Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1982-234

1982-234Kanag

Testo completo

November 4, 1982
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 82-234
Honorable Homer E. Jarchow
Representative, Ninety-Fifth District
2121 West Douglas
Wichita, Kansas 67213
Re: Kansas Constitution--Finance and Taxation--
Uniform and Equal Rate of Assessment and Taxation
Taxation--Property Exempt From Taxation--Property
Constructed or Purchased in Part with Industrial
Revenue Bond Proceeds
Synopsis: Based upon the Kansas Supreme Court's differentiation
of "permissible" and "impermissible" partial exemp-
tions, and the declaration of public purpose provided
in K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 12-1740, it cannot be concluded,
as a matter of law, that the portion of K.S.A. 1981
Supp. 79-201a, Second, (as amended by L. 1982, ch. 389,
§1), which grants a partial exemption from taxation
to property constructed or purchased in part with the
proceeds of revenue bonds issued on or after July 1,
1981, under the authority of K.S.A. 12-1740 to 12-1749,
inclusive, and amendments thereto, is prohibited by
Article 11, Section 1, of the Kansas Constitution.
Cited herein: K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 12-1740, 12-3418,
79-201a, as amended by L. 1982, ch. 389, §1, 79-3120a
(now repealed), L. 1982, ch. 63, §9, Kan. Const.,
Art. 11, §1.
*
Dear Representative Jarchow:
You seek an opinion concerning the constitutional validity of
the following two sentences of K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 79-201a, Second,
(as amended by L. 1982, ch. 389, §1):
"Any property constructed or purchased
in part with the proceeds of revenue bonds
issued on or after July 1, 1981, under the
authority of K.S.A. 12-1740 to 12-1749,
inclusive, and amendments thereto, shall
be exempt from taxation to the extent of
the value of that portion of the property
financed by the revenue bonds and only for
a period of 10 calendar years after the calen-
dar year in which the bonds were issued.
The exemption of that portion of the prop-
erty constructed or purchased with the pro-
ceeds of revenue bonds shall terminate
upon the failure to pay all taxes levied on
that portion of the property which is not
exempt and the entire property shall be
subject to sale in the manner prescribed
by K.S.A. 79-2301 et seq., and amendments
thereto." (Emphasis added.)
You question whether the above-quoted provisions violate Article 11,
Section 1, of the Kansas Constitution, which, in part relevant
to your inquiry, states: "The legislature shall provide for
a uniform and equal rate of assessment and taxation . . . ."
Under the statutory provisions quoted above, certain property is
exempt from taxation to a limited extent. Thus, conversely, the
same property is subject to taxation to a limited extent. The
property is exempt from taxation only "to the extent of the value
of that portion of the property financed by the revenue bonds."
It follows, therefore, that the property is subject to taxation
only to the extent of the value of that portion of the property
which is not financed with the revenue bonds. Hence, under these
provisions, the full value of certain property is not used as the
basis of assessment for such property for purposes of property
taxation.
On two separate occasions within recent years, the Kansas Supreme
Court has held that Article 11, Section 1, of the Kansas Constitution
prohibits the legislature from prescribing that a value, other than
the full fair market value, of farm machinery and equipment shall
be used as the basis of assessment for such property for purposes
of property taxation. See State ex rel. Stephan v. Martin (Martin III),
230 Kan. 759 (1982), and State ex rel. Stephan v. Martin (Martin I),
227 Kan. 456 (1980). Accordingly, until the Court rendered its
decision in Von Ruden v. Miller, 231 Kan. 1 (1982), we believed the
Martin cases established that Article 11, Section 1, of the Kansas
Constitution prohibits the granting of partial exemptions from
property taxation.
However, in Von Ruden, the Court upheld the constitutionality of
the property tax exemption granted in K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 79-3120a(c)
(now repealed, see L. 1982, ch. 407, §5, but see also L. 1982,
ch. 63, §9). This statute provided in part:
"The following shall be and are hereby
exempt from taxes levied under the provisions
of K.S.A. 1979 Supp. 79-3109, and amend-
ments thereto, and from all other property
or ad valorem taxes levied under the laws
of the state of Kansas:
"(c) money, notes and other evidences of
debt, to the extent of the tax liability
hereinafter provided, which is owned by a
person who has a disability or was sixty (60)
years of age or older on January 1 of the year
in which an exemption is claimed hereunder.
The exemption allowable under this subsection
shall be in an amount equal to the lesser
of the following: (1) The amount of the tax
liability on the first three thousand dollars
($3,000) of gross earnings from said money,
notes and other evidence of debt; or (2)
the amount of the tax liability on the first
three thousand dollars ($3,000) of gross
earnings from said money, notes and other
evidences of debt reduced by the amount that
the owner's income exceeds twelve thousand
five hundred dollars ($12,500), including
in such owner's income the income of such
person's spouse, in the year next preceding
that in which the exemption is claimed under
this subsection." (Emphasis added.)
It is clear that these provisions grant a partial exemption from
taxation for certain money, notes and other evidences of debt.
However, the Court upheld the validity of these provisions,
saying:
"It is reasonable to assume that persons in
this category use the income generated by
this property as a primary means of support.
By exempting [a limited amount of] the income
generated by intangibles owned by low income
persons, more funds remain in their households
and the amount of public assistance outlay
is thereby reduced. Obviously, the statute
serves a public purpose . . . . It is of
note that this exemption differs from the
provision reducing the assessed [appraised]
value of certain farm machinery and equipment
found unconstitutional in State ex rel. Stephan v.
Martin, 227 Kan. 456, 608 P.2d 880 (1980).
That provision did not exempt such property
from taxation based on a purpose promoting
the general welfare. Rather, it purposefully
sought to alter the assessment rate of partic-
ular property for the purpose of benefiting
a particular class of persons . . . ." (Emphasis
added.) Id. at 14-15.
In Martin I, supra, the Court specifically found that "the provision
reducing the appraised valuation of certain farm machinery and
equipment" was a partial exemption from taxation. See 227 Kan.
at 467-468. Then, the Court said: "In this respect [i.e., in
granting a partial exemption], the law violates the requirements
of art. 11, §1 of the Kansas Constitution mandating uniformity
and equality in the basis of assessment." (Emphasis added.) Id.
at 468.
Notwithstanding this clear and unambiguous statement of the
Court in Martin, we must conclude from the above-quoted statements
of the Court in Von Ruden, that it was not the fact that the pro-
visions of K.S.A. 1979 Supp. 79-342 granted a partial exemption
from taxation which rendered that law unconstitutional, but instead,
the law was unconstitutional because the partial exemption was "for
the purpose of benefiting a particular class of persons," and not
for the "purpose [of] promoting the general welfare." Von Ruden,
supra at 15.
Thus, notwithstanding the fact that the above-quoted provisions
of K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 79-201a, Second, as amended, grant a partial
exemption from taxation, we are constrained, under the statement
made by the Court in Von Ruden, from concluding, as a matter of
law, that these provisions are constitutionally prohibited merely
because they prescribe a partial exemption from taxation.
However, the Supreme Court has consistently held that any statutory
exemption of property from property taxation must "have a public
purpose and promote the general welfare." See Von Ruden v. Miller,
supra at 14; State ex rel. Tomasic v. Kansas City, Kansas Port
Authority, 230 Kan. 404, Syl. 113 (1981); State, ex rel., v. Board
of Regents, 167 Kan. 587, 596 (1949); and Sumner County v. Wellington,
66 Kan. 590, 593 (1903). The question, therefore, arises whether
this statutory exemption has a public purpose and promotes the
general welfare. In regard to this issue, the Court has said:
"Within the scope of legislative power, the legislature itself is
the judge of what exemptions are in the public interest and will
conduce to the public welfare." Gunkle v. Killingsworth, 118 Kan.
154, 157 (1925). Accord, State ex rel. Tomasic v. Kansas City,
Kansas Port Authority, supra at 412; and State, ex rel., v. Board
of Regents, supra at 596.
In the recent case of State ex rel. Tomasic v. Kansas City, Kansas
Port Authority, supra, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of a statute which exempted property owned by a port authority from
taxation. Moreover, the Court upheld the statute, even though it
also provided that the exemption was to continue if the property was
leased to a non-governmental entity. In upholding the validity of
this tax exemption statute, the Court said:
"It cannot be seriously contended the
port authority property or bonds will
be 'used exculsively' for one of the
constitutionally enumerated exemptions.
Therefore, the exemption, if valid, must
meet the criteria for statutory exemption.
The legislature has declared an exemption
because the 'exercise of the powers granted
by this act will be in all respects for the
benefit of the people of this state.' K.S.A.
1980 Supp. 12-3418. Certainly economic benefits
flow from the powers vested in port authorities,
and the court cannot say there is not public
purpose and promotion of the general welfare
in such benefits. The exemption is consti-
tutionally valid." (Emphasis added.)
Id. at 412-413.
Hence, it can be seen that the Court upheld the exemption because
the "Port Authority Act," K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 12-3401 et seq.,
contained a legislative declaration that the act will promote
the general welfare. Following this rationale of the Court, we
note that the legislature has declared the purpose of the "Industrial
Revenue Bond Act," K.S.A. 12-1740 to 12-1749, inclusive, as follows:
"It is the purpose of this act to pro-
mote, stimulate and develop the general
welfare and economic prosperity of the
state of Kansas through the promotion and
advancement of physical and mental health,
industrial, commercial, agricultural, natural
resources and of recreational development
in the state; to encourage and assist in
the location of new business and industry
in this state and the expansion, relocation
or retention of existing business, industry
and health development; and to promote the
economic stability of the state . . . ."
(Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 12-1740.
If it is "certain" that "economic benefits flow from the powers
vested in port authorities" under the provisions of K.S.A. 1981
Supp. 12-3401 et seq., and, thus, the exemption provided in K.S.A.
1981 Supp. 12-3418 is constitutionally permissible, we cannot
conclude, as a matter of law, that economic benefits do not also
flow from the powers vested in cities and counties under the
provisions of K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 12-1740 et seq. Moreover, just
as the Court could not say "there is not public purpose and pro-
motion of the general welfare" which flow from the powers vested
in port authorities, we cannot say there is not public purpose
and promotion of the general welfare which flow from the powers
vested in cities and counties under K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 12-1740
et seq.
Thus, we cannot conclude, as a matter of law, that the partial
exemption from taxation granted to certain property under the
above-quoted provisions of K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 79-201a, Second,
as amended, is not "based on a purpose promoting the general
welfare," and is granted merely "for the purpose of benefiting
a particular class of persons." Von Ruden, supra at 15. Hence,
based upon the Court's differentiation, in Von Ruden, of
"permissible" and "impermissible" partial exemptions, and the
declaration of public purpose provided in K.S.A. 1981 Supp.
12-1740, we cannot conclude, as a matter of law, that the portion
of K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 79-201a, Second, as amended, which grants a
partial exemption from taxation to property constructed or pur-
chased in part with the proceeds of revenue bonds issued on or
after July 1, 1981, under the authority of K.S.A. 12-1740 to 12-1749,
inclusive, and amendments thereto, violates Article 11, Section 1,
of the Kansas Constitution.
In concluding, we note that the distinction made in Von Ruden,
supra, between "permissible" and "impermissible" partial exemptions
represents a significant departure from prior interpretations of
Article 11, Section 1 of our constitution, developed nearly
from statehood, holding that this constitutional provision requires
uniformity and equality in the burden of taxation. See Martin I,
supra, and the cases cited therein at 461. While the total
exemption of property from taxation does not disturb this principle,
the partial exemption of property from taxation creates non-
uniformity and inequality in the burden of taxation. Clearly,
when property is subject to taxation, but such property is valued
for purposes of taxation at less than its fair market value, such
property is burdened by taxation to a lesser extent than property
valued for purposes of taxation at fair market value. Such is
the case here. Property constructed or purchased in part by
industrial revenue bond proceeds is valued for taxation purposes
at less than its fair market value. It is valued at its fair
market value less the value of that portion of the property financed
by the revenue bonds. Thus, some of that property's tax burden is
shifted to other property subject to taxation. However, until the
Supreme Court clarifies or retracts its statement in Von Ruden,
supra, we must conclude that Article 11, Section 1, of the Kansas
Constitution permits the granting of partial exemptions from
taxation, so long as the exemption is "based on a purpose promoting
the general welfare" and is not merely "for the purpose of benefiting
a particular class of persons." Von Ruden, supra at 15.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
Rodney J. Bieker
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:BJS:RJB:jm

Continua la tua ricerca in ChatGPT o Claude

Collega Omnilex per cercare nel corpus legale dal tuo assistente IA.