moore, supra. Although you did
not inquire about the propriety of the procedures used to
adopt the concurrent resolution, we know of no defect along
these lines which would nullify it and so vitiate the results
of the election.
The Supreme Court of Kansas has addressed the question of the
inclusion of a time or mode of proceeding included in a
constitutional provision in State, ex rel. v. Sessions, 87
Kan. 497 (1912). The case dealt with a question of whether
a resolution adopted by the legislature in 1904 and not
submitted to the voters at the next election could be
submitted at a later date. The court held it could not. In
discussing the issue of whether a constitutional provision
could be held directory rather than mandatory the court,
quoting from Cooley's Const. Lim., 7th ed., states:
"But the courts tread upon very dangerous
ground when they venture to apply the
rules which distinguish directory and
mandatory statutes to the provisions of a
constitution. Constitutions do not
usually undertake to prescribe mere rules
of proceeding, except when such rules are
looked upon as essential to the thing to
be done; and they must then be regarded in
the light of limitations upon the power to
be exercised. It is the province of an
instrument of this solemn and permanent
character to establish those fundamental
maxims, and fix those unvarying rules by
which all departments of the government
must at all times shape their conduct; and
if it descends to prescribing mere rules
of order in unessential matters, it is
lowering the proper dignity of such an
instrument, and unsurping[sic] the
proper province of ordinary legislation.
We are not therefore to expect to find in
a constitution provisions which the
people, in adopting it, have not regarded
as of high importance, and worthy to be
embraced in an instrument which, for a
time at least is to control alike the
government and the governed, and to form a
standard by which is to be measured the
power which can be exercised as well by
the delegate as by the sovereign people
themselves. If directions are given
respecting the time or modes of proceeding
in which a power should be exercised,
there is at least a strong presumption
that the people designed it should be
exercised in that time and mode only; and
we impute to the people a want of due
appreciation of the purpose and proper
province of such an instrument, when we
infer that such directions are given to
any other end. Especially when, as has
been already said, it is but fair to
presume that the people in their
constitution have expressed themselves in
careful and measured terms, corresponding
with the immense importance of the powers
delegated, and with a view to leave as
little as possible to implication.
(Cooley's Const. Lim., 7th ed., p.
114.)" 87 Kan. at 498-499.
Accordingly, it is our opinion that, regardless of the
interrelationship between the ongoing reappraisal process and
the implementation date of the classification scheme, there is
no legal basis to allow delay of the classification amendment
date. It is a well established rule of law that it is not the
province of the courts to determine the wisdom of legislation
touching the public interest as that is a legislative
function with which courts cannot interfere. State ex rel,
Schneider v. Kennedy, 225 Kan. 13, 21 (1978); In re
Estate of Diebolt, 187 Kan. 2, 17
659
(1960);
(1957),
State, ex
rel. v. Fadely, 180 Kan. 652, Hunt v. Eddy,
150 Kan. 1, 4 (1939).
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
Glen Easley
Special Assistant Attorney General
RTS:JLM:GE:jm

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