Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1983-048

1983-048Kanag

Testo completo

April 4, 1983
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 83- 48
The Honorable Jack H. Brier
Secretary of State
2nd Floor, Statehouse
Topeka, Kansas 66612
Re: Notaries Public and Commissioners -- Notaries
Public -- Revocation of Appointments
Synopsis: An applicant for appointment by the secretary of
state as a notary public must include in the appli-
cation an oath of office, and the failure to take
the oath of office may constitute grounds for revo-
cation of a notary's appointment pursuant to K.S.A.
1982 Supp. 53-118. However, whether an oath has
been legally administered is a question of fact.
Prior to revoking the appointment of a notary pub-
lic, the secretary of state must give reasonable
notice thereof and provide an opportunity for the
notary to respond to the charges being relied upon
as grounds for revocation at a hearing held for
such purpose. Further, revocation of a notary's
appointment pursuant to K.S.A. 1982 Supp. 53-118
operates prospectively, and the secretary of state
has no authority to revoke a notary's appointment
ab initio.
Even though there may have been a defect in a per-
son's appointment as a notary public, or such per-
son failed to conform to some condition precedent
to assuming the office of notary public, such per-
son is nonetheless a de facto officer where such
person was issued a certificate of appointment as
a notary, such person held himself or herself out
to the public as being a duly appointed notary and,
in availing themselves of the notary's services,
the public, without inquiry, clearly has presumed
such person to be a validly appointed officer. As
a consequence, the acts of such person as a de
facto officer are as valid and effectual, where
they concern the public or the rights of third
parties, as though such person was an officer de
jure, and such acts are not subject to collateral
attack. Cited herein: K.S.A. 1982 Supp. 53-101,
53-102, 53-104, 53-105, 53-105a, 53-116, 53-117,
53-118, K.S.A. 54-102, 54-104, 54-106.
*
Dear Secretary Brier:
You have posed several questions regarding your authority to
revoke the appointment of a notary public. All of your ques-
tions are predicated on a request made of you by an attorney
in Overland Park, Kansas, that appointments of two notaries
public be set aside ab initio, because they failed, in his
judgment, to properly take the oath of office. In support
of his contention, he has provided you with excerpts from
depositions taken of these notaries, in which they indicate
that they did not verbally take the oath of office required
of notaries public. For this reason, the attorney suggests
that these notaries' appointments were void from the be-
ginning and, as a consequence, they lacked power and authority
to perform notarial acts. Within the context of these facts,
you have first asked whether you have authority "to set aside
ab initio a notary's appointment."
Before responding to this question, a review of pertinent
statutes is appropriate. K.S.A. 1982 Supp. 53-101 authorizes
the appointment of notaries public for terms of four years.
K.S.A. 1982 Supp. 53-102 imposes conditions precedent to any
such appointment as follows:
"Every person, before entering upon the duties
of a notary public, shall file with the secre-
tary of state an application for appointment
as a notary public, which shall also include
an oath of office and a good and sufficient
bond to the state of Kansas in the sum of two
thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500), with
one or more sureties to be approved by the
secretary of state. The bond shall be condi-
tioned upon the faithful performance of all
notarial acts in accordance with this act.
Every notary public before receiving the ap-
pointment as a notary public shall also file
with the secretary of state the official sig-
nature and an impression of the seal to be
used by the notary public." (Emphasis added.)
Upon satisfying these conditions and payment of the fee pre-
scribed by K.S.A. 1982 Supp. 53-104, K.S.A. 1982 Supp. 53-105a
provides for the issuance of a certificate of appointment to
the applicant, if the secretary of state is "satisfied the
applicant is qualified to be appointed as a notary public."
As indicated by the emphasized language in the above-quoted
provisions of K.S.A. 1982 Supp. 53-102, one of the prerequi-
sites for appointment as a notary public is including an oath
of office with the application filed with the secretary of
state. Here, we note that K.S.A. 54-106 provides:
"All officers elected or appointed under any
law of the state of Kansas shall, before en-
tering upon the duties of their respective
offices, take and subscribe an oath or affir-
mation, as follows:
"'I do solemnly swear [or affirm, as the case
may be] that I will support the constitution
of the United States and the constitution of
the state of Kansas, and faithfully discharge
the duties of . So help me God."
(Emphasis added.)
We also note that K.S.A. 54-102 requires that "all oaths shall
be administered by laying the right hand upon the Holy Bible
or by the uplifted right hand." From the documents submitted
with your request, it is apparent that both of the notaries
public in question subscribed to the oath set forth in K.S.A.
54-106 and filed a copy of the signed oath with your office.
Thereupon, a certificate of appointment as a notary public
was issued to each applicant. However, the information pro-
vided you by the aforementioned attorney indicates that in
neither case did the applicant take the oath verbally or
comply with the requirements of K.S.A. 54-102, i.e., that
the person taking the oath raise his or her right hand or
place it upon the Bible. Thus, the initial issue to be re-
solved is whether the oath was properly taken under these
circumstances.
In 1964, this office issued a letter in response to a muni-
cipal court judge's question whether a public officer must
be verbally sworn, as well as subscribing to the oath.
Acknowledging the statutory language, "take and subscribe
an oath or affirmation" used in K.S.A. 54-106, that letter
stated:
"While some unequivocal act is necessary, a
person may and should be sworn in a form and
mode which he regards as binding on his con-
science and where a statute lays down a par-
ticular form of oath or affirmation that form
should be followed. We think it is clear from
the statute that it is necessary that a public
official take the oath verbally as well as
subscribing to it." (Emphasis added.)
We concur in that advice. However, the fact that an oath
"should" be taken in the manner indicated in the letter is
not determinative of whether the statutes preclude taking
the oath in a manner which deviates to some extent from the
statutory scheme. The propriety of such deviation depends
on whether the statutory scheme is mandatory or directory.
The Kansas Supreme Court has distinguished between directory
and mandatory statutory language, as follows:
"The difference between directory and manda-
tory statutes, where their provisions are not
adhered to, is one of effect only; the legis-
lature intends neither to be disregarded. How-
ever, violation of the former is attended with
no consequences but failure to comply with the
requirements of the latter either invalidates
purported transactions or subjects the noncom-
plier to affirmative legal liabilities (2
Sutherland Statutory Construction [3rd ed.]
§2801)." Wilcox v. Billings, 200 Kan. 654,
657.
There are numerous cases in which our Supreme Court has enun-
ciated guidelines for determining the mandatory or directory
nature of a statute. See, e.g., Wilcox v. Billings, supra;
Paul v. City of Manhattan, 212 Kan. 381 (1973); Bell v. City
of Topeka, 220 Kan. 405 (1976). However, we think it unnec-
cessary to review those guidelines here. Even though there
are no Kansas cases precisely determinative of this issue,
we believe the conclusion may be derived implicitly from the
decisions of the Supreme Court which have addressed the sta-
tutory provisions pertinent to this issue.
In State v. Kemp, 137 Kan. 290 (1933), the defendant-appellant
was convicted of perjury in connection with making false
statements under oath in a verified pleading. On appeal, he
contended that "there was no proof an oath was administered."
Id. at 291. Such contention was premised on the failure to
observe all the requirements of R.S. (now K.S.A.) 54-102 and
54-104 in administering the oath. The Court discussed this
issue, as follows:
"It was a question of fact whether Kemp swore
on oath legally administered. The notary who
officiated in the proceeding identified his
certificate and told what occurred. His testi-
mony respecting what occurred showed none of
the statutory requirements relating to adminis-
tration of an oath were observed. But there
was the notary's certificate. The statute says
the certificate was evidence the affidavit was
duly made. In his brief Kemp discusses presump-
tions, which Dean Wigmore called artificial
rules which stand in place of proof until the
contrary is shown, and which the supreme court
of Missouri called bats of the law flitting
in the twilight but disappearing in the sun-
shine of actual evidence. We have no presump-
tion here. We have the notary's written state-
ment under signature and seal, made at the time.
Under the sunshine of the statute it has the
radiance of actual fact. We have the notary's
oral statement. It flits in the twilight of
memory of things two and a half years old.
The jury could believe either.
"Besides what has been said, Kemp went to the
notary with a blank form to be made into an
affidavit with a certificate that the formali-
ties of a solemn ceremony had been observed.
The purpose was to certify an answer to be filed
in court, verification being necessary properly
to raise the issue which the answer purported
to raise. The notary had before him the certi-
ficate to be executed, which if executed would
declare Kemp was sworn. The notary executed
the certificate. Manifestly, both parties in-
tended that out of Kemp's visit to the notary
there should come what would have the effect
of administration of an oath; and the court
holds that in the absence of clear proof the
ceremony, or lack of ceremony, was designed by
the participants to leave Kemp unsworn, the
legal effect of what occurred was the same as
if Kemp was sworn according to formalities pre-
scribed for administration of an oath. (State
v. Madigan, 57 Minn. 425; Atwood v. State,
146 Miss. 662; Komp v. State, 129 Wis. 20.)"
(Emphasis added.) Id. at 291, 292.
A portion of the foregoing excerpt was quoted in State v.
Anderson, 178 Kan. 322 (1955), involving a similar prosecu-
tion for perjury. There, the defendant, a deputy sheriff,
was convicted of perjury for swearing to a false statement
for the purpose of having a criminal prosecution instituted.
In reaching a conclusion similar to that obtained in State
v. Kemp, supra, the Court analyzed defendant's contentions,
as follows:
"Appellant contends he was not under oath when
he merely signed the complaint and the judge
charged with administering the oath signed
the same in silence and made no statements to
nor asked him any questions. Our statute
(G.S. 1949, 54-102) does provide that: 'All
oaths shall be administered by laying the right
hand upon the Holy Bible, or by the uplifted
right hand.' and it is clear from the evidence
that statutory requirements and formality were
not had as they should have been. But it is
common knowledge that such requirements are
not always complied with strictly. The ques-
tion is whether under the circumstances what
was done was an utter nullity. Appellant told
the county judge his version of why Gilbert
Libby should be arrested and prosecuted and
the judge thereupon prepared a complaint the
first words of which were 'Duane Anderson be-
ing duly sworn, on oath says . . .' After its
completion the judge handed the complaint to
Anderson, who read it, signed it, and handed
it to the judge and saw him sign the jurat and
affix his official seal. Surely some weight
must be given to opening statements of the
complaint and to the physical acts of the par-
ties even though statutory formalities were
not observed, and especially is this true in
the light of the testimony of the judge that
he believed Anderson was swearing to the com-
plaint, and there was no design by either the
judge or Anderson to leave Anderson unsworn."
(Emphasis added.) Id. at 327.
We also note the case of State v. Jones, 125 Kan. 147 (1928),
where the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment
sustaining a motion to quash "on the ground that the complaint
on which the warrant [for defendant's arrest] had been issued
was not properly verified," i.e., the formalities of 54-102
and 54-104 had not been observed.
Several important points are to be derived from these cases.
First, it is obvious that the Kansas Supreme Court has not
only recognized that there is not always strict adherence to
the statutory requirements attending the administration of
oaths, but has determined that in certain cases an oath may
be properly administered despite a failure to strictly ob-
serve the requisite formalities. Implicitly, therefore, the
Court has regarded the pertinent statutes as being directory
in nature.
Second, in those instances where the Court has determined
that an oath had, in fact, been administered, notwithstanding
non-observance of some of the statutorily-required formalities,
such determination has been founded on the intentions and
beliefs of the parties involved. In both Kemp and Anderson,
supra, the Court found that the respective parties intended
that their actions result in the administration of an oath,
and that they believed their actions had, in fact, accomplished
that objective.
Finally, and as a necessary consequence of the foregoing
conclusions, it is clear that whether an oath has been legally
administered is a question of fact. The pertinent facts and
circumstances must be established and considered, so that the
intentions and beliefs of the involved parties may be ascer-
tained therefrom.
With these observations in mind, it is appropriate to consider
the authority to revoke the appointment of a notary public.
K.S.A. 1982 Supp. 53-118 provides in pertinent part:
"(a) The secretary of state may refuse to
appoint any person as a notary public or may
revoke the appointment of any notary public
upon any of the following grounds:
"(1) Substantial or material misstatement or
omission in the application submitted to the
secretary of state;
"(2) conviction of a felony or of a lesser
offense involving moral turpitude or of a
nature incompatible with the duties of a notary
public. A conviction after a plea of nolo
contendere is deemed to be a conviction with-
in the meaning of this subsection;
"(3) revocation, suspension or denial of a
professional license, if such revocation, sus-
pension or denial was for misconduct, dishon-
esty or any cause substantially relating to
the duties or responsibilities of a notary
public;
"(4) cessation of United States citizenship;
"(5) incapacitation to such a degree that the
person is incapable of reading or writing the
English language;
"(6) failure to exercise the powers and duties
of a notary public in accordance with this act."
In light of the factual circumstances prompting your request,
it would appear that subsection (a)(1) of this statute sets
forth a possible basis for revocation. As noted previously,
the notary's oath of office is included in the application
for appointment as a notary. Hence, if the applicant did
not take the oath of office as statutorily required, but in-
dicated by the application that the oath had, in fact, been
administered, we believe there is a basis for revoking the
notary's appointment on the ground that there was a "[s]ub-
stantial or material misstatement . . . in the application
submitted to the secretary of state." However, it is clear
that such revocation would be premised on the fact that the
notary did not take the oath of office, and we hasten to
reiterate that this is a question of fact. It must be de-
termined whether, under the relevant facts, the persons pur-
porting to administer and take the oath intended and believed
the oath was administered and taken, respectively.
This leads to a consideration of your questions regarding the
procedures prerequisite to a revocation. Essential to this
issue is the fact that notaries public are public officers.
In stating this conclusion, we are cognizant that K.S.A. 1982
Supp. 53-101 provides that "[n]otaries public shall not be
considered as state officers." However, we note that notaries
public: (1) are appointed for a term of four years (53-101);
(2) are required to take an oath of office (53-102); (3) are
required to give a good and sufficient bond; (4) are required
to provide and use a notarial seal to "authenticate all offi-
cial acts, attestations and instruments" (53-105); (5) must
resign their appointments, in order to cease being a notary
in Kansas (53-116); (6) are not automatically reappointed as
notaries at the expiration of their respective terms, but
must comply with the statutory requirements for initial appoint-
ments in order to serve for successive terms (53-117); and
(7) cannot be removed except upon revocation of their appoint-
ments pursuant to specific grounds (53-118). In our judgment,
these are all indicia of a public office.
In a letter opinion dated February 21, 1969 (VI Op. Att'y Gen.
656), Attorney General Frizzell identified the necessary ele-
ments of a public office, as follows:
"(1) the office must be created by the consti-
tution or legislature of the state or created
by [a] municipality or other body through au-
thority conferred by the legislature; (2) the
position must possess a delegation of a por-
tion of the sovereign power of government, to
be exercised for the benefit of the public;
(3) the powers conferred, and the duties to
be discharged, must be defined, directly or
impliedly, by the legislature or through leg-
islative authority; (4) the duties must be per-
formed independently and without control of a
superior power, other than the law, unless
they be those of an inferior or subordinate
office, created or authorized by the legis-
lature, and by it placed under the general
control of a superior officer or body; (5)
and the position must have some permanency
and continuity, and not be only temporary or
occasional. See Jagger v. Green, 90 Kan. 153,
158-159 (1913); Jones v. Botkin, 92 Kan. 242,
246-247 (1914); Miller v. Ottawa Co. Commis-
sioners, 146 Kan. 481, 484, 485 (1937)." VI
Op. Att'y Gen. at 656-657."
Clearly, a notary public satisfies these requirements. The
position of notary public is statutorily created; notaries'
powers and duties are statutorily conferred and defined, re-
spectively; subject only to the secretary of state's autho-
rity to appoint and revoke appointments, their duties are
performed independently; even though there is no prescribed
number of notaries public or continuity of a particular
notary's position, there is relative permanency in a particu-
lar position, in the sense that a notary is appointed for a
specific term; and the authentication of documents, adminis-
tration of oaths and affirmations and the performance of
other notarial acts represent the exercise of a portion of
the sovereign power of state government for the benefit of
the public.
Finally, absent statutes specifically stating otherwise,
notaries generally have been considered public officers.
"Originally notaries were mere commercial scriveners. When
they became important to the commercial world, their appoint-
ment was provided for and their duties regulated by public
law. Since their appointment is now provided for by public
law, it is generally agreed they are public officers . . . ."
58 Am.Jur.2d Notaries Public §5 (1971).
For all of these reasons, it is our opinion notaries public
are public officers exercising a portion of the sovereign
power of the State of Kansas, and we do not believe such con-
clusion is in conflict with the provision of K.S.A. 1982 Supp.
53-101 declaring that notaries are not to be considered state
officers. In our judgment, the only legislative purpose
served by this provision is to preclude notaries public from
any right to the various entitlements, emoluments and perqui-
sites of office, such as salary or other compensation, reim-
bursement of expenses, office space, retirement benefits and
other similar benefits provided elected and appointed officers
of the State of Kansas.
Thus, having concluded that a notary public is a public offi-
cer, the question arises whether a notary's appointment may
be summarily revoked for any of the grounds specified in
K.S.A. 1982 Supp. 53-118. Pursuant to the commentator in
63 Am.Jur.2d Public officers and Employees §179 (1972):
"An implied power of summary removal is not
incident to the power of appointment where
the extent of the term of office is fixed by
the statute. In the absence of any provision
for summary removal, appointments to continue
for life or during good behavior -- which in
contemplation of law is for a fixed term -- or
for a fixed term of years cannot be terminated
except for cause. It is the fixity of the
term that destroys the power of removal at
pleasure." (Footnotes omitted.) (Emphasis
added.)
Not only has the legislature prescribed a fixed term of office
for notaries public, the specific causes for revoking a notary's
appointment have been listed in 53-118. Such facts prompt
the conclusion that a notary public is entitled to notice and
an opportunity to be heard prior to revocation of his or her
appointment. In Jacques v. Litle, 51 Kan. 300 (1893), the
Kansas Supreme Court considered the propriety of a summary
removal of a school district treasurer, an elected officer
serving for a term of years and for whom there were statu-
torily prescribed causes for removal. There, the Court stated:
"Where an office is held at the pleasure of an
appointing power, and also where the power of
removal may be exercised at its discretion, it
is well settled that the officer may be re-
moved at any time without notice or hearing.
(The State, ex rel., v. Mitchell, 50 Kas. 289.)
The defendant holds his office by virtue of an
election, and is chosen for a definite time.
Nothing in the law warrants the implication
that a school-district officer who has been
elected and qualified and entered upon his
duties may be removed at the will or pleasure
of any officer. The statute prescribes the
causes for which a removal may be had, and
fairly implies that the cause must be shown,
and that the party charged with negligence
and wrong is entitled to notice and a right
to be heard in his own defense. It is well
established by the great weight of authority,
that where an officer is elected by the people
for a definite term, and provision is made
for his removal for cause, the power of re-
moval cannot, in the absence of the positive
mandate of statute, be exercised without no-
tice and hearing. The mere silence of the
statute with respect to notice and hearing
will not justify the removal of such an offi-
cer upon a charge of misconduct and negligence,
without knowledge of the charges and an oppor-
tunity to explain his conduct and defend his
course and character. (Field v. Commonwealth,
32 Pa.St. 478; Ex parte Hennen, 13 Pet. 230;
Page v. Hardin, 8 B. Mon. 648; The State v.
City of St. Louis, 90 Mo. 19; Willard's Appeal,
4 R. I. 601; Chase v. Hathaway, 14 Mass. 222;
Dullam v. Wilson, 53 Mich. 392; Mech. Pub.
Off., §454.)" Id. at 302, 303.
The foregoing principles were cited in Lynch v. Chase, 55 Kan.
367 (1895), where the Court stated:
"Where there is no term or tenure fixed by the
constitution or the statute, or where the of-
fice is to be held during the pleasure of the
appointing power, the power of removal is dis-
cretionary and without control; but it is well
settled that where an officer is chosen for a
definite term, and provision is made for his
removal for cause, the causes for removal must
be alleged, the party notified, and a hearing
had. (The State v. Mitchell, 50 Kas. 289;
Jacques v. Little, 51 id. 300; Lease v. Free-
born, 52 id. 750.) Where the power of removal
is definite, and the limits of its exercise
prescribed, it must be exercised in the manner
and upon the conditions provided by law. Where
the statute gives power of removal for cause,
without specifying the causes, the power is
necessarily of a discretionary nature, and the
removing authority is the exclusive judge of
the cause and the sufficiency thereof; but
where the statute specifies the causes for
removal and prescribes the procedure, it would
seem that removals could not be made for other
causes nor in any other method than that pre-
scribed by statute." Id. at 370, 371.
See, also, The State, ex rel., v. Stewart, 90 Kan. 778 (1913).
The foregoing Kansas cases are in accord with the following
statement of general authority:
"[A]lthough it has been recognized that there
are some exceptions to the rule, an officer
is generally entitled to notice and a hearing
in order that he may have an opportunity to
defend, the statute not providing otherwise,
where he holds for a definite term, whether he
holds for a term of years, for life, or during
good behavior, or, whether or not he holds
for a definite term, where, under the law, he
may not be dismissed except for cause or for
specified causes. In either case, although
the law conferring authority to remove does
not expressly provide for notice, it is im-
plied that notice was intended. The mere si-
lence of the statute with respect to notice
and hearing will not justify the removal of
an officer whose term or tenure is declared
by law, without knowledge of the charges and
an opportunity to be heard." (Footnotes
omitted.) (Emphasis added.) 63 Am.Jur.2d
Public Officers and Employees §209, pp. 755,
756.
Accordingly, even though there is no contract right or pro-
perty interest in a public office [Goodrich v. Mitchell, 68
Kan. 765 (1904)], a public officer who holds for a definite
term, and who may not be removed except for specific causes,
is entitled to notice and an opportunity for a hearing before
removal from office. Thus, it is our opinion that, prior to
revoking a notary public's appointment, the secretary of
state must give the notary reasonable notice and provide an
opportunity for a hearing. Although such hearing need not,
in our judgment, be an adjudicative or trial-type hearing,
we believe it should afford the notary an opportunity to re-
spond to the charges being relied upon as grounds for removal.
It is to be noted that nearly all (if not all) of the grounds
for revocation set forth in K.S.A. 1982 Supp. 53-118 involve
questions of fact. This is particularly true of the question
presented here, i.e., whether in fact the notaries took the
oath of office. Hence, a hearing held prior to revocation
of a notary's appointment should be designed to establish the
presence or absence of the facts necessary to establish the
particular grounds for revocation.
The final issue is whether a revocation of a notary's appoint-
ment can be made effective ab initio. We think not. In the
first place, we do not think the statutes vest such authority
in the secretary of state. As stated in Murray v. State
Board of Regents, 194 Kan. 686, 689, 690 (1965):
"Governmental agencies are creatures of the
legislature, and can exercise only such pow-
ers as are expressly conferred by law and
those necessary to make effective the powers
expressly conferred. (State, ex rel., v. City
of Kansas City, 181 Kan. 870, 317 P.2d 806;
State, ex rel., v. City of Overland Park, 192
Kan. 654, 391 P.2d 128)."
Although Kansas courts have recognized the necessity for the
implication of powers in some instances, Kansas cases, for
the most part, have limited the determination of implied
powers to situations where, without them, the governmental
agency would have no way to carry out its express statutory
powers. See, e.g., Edwards County Commissioners v. Simmons,
159 Kan. 41 (1944); Womer v. Aldridge, 155 Kan. 446 (1942);
The State, ex rel., v. Wooster, 111 Kan. 830 (1922); The
State, ex rel., v. Younkin, 108 Kan. 634 (1921); Young v.
Regents of State University, 87 Kan. 239 (1912); and Brown
County v. Barnett, 14 Kan. 627 (1875).
Here, it must be recognized that revoking a notary's appoint-
ment ab initio is tantamount to a declaration that the notary's
appointment was void. We find no express statutory authority
for such action, and we find no basis for concluding that
such authority must be implied in order to carry out the
powers expressly granted. In our judgment, K.S.A. 1982 Supp.
53-118 contemplates revocations having prospective application
only. It provides no authority for declaring an appointment
void from its inception.
Moreoever, under the facts you have presented, we think case
law would preclude a finding that, from the time of their
appointment, the notaries in question lacked lawful authority
to perform notarial acts. Even if grounds exist for revoking
these notaries' appointments, we believe that the notarial
acts performed by them prior to revocation are not subject
to collateral attack. Of pertinence to this point is State
v. Miller, 222 Kan. 405 (1977), where the Court stated:
"In Olathe Hospital Foundation, Inc. v. Exten-
dicare, Inc. supra, the legal status of two
members of an appeal panel, established under
the provisions of Regional Health Programs
Act, was challenged on the grounds that their
terms had expired and they had not taken oaths
of office prior to the hearing in question.
Concerning the characteristics of a de facto
officer we held:
"'A person who assumes and performs the duties
of a public office under color of authority
and is recognized and accepted as the right-
ful holder of the office by all who deal with
him is a de facto officer, even though there
may be defects in the manner of his appoint-
ment, or he was not eligible for the office,
or he failed to conform to some condition pre-
cedent to assuming the office.' (Syl. 5.)
"This court has consistently held that a chal-
lenge to the authority of a de facto officer
must be made at the time he acts and that his
actions are not subject to collateral attack.
His authority may only be challenged in a di-
rect proceeding brought by the state or one
claiming the office. (Olathe Hospital Founda-
tion, Inc. v. Extendicare, Inc., supra; Parvin
v. Johnson, supra; and Briggs v. Voss, 73 Kan.
418, 85 Pac. 571.)" 222 Kan. at 414.
Of similar import, we also note the following statement from
State v. Roberts, 130 Kan. 754 (1930):
"The contention of the appellant may readily
be conceded that the election of a judge pro
tem. in this case was not within the provi-
sions of the statute (R.S. 20-305), but whether
properly and legally elected or not, he assumed
the duties of the office, was accepted and re-
puted as being such officer, and was in posses-
sion of the office under a fair color or title
thereto, which would make him a de facto offi-
cer regardless of the legality of his election.
"'An officer de facto is one who has the reputa-
tion of being the officer he assumes to be, and
yet is not a good officer in point of law. A
person will be held to be a de facto officer
when, and only when, he is in possession, and
is exercising the duties, of an office; his
incumbency is illegal in some respect; he has
at least a fair color of right or title to the
office, or has acted as an officer of such a
length of time, and under such circumstances
of reputation or acquiesence by the public and
public authorities, as to afford a presumption
of appointment or election, and induce people,
without inquiry, and relying on the supposi-
tion that he is the officer he assumes to be,
to submit to or invoke his action . . .' (46
C.J. 1053.)
"'The acts of an officer de facto are as valid
and effectual where they concern the public or
the rights of third persons, until his title
to the office is judged insufficient, as
though he were an officer de jure, and the
legality of the acts of such an officer can-
not be collaterally attacked in a proceeding
to which he is not a party.' (46 C.J. 1060,
1061.)" Id. at 756, 757.
Even were it determined that the notaries public in question
had not taken their oaths of office, we think there can be
no question that they are de facto officers. They were issued
certificates of appointment as notaries public, they held
themselves out to the public as being duly appointed notaries
and in availing themselves of the notaries' services, the
public, without inquiry, clearly has presumed them to be
validly appointed officers. In our judgment, therefore, the
actions of these notaries as de facto officers are not subject
to collateral attack.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN ATTORNEYGENERALOFKANSAS
RobertAlderson
First Deputy Attorney General
RTS:WRA:hle

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