Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1982-187

1982-187Kanag

Testo completo

September 3, 1932
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 82- 187
Mr. Jay W. Vander Velde
Lyon County Attorney
Lyon County Courthouse
Emporia, Kansas 66801
Re: Crimes and Punishments -- Code; Classification of Crimes
and Penalties -- Prospective Application of Increased
Penalties
Synopsis: The increased penalty provisions of K.S.A. 21-4501 (as
amended by L. 1982, ch. 137, §1) and K.S.A. 21-4608, (as
amended by L. 1982, ch. 150, §1) do not apply to crimes
committed before July 1, 1982 (the effective date of the
amendments), but are applicable to sentencing for crimes
committed after July 1, 1982.
The term "conditional release," as used in K.S.A. 21-4608
(as amended), refers to release from incarceration, subject
to rules and conditions imposed by the releasing authority,
following imprisonment for the maximum term imposed,
minus work and good behavior credits. Cited herein:
K.S.A. 21-4501 (as amended by L. 1982, ch. 137, §1),
21-4608 (as amended by L. 1982, ch. 150, §1), 22-3718,
U.S. Const., Art. I, §9.
Dear Mr. Vander Velde:
As Lyon County Attorney, you have requested our opinion regarding recent
amendments to sentencing provisions of the Kansas Criminal Code. your
inquiry concerns K.S.A. 21-4501 (as amended by L. 1982, ch. 137, 51),
which deals with increased penalties for certain felonies, and K.S.A.
21-4608 (as amended by L. 1982, ch. 150, g1), relating to consecutive
sentencing for crimes committed by individuals while on probation or
parole or while incarcerated.
Specifically, you ask whether the increased penalties should be applied:
1) To an individual who, while on probation or parole
for a prior felony, commits a crime prior to July 1,
1982 (the date the amendments became effective), but
is convicted after July 1, 1982; or
2) To an individual who, while on probation or parole
for a crime committed prior to July 1, 1982, commits
a crime after July 1, 1982.
Finally, you inquire whether the term "conditional release," as used
in K.S.A. 21-4608 (as amended) refers to probation, or is narrower or
broader than probation.
The Kansas Supreme Court has stated: "[T]he general rule of statutory
construction is that a statute will operate prospectively unless its
language clearly indicates that the legislature intended that it operate
retrospectively." State v. Hutchison, 228 Kan. 279, 287 (1980).
It is significant to note, that there is no language in these amendments
relating to retrospective application.
Furthermore, Article I, Section 9 of the United States Constitution
provides that no ex post facto law shall be passed. In Weaver v.
Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981), the United States Supreme Court reviewed
numerous cases involving ex post facto laws and reiterated the following
guidelines:
"The ex post facto prohibition forbids the Congress and
the States to enact any law 'which imposes a punishment
for an act which was not punishable at the time it was
committed; or imposes additional punishment to that then
prescribed.' (Citations omitted.) Through this pro-
hibition, the Framers sought to assure that legislative
Acts give fair warning of their effect and permit
individuals to rely on their meaning until explicitly
changed. (Citations omitted.) The ban also restricts
governmental power by restraining arbitrary and
potentially vindictive legislation. (Citations omitted.)
In accord with these purposes, our decisions prescribe
that two critical elements must be present for a criminal
or penal law to be ex post facto: it must be retrospective,
that is, it must apply to events occurring before its
enactment, and it must disadvantage the offender affected
by it. (Citations omitted.) . . . The presence or absence
of an affirmative, enforceable right is not relevant, how-
ever, to the ex post facto prohibition, which forbids the
imposition of punishment more severe than the punishment
assigned by law when the act to be punished occurred.
Critical to relief under the Ex Post Facto Clause is not
an individual's right to less punishment, but the lack of
fair notice and 'governmental restraint when the legislature
increases punishment beyond what was prescribed when the
crime was consummated. Thus, even if a statute merely
alters penal provisions accorded by the grace of the
legislature, it violates the Clause if it is both retro-
spective and more onerous than the law in effect on the
date of the offense." 450 U.S. at 28-31.
Effective July 1, 1982, K.S.A. 21-4501 (as amended) increased the
penalties for certain classes of felonies. For example, the 1982
amendments include:
An increase in the minimum sentence
from one year to three years;
An increase in the minimum sentence
from one year to two years; and
An increase in the minimum sentence
from one year to "not less than one
two years."
for Class C felonies
for Class D felonies
for Class E felonies
year nor more than
Also, as of July 1, 1982, K.S.A. 21-4608 (as amended) requires that an
individual convicted and sentenced for a felony while on probation or
parole or while incarcerated, shall serve the new sentence consecutively
to the terms under which the person was released or incarcerated. This
amendment effectively prohibits a judge from ordering sentences to run
concurrently, an option available to judges prior to passage of the
amendment.
Finally, we note that K.S.A. 21-4501 (as amended) and K.S.A. 21-4608
(as amended) are sections of the Kansas Criminal Code. In State 7. Palls,
213 Kan. 249 (1973), the Kansas Supreme Court emphasized: "The Kansas
Criminal Code relates to substantive law and operates prospectively on
crimes committed after its effective date." Id. at 252. Substantive
law has been defined and distinguished from procedural law as follows:
"As related to criminal law and procedure, substantive
law is that which declares what acts are crimes and
prescribes the punishment therefor; whereas procedural
law is that which provides or regulates the steps by
which one who violates a criminal statute is punished.
"Changes in the length of sentences for criminal acts
have been given prospective application only." State v.
Hutchison, 225 Kan. at 287. (Emphasis in original.)
Obviously, the recent amendments to K.S.A. 21-4501 and 21-4608 enhance
the criminal punishment for certain felonies and for crimes committed by
individuals while on probation or parole or while incarcerated. Therefore,
in our opinion, retroactive application of these amendments to crimes
committed before July 1, 1982 (the effective date of these amendments),
would be improper as violative of the prohibition against ex post facto
laws.
Your second inquiry concerns the applicability of the increased penalty
amendments of K.S.A. 21-4608 to individuals who commit a crime after
July 1, 1982, while on probation or parole for a crime committed prior
to July 1, 1982. In essence, the enhanced penalties are status related,
being applicable only to individuals who are incarcerated or on probation
or parole when convicted of a subsequent crime. In this regard, it is
helpful to note that in discussing a recidivist statute, the Kansas
Supreme Court stated:
"A showing of prior convictions goes only to the
question of defendant's status. The prior conviction
or convictions gives the defendant a classification, and
the statute prescribes sequentially increased punishment
for repeated offenders. A repeating offender is not
punished for the prior offense or offenses, but the
Legislature has declared that repeated violations
justify the enhanced penalty." State v. Jones,
214 Kan. 568, 570 (1974).
The Court then concluded: "The recidivist statute in question is
neither unconstitutional as an ex post facto law nor denies defendant
equal protection or due process of law." Id.
Similarly, in a series of cases, the Kansas Supreme Court has upheld
habitual criminal statutes, finding "it has generally been held it is
not an ex post facto law, that it is simply an additional or greater
punishment imposed for the recent conviction because of a former
conviction or convictions." Cochran v. Simpson, 143 Kan. 273, 276
(1936). (Emphasis added.) See also Fairbanks v. State, 196 Kan.
650, 652 (1966); Thomson v. State, 195 Kan. 318, 320 (1965); Johnson
v. Crouse, 191 Kan. 694, 700 (1963); Luppy v. Hudspeth, 159 Kan. 434,
436 (1945).
In accordance with the cited authorities, it is our opinion that the
amendments to K.S.A. 21-4608, which enhance penalties based on the status
of the offender, do not constitute an ex post facto law. Therefore,
K.S.A. 21-4608 (as amended) is properly applied to individuals who
commit a felony after July 1, 1982, while on probation or parole
for a crime committed prior to July 1, 1982.
Your final question concerns the meaning of "conditional release" as
used in K.S.A. 21-4608 (as amended). K.S.A. 22-3718 defines conditional
release, stating:
"An inmate who has served his maximum term or terms, less
such work and good behavior credits as have been earned,
shall, upon release, be subject to such written rules
and conditions as the authority may impose, until the
expiration of the maximum term or terms for which he
was sentenced or until he is otherwise discharged."
In discussing the meaning of "conditional release" under Kansas law,
the United States District Court for the district of Kansas found:
"It should be indicated here that the distinction
between 'parole' and 'conditional release' is worth
noting. In the former instance, release from confinement
is discretionary with the Board of Probation and Parole,
while 'conditional release' is mandatory, the time
being computed by deductions from the maximum term for
'good time' and 'incentive credits,' and is the equivalent
of a sentence served completely." Smith v Crouse, 298
F.Supp. 1029, 1033 (D. Kan. 1968).
Therefore, it is our opinion that the term conditional release does not
pertain to probation at all, but refers instead to release subject to
specified conditions, following imprisonment for the maximum term less
work and good behavior credits.
In conclusion, it is our opinion that the increased penalty provisions
of K.S.A. 21-4501 (as amended by L. 1982, ch. 137, 51) and K.S.A. 21-4608
(as amended by L. 1982, ch. 150, 51) do not apply to crimes committed
before July 1, 1982, but are applicable to sentencing for crimes committed
after July 1, 1982. Finally, the term "conditional release," as used in
K.S.A. 21-4608 (as amended), refers to release from incarceration, subject
to rules and conditions imposed by the releasing authority, following
imprisonment for the maximum team imposed, minus work and good behavior
credits.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
Mary B. udrick
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:JEF:MBM:may

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