Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1985-146

1985-146Kanag

Testo completo

October 29, 1985
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 85-146
Rodney J. Bieker, Director
Legal Services Section
Kansas State Department of Education
120 East 10th Street
Topeka, Kansas 66612
Re: Schools -- State Department of Education --
Application of Kansas Internship Plan to Private
Parochial Schools
Synopsis: The participation by parochial schools in the
Kansas internship plan would not violate the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
However, the state's payment of a cash stipend to
senior teachers supervising and assisting interns
at parochial schools would not withstand a
constitutional challenge. Cited herein: U.S.
Const., First Amend.
Dear Mr. Bieker:
As legal services director of the State Department of
Education, you request our opinion concerning the ability of
parochial schools to participate in the department's proposed
teacher internship plan. Under this plan, first-year
teachers will be supervised and assisted by a panel of
professional educators pursuant to an individualized
professional development plan. Interns who successfully
complete the program will be recommended for teacher
certification. You advise that participating school districts
will be compensated by the state at a rate of $1,000 per
intern. The $1,000 stipend is to be paid to the senior
teacher who has the responsibility for managing the intern's
planned professional activities. You inquire whether
parochial schools may participate in the internship plan and,
if so, whether senior teachers at such schools may receive the
stipend without violating the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment.
In determining whether a particular state action is an
improper "law respecting an establishment of religion," the
United States Supreme Court has applied a three-part test:
"First, the statute must have a secular
legislative purpose; second, its principal
or primary effect must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion, Board of
Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243
(1968); finally, the statute must not
foster 'an excessive government
entanglement with religion.' Walz [v.
Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674
(1970)]." Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602, 612-613, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d
745, (1971).
The United States Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed that
state action alleged to violate the establishment clause
should be measured against the Lemon criteria [Grand Rapids
School District v. Ball, U.S. 105 S.Ct. 3216, 87
L.Ed.2d 267 (1985)], and has detailed the restraints imposed
on state involvement with teachers in non-public schools.
See generally, Aguilar v. Felton, U.S. , 105
S.Ct. 3232, 87 L.Ed.2d 290 (1985).
In Lemon, the Court examined a Rhode Island statute
providing for a 15% salary supplement to teachers in
non-public schools at which the average per-pupil
expenditure on secular education was below the average in
public schools, conditioned on the teachers giving only
courses offered in public schools and agreeing not to teach
courses in religion. The Court noted the "substantially
different ideological character" between textbooks and
teachers by stating:
"In terms of potential for involving some
aspect of faith or morals in secular
subjects, a textbook's content is
ascertainable, but a teacher's handling of
a subject is not. We cannot ignore the
danger that a teacher under religious
control and discipline poses to the
separation of the religious from the
purely secular aspects of pre-college
education." 403 U.S. at 617.
"We simply recognize that a dedicated
religious person, teaching in a school
affiliated with his or her faith and
operated to inculpate its tenets, will
inevitably experience great difficulty in
remaining religiously neutral." Id at
618.
The Court found the "potential for impermissible fostering of
religion," but based its holding upon its finding that the
comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state
surveillance required to ensure the absence of religious
content, would constitute excessive entanglement.
Similarly, in Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 95 S.Ct.
1753, 44 L.Ed.2d 217 (1975), the United States Supreme Court
invalidated a state program that offered guidance, testing,
remedial and therapeutic services performed by public
employees on the premises of parochial schools. The Court
found that though a comprehensive system of supervision might
conceivably prevent teachers from having the primary effect of
advancing religion, such a system would inevitably lead to an
unconstitutional administrative entanglement between church
and state.
A recent decision of the U.S. District Court in Stark v. St.
Cloud State University, 604 F.Supp. 1555 (D. Minn. 1985),
appears to be most analogous to the facts of this case. In
Stark, the district court held unconstitutional a state
university's policy which allowed students to satisfy their
student teaching requirement at parochial schools. Under the
policy, non-public schools were paid a standard rate of
$6.00 per quarter hour for each student teacher placed
therein. The policy provided that students who chose to be
placed in a non-public school would be made aware that any
involvement on their part in any religious aspect of the
school's program was "exclusively between the parochial
school's personnel and the student teacher." Accommodations
were to be made for any university supervisors who, based on
religious grounds, objected to supervising a placement at a
non-public school. The policy included no other specific
references to any religious aspects of a non-public school's
program.
In finding the policy violative of the Establishment Clause,
the court stated:
"The undisputed facts in this action,
interpreted in light of the above
case-law, establish that the University
policy violates the Establishment Clause.
The challenged policy allows the placement
of public university student-teachers at
a parochial school in any one of the
substantive academic areas for which
teachers are certified. The Department's
hands-on role in the program is the
weekly on-site supervision of the
placement by a faculty member including
discussions with both the
student-teacher and the parochial
teacher. The sum of the various aspects
of the program is that a much greater
entanglement with a pervasively sectarian
setting occurs than is permissible under
the Court's decisions in this area.
"In fact, the on-site teaching of the
full range of academic subjects creates an
even greater danger of fostering religion
than the programs involved in Meek,
Wolman, Americans United for Separation
of Church and State, and Felton. The
policy does not establish any procedures
to ensure that the public university
students and the university supervisors
maintain the necessary strict religious
neutrality. Rather, ' [a]ny involvement
by the student teacher in any religious
aspect of a private parochial school's
program is exclusively between the
parochial school personnel and the student
teacher.' . . . Thus, the danger that the
student-teacher might intentionally or
unintentionally engage in the
impermissible inculcation of religion is
real and not insubstantial. To ensure
this did not occur would require
'comprehensive, discriminating and
continuing state surveillance'. Lemon,
403 U.S. at 619, 91 S.Ct. at 2114. This
surveillance by itself is a constitu-
tionally excessive entanglement of
church and state.
"Furthermore, the participants in the
program are by definition all supportive
of the placement in a parochial school and
therefore no incentive exists for
complaint. Felton, 739 F.2d at 65. The
nonpublic school, its cooperating
teacher, and its students are all
accustomed to coloring the educational
experience with religious content and
perspective. They are unlikely to notice
or complain if the student teacher is
included in or initiates that type of
experience. The student teacher will have
agreed to the placement in a parochial
school and, therefore, often will be
supportive of its religious milieu. The
lack of incentive to complain is even
greater than in those cases involving
fully licensed teachers because the
university student is at an impressionable
stage of teacher preparation and subject
to the influences of the parochial
instructor who, is, in effect the tutor.
The university supervisor must also be a
willing participant in the parochial
placement and the oversight provided is
limited. 'Because "[t]he State must be
certain, given the Religion Clauses, that
subsidized teachers do not inculcate
religion", reliance could not be placed
simply "on the good faith and
professionalism of the secular teachers
and counselors functioning in
church-related schools."' Felton, 739
F.2d at 65-66 (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S.
at 619, 91 S.Ct. at 2114; and Meek, 421
U.S. at 369, 95 S.Ct. at 1765).
"Accordingly, there must be active and
extensive surveillance, which has not been
provided, to prevent the fostering of
religion. Yet, under Meek this very
surveillance constitutes excessive
entanglement. Meek, 421 U.S. at 372, 95
S.Ct. at 1776; Felton, 739 F.2d at 64 &
n. 16.
"The policy also fails to provide any
express restrictions on the use of the
state funds that are provided to the
parochial school for the placement of a
student teacher in its classrooms. Even
though it appears that the monies actually
paid to date have been used for secular
purposes, there is no prohibition against
their being used wholly or primarily to
advance religion. In addition, the
surveillance necessary to ensure this did
not occur simply increases the already
constitutionally excessive entanglement."
604 F.Supp. at 1563-64.
We find the Kansas internship plan distinguishable in several
important respects from the student teaching policy held
unconstitutional in Stark. First, under the Kansas
internship plan, the intern is an employee of the parochial
school, not a student of a state university. We recognize
that such an intern would likely be teaching in a pervasively
sectarian environment, and would be at an impressionable state
of teacher preparation, subject to the influences of the
senior teacher who is responsible for managing the interns
planned professional experiences. Although the intern, as an
employee of the parochial school and a first-year teacher,
might intentionally or unintentionally foster religion, the
state's involvement with that intern is minimal. The intern
is not affiliated with the state, is not compensated by the
state, and is not supervised by an employee of the state.
Accordingly, we do not view the intern's participation as
state action which has the primary effect of advancing
religion.
Secondly, under the plan the committee responsible for
supervising and assisting the intern does not include a
representative of a state college or university. The
"assistance committee" responsible for assisting, supporting,
and assessing the intern consists solely of "in-house"
personnel: a certified practicing "senior teacher," and a
certified practicing administrator. Accordingly, the plan
does not compel a comprehensive, discriminating, and
continuing state surveillance in the parochial schools.
Although the plan requires an intern to attend two 7-hour
seminars conducted by an approved college, university, or
school district, and requires the assistance committee to be
trained by the State Department of Education, we view these
and other minimal contacts between the state and those
participating in the internship plan as "minor and
unobtrusive." See New Jersey State Bd. of Higher Educ.
v. Board of Directors of Shelton College, 90 N.J. 470, 448
A.2d 988 (1982). The plan does not require the day-to-day
administrative supervision of the state in religious
activities, and,in our opinion, does not entail the excessive
entanglement proscribed by the First Amendment. Accordingly,
we believe that participation by parochial schools in the
Kansas internship plan would not violate the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment.
We next examine the question of whether the Establishment
Clause would be offended by the state's payment of a $1,000
stipend to a senior teacher at a parochial school for that
teacher's participation in the internship plan. The Supreme
Court has dispelled the "notion that a religious person can
never be in the state's pay for a secular purpose." Roemer
v. Maryland Public Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736, 746 & n. 13, 96
S.Ct. 2337, 2345 & n. 13, 49 L.Ed.2d 179, 188 & n. 13 (1976).
However, such arrangements are permissible only when a valid
secular purpose exists and the danger of aiding sectarian
values is circumscribed. Stark v. St. Cloud State Univ.,
supra, at 1564. Neutrality is required, Roemer, 426
U.S. at 747, and the state must be certain that subsidized
teachers do not inculcate religion. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619.
We have no hesitancy in recognizing the internship plan's
primary secular purpose of improving the quality of teacher
preparation in Kansas. However, we cannot ignore the danger
of aiding sectarian values from the state's payment of a
stipend to senior teachers. Although labeled a "stipend" and
not a salary supplement or a cash subsidy, we find the cash
payment to a senior teacher i4 a parochial school
indistinguishable from that held unconstitutional in Lemon.
Even if the stipend payment process is straightforward and
susceptible to the routinization that characterizes most
reimbursements schemes, the services for which the senior
teacher is being compensated are not discrete and clearly
identifiable. Compare Committee for Public Education v.
Regan, 444 U.S. 646 L.Ed.2d 94 (1979) (N.Y. statute
authorizing the use of public funds to reimburse
church-sponsored and secular non-public schools for
performing various testing and reporting services mandated by
state law did not contravene the Establishment Clause.)
The touchstone under the Establishment Clause is not how
much public support any one religious institution or
instructor receives, but rather that public funds are used to
support religion in general. A school district or other
governmental body cannot seek to advance nonreligious goals
and values, no matter how laudatory, through religious means.
Doe v. Aldine Independent School District, 563 F.Supp. 883
(S.D. Tex. 1982).
Because of the varying and interpersonal nature of the
services performed by a senior teacher for an intern, we doubt
the state could show that its compensation to senior teachers
would serve the state's legitimate secular ends without any
appreciable risk of being used to transmit or teach religious
values or to foster an ideological outlook. In short, no
effective means exists to insure that the direct cash payments
to senior teachers at parochial schools would cover only
secular services.
While it is always difficult to predict what a court will say
on a matter involving First Amendment questions, we believe
that while participation by parochial schools in the Kansas
internship plan would withstand a constitutional challenge,
the direct cash payment to senior teachers at such schools
would not.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS
Kathryn Gardner
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:JSS:KG:crw

Continua la tua ricerca in ChatGPT o Claude

Collega Omnilex per cercare nel corpus legale dal tuo assistente IA.