Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1983-101

1983-101Kanag

Testo completo

June 28, 1983
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 83- 101
Mr. Brian Moline, Esq.
General Counsel
State Corporation Commission
Fourth Floor, State Office Building
Topeka, Kansas 66612
RE: Public Utilities -- Powers of the State Corporation
Commission -- Intrastate Rail Regulation
Synopsis: Where Section 214 of the Staggers Rail Act of
1980 (49 U.S.C. §(KCC1), explicitly providing
for the regulation of intrastate rail rates by
the KCCerstate Commerce Commission, is in conflict
with Kansas statutes providing for the regulation
of intrastate rail rates by the State Corporation
Commission, federal law must prevail, pursuant to
the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution, Art. VI. Cited herein: K.S.A. 66-117,
66-170, 49 U.S.C. § 10101, 49 U.S.C. § 10501, 49
U.S.C. § 10701, 49 U.S.C. § 10706, 49 U.S.C. § 10707,
49 U.S.C. § 10712, 49 U.S.C. § 10762, 49 U.S.C. §
11501, and U.S. Constitution, Art. VI.
Dear Mr. Moline:
As General Counsel for the State Corporation Commission .(KCC)
you have asked for our opinion regarding the regulatory authority
of the"KCC over intrastate rates, where Congress, by means of
the Staggers Rail Act of 1980 created statutes regulated by the
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) which conflict with state
laws. Your specific inquiry is whether the KCC can assume that
the federal government has preempted the field of intrastate
rail rate regulation, and is therefore required to act in
accordance with federal law where it conflicts with state law on
intrastate rail rates, or must the KCC follow present state law
until the legislature specifically authorizes the KCC to act in
conformance with the Staggers Rail Act. As a preliminary matter
we would emphasize that you have not asked, and we have not
addressed, any question concerning the constitutionality of the
Staggers Rail Act of 1980, which we understand is on appeal in
The State of Texas, et al. v. United States of America, et al.,
No. 82-1693 in the Fifth Circuit.
The question you pose was addressed in a 1982 Kentucky case where
a railroad brought suit against a utility company to collect
amounts due the railroad pursuant to newly enacted tariffs on
file with the ICC. Louisville & N.R. CO. v. Kentucky Utilities Co.,
535 F. Supp. 244 (1982). The federal district court, in holding
that the utility was required to pay rates set out in the tariff
on file with the ICC, rather than the lower rate set by the
Kentucky Railroad Commission, stated:
"On October 1, 1980, Congress enacted the
Staggers Rail Act to assist the nation's
railroads in rehabilitating the rail system
and to offset the industry's inadequate
rate of return on investment. . . . As part
of the Staggers Rail Act, under Section 214
(b)(6), Congress preempted state authority
to establish general rate increases for
commerce traveling wholly intrastate. It
is undisputed that the rate increases at
issue are "general rate increases" subject
to Section 214(b)(6); and it is likwise un-
disputed that Congress was authorized under
the Interstate. Commerce Clause to enact
Section 214(b)(6)." (Id at 246.)
"[T]here is nothing in the statute to suggest
that rail carriers must comply with state
filing requirements to enforce prescribed
intrastate tariff increases subsequent to
October 1, 1980. Section 214(b)(6), 49
U.S.C. § 11501(b)(6), is explicit: the
statute wholly preempts state regulatory
authority to prescribe certain interstate
and intrastate rate increases. Since the
ICC has the exclusive duty to establish
general rate increases, Kentucky has the
correlative duty not to interfere with
the agency's exercise of its mandate. The
statute wholly preempts inconsistent Kentucky
law defining filing procedure, since Kentucky
no longer has jurisdiction to establish
certain intrastate tariff increases."
(Id at 247.) (Emphasis added.)
The language of Section 214(b)(6) [49 U.S.C. 5 11501(b)(6)]
provides:
"Notwithstanding any other provision of this
subtitle [49 USCS 55 10101 et seq.], a State
authority may not exercise any jurisdiction
over general rate increases under section
10706 of this title [49 USCS § 10706], in-
flation-based rate increases under section
10712 of this title [49 USCS § 10712], or fuel
adjustment surcharges approved by the Commis-
sion."
A plain reading of the emphasized part of the Louisville case
and the statute clearly suggests that it was the intent of the
Congress, in enacting the quoted section of the Staggers Rail
Act of 1980, to wholly preempt state regulation of tariff rates.
Pertinent parts of other subsections of 49 U.S.C. 5 11501
suggesting a preemption of state laws are:
"(b)(1) A State authority may only exercise
jurisdiction over intrastate transportation
provided by a rail carrier providing trans-
portation subject to the jurisdiction of the
Commission under subchapter I of chapter 105
of this title if such State authority exercises
such jurisdiction exclusively in accordance
with the provisions of this subtitle.
• • •
(b)(4)(A) Any State authority which is denied
certification or which does not seek certifi-
cation may not exercise any jurisdiction over
intrastate rates, classifications, rules, and
practices until it receives certification under
this subsection. . . .
(c) Any rail carrier providing transportation
subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission
under subchapter I of chapter 105 of this
title may petition the Commission to review
the decision of any State authority, in any
administrative proceeding in which the law-
fulness of an intrastate rate, classification,
rule, or practice is determined, on the grounds
that the standards and procedures applied by
the State were not in accordance with the pro-
visions of this subtitle. . . .
(d)(1) The Commission has exclusive authority
to prescribe an intrastate rate for transpor-
tation provided by a rail carrier subject to
the jurisdiction of the Commission under sub-
chapter I of chapter 105 of this title [49 USCS
55 10501 et seq.] when--
(A) a rail carrier files with an appropriate
State authority a change in an intrastate
rate, or a change in a classification, rule,
or practice that has the effect of changing
an intrastate rate, that adjusts the rate to
the rate charged on similar traffic moving
in interstate or foreign commerce; and
(B) the State authority does not act finally
on the change by the 120th day after it was
filed.
(2) When a rail carrier files an application
with the Commission under this subsection, the
Commission shall prescribe the intrastate rate
under the standards of subsection (a) of this
section. Notice of the application shall be
served on the State authority and chapter 107
or this title [49 USCS 55 10701 et seq.)"
The statutory language, above, emphasizes the intent of Congress
that ultimate jurisdiction and regulatory authority over
intrastate rates lies with the ICC. Where conflicts between
state and federal laws arise, federal law supersedes state law.
An example of where federal law conflicts with state law is
49 U.S.C. § 10762(c)(3) which provides that new rail rate increases
become effective upon 20 days notice, while K.S.A. 66-170
prohibits increases in rail rates by the KCC without giving 60
days notice.
Another illustration of a conflict is 49 U.S.C. § 10707(b)
(1) which mandates a final decision on rail rate cases within
5 months while K.S.A. 66-117 grants the KCC 240 days in which
to make a decision.
The United States Supreme Court discussed the preemption of state
law by federal statute or regulation at some length in Chicago
and North Western Transportation Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co.,
450 U.S. 311, 101 S.Ct. 1124, 67 L.Ed.2d 258 (1981). Justice
Marshall, in delivering the opinion of the court, observed that:
"The underlying rationale of the pre-emption
doctrine, as stated more than a century and a
half ago, is that the Supremacy Clause invali-
dates state laws that 'interfere with, or are
contrary to, the laws of Congress. . .
Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 211, 6 L.Ed. 23
(1824). The doctrine does not and could not
in our federal system withdraw from the States
either the 'power to regulate where the acti-
vity regulated [is] a merely peripheral con-
cern' a federal law, San Diego Building Trades
Council v. Garmon, or the authority to legis-
late when Congress could have regulated 'a
distinctive part of a subject which is peculiar-
ly adapted to local regulation. . .but did not.'
But when Congress has chosen to legislate
pursuant to its constitutional powers, then
a court must find local law pre-empted by
federal regulation whenever the 'challenged
state statute "stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full
purpose and objectives of Congress."' Perez
v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 649, 91 S.Ct.
1704, 1711, 29 L.Ed.2d 233 (1971), quoting
Hines v. Davidowitz, supra, at 67-68, 61
S.Ct., at 404." (Id at 1131.)
The court in Chicago and North Western Transportation Co. v.
Kalo Brick & Tile Co., supra, further states that, the common
rationale of the Supreme Court's treatment of cases involving
the Interstate Commerce Act in favor of the federal statutes,
as opposed to conflicting state statutes is that:
"[T]here can be no divided authority over
interstate commerce, and. . .the acts of
Congress on that subject are supreme and
exclusive.' Missouri Pacific R. Co. v.
Stroud, 267 U.S. 404, 408, 45 S.Ct. 243,
245, 69 L.Ed. 683 (1925). Consequently,
state efforts to regulate commerce must fall
when they conflict with or interfere with
federal authority over the same activity."
(Id at 1131.)
An even more recent analysis of the preemption doctrine, in which
a regulation of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board preempted state
law, was similarly treated in Fidelity Federal S. & L. Assn. v.
de la Cuesta, U.S. , 102 S.Ct. , 73 L.Ed.2d 664, 674-
675, (1982). Justice Blackman, speaking for the court, concluded
"The pre-emption doctrine, which has its
roots in the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const,
Art VI, cl 2, requires us to examine con-
gressional intent. Pre-emption may be
either express or implied, and 'is compelled
whether Congress' command is explicitly stated
in the statute's language or implicitly con-
tained in its structure and purpose.' Jones
v. Rath Packing Co., 430 US 519, 525, 51 L
Ed 2d 604, 97 S Ct 1305 (1977)." Absent
explicit pre-emptive language, Congress'
intent to supersede state law altogether
may be inferred because '[t]he scheme of
federal regulation may be so pervasive that
Congress left no room for the states to sup-
plement it,' because 'the Act of Congress may
touch a field in which the federal interest
is so dominant that the federal system will
be assumed to preclude enforcement of state
laws on the same subject,' or because 'the
object sought to be obtained by federal law
and the character of obligations imposed
by it may reveal the same purpose.' Rice
v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp. 331 US 218, 230,
91 L Ed 1447, 67 S Ct 1146 (1947)."
"Even where Congress has not completely dis-
placed state regulation in a specific area,
state law is nullified to the extent that it
actually conflicts with federal law. Such a
conflict arises when "compliance with both
federal and state regulations is a physical
impossibility,' Florida Lime & Avocado Growers
Inc. v. Paul, 373 US 132, 142-143, 10 L Ed 2d
248, 83 S Ct 1210 (1963), or when state law
'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and ob-
jectives of Congress,' Hines v. Davidowitz,
312 US 52, 67, 85 L Ed 581, 61 S Ct 399 (1941)."
Based upon the most recent court decisions and the language of
Staggers Rail Act, we are compelled to conclude that the federal
statute explicitly grants ultimate jurisdiction over intrastate
rail rates to the ICC rather than state authorities, and it is
the intent of Congress that the federal government preempt the
field of intrastate rail regulation. Thus, where the Staggers
Rail Act of 1980 and the Kansas statutes regulating intrastate
rail rates conflict, federal law must prevail.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS
Carl M. Anderson
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:BJS:CMA:ljh

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