Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1985-042

1985-042Kanag

Testo completo

ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
April 26, 1985
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 85- 42
Don Vsetecka
Holcomb City Attorney
311 Campus Drive, Suite 101
Garden City, Kansas 67846
Re: Constitution of the State of Kansas--Corporations--
Cities' Power of Home Rule; Payment of Attorney's Fees
Incurred by City Official in Defending a Criminal Action
Synopsis: Pursuant to authority granted by Article 12, Section 5
of the Kansas Constitution, the governing body of a
city may pay attorney's fees of a city official who
is acquitted of criminal charges, provided the govern-
ing body finds that the criminal charges arose from
the discharge of an official duty in which the city
had an interest, and that the officer acted in good
faith. Cited herein: K.S.A. 75-6108, 75-6116; Kan.
Const., Art. 12, §5.
Dear Mr. Vsetecka:
You request our opinion as to whether the City of Holcomb may pay
the legal fees and expenses incurred by Mayor Ivan Myers and
Police Chief Donald Nevin for defense of criminal charges brought
against them for two class A misdemeanors, eavesdropping and
breach of privacy, and conspiracy, a class C misdemeanor. You
indicate that the criminal charges arose out of a wiretapping
incident in which city telephone lines were allegedly tapped and
telephone conversations of a city employee recorded.
In response, we first note that the Kansas Tort Claims Act
prescribes that governmental entities, including cities, shall
provide for the defense of any civil action brought against a
public employee. See K.S.A. 75-6108 and 75-6116. However, the
act is silent as to defense of employees in criminal actions, and
neither obligates a governmental entity to provide for the defense
of such an action, nor prescribes circumstances under which the
same is permissible. Further, we are unaware of any reported
Kansas case which has considered the power of a city to provide
for the defense of a city official charged with a crime. In the
absence of any Kansas statute or case which provides guidance, we
must examine pertinent cases from other jurisdictions.
The decisions of the various state courts which have considered
the authority to expend public moneys to defend a public official
charged with a crime appear to be in some degree of conflict.
See 130 A.L.R. 736 and A.L.R. Blue Book of Supplemental Decisions,
Volumes 1-6. A number of courts have held that expenditures
for such a purpose constitute a mere gratuity and are not for
a public purpose. See, e.g., Guerine v. City of Northlake,
274 N.E.2d 625 (Ill. App. 1971); In re Jensen, 60 N.Y.S. 933
(N.Y. App. 1899). Other courts have upheld such expenditures
when made pursuant to statute, or independent of statute or
ordinance. See, e.g., Valerius v. Newark, 423 A.2d 988 (N.J.
Sup. Ct. 1980); Lomelo v. City of Sunrise, 423 So.2d 974 (Fla.
App. 1982).
In Powers v. Goodwin, 291 S.E.2d 466 (W.Va. Sup. Ct. 1982),
the West Virginia Supreme Court stated that the majority rule
concerning the power to indemnify a public officer for attorney's
fees incurred in defending a criminal action was as follows.
"In order to justify indemnification from
public funds the underlying action must arise
from the discharge of an official duty in
which the government has an interest; the
officer must have acted in good faith; and the
agency seeking to indemnify the officer must
have either the express or implied power to do
so." Id., Syl. 53.
The court further stated in Powers that "the conviction of a
common law or statutory crime is conclusive proof that the
official was not acting in good faith and was outside the scope
of his official duties." 291 S.E.2d at 474.
We are persuaded by these pronouncements of the West Virginia
court, and accordingly conclude that the City of Holcomb may not
consider a request for payment of attorney's fees incurred in
defending the subject criminal actions until and unless the
defendants are acquitted. If the defendants are acquitted,
it is our opinion that the governing body may, pursuant to home
rule powers granted by Article 12, §5 of the Kansas Constitution,
pay the individual's attorneys fees if it finds that the under-
lying criminal actions arose from the discharge of an official
duty in which the city had an interst, and that the officer
acted in good faith. It should be noted that, under common
law principles recognized in this state, Mayor Ivan Myers would
be disqualified from participating in any deliberations of
the governing body concerning a request for reimbursement of
attorneys fees which he has incurred. See Anderson v. City of
Parsons, 209 Kan. 337, 341-342 (1972).
Finally, it should be noted that the conclusions reached here-
in do not address the question of whether a city may provide
counsel in advance for police officers charged in illegal
arrest or excessive force cases. As one court has noted, the
provision of counsel in such cases may serve a public purpose in
that such charges occur more frequently, arise from the per-
formance of duties, and thus affect the morale of a police
department. See Moya v. New Brunswick, 448 A.2d 999, 1004-
1005 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1982). In contrast, charges of illegal
wiretapping by police officials occur less frequently, and it is
our opinion that the advance provision of counsel in such cases
would not have a substantial effect on the morale of a police
department.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
Terrence R. Hearshman
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:JSS:TRH:jm

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