Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1983-185

1983-185Kanag

Testo completo

December 30, 1983
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 83- 185
The Honorable Roy M. Ehrlich
State Senator, Thirty-Fifth District
Route 1, Box 92
Hoisington, Kansas 67544
Re: Laws, Journals and Public Information -- Records
Open to Public -- Conviction Records of Certain
Traffic Offenses; Closed to Public
Amendments to the United States Constitution --
Rights and Immunities of Citizens -- Fourteenth
Amendment; Equal Protection
Constitution of the State of Kansas -- Bill of
Rights -- Equal Rights
Synopsis: 1983 Senate Bill No. 310 (L. 1983, ch. 28) pro-
vides that speeding convictions for traveling not
more than 10 miles per hour in excess of the 55
mile per hour speed limit established by K.S.A.
8-1336(a)(3) shall not be part of the public
record and shall not be considered by any insur-
ance company in establishing rates for an auto-
mobile liability insurance policy or cancelling
such coverage. The classification of accessible
records created by 1983 Senate Bill No. 310 bears
a reasonable relationship to a legitimate legis-
lative function and does not offend the guarantees
of equal protection found in the United States and
Kansas constitutions. - Cited herein: 1983 Senate
Bill No. 310 (L. 1983, ch. 28), Kan. Const., Bill
of Rights §§1, 2, U.S. Const., Fourteenth Amendment.
*
Dear Senator Ehrlich:
You request our opinion on certain constitutional questions
with regard to 1983 Senate Bill No. 310. Your specific ques-
tion raises the issue of whether the bill violates constitu-
tional equal protection guarantees because it "treats speeding
convictions for traveling not more than 10 miles per hour in
excess of the maximum 55 mile per hour speed limit .
different(ly) from other speeding convictions."
1983 Senate Bill No. 310 (L. 1983, ch. 28) provides that
speeding convictions for traveling not more than 10 miles
per hour in excess of the 55 mile per hour speed limit estab-
lished by K.S.A. 8-1336(a)(3) shall not be part of the pub-
lic record and shall not be considered by any insurance com-
pany in establishing rates for an automobile liability
insurance policy or cancelling such coverage. As noted in
Attorney General Opinion No. 83-117, 1983 Senate Bill No. 310
appears to be designed solely to prevent insurance companies
from using certain conviction records in rate and coverage
determinations. To accomplish that purpose the bill restricts
access to the official records of such convictions at the
state and local level. It does not appear to us that, in
accomplishing this purpose, the bill offends the equal pro-
tection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States constitution.
A brief review of the general rules applicable to equal pro-
tection challenges to legislative enactments will illustrate
this point. The Fourteenth Amendment to the federal consti-
tution prevents the states of the union from denying to any
person within their jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws. The Kansas Supreme Court has held that the provisions
of the Kansas Constitution declaring that all men are possessed
of equal and inalienable natural rights and that all free
governments are instituted for the equal protection and bene-
fit of the people are the Kansas counterparts to the equal
protection guarantees found in the Fourteenth Amendment. Kan.
Const., Bill of Rights §§1,2; Stephens v. Synder Clinic Asso-
ciation, 230 Kan. 115 (1981).
The equal protection guarantee found in the Kansas and Federal
Constitutions does not prevent classification of persons and
objects for the purpose of legislation. A state legislature
does not violate equal protection simply by classifying per-
sons so that some are affected by legislation or regulation
differently than others. In State ex rel. Schneider v. Liggett,
223 Kan. 610, 616 (1978), the court discussed the tests to be
utilized in equal protection analysis.
"Traditionally, the yardstick for measuring
equal protection arguments has been the
'reasonable basis' test. The standard was
set forth in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420, 425-26, 6 L.Ed.2d 393, 81 S.Ct. 1101:
'' ' . . . The constitutional safeguard is
offended only if the classification rests
on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achieve-
ment of the .the State'sective. State legis-
latures are presumed to have acted within
their constitutional power despite the fact
that, in practice, their laws result in some
inequality. A statutory discrimination will
not be set aside if any state of facts rea-
sonably may be conceived to justify it. . . .
"In Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 25
L.Ed.2d 491, 90 S.Ct. 1153, reh. denied 398
U.S. 914, 26 L.Ed.2d 80, 90 S.Ct. 1684, it
was stated:	"'
ni . . If the classification has some "rea-
sonable basis," it does not offend the Con-
stitution simply because the classification
"is not made with mathematical nicety or be-
cause in practice it results in some inequal-
ity." Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.,
220 U.S. 61, 78. . . (p. 485.)
"A more stringent test has emerged, however,
in cases involving 'suspect classifications'
or 'fundamental interests.' Here the courts
peel away the protective presumption of con-
stitutionality and adopt an attitude of ac-
tive and critical analysis, subjecting the
classification to strict scrutiny. The bur-
den of proof to justify the classification
falls upon the state (See, Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618, 22 L.Ed.2d 600, 89 S.Ct. 1322.)
This test has been used to strike down classi-
fications based on race (Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010, 87 S.Ct. 1817);
sex (Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 30 L.Ed.2d
225, 92 S.Ct. 251); ethnic background
(Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 16 L.Ed.
2d 828, 86 S.Ct. 1717); residency (Shapiro v.
Thompson, supra); alienage (Sugarman v. Dougall,
413 U.S. 634, 37 L.Ed.2d 853, 93 S.Ct. 2842;
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 29 L.Ed.
2d 534, 91 S.Ct. 1848); and infringements of
fundamental rights, such as the right to
travel freely (Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330, 31 L.Ed.2d 274, 92 S.Ct. 995; Aptheker
v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 12 L.Ed.
2d 992, 84 S.Ct. 1659) or to practice one's
religion (Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
10 L.Ed.2d 965, 83 S.Ct. 1790)." See also
Manhattan Buildings, Inc. v. Hurley, 231 Kan.
20, 30 (1982).
It is clear to us that Senate Bill No. 310 does not burden
any recognized fundamental interests or produce a "suspect
classification" by restricting access to records of certain
speeding. convictions. Under an equal protection analysis,
the bill should be subject to the reasonable basis test dis-
cussed in the above quoted material. Legislative classifica-
tions which offend equal protection under the test are those
which are arbitary and which bear no reasonable relationship
to the accomplishment of a legitimate state purpose. As
recognized in Attorney General Opinion No. 83-117, the courts
have acknowledged the legitimate power of the legislature to
restrict access to official records and documents, including
access to records of certain criminal convictions. See
Stephens v. Van Arsdale, 227 Kan. 676 (1980). Senate Bill
No. 310 restricts access official documents for the purpose
of preventing insurance companies from using the documents
in rate and coverage determinations. The bill does not
create a class of individuals whom the state treats differ-
ently with regard to a speeding conviction. It does not dis-
criminate with regard to the state imposed sanctions which
are attendant to a speeding conviction. Senate Bill No. 310
creates a classification which affects only the records of
speeding convictions. Thus the persons affected by the bill
are those who may wish to have access to the records. The
bill restricts access to all persons and thus does not dis-
criminate in its effect upon those who would seek access to
such records. As noted above, the legislature may restrict
access to such records when it determines that such restric-
tions are prudent. For the purposes which the bill is obvi-
ously intended, it appears that the classification created
by the legislation does not violate the equal protection
guarantees of the United States and Kansas Constitutions.
In conclusion, we note that 1983 Senate Bill No. 310 (L.
1983, ch. 28) provides that speeding convictions for travel-
ing not more than 10 miles per hour in excess of the 55 mile
per hour speed limit established by K.S.A. 8-1336(a)(3) shall
not be part of the public record and shall not be considered
by any insurance company in establishing rates for an auto-
mobile liability insurance policy or cancelling such coverage.
The classification of accessible records created by 1983
Senate Bill No. 310 bears a reasonable relationship to a
legitimate legislative function and does not offend the
guarantees of equal protection found in the United States
and Kansas constitutions.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General
Mary F. Carson
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:BJS:MFC:hle

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