Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1982-211

1982-211Kanag

Testo completo

September 20, 1982
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 82- 211
I. H. McMahon
Mayor
425 15th Street
Osawatomie, Kansas 66064
Re: Cities of the Second Class--General Provisions--
Meetings of Council
Synopsis: Where a special meeting of the council of a city of
the second class is held, at which the mayor and all
members of the council are present and participate in
all matters coming before the council for consideration,
the preliminary requirements of K.S.A. 14-111, relating
to written request and formal call for such meeting,
are waived, and the special meeting, and actions taken
thereat, are legal despite the failure to observe such
preliminary requirements.
In the absence of a charter ordinance providing
otherwise, the mayor of a council city is not
authorized to veto motions or resolutions adopted
by a majority of the council members.
A memorandum of agreement between a recognized
employee organization and a city subject to the
provisions of the Kansas Public Employer-Employee
Relations Act must be implemented by the adoption
of an ordinance by the city governing body. Cited
herein: K.S.A. 12-3003, 14-111, 15-106, 75-4321,
75-4322, 75-4331, 75-4337.
*
Dear Mr. McMahon:
You request our opinion as to several questions arising out of
a special meeting of the Osawatomie city council. You advise
that the meeting in question was arranged by the city manager
for the purpose of reviewing the 1981 city audit report, but
that none of the formalities of K.S.A. 14-111, relating to
written request for and call of a special meeting, were observed.
You state that all city council members and the mayor were present
at said meeting, and that the council, in addition to reviewing
the audit report, approved (by a 5-3 vote) a motion to present
a settlement proposal, relating to negotiations between the city
and the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW),
to union representatives. The questions raised by your inquiry
are as follows:
1. In the absence of compliance with the preliminary
requirements of K.S.A. 14-111, as to written request
and formal call of a special meeting, was the special
meeting, attended by all council members and the mayor,
and the action taken relative to the IBEW settlement,
legal and valid?
2. Do you, as mayor, have the power to veto the action
taken by the council (at the special meeting) in relation
to the IBEW contract?
3. Is it necessary for the city to adopt an ordinance
in order to "legalize" the agreement with the IBEW?
In response to the first question, it should be noted that K.S.A.
14-111 relates to regular and special meetings of the council in
cities of the second class, and provides as follows:
"Regular meetings of the council shall be
held at such times, not less than once in
each month, as shall be prescribed by
ordinance. Special meetings may be called
by the mayor or acting mayor, on the written
request of any three members of the council,
specifying the object and purpose of such
meeting, which request shall be read at
the meeting, and entered at length on the
journal. In all cases, it shall require
a majority of the councilmen elect to
constitute a quorum to do business; but
a smaller number may adjourn from day to
day, and may compel the attendance of
absent members, in such manner and under
such penalties as the council by ordinance
may have previously prescribed."
In Bluff City v. Western Light & Power Corp., 137 Kan. 169 (1933),
the Kansas Supreme Court construed the provisions of K.S.A. 15-106,
which statute relates to special meetings in cities of the third
class and is identical to K.S.A. 14-111 (disregarding minor
differences in punctuation), in the following manner:
"Where a special meeting of the council of
a city of the third class is held, at which
the mayor, the clerk and all the members of
the council are present and participate in
all the matters coming before the council
for consideration, the specific preliminary
requirements of R. S. 15-106 as to written
request and formal call for such meeting
will be deemed as having been waived, and
the special meeting will not be illegal nor
the ordinances passed thereat invalid on
account of the omission of such preliminary
requirements." Syllabus No. 4 (Emphasis
added.)
In our judgment, the above-quoted rule, which was quoted with
approval in West v. Unified School District, 204 Kan. 29, 36
(1969), is dispositive of the first question. The preliminary
requirements of K.S.A. 14-111 were, in our opinion, waived by
the presence of the mayor and all council members, and the
action taken relative to the IBEW settlement does not appear
to be illegal or invalid as a result of these procedural defi-
ciencies.
In regard to your second question, relating to the mayoral veto
power, K.S.A. 12-3003 provides, in part, as follows:
"The mayor of a council city shall have the
power to sign or veto any ordinance passed
by the council: Provided, That ordinances
on which the mayor casts the deciding vote
and appropriation ordinances the mayor shall
have no veto and he or she shall sign such
ordinances if present at the meeting, and
if the mayor refuses or neglects to sign or
be not present at the meeting they shall take
effect without his or her signature."
As is readily apparent, the above-quoted statute gives the
mayor of a council city the power, with certain exceptions,
to veto ordinances. In the absence of a charter ordinance
providing otherwise, it is our opinion that the mayor of a
council city is not authorized to veto motions or resolutions
adopted by a majority of the council members.
Addressing your third question, it should be noted that state
statutes do not distinguish an ordinance from a resolution or
declare when it is proper to use one or the other. Benson v.
City of DeSoto, 212 Kan. 415, 420 (1973). However, the Kansas
Supreme Court has distinguished between the two modes of action,
and in Benson, supra, the Court quoted the following excerpt
from McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 15.02 (3rd ed.):
"A 'resolution' is not an 'ordinance,' and
there is a distinction between the two terms
as they are commonly used in charters. A
resolution ordinarily denotes something less
solemn or formal than, or not rising to the
dignity of, an ordinance. The term 'ordinance'
means something more than a mere verbal motion
or resolution, adopted, subsequently reduced
to writing, and entered on the minutes and
made a part of the record of the acting body.
It must be invested, not necessarily literally,
but substantially, with the formalities,
solemnities, and characteristics of an ordinance,
as distinguished from a simple motion or resolution.
"A resolution in effect encompasses all actions
of the municipal body other than ordinances.
Whether the municipal body should do a partic-
ular thing by resolution or ordinance depends
upon the forms to be observed in doing the
thing and upon the proper construction of
the charter. In this connection it may be
observed that a resolution deals with matters
of a special or temporary character; an ordinance
prescribes some permanent rule of conduct or
government, to continue in force until the
ordinance is repealed. An ordinance is dis-
tinctively a legislative act; a resolution,
generally speaking, is simply an expression
of opinion or mind concerning some particular
item of business coming within the legislative
body's official cognizance, ordinarily ministerial
in character and relating to the administrative
business of the municipality. Thus, it may be
stated broadly that all acts that are done by
a municipal corporation in its ministerial
capacity and for temporary a purpose may be
put in the form of resolutions, and that matters
upon which the municipal corporation desires to
legislate must be put in the form of ordinances.
It may further be stated broadly that charters
contemplate that all legislation creating liability
or affecting in any important or material manner
the people of the municipality should be enacted
by ordinances, whether the city is acting in its
governmental or private capacity. Whenever the
controlling law directs the legislative body to
do a particular thing in a certain manner the
thing must be done in that manner." (Emphasis
added.) Id. at 420-421
The underscored portion of the above quotation is particularly
pertinent in considering your third question. We are advised
that IBEW Local 304 has been formally recognized by the Kansas
Public Employees Relations Board as an employee organization,
and it is, therefore, apparent that the city of Osawatomie has
elected to be covered by the Kansas Public Employer-Employee
Relations Act, K.S.A. 75-4321 to 75-4337. See K.S.A. 75-4321(c).
A portion of that act, K.S.A. 75-4331, concerns the "memorandum
of agreement," which is the basic bargaining tool, and provides,
in part, as follows:
"If a settlement is reached with an employee
organization and the governing body or authority,
the governing body or authority shall implement
the settlement in the form of a law, ordinance,
resolution, executive order, rule or regulation."
(Emphasis added.)
While the above-quoted statute provides for the implementation
of a settlement in six different forms, it is apparent that the
form to be utilized depends upon the type of governmental subdi-
vision which is entering into the settlement. The Kansas Public
Employer-Employee Relations Act applies to a number of different
governmental subdivisions, as is reflected in the following de-
finition of "public employer," as set forth in K.S.A. 75-4322:
"As used in this act:
• • •
"(f) 'Public agency' or 'public employer' means
every governmental subdivision, including any
county, township, city, school district, special
district, board, commission, or instrumentality
or other similar unit whose governing body exer-
cises similar governmental powers, and the state
of. Kansas and its state agencies." K.S.A. 75-4322.
In our judgment, a settlement between a city and an employee
organization must, under K.S.A. 75-4331, be implemented in the
form of an ordinance. If, on the other hand, a school district
or county were entering into a settlement, it should be imple-
mented in a form of a resolution. Similarly, settlements in-
volving the state of Kansas could take the form of a law, exe-
cutive order, rule or regulation.
In accordance with the above, it is our opinion that the city
of Osawatomie must adopt an ordinance in order to implement the
settlement which was negotiated with IBEW, Local 3Q4.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEYGENERALOFKANSAS
Terrence R. Hearshman
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:BJS:TRH:hle

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