Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1983-131

1983-131Kanag

Testo completo

September 9, 1983
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 83- 131
The Honorable Ronald R. Hein
State Senator, Twentieth District
6031 West 24th Terrace
Topeka, Kansas 66614
Re: Crimes and Punishments -- Sex Offenses -- Promoting
Prostitution; Newspaper Advertisements
Synopsis: A newspaper may refuse to accept for publication
any advertisement which is presented to it with-
out a violation of the First or Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the United States Constitution, except
in those situations where a clear restraint of
trade results or some other protected right is
infringed. A newspaper may accordingly refuse
to publish any individual advertisement or class
of advertisements for businesses such as massage
parlors. Should such advertisements be accepted
for publication, a newspaper would not be engaging
in any activity which is included in the criminal
offense of promoting prostitution (K.S.A. 21-3513),
which, as a penal statute, must be narrowly construed.
Cited herein: K.S.A. 21-3513, U.S. Const., Amend. I,
and Amend. XIV.
Dear Senator Hein:
On behalf of the Department of Administration of Justice of
the Topeka Outreach Center of Wichita State University, you
have requested the opinion of this office on three inter-
related questions which concern the publication by newspapers
of advertisements for massage parlors. Specifically, you in-
quire: (1) are newspapers required to publish any advertise-
ments which they are requested to print; (2) are such news-
papers required to run advertisements for businesses where
arrests or convictions for prostitution have been made: and
(3) can a newspaper be prosecuted under Kansas statute
(K.S.A. 21-3513) for advertising a business at which arrests
or convictions for prostitution have been made, where such
arrests or convictions arise out of the nature of the business?
Your first two inquiries may be addressed together, since both
concern the obligation of newspapers to publish paid advertise-
ments. Moreover, although your letter refers to both
publically owned and private newspapers, we know of no legal distinction
between them which is relevant to your inquiry. Although Kansas
Courts have not had the opportunity to rule on the question of
an advertister's right to access to the public through a news-
paper, there are numerous cases from other state and federal
jurisdictions on this point. Almost without exception, they
have held that a newspaper is under no obligation to print any
advertisement which is presented to it, and may decline to do
so without having to provide any justification for its refusal.
Wisconsin Assn. of Nursing Homes v. Journal Co., 92 Wis.2d 709,
285 N.W.2d 891 (1979), Modla v. Tribune Publishing Co., 14 Ariz.
App. 82, 480 P.2d 999 (1971), Chicago Joint Bd., Amalgamated
Clothing Workers v. Chicago Tribune Co., 435 F.2d 470 (7th
Cir. 1970). The protections afforded by the First Amendment
[Carpets by the Carload, Inc. v. Warren, 368 F.Supp. 1075
(E.D. Wis. 1973)] and the Fourteenth Amendment [Associates
& Aldrich Company v. Times Mirror Company, 440 F.2d 133 (9th
Cir. 1971)] simply do not apply in the area of a newspaper's
discretion over what advertising to accept or reject, or the
format in which it may be run.
Only in those cases where a newspaper uses its discretion
under the First Amendment to attempt to destroy competition
and establish a monopoly (i.e., an advertiser is prohibited
from advertising with a competitor) have courts made an exception
to this general rule. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342
U.S. 143, 72 S.Ct. 181, 96 L.Ed.2d 162 (1951). Additionally,
in the case of publications which serve as the official voice
of a particular group, courts have on occasion found counter-
vailing interests, such as the right to fair and open corporate
elections, which modify the otherwise absolute discretion.
Fitzgerald v. National Rifle Association, 383 F.Supp. 162
(D.N.J. 1974). Such cases are by far the exception rather
than the rule, however.
Given the above, it is our opinion that a newspaper may estab-
lish as a general policy its refusal to accept for publication
any advertisements for businesses where arrests or convictions
for prostitution have been made. Indeed, given the broad
sweep of the decisions cited above, a newspaper could decline
to publish any advertisements for massage parlors, adult book
stores, adult cinemas or other businesses of a similar nature.
See, e.g., Bloss v. Federated Publications, Inc., 380 Mich. 485,
157 N.W.2d 241 (1968). Advertisers do not have any constitutional
right of access to a newspaper. Newspaper Printing Corp. v.
Galbreath, 580 S.W.2d 777 (Tenn. 1979) and cases cited therein
at 779.
Your third inquiry goes to the potential criminal liability
of a newspaper which runs ads for a business at which there
have been arrests made or convictions obtained for prostitu-
tion. The statute you cite, K.S.A. 21-3513, concerns the
offense of promoting prostitution, and defines the crime to
include:
"(a) Establishing, owning, maintaining or
managing a house of prostitution, or partici-
pating in the establishment, ownership, main-
tenance, or management thereof; or
"(b) Permitting any place partially or wholly
owned or controlled by the defendant to be
used as a house of prostitution; or
"(c) Procuring a prostitute for a house of
prostitution; or
"(d) Inducing another to become a prostitute;
or
"(e) Soliciting a patron for a prostitute or
for a house of prostitution; or
"(f) Procuring a prostitute for a patron; or
"(g) Procuring transportation for, paying
for the transportation of, or transporting a
person within this state with the intention
of assisting or promoting that person's en-
gaging in prostitution; or
"(h) Being employed to perform any act which
is prohibited by this section." (Emphasis
added.)
We presume from your question that you assume a situation
in which the newspaper, by virtue of the prior arrests, has
knowledge of the activities of the owners or employees of
the particular business. In the absence of such knowledge,
a newspaper has been held not to be liable for the content
of ads it prints, even though the ads are subsequently shown
to be in violation of a state civil rights act. Commonwealth
v. Pittsburg Press, 483 Pa. 314, 396 A.2d 1187 (1979). Al-
though cases do exist in which publishers have been convicted
for printing advertisements which they had reason to know were
obscene [Dunlop v. United States, 165 U.S. 486, 41 L.Ed. 799
(1899)], such decisions hinge both on the particular facts
of the case and statutes which specifically made the publica-
tion a criminal offense. In that K.S.A. 21-3513 is a penal
statute, it must be narrowly construed [State v. Kearns, 229
Kan. 207 (1981)], and in our opinion fails to place a news-
paper on notice that the mere printing of such an ad would
incur criminal liability. See, e.g., State v. Stauffer
Communications, Inc., 225 Kan. 540 (1979).
In conclusion, a newspaper may refuse to accept for publication
any advertisement which is presented to it without a violation
of the First or Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution, except in those situations where a clear restraint
of trade results or some other protected right is infringed.
A newspaper may accordingly refuse to publish any individual
advertisement or class of advertisements for businesses such
as massage parlors. Should such advertisements be accepted
for publication, a newspaper would not be engaging in an ac-
tivity which is included in the criminal offense of promoting
prostitution (K.S.A. 12-3513), which, as a penal statute, must
be narrowly construed.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS
Jeffrey S. Southard
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:BJS:JSS:hle

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