Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1985-165

1985-165Kanag

Testo completo

November 26, 1985
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 85- 165
Leigh Hood
Assistant Ford County Attorney
Ford County Courthouse
P.O. Box 1057
Dodge City, Kansas 67801
Re: State Boards, Commissions and Authorities -- Law
Enforcement Training Center -- Qualifications of
Applicant
Synopsis: An ex-felon who has received a pardon from the
governor of this or any other state for a criminal
conviction is not qualified under the requirements
of K.S.A. 1984 Supp. 74-5605 and 74-5607a to
become a law enforcement officer in Kansas. Since
the legal effect of a pardon is not to "wipe out"
the previous conviction for all purposes, a person
with such a conviction may not be considered for a
position as deputy sheriff under the laws of the
State of Kansas. In that the opportunity to serve
as a law enforcement officer is a privilege, not a
right, the state can require higher standards for
professional positions than for other civil service
positions. Thus, an ex-felon is automatically
excluded from becoming an applicant for the law
enforcement training course, because he does not
meet the statute's basic requirement that there
have been no prior convictions. A prior opinion
which is inconsistent with this conclusion (VII
Attorney General Opinions 946) is withdrawn.
Cited herein: K.S.A. 22-3701; K.S.A. 1984 Supp.
74-5602, as amended by L. 1985, ch. 257, §1; K.S.A.
1984 Supp. 74-5605; 74-5607a; Kan. Const., Art.
1, 57.
*
Dear Mr. Hood:
On behalf of the Ford County Attorney, you request our opinion
on the effect of a "full pardon" upon a criminal conviction.
Specifically, you indicate that the Ford County sheriff's
department has received an employment application for the
position of deputy sheriff from an applicant who was
convicted for a felony in Texas, and who was later fully
pardoned by that state. You inquire whether such a pardon
"wipes out" a previous conviction, and, if so, whether the
applicant may be considered for a position as deputy sheriff
under Kansas law.
K.S.A. 1984 Supp. 74-5607a deals with certification for
permanent appointment as a police or law enforcement officer,
and states:
"No person shall receive a permanent
appointment as a full-time police officer
or law enforcement officer, unless such
officer has been awarded a certificate
attesting to satisfactory completion of a
course of not less than 320 hours of
accredited instruction at the training
center . . . ." (Emphasis added.)
As amended by L. 1985, ch. 257, §1, K.S.A. 1984 Supp. 74-5602
includes the position of deputy sheriff within the definition
of a law enforcement officer.
"'Police officer' or 'law enforcement
officer" means a full-time or part-time
salaried officer or employee of the state,
a county or a city, whose duties include
the prevention or detection of crime and
the enforcement of the criminal or traffic
laws of this state or any municipality
thereof. Such terms shall include, but
not be limited to, the sheriff,
undersheriff and full-time or part-time
salaried deputies in the sheriff's office
in each county . . . ." (Emphasis added.)
K.S.A. 1984 Supp. 74-5605 lists the qualifications for a
training course applicant, and requires that the applicant:
". . . has not been convicted, and does
not have an expunged conviction, by any
state or the federal government of a crime
which is a felony or its equivalent under
the uniform code of military justice;"
We believe it is the clear intent of these statutes to require
all applicants for a permanent position with a sheriff's
department to complete the law enforcement training course.
(K.S.A. 1984 Supp. 74-5607a). Further, an applicant for the
training cannot have been convicted of a felony or have had a
felony conviction expunged. K.S.A. 1984 Supp. 74-5605. Our
research does not reveal any Kansas cases or statutes which
indicate the effect of a full pardon on a criminal
conviction. However, a 1972 opinion of this office (VII
Attorney General Opinions 946) addresses the identical
issue, namely can a convicted felon, pardoned by the governor
for something other than proof of subsequent innocence, be
considered for a law enforcement position under the laws of
the State of Kansas? The opinion stated that a pardoned
ex-felon could not be certified as having not been
convicted within the meaning of the statute. However, it
also concluded that a pardon would allow an individual to meet
the requirements of K.S.A. 1984 Supp. 74-5605(c). We cannot
agree with this internally contradictory conclusion.
K.S.A. 1984 Supp. 75-5605 clearly requires that a training
course applicant "has not been convicted." We are unable to
see how one can acknowledge that an applicant has been
convicted within the meaning of the statute, and at the same
time allow him to meet the requirements of K.S.A. 1984 Supp.
74-5605(c). Our interpretation of the legal effect of a
pardon is in fact expressed in the 1972 opinion, which states:
"It is the general rule that the effect of
a full pardon is to make the offender a
"new man," which blots out the existence
of guilt, so that in the eye of the law
the offender is as innocent as if he had
never committed the offense. Pardon is in
effect the remission of guilt, amnesty,
oblivion or forgetfulness. (State v.
Page, 60 Kan. 664, 57 P.514; Jamison
v. Flanner, Sheriff, 116 Kan. 624, 228
P. 82; 59 Am.Jur.2d, Pardon and Parole,
Sec. 3.)"
However, it goes on to specifically acknowledge:
"These statements are generalizations and
have not been universally accepted or
approved. A pardon does not so operate
for all purposes; since the very essence
of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of
penalty, a pardon also implies guilt. It
does not obliterate the fact of the
commission of the crime and the conviction
thereof. (67 C.J.S. Pardons, § 11.)
The executive act of granting a pardon
does not obliterate the fact of
conviction. Matter of Baldi v.
Gilchrist, 204 App.Div. 425, 427, 198
N.Y.S. 493, 495; People, ex rel. v.
Brophy, 287 N.Y. 132, 38 N.E.2d 468.)"
(Emphasis added.)
Given the presumption that a pardon does not obliterate the
fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction
thereof, we believe it is impossible to affirm the 1972
opinion. Instead, we reiterate our belief that ex-felons
are automatically excluded from becoming an applicant for the
law enforcement training course, because they do not meet the
statute's basic requirement that there have been no prior
convictions.
We believe that the present situation can be distinguished on
another basis as well. The former opinion relied on a
decision of the Supreme Court of Iowa, Slater v. Olson,
230 Iowa 1005, 299 N.W. 879 (1941). In that case, the court
reviewed a decision by the Civil Service Commission of Des
Moines to reject a plaintiff's application for a civil service
examination because he had been convicted of a felony,
although he had subsequently received a full pardon. An Iowa
statute imposed an across-the-board prohibition against the
employment of all felons in all civil service positions.
The court found this section to be inapplicable to one who has
received a full pardon, because it imposes legal consequences
and disabilities on a person already exempted from them by a
pardon. VII Atty. Gen. Opin. at 948.
We do not disagree with the Iowa court's decision, given the
fact that its statutes sweep so broadly as to ban all felons
from all civil service positions. However, since the
conviction and pardon at issue here occurred in Texas, we
believe it would be instructive to refer to Texas authorities
in analyzing the effect of a convict's pardon. In Texas, an
ex-felon is specifically excluded from certification as a
police officer, but there is no across-the-board felon ban for
all civil service positions. Likewise, Kansas denies an
ex-felon the right to become a police officer or law
enforcement officer, but makes no general felon ban on all
civil service positions.
In 1980, the Texas Attorney General issued an opinion which
concluded that a pardon granted for any reason other than
subsequent proof of innocence would not entitle a convicted
felon to be certified as a peace officer. See Op. Atty.
Gen. 1980, No. MW-270. Further, in Dixon v.McCullen,
527 F.Supp. 711 (N.D.Tex. 1981), an ex-felon brought a civil
rights case alleging violation of his constitutional rights
when he was denied certification as a police officer. Texas
has a statute which provides that no person convicted of a
felony may be licensed as a police officer. Tex Rev.
Civ. Stat. Ann., art. 4413 (29aa)(Vernon Supp. 1984).
The plaintiff asserted he was entitled to be certified as a
police officer, due to the legal effect which a pardon granted
by the governor has under Texas law. After construing the
Texas Constitution and applicable Texas statutes, the district
court came to the opposite conclusion, holding that: (1) the
pardon granted to the plaintiff by the governor removes some,
but not all, legal disabilities; and (2) the statute
automatically excluding ex-felons from certification as a
police officer is constitutional.
Like the Constitution of Kansas, the Texas Constitution gives
the Governor of Texas power to grant pardons in criminal
matters:
"In all criminal cases, except treason and
impeachment, the Governor shall have
power, after conviction, on the written
signed recommendation and advice of the
Board of Pardons and Paroles, . . . to
grant . . . pardons . . . ." Article
Four, Section Eleven; see also Tex.
Code Crim. Pro. Ann., art. 48.01
(Vernon's 1979)—
The court noted that the undisputed legal effect of a pardon
is to restore some civil rights to an ex-felon. See
Easterwood v. State, 31 S.W. 294, 296 (1895); 44
Tex.Jur.2d Pardon, Reprieve, Etc., 513 (1963); Tex Att'y.
Gen. Op., No. MW-148 (1980). However, it also held that
the governor cannot overrule the judgment of a court of law,
as he has no "appellate" jurisdiction. Watkins v. State,
572 S.W.2d 339 (Tex.Crim.App. 1978). Therefore, the
district court concluded that, regardless of any
post-judgment actions, a final judgment and conviction
against an ex-felon does not disappear.
Further, the court held that the Texas statute which
automatically excluded ex-felons from certification as
police officers was constitutional, because there were no
equal protection or due process violations present. When
addressing the issue of equal protection, the court applied
the minimal rationality standard to the facts, stating:
"There is no constitutional right to
public employment. McGarvey v.
District of Columbia, 468 F.Supp.687
(D.C. 1979). A Government must have
authority to scrutinize the hiring of
personnel based on conduct occurring prior
to their employment. Dew v. Halabv,
317 F.2d. 582 (D.C. Cir. 1963). The
rationale is to insure that those persons
publicly employed in emergency or
dangerous situations are sober and alert,
and possess qualities such as honesty,
integrity, reliability and obedience to
the law." 527 F.Supp. at 721.
In short, the court felt that the classification presented by
the statute was justified, since a state has a legitimate
concern for maintaining high standards of professional conduct
in its law enforcement officers. Barsky v. Board of
Regents of New York, 347 U.S. 442, 74 S.Ct. 650, 98 L.Ed 829
(1953).
In addressing the issue of whether the plaintiff's due process
rights had been violated, the court again upheld the
classification created by the statute. The court said:
"A state can require high standards of
qualification for a profession such as
good moral character, as long as it has a
rational connection to the applicant's
fitness or capacity (especially when
discussing a 'true' profession, like law,
medicine or law enforcement, where ethics
should be the most minimal of
qualifications)." [Citing Schware v.
Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 77
S.Ct. 752, 1 L.Ed.2d 796 (1957)] 527
F.Supp. at 723.
In our opinion, both the Kansas Constitution and Kansas
statutes should be interpreted in a manner consistent with the
Dixon decision. We believe that the legislature never
intended for a convicted felon to be an eligible applicant for
the position of deputy sheriff, even if he has received a full
pardon from this or any other state. As noted above, Kansas
has two statutes which, when considered together, prevent a
person previously convicted of a felony from being certified
as a law enforcement officer. K.S.A. 1984 Supp. 74-5607a
requires that all applicants for a permanent position with a
sheriff's department complete the law enforcement training
course. This course cannot be completed by a convicted
ex-felon even if he has received a full pardon, in that it
is a requirement of K.S.A. 1984 Supp. 74-5605 that a training
course applicant has not been "convicted." Thus, these
statutes automatically exclude ex-felons from certification
as law enforcement officers.
Although the Kansas Constitution gives the Governor of Kansas
power to grant pardons in criminal matters, the legal effect
of a full pardon is not to "wipe out" an ex-felon's previous
conviction. Article 1, Section 7 provides:
"The pardoning power shall be vested in
the governor, under regulations and
restrictions prescribed by law."
Elaborating on the governor's pardon power, K.S.A. 22-3701
provides in relevant part:
"The governor may pardon, or commute the
sentence of, any person convicted of a
crime in any court of this state upon such
terms and conditions as he may prescribe
in the order granting the pardon or
commutation."
It is our opinion that while the legal effect under Kansas law
of a pardon is to restore the civil rights of an ex-felon,
employment as a law enforcement officer is a privilege, not a
right. As such, the state can require higher standards for
professional positions than for other civil service positions,
as long as the standards have a rational connection to the
applicant's fitness or capacity for the job. We find the
disqualification of ex-felons from law enforcement positions
to be rationally related to a legitimate desire that
professionals licensed by the state possess qualities such as
honesty, integrity, reliability and obedience to the law.
As the court noted in Dixon, a pardon does not make a
final conviction disappear, because a pardon implies guilt.
527 F.Supp. at 718. Although a pardon removes some legal
disabilities, it does not change the common-law principle that
a conviction of an infamous offense is evidence of bad
character. Bennett v. State, 5 S.W. 527 (1887). Thus, a
pardon does not substitute a good reputation for one that is
bad, it does not obliterate the fact of the commission of the
crime, it does not wash out the moral stain, and it does not
wipe the slate clean; it involves forgiveness, but not
forgetfulness. Stone v. Oklahoma Real Estate Com., 369 P.2d
642 (1962); Doe v. Webster, 606 F.2d 1226 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
In light of this legal result, the legislature may wish to
consider the creation of categories of pardons, as indicated
by the Dixon court. 527 F.Supp. at 719. These might
include a conditional pardon (limited to any specific
situation), a general pardon (all civil rights, but not
employment as a law enforcement officer), and an unconditional
pardon (total elimination of any disability). However,
under the Kansas Constitution and present statutes, it is our
opinion that an ex-felon who has received a pardon from the
governor of this or any other state for a criminal conviction
is not qualified under the requirements of K.S.A. 1984 Supp.
74-5605 and 74-5607a to become a law enforcement officer in
Kansas. Since the legal effect of a pardon is not to "wipe
out" the previous conviction for all purposes, the applicant
may not be considered for a position as deputy sheriff under
the laws of the State of Kansas.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS
Barbara P. Allen
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:JSS:BPA:crw

Continua la tua ricerca in ChatGPT o Claude

Collega Omnilex per cercare nel corpus legale dal tuo assistente IA.