Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1986-053

1986-053Kanag

Testo completo

ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL April 14, 1986
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 86- 53
The Honorable Wint Winter, Jr.
State Senator, Second District
Capitol, Room 120-S
Topeka, Kansas 66612
The Honorable Dale Sprague
State Representative, Seventy-Third District
Capitol, Room 112-S
Topeka, Kansas 66612
Re: United States Constitution -- Amendments --
Rights and Immunities of Citizens; Taking of
Property Without Due Process
Synopsis: 1986 Senate Bill No. 696, which would enact the
Family Farm Rehabilitation Act, does not
constitute a "taking" of property which must be
compensated under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. A lender's security interest is
preserved under the bill, and a farmer seeking to
invoke the bill's protection from foreclosure
must annually pay an amount which is equivalent
to that which the lender would receive if the
land were sold at its present fair market value
and the proceeds invested at current rates.
Given decisions of the United States Supreme
Court which permit such action by a state in the
exercise of its police powers during a time of
distress in the agricultural economy, in our
opinion 1986 Senate Bill No. 696 is
constitutional. Cited herein: 1986 Senate Bil
No. 696; 1986 House Bill No. 2691; U.S. Const., '
Fourteenth Amend.
Dear Senator Winter and Representative Sprague:
You jointly request our opinion on 1986 Senate Bill No. 696,
otherwise known as The Family Farm Rehabilitation Act ("the
act"). Specifically, you ask whether the act constitutes a
"taking " of property in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. Further, you
ask whether the payments to lenders required to be made by
the act are equivalent to the economic result to lenders in
the event the act is not invoked. We note that the
essential provisions of the act have been incorporated into
another pending measure, 1986 House Bill No. 2691. In that
the provisions of the two bills as regards the act are very
similar, for simplicity we will refer to both using the
senate bill number.
1986 Senate Bill No. 696 would permit, under certain
conditions, a stay of execution of judgment resulting from
three types of cases: (1) foreclosures of mortgages on
agricultural land; (2) cancellations of contracts for the
purchase of agricultural land; or (3) repossessions of
agricultural property. The act allows an "insolvent" farmer
(as that term is defined by the act) to obtain a series of
three one-year extensions of the stay, during which time
he may keep his land and equipment and remain in business.
The stated purpose of the bill is as follows:
"The purpose of this act is to provide a
procedure to effectuate a broad program of
rehabilitation of distressed farmers faced
with forced sales of their farming
operations and oppressive debt burdens and
to this end the provisions of this act
would be liberally construed to provide
distressed farmers with the relief
authorized under this act."
Economic distress in the agricultural industry is not a new
problem to the Kansas legislature. During the 1930s, the
Kansas legislature passed a series of bills known as the
moratorium acts of 1933, 1934 and 1935 to deal with the
depressed farm economy. These acts required both court
involvement and the payment of reasonable rental value by the
debtor to retain his property in the event of impending
foreclosure. The Kansas laws did face constitutional
challenges, however, and some were struck down. Kansas City
Life Insurance Co. v. Anthony, 142 Kan. 671 (1935) (act of
1935 impermissibly interfered with property rights which had
already been adjudicated); Oklahoma State Bank v. Bolin,
141 Kan. 127 (1935) (1934 law constituted unlawful delegation
of authority by legislature to governor). At the same time,
however, federal relief was also sought to resolve
agricultural problems. The legislation which resulted is
known as the Frazier-Lemke Act.
The Frazier-Lemke Act initially allowed farmers in default
to remain in possession of their land during a five-year
stay of foreclosure. During the five-year period of the
stay (later amended to three years), the farmer could
repurchase the property at its current appraised value. The
law was held partially unconstitutional in 1935 in the case
of Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S.
555 55 S.Ct. 584, 79 L.Ed. 1593 (1936). Frazier-Lemke was
amended in 1935 and was found to be constitutional in the
1937 case of Wright v. Vinton Branch of the Mountain
Trust Bank, 300 U.S. 440, 57 S.Ct. 556, 81 L.Ed. 736 (1937).
Fortunately for our analysis, the key provisions of the
Frazier-Lemke Act are very similar to those of 1986
Senate Bill No. 696. Like Frazier-Lemke, the bill allows
farmers in any foreclosure or repossession an opportunity to
apply for a stay preventing the lender from conducting a
sheriff's sale of land or equipment and implements. As we
read the act, such application must be prior to the
issuance of any foreclosure order by the district court.
This is important, in that one of the earlier Kansas Acts
(that of 1935) was struck down as interfering with court
orders which were already res judicata.
Once application is made, the district court shall issue an
order which prevents a lender from foreclosing for a period
of one year, on condition that the farmer pay into court,
within 30 days, a sum of money equal to the market interest
rate for one year multiplied by the amount determined by the
court to be the current fair market value of the land. In
the case of agricultural property (i.e. farm machinery),
the amount due represents interest on the fair market value
as well as depreciation. In either case, "interest" is
defined to be the most recent 52 week treasury bill rate,
plus 2%. Upon the payment of such sums into court, the
farmer may continue in possession of the land and/or
equipment and may obtain up to two additional periods of one
year. Each extension is contingent upon the payment of
similar amounts by the farmer into court, which amounts are
then distributed to the lender(s). At any time before the
end of any of the three one-year periods, a farmer has the
right to redeem the land and/or equipment by paying the
lender an amount equal to the fair market value of the
property determined as of the date of the entry of the
original stay order, or at the time of redemption, whichever
is greater. (Credit for depreciation already paid for is
given in the case of agricultural equipment).
A determination of the constitutional due process issue
raised by 1986 Senate Bill No. 696 requires an analysis of
the oft-cited U.S. Supreme Court case, Blaisdell v.
Home Bldg. and Loan Association, 290 U.S. 398, 54 S.Ct.
231, 78 L.Ed. 413 (1934), as well as Wright v. Vinton
Branch of the Mountain Trust Bank, supra. The Court in
Blaisdell upheld the constitutionality of a Minnesota
mortgage moratorium statute, finding that the state's
inherent police powers may be used in times of economic
hardship for the protection of the interests of society as a
whole. In the case, the court determined that the
constitutional prohibition against state laws which impair
contract rights must be balanced against the state's need to
use its police power to protect the health of society. The
relief tailored must be reasonable in light of the
emergency. According to Blaisdell, the economic
interests of the state may justify the exercise of such
protective power, notwithstanding a temporary interference
with existing contracts, provided such contracts are not
destroyed. 290 U.S. at 439.
In Wright, the Supreme Court upheld the revised Frazier-
Lemke Act against an attack that it impaired a lender's
security interest. Rejecting this challenge, the Court
found that the act, like the present Senate bill, did not
impair the lender's lien, which remained on the property
until either the debt was paid or foreclosure occurred, and
provided for the public sale of the property in the event
redemption did not occur. The lender further received a
reasonable rent on the property, which remained in the
debtor's possession. The Court found no "taking" to occur,
and concluded that the on-going supervision of the court
protected the lender from a debtor who could not or would
not be able to redeem at the end of the three year period.
The same safeguards can be found in 1986 Senate Bill No. 696.
In addressing the specific constitutional issue of whether a
"taking" occurs under the bill, it is necessary to determine
the position of a lender under the bill's provisions in
comparison to its position under the status quo. Pursuant
to the provisions of the bill, a farmer may file for a stay
of execution upon agricultural land and agricultural
property upon payment of a sum which is equivalent to what
would be earned if the the fair market value of that land or
property (in dollars) was invested at current rates.
As a result, the economic result experienced by a lender
foreclosing on agriculture land under the status quo would
be very similar, if not identical, to the result under the
act, due primarily to the prevailing depressed land values.
Today, a lender who chooses to foreclose on agricultural
property and sell such property at a judicial sale would
receive no more than the present fair market value of the
land, which is very likely to be below the price at which
the land was purchased and on which the loan was based.
In our opinion, the economic results under 1986 Senate Bill
No. 696 and existing law are essentially the same. Under
the provisions of the bill, the lender is not at a
disadvantage economically compared to a lender foreclosing
on land and property outside of the act. Likewise, as the
lender retains the right to the property unless it is
redeemed (again for the present fair market value), no
"taking" occurs.
In conclusion, 1986 Senate Bill No. 696, which would enact
the Family Farm Rehabilitation Act, does not constitute a
"taking" of property which must be compensated under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. A lender's security interest is
preserved under the bill, and a farmer seeking to invoke the
bill's protection from foreclosure must annually pay an
amount which is equivalent to that which the lender would
receive if the land were sold at its present fair market
value and the proceeds invested at current rates. Given
decisions of the United States Supreme Court which permit
such action by a state in the exercise of its police powers
during a time of distress in the agricultural economy, in
our opinion 1986 Senate Bill No. 696 is constitutional.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
Jeffrey S. Southard
Deputy Attorney General
RTS:JSS:crw

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