Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1986-160

1986-160Kanag

Testo completo

ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
November 17, 1986
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 86- 160
Mr. Robert C. Foulston
Foulston, Siefkin, Powers &
Eberhardt
Fourth Financial Center
Wichita, Kansas 67202
•
Re: Courts--Supreme Court--Qualifications of Justices
Synopsis: Based on the nominee's personal data form as
submitted to the Supreme Court Nominating
Commission, said nominee does not meet the
qualification in K.S.A. 20-105 of having engaged in
the active and continuous practice of law for a
period of ten years prior to the date of
appointment as justice. The active practice of law
has been defined by the Supreme Court of Kansas as
meaning that the legal activities of the individual
must have been pursued on a full-time basis and
constituted his regular business. The nominee is
not automatically disqualified because of having
held the positions to which he has been appointed,
but because his personal data form does not
indicate that his legal activities while holding
those positions were "pursued on a full-time basis
and constituted his regular business." In .making
the ultimate determination of whether this nominee
is qualified, the Supreme Court Nominating
Commission may consider additional information
regarding specific legal services performed by the
nominee in his various employments and may thus
reach a contrary conclusion. Cited herein: K.S.A.
20-105
Dear Mr. Foulston:
As Chairman of the Supreme Court Nominating Commission, you
request our interpretation of K.S.A. 20-105 as it applies to a
certain nominee. Specifically, you inquire whether this
nominee meets the statute's qualification of having "engaged
in the active and continuous practice of law" for a period of
ten years prior to the date of appointment as justice.
The nominee in question was admitted to practice law in the
state of Kansas in 1974. The positions held by this
individual since that time are as follows: two years - legal
research attorney for a district court judge; one year - law
firm associate; one and one-half years - administrative
assistant for a United States Representative; four years -
Secretary of Revenue; three and one-half years - Kansas
Corporation Commissioner. The question thus presented is
whether, while holding these positions, the nominee was
actively engaged in the practice of law. The answer to this
question turns on the definition attributable to the phrase
"active practice of law," and the specific facts associated
with this nominee.
The common definition of the word "practice" is "to do or
perform habitually or customarily; to acquire or polish a
skill; to work at, especially as a profession." The American
Heritage Dictionary, New College Edition (1976). To actively
practice law, then, would be to habitually perform legal
services, and in so doing acquire or polish one's legal
skills. This definition is supported by the recent Kansas
Supreme Court decision of In re Application of Stormont,
238 Kan. 627 (1986). In that case, the Court was asked to
determine whether an applicant for admission to the bar of
Kansas was qualified under Supreme Court Rule 703 as exempt
from written examination. The applicant had been admitted by
examination to the bar of Oklahoma in 1966. He had practiced
in that state until 1981 when he moved to Kansas and accepted
a position which entailed corporate managerial and legal
activities. He retained a few of his clients in Oklahoma and
continued to perform occasional legal services for those
clients. The Court held that the work performed under his
license to practice in Oklahoma between 1981 and 1986 was not
sufficient to constitute active legal services as required by
Supreme Court Rule 703(a)(3). The Court stated as follows:
"Rule 703(a)(3) requires more than a
showing of the performance of legal
services in the foreign jurisdiction for
the required period of time--the rule
requires the applicant to have actively
performed legal services. Kansas has a
valid interest in admitting individuals to
the bar who have an acceptable level of
professional ethics and knowledge--hence
the bar examination requirement for all
except those qualifying under Rule 703.
In admitting individuals under Rule 703,
experience in another jurisdiction is,
inter alia, substituted for current
testing of knowledge. The occasional
practice of law in another jurisdiction is
no assurance of competency and skills kept
honed by experience.
"The Supreme Court of Arkansas was
confronted with the determination of what
constituted the active practice of law for
admission to the bar on reciprocity
without written examination in Undem v.
State Bd. of Law Examiners, 266 Ark.
683, 587 S.W.2d 563 (1979). The court
held:
'The active practice of law means that the
legal activities of the applicant must
have been pursued on a full-time basis and
constituted his regular business.
Petition of Jackson, 95 R.I. 393, 187 A.2d
536 (1963).' 266 Ark. at 696.
"We agree with this definition and hold
that the term 'actively performed legal
services' contained in Rule 703(a)(3)
requires that the applicant must have
pursued such legal activities in the
jurisdiction in which he or she was
admitted on a full-time basis and must
have constituted the applicant's regular
business for the requisite time period."
238 Kan. at 628, 629.
While the language of the Supreme Court Rule discussed in
Stormont differs somewhat from the relevant language found
in K.S.A. 20-105, we believe that the reasoning of the court
is applicable to the latter as well as the former. K.S.A.
20-105 provides in full as follows:
"No person shall be qualified to hold the
office of justice of the supreme court,
unless such person shall have been
regularly admitted to practice law in the
state of Kansas and has engaged in the
active and continuous practice of law, as
a lawyer, judge of a court of record or
any court in this state, full-time teacher
of law in an accredited law school or any
combination thereof for a period of at
least ten (10) years prior to the date of
appointment as justice."
The legislature, through this statute, has made a point of
requiring not only that the individual seeking an appointment
as supreme court justice be regularly admitted to practice law
in Kansas, but also that the individual be engaged in the
active and continuous practice of law for a period of ten
years. Just as in Stormont, the occasional practice of
law over a period of ten years is not assurance of legal
skills kept honed by experience, which is the purpose of the
requirement of continuous and active practice of law. Other
Kansas cases recognize a distinction between the requirements
of being admitted to the bar and being admitted to practice
law. See Phelps v. Shanahan, 210 Kan. 605, 609
(1972). We suggest that there is also a distinction between
the requirements of being admitted to practice law and
actively engaging in the practice of law. Indeed the statute
itself suggests a distinction between the two in that it lists
both as requirements and would otherwise be redundant. K.S.A.
20-105.
• We must point out, however, that in Stormont the Court was
interpreting its own rule, while we are interpreting the
legislative intent behind a statute. The Court, had it been
looking at K.S.A. 20-105, may not have applied such a strict
construction to the statute as it applied to its own rule.
For the reasons stated, the Court has determined that
admittance by motion to the bar of the state of Kansas
requires that the applicant have maintained a significant
degree of active legal practice to be entitled to forgo
written examination. Such a high degree of activity may not
be deemed as required for qualification as a justice. As
stated in Attorney General Opinion No. 86-7:
"[S]tatutory provisions imposing
qualifications for office should be
construed in favor of those seeking to
hold office:
'Provisions in constitutions and statutes
imposing qualifications should receive a
liberal construction in favor of the right
of the people to exercise freedom of
choice in the selection of officers, and
in favor of those seeking to hold office.
Ambiguities should be resolved in favor of
eligibility to office, and constitutional
and statutory provisions which restrict
the right to hold public office should be
strictly construed against
ineligibility.' (Footnotes omitted.) 67
C.J.S., Officers §17."
Further, the legislature has recognized in K.S.A. 20-105 that
attorneys who do not represent clients or make court
appearances may still be considered as engaged in the active
practice of law, i.e. judges and law school professors. The
inference is that one who continues to utilize and update his
legal training, even if not as a trial lawyer, meets this
qualification for appointment as a justice.
In applying the above considerations to the nominee in
question, and basing our analysis on the limited personal
data information submitted to the Nominating Commission by the
nominee, we cannot say that the nominee meets the
qualification in K.S.A. 20-105 of having engaged in the active
and continuous practice of law for a period of ten years.
This is not to say, however, that the nominee is conclusively
disqualified. The nominee is not disqualified merely for
holding the positions to which he has been appointed. The
nominee may be able to present additional information relevant
to his legal activities which would tend to show that he has
been actively engaged in the practice of law. Further, it is
the Commission which is to make the final determination as to
the nominee's qualifications. We are merely setting forth
matters for the Commission to consider in making this -
determination, and providing an opinion based on the limited
information contained in the nominee's personal data form.
Our conclusion that the nominee does not meet the
qualification of having engaged in the active and continuous
practice of law for a period of ten years was reached pursuant
to the following considerations:
1) There is little doubt that the nominee's two-year
clerkship with a district court judge and his one year as
associate with a law firm constituted the active practice of
law.
2) The one and one half years spent as administrative
assistant to a United States Representative appears also to
have constituted the active practice of law. One of the
responsibilities of the nominee while serving in this capacity
was to analyze federal legislation and it is our understanding
that he was expected to and did provide legal advice and
opinions for the Representative.
3) As Secretary of Revenue, the nominee has stated that his
job "entailed strategic planning and management, development
and analysis of legislation and regulations and ultimate
determination of the Department's legal posture in significant
cases." He also states that "my efforts there focused on
management and organizational planning." It is difficult for
us to judge, using this description, whether these functions
were performed under the nominee's "administrator's hat" or
his "lawyer's hat." As mentioned by the nominee, the
Department employed a staff of 18 attorneys. He does not
indicate whether he participated with his legal staff in the
drafting of legal opinions and briefs or approved such as to
their substance. Information in this regard is crucial in
making the ultimate determination that he was or was not
engaged in the active practice of law during those four years.
4) The nominee's last three years of service have been with
the Kansas Corporation Commission as a Commissioner. He
states that "[m]ajor commission decisions are the product of
a hearing process similar to that carried out in the state's
trial courts." The nominee functions as a "hearing officer"
or "judge" in these proceedings. According to the nominee, a
staff of 19 attorneys is responsible for providing
"representation for the general public in commission
proceedings and before other administrative bodies and to
assist in drafting orders and pursuing appeals." In presiding
over these hearings and issuing decisions pursuant to them, it
can be argued that a Kansas Corporation Commissioner utilizes
legal expertise and in so doing keeps his legal skills
polished. Though the position does not require legal
expertise, it certainly does not preclude one holding that
position from practicing law and in fact provides an ideal
forum for one to do so. Again, the Nominating Commission may
need additional information to formulate a determination of
whether this particular nominee engaged in the active practice
of law while employed in this position.
In conclusion, based on the nominee's personal data form as
submitted to the Supreme Court Nominating Commission, said
nominee does not meet the qualification in K.S.A. 20-105 of
having engaged in the active and continuous practice of law
for a period of ten years prior to the date of appointment as
justice. The active practice of law has been defined by the
Supreme Court of Kansas as meaning that the legal activities
of the individual must have been pursued on a full-time basis
and constituted his regular business. The nominee is not
automatically disqualified because of having held the
positions to which he has been appointed, but because his
personal data form does not indicate that his legal activities
while holding those positions were "pursued on a full-time
basis and constituted his regular business." In making the
ultimate determination of whether this nominee is qualified,
the Supreme Court Nominating Commission may consider
additional information regarding specific legal services
performed by the nominee in his various employments and may
thus reach a contrary conclusion.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
a a
JuleneL.Miller
Deputy Attorney General
RTS:JLM:jm

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