Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1984-023

1984-023Kanag

Testo completo

March 7, 1984
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 84- 23
Charles F. Lay
Attorney at Law
104 E. Main
P.O. Box 6
Gardner, Kansas 66030
Re: Automobiles and Other Vehicles -- Serious Traffic Of-
fenses -- Driving While Under Influence of Alcohol;
Prohibition on Parole Until Minimum Sentence Served
Synopsis: K.S.A. 1983 Supp. 8-1567 (c), (d) and (e) provide that
a person convicted of a violation of the statute is not
eligible for probation or suspension or reduction of
sentence until the minimum time of imprisonment has been
served. While the term "parole" is not specifically
used, the statute must be construed to include parole
within those actions which are not allowed before the
minimum sentence is served. Cited herein: K.S.A. 1983
Supp. 8-1567, K.S.A. 12-4511.
Dear Mr. Lay:
As city prosecutor for Gardner, Kansas, you request our opinion
on a question concerning the penalty provisions of K.S.A. 1983
Supp. 8-1567, which statute proscribes driving a motor vehicle
while under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Specifically, you
inquire whether a court may grant a defendant parole prior to
the latter having served the minimum sentence provided by statute.
In that Gardner has adopted the provisions of the statute pur-
suant to K.S.A. 1983 Supp. 8-1567(n), the same penalties exist
in the city ordinance. Accordingly, although it is the effect of
the city ordinance which concerns you, for the sake of simplicity
we will refer only to the statute, since the identical language
found in both warrants the same construction.
Subsection (e) of the statute concerns those persons who are con-
victed three or more times of the offense of DUI. Upon such a
conviction, the subsection states that
"A person shall be sentenced to not less than 90
days' nor more than one year's imprisonment and
fined not less than $1,000 nor more than $2,500.
The person convicted shall not be eligible for
release on probation or suspension or reduction
of sentence." (Emphasis added.)
Similar wording is found in subsections (c) and (d), which deal
with first and second-time offenders, respectively.
In that the wording of the subsection does not specifically list
parole among those options which are foreclosed to a defendant
convicted thereunder, you inform us that some defense counsel have
successfully argued that parole may be granted. Although you do
not so state, we presume that this is under the authority of K.S.A.
12-4511, which is contained in the Code of Procedure for Municipal
Courts. The relevant language contained therein states:
"The municipal judge may parole any person confined
to jail as a result of a conviction of a violation
of a city ordinance. The judge may set such conditions
and restrictions as he or she sees fit to impose for
a term not exceeding one year and may at any time dis-
charge such person for good cause shown."
In determining whether K.S.A. 1983 Supp. 8-1567 extends to parole
as well as probation and suspension or reduction of sentence, the
principle rule 9f statutory construction concerns the intent of
the legislature, and where that intent is clearly expressed, it
must be given effect. Szoboszlay v. Glessner, 233 Kan. 475 (1983).
However, in so doing, one is not limited to a mere consideration of
the statutory language, but may look also to the historical back-
ground of the enactment, circumstances attending its passage, the
purpose to be accomplished and the effect the statute may have
under the various different constructions. Matter of Reed's Es-
tate, 233 Kan. 531 (1983). Further, if adherence to the strict
letter of the statute would lead to injustice or absurdity, or
result in contradictory provisions, the general design and pur-
pose of the statute should be kept in mind, and reflected in the
ultimate construction. Lincoln American Corp. v. Victory Life
Insurance Co., 375 F.Supp. 112 (D. Kan. 1974). Finally, if neces-
sary to achieve legislative intent, words, phrases or clauses may
be omitted or inserted in appropriate places to reach that result.
Baker v. R. D. Andersen Construction Co., 7 Kan.App.2d 568 (1982).
Accordingly, the absence of the word parole in the statute is not
determinative of the question.
K.S.A. 1983 Supp. 8-1567 was significantly amended in 1982 toward
the end of strengthening the penalties which those in violation of
the statute would be subjected to. In construing the effect of
one of the numerous changes made that year (namely the prohibi-
tion on plea bargaining), the Kansas Supreme Court held as
follows in the case of State v. Compton, 233 Kan. 690 (1983):
"The objective sought to be attained by the legislature
is to deter drunken driving and thus to reduce the in-
juries, deaths and property damage attributable to it
by making the penalties for DUI certain and severe.
This objective is consistent with the legitimate
aims of both the legislative and executive branches
of government, and more particularly of the prosec-
utor. It is also an objective of the judiciary. De-
terrence, the discouragement of potential offenders,
has long been recognized as one of the legitimate
goals of sentencing. See Guides for Sentencing, pub-
lished by the Council of Judges of the National Council
on Crime and Delinquency, p. 3 (2d ed. 1974), and
The State Trail Judge's Book, pp. 288-89 (2d ed. 1969).
That the problem is a serious one is well illustrated
in the opening paragraph of a recent Note in the
Washburn Law Journal, The New Kansas DUI law: Con-
stitutional Issues and Practical Problems, 22 Wash-
burn L.J. 340-41 (1983):
'More than half of all highway accidents are a di-
rect result of drunk drivers. In 1980, the Kansas
Highway Patrol arrested 2,733 people for driving
while under the influence of alcohol (DUI) and at-
tributed 195 deaths and 5,350 injuries to the ab-
use of alcohol, yet the judiciary has been reluct-
ant to apply the maximum penalties in many DUI cases
where the social drinker is concerned, because of
the strictness of the penalties. Additionally, cur-
rent sanctions imposed on offenders have not had an
adequate impact on the serious problem drinker.'"
233 Kan. at 699-700.
With the above in mind, the specific amendment at issue here may be
examined. In addition to prohibiting plea bargaining, the legis-
lature also added language which required a defendant to serve
the minimum term of imprisonment, without recourse to probation,
suspension or reduction of sentence. This clearly had the effect,
as the court noted in Compton, of "making the penalties for DUI
certain and severe." 233 Kan. at 699. To allow parole would
effectively negate this new approach, for under K.S.A. 12-4511 a
defendant could be paroled after serving only one day of a 90
day minimum sentence. Further, at the municipal court level, the
terms parole and probation are often used interchangeably. City
of Junction City v. Griffin, 226 Kan. 516 (1979). Indeed, there
is no section in the Code of Procedure for Municipal Courts which
provides for probation, K.S.A. 12-4511 acting to cover all such
situations.
Accordingly, it is our opinion that K.S.A. 8-1567(c), (d) and (e)
should be read so as to include a ban on parole for defendants
who have not served the minimum time of imprisonment set by law.
To reach the opposite conclusion would be to defeat the purpose
of the change made in 1982, and so would frustrate legislative
intent. Additionally, given the almost identical nature of pro-
bation and parole in a municipal court, it would be absurd to
prohibit one and yet allow the other. We therefore conclude that
in prohibiting probation, along with the suspension and reduction
of sentence, the legislature clearly intended to eliminate all means
by which a sentence could be avoided, except as otherwise specif-
ically provided, i.e. community service time, alcohol abuse treat-
ment program, etc. This would include the grant of parole under
K.S.A. 12-4511.
In conclusion, K.S.A. 1983 Supp. 8-1567 (c), (d) and (e) provide
that a person convicted of a violation of a statute is not eli-
gible for probation or suspension or reduction of sentence until
the minimum time of imprisonment has been served. While the
term "parole" is not specifically used, several factors, includ-
ing legislative intent and the use of words having the same ef-
fect, require the statute to be construed to include parole with-
in those actions which are not allowed before the minimum sen-
tence is served.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS
JeffreyS.Southard
Assistant Attorney General
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