Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1983-181

1983-181Kanag

Testo completo

December 15, 1983
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 83- 181
Phillip Harris
City Attorney
Law Department
Justice Center
8500 Antioch
Overland Park, Kansas 66212
Re: Cities and Municipalities -- Municipal Courts --
Diversion Agreements; Driving While Under Influ-
ence of Alcohol
Synopsis: K.S.A. 12-4415(b) precludes a city attorney from
entering into a diversion agreement with a defen-
dant accused of driving a vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol or drugs if the defendant
has previously been convicted of such an offense
or been diverted from prosecution. This statute
should be read in pari materia with K.S.A.
8-1567(i), which establishes a five year limit
on consideration of prior offenses. Therefore,
if a defendant has been convicted of or diverted
from a DUI offense in the preceeding five years,
he or she is ineligible for diversion on a subse-
quent offense. Cited herein: K.S.A. 8-1567, as
amended by L. 1983, ch. 37, K.S.A. 12-4413, 12-4415,
L. 1982, ch. 144.
*
Dear Mr. Harris:
As City Attorney for Overland Park, Kansas, you request our
opinion on a question concerning the diversion of persons
accused of violating a city ordinance patterned after K.S.A.
8-1567, as amended by L. 1983, ch. 37. This statute, which
deals with the offense of driving a motor vehicle while
under the influence of alcohol or drugs, provides [at sub-
section (n)] that cities may adopt ordinances which make
such conduct an offense, provided that the minimum penalties
are the same and the maximum penalties do not exceed those
of K.S.A. 8-1567, as amended. The City of Overland Park
has done so, and offers diversion to certain offenders as
an alternative to prosecution. Your inquiry arises out of
the wording of one of the diversion statutes for municipal
courts found at K.S.A. 12-4413 et seq.
Specifically, K.S.A. 12-4415 sets forth the factors which a
city prosecutor shall consider in determining whether to
offer diversion to a defendant accused of an "alcohol re-
lated offense," which is defined by K.S.A. 12-4413(3) as a
violation of K.S.A. 8-1567 or a city ordinance modeled
thereafter. After enumerating the non-exclusive list, the
statute states [at subsection (b)]:
"A city attorney shall not enter into a di-
version agreement in lieu of further criminal
proceedings on a complaint alleging a viola-
tion of an alcohol related offense if the
defendant has previously participated in di-
version of an alcohol related offense or has
previously been convicted of or plead nolo
contendere to a violation of an alcohol re-
lated offense in this state."
In view of the fact that the language of the subsection is
open-ended, and imposes no time limit beyond which a diver-
sion or conviction shall not be considered, you ask whether
a defendant can be rendered ineligible for diversion by
virtue of any previous conviction or diversion, no matter
how far in the past.
It should first be noted that the statutes governing diver-
sion in municipal court were a part of the 1982 act (ch. 144
of the session laws of that year) which also significantly
amended K.S.A. 8-1567. As part of the latter amendments, a
new subsection (i) was added which defined what constituted
a "conviction" under the statute. As further amended by L.
1983, ch. 37, the subsection provides:
"For the purpose of determining whether a
conviction is a first, second or third or
subsequent conviction for the purpose of
sentencing under this section, the term 'con-
viction' includes being convicted of a viola-
tion of this section or entering into a diver
sion agreement in lieu of further criminal
proceedings on a complaint alleging a viola-
tion of this section. For such purpose 'con-
viction' also includes being convicted of a
violation of a law of another state or an
ordinance of any municipality which prohibits
the acts that this section prohibits, or en-
tering into a diversion agreement in lieu of
further criminal proceedings in a case alleg-
ing a violation of such a law or ordinance.
For the purpose of this section, only convic-
tions occurring in the immediately preceding
five years, including prior to the effective
date of this act, shall be taken into account."
(Emphasis added.)
As construed by a prior opinion of this office, the under-
scored language above imposes a five year limit upon those
convictions or diversions which may be considered when an
individual is again the subject of a DUI prosecution. Attor-
ney General Opinion No. 82-185. As clarified by the 1983
amendment, prosecutors may only look back to the five year
period immediately proceeding the present violation, but may
include violations which occurred prior to the effective
date of the act (July 1, 1982).
In our opinion, this five year limit should be considered
when applying the provisions of the municipal diversion
statutes, including K.S.A. 12-4415. Both that statute and
K.S.A. 8-1567 were part of the same act in 1982, and addi-
tionally reference the same subject matter. As such, they
should be read in pari materia with one another. Capital
Electric Line Builders, Inc. v. Lennen, 232 Kan. 379, affm.
as modif., 232 Kan. 652 (1982). The use of the same time
period throughout the statutes allows them to be in harmony
with one another, which result is always to be achieved if
reasonably possible to do so. Callaway v. City of Overland
Park, 211 Kan. 646 (1973). It also avoids the inconsistency
of allowing an individual to start with a clean record after
5 years for purposes of sentencing, yet deny him that oppor-
tunity for purposes of diversion. Given the reasonable al-
ternative, such an inconsistent result should not be found
to be the intent of the legislature. See, e.g., Taylor v.
Department of Health and Environment, 230 Kan. 283 (1981).
In conclusion, K.S.A. 12-4415(b) precludes a city attorney
from entering into a diversion agreement with a defendant
accused of driving a vehicle while under the influence of
alcohol or drugs if the defendant has previously been con-
victed of such an offense or been diverted from prosecution.
While the statute would appear to preclude diversion if a
defendant had ever been convicted or diverted, it should
be read in pari materia with K.S.A. 8-1567(i), which estab-
lishes a five year limit on consideration of prior offenses.
Therefore, if a defendant has been convicted of or diverted
from a DUI offense in the preceeding five years, he or she
is ineligible for diversion on a subsequent offense-.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS
JeffreyS.Southard
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:BJS:JSS:hle

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