Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1982-155

1982-155Kanag

Testo completo

July 12, 1982
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 82- 155
E. A. Mosher, Executive Director
League of Kansas Municipalities
112 West Seventh Street
Topeka, Kansas 66603
Re: Automobiles -- Serious Traffic Offenses -- Driving
While Under Influence of Alcohol; Imposition by
Municipal Courts of Penalties for Second, Third
and Subsequent Violations
Criminal Procedure -- Method of Trial in Municipal
Court -- Trial to the Court; Right to De Novo Jury
Trial at District Court Level
Synopsis: K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 8-1567, as amended by 1982 Senate
Bill No. 699, establishes stricter Penalties for
those persons who are convicted a second, third or
subsequent time for driving a vehicle under the
influence of alcohol. The new penalties can in-
volve maximum imprisonment of up to one year and
fines of up to $2,500, both of which are beyond
the penalties which may be imposed without a right
to a jury trial being afforded to a defendant.
As trials for violations of municipal ordinances
are to the court, a potential conflict is created.
However, as the legislature has authorized cities
to adopt lesser maximum penalties than those of
the statute, this problem may be avoided by a
city when it drafts an ordinance on this subject.
Furthermore, even if the maximum penalties of the
statute are adopted by a city, a defendant's
right to a de novo trial before a jury at the
district court level sufficiently protects the
constitutional right to trial by jury.
K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 8-262 (driving while license can-
celed, suspended or revoked) and 8-1568 (fleeing
or attempting to elude a police officer) provide
that persons convicted of a third offense shall be
guilty of a class E felony. In the absence of any
statutory provision to the contrary, a city is
without the power to classify such conduct by or-
dinance as a misdemeanor. Again, however, the
right to a trial de novo by a jury at the district
court level avoids any denial of a constitutional
right of the defendant to a jury trial. Attorney
General Opinion No. 81-222 is reaffirmed. Cited
herein: K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 8-262, 8-1567, as
amended by 1982 Senate Bill No. 699, 8-1568, K.S.A.
12-4501, 22-3609, 22-3610, both as amended by 1982
Senate Bill No. 699, 1982 Senate Bill No. 699.
Dear Mr. Mosher:
As Executive Director of the League of Kansas Municipalities,
you request our opinion on two inter-related questions con-
cerning the imposition of penalties by municipal courts.
Specifically, you inquire whether such a court may impose
sentences of up to a year for misdemeanors (under K.S.A. 1981
Supp. 8-1567, as amended by 1982 Senate Bill No. 699) and
sentences of up to five years for a class E felony (K.S.A.
1981 Supp. 8-262 and 8-1568) without providing the right to
a jury trial. In that the first of these three statutes con-
tains provisions which set it apart from the latter two, our
response will address it separately.
Prior to July 1, 1982, K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 8-1567 imposed cer-
tain penalties upon those persons who were convicted of driv-
ing while under the influence of alcohol. Under subsection
(c), the statute provides:
"Every person who is convicted of a violation
of this section shall be punished by imprison-
ment of not more than one (1) year, or by a
fine of not less than one hundred dollars
($100) nor more than five hundred dollars
($500), or by both such fine and imprisonment.
On a second or subsequent conviction he or she
shall be punished by imprisonment for not less
than ninety (90) days nor more than one (1)
year, and, in the discretion of the court, a
fine or not more than five hundred dollars
($500)."
As set forth in the Standard Traffic Ordinance for Kansas
Cities (1979) (at Article 6, Section 30), the maximum term of
imprisonment is reduced to 6 months. Although dicta in the
case of City of Junction City v. Lee, 216 Kan. 495 (1976)
would indicate that such a reduction creates an impermissible
conflict between the statute and an ordinance employing such
language, this problem is now moot in light of a statutory
change, as discussed hereinbelow.
Following the effective date of 1982 Senate Bill No. 699 on
July 1, 1982, the penalty for a second conviction under the
statute is increased to a sentence of imprisonment of not less
than 90 days nor more than 1 year and a fine of not less than
$500 nor more than $1,000. Upon a third or subsequent conviction,
the fine is increased to not less than $1,000 nor more than
$2,500, with the jail sentence remaining the same. The pre-
sence of these increased sentences creates a potential con-
flict between K.S.A. 22-3404(3), which provides that trials
in municipal court are to the court, and judicial decisions
which require the right of a defendant to a trial by jury where
imprisonment for more than six months or a fine greater than
$500 is authorized. State v. Irving, 216 Kan. 588, 589 (1975).
In our opinion, this conflict can be resolved in one of two
ways.
First, it should be noted that subsection (n) of Section 5 of
the bill, amending K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 8-1567, provides that:
"Nothing contained in this section shall be
construed as preventing any city from enacting
ordinances declaring acts prohibited or made
unlawful by this act as unlawful or prohibited
in such city and prescribing penalties for vio-
lation thereof, but the minimum penalty in any
such ordinance shall not be less than nor ex-
ceed the minimum penalty prescribed by this
act for the same violation, nor shall the maxi-
mum penalty in any such ordinance exceed the
maximum penalty prescribed for the same vio-
lation." (Emphasis added.)
By this subsection, the legislature has expressly allowed a
city to impose maximum sentences less than those of the sta-
tute, thus avoiding the conflict noted in City of Junction City v.
Lee, supra. Therefore, a city could enact an ordinance which
contains a maximum term of imprisonment of six months and a
maximum fine of $500. Accordingly, under Kansas and Federal
court decisions, no right to a jury trial would be present,
leaving a city free to continue trying such cases to the court.
Should a city desire to impose the new maximum penalties
now authorized, it is our opinion that it still would not be
required to afford defendants the right to a jury trial. We
base this conclusion on the holding of Ludwig v. Massachusetts,
427 U.S. 618, 96 S.Ct. 2781, 49 L.Ed.2d 732 (1976). In this
case, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the
denial of a jury trial at the municipal level denied a defendant
of rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments where, on
appeal, he or she was entitled to a trial de novo before a jury.
Similar to Kansas, the Massachusetts court system affords
only trial to the court at what the Court termed the "first-
tier" of the system. Upon appeal, a de novo trial before a
6 person jury is provided as a matter of right. In rejecting
the argument that such a system was constitutionally imper-
missible, the Court stated:
"It is indisputable that the Massachusetts
two-tier system does afford an accused charged
with a serious offense the absolute right to
have his guilt determined by a jury composed
and operating in accordance with the Constitu-
tion. Within the system, the jury serves its
function of protecting against prosecutorial
and judicial misconduct. It does so directly
at the second tier of the Massachusetts system."
427 U.S. at 625-626.
In this state, a defendant convicted in municipal court is
granted a right to appeal to the district court by K.S.A.
12-4501. Procedure for such appeals is governed by K.S.A.
22-3609 and 22-3610, both of which have been amended by 1982
Senate Bill No. 699, Sections 18 and 20. The former provides
that a jury trial is available if requested by the defendant
in writing, while the latter requires the case to be tried
de novo at the district court level. This is not the case
only when a diversion agreement was previously entered into
but violated. Trial of such cases is upon a stipulated set
of facts arrived at as part of the diversion agreement. 1982
Senate Bill No. 699, Section 15(b). In view of the close
similarity between the Massachusetts and Kansas court systems,
it is our opinion that the Ludwig holding is applicable to
municipal courts in this state, leaving them free to impose
sentences in excess of the limits traditionally set for "petty"
offenses, for which no right to a jury exists. Baldwin v.
New York, 399 U.S. 66, 90 S.Ct. 1886, 26 L.Ed.2d 437 (1970).
Our response to your inquiry concerning the remaining two
statutes, K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 8-262 and 8-1568, is somewhat
different, given the different language contained in the sta-
tutes. As noted above, K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 8-1567 has been
amended through the addition of subsection (a), which provides
that the maximum penalties of a city ordinance dealing with
the same offense need not equal those of the statute. No
such language appears in the other two statutes, however,
which contain the following penalties for violation.
K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 8-262(a).
"Any person who drives a motor vehicle on any
highway of this state at a time when such per-
sons' privilege so to do is canceled, suspended
or revoked shall be guilty of a class B misde-
meanor on the first conviction, a class A mis-
demeanor on the second conviction and for third
and subsequent convictions shall be guilty of
a glass E felony."
K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 8-1568.
"(a) Any driver of a motor vehicle who will-
fully fails or refuses to bring such driver's
vehicle to a stop, or who otherwise flees or
attempts to elude a pursuing police vehicle,
when given visual or audible signal to bring
the vehicle to a stop, shall be guilty as pro-
vided by subsection (b) • • • •
"(b) Every person convicted of violating sub-
section (a), upon a first conviction, shall be
guilty of a class B misdemeanor. Every person
convicted of violating subsection (a), upon a
second conviction of such subsection shall be
guilty of a class A misdemeanor. Every person
convicted of violating subsection (a), upon a
third or subsequent conviction of such subsec-
tion, shall be guilty of a class E felony."
In the absence of any language similar to that of subsection
(n), a city cannot, in our opinion, impose lesser penalties
than those provided by these two statutes. While alluded to
in City of Junction City v. Lee, supra, this question was
directly addressed by a recent opinion of this office, No.
81-222. There, we concluded that
"the Kansas Supreme Court would clearly find
conflict between a felony state statute prohi-
biting certain conduct and a municipal ordin-
ance prohibiting the same conduct but providing
misdemeanor sanctions. Such an ordinance can-
not be considered merely an enlargement on the
provisions of a statute which would require
more than is required by a statute, nor is it
an ordinance which concurrently regulates con-
duct with state statutes providing substantially
identical penalties. Carrying the proposed or-
dinance to a logical extreme, if such a situa-
tion were not a conflict, municipalities would
be empowered to enact ordinances regulating
such conduct as first degree murder, rape,
burglary and various and sundry felony offenses
as defined by state law, and provide misdemeanor
sanctions for the same. Thus, in light of K.S.A.
1980 Supp. 21-3108(3), should an individual be
charged by city ordinance and convicted of
first degree murder, receive a thirty-day jail
sentence for the same, prosecution by the state
would be barred, as the same would place the
defendant in 'double jeopardy.' Such a situa-
tion clearly conflicts with the Kansas criminal
code and would render the same largely ineffec-
tive. Thus, it is our opinion, should the
State of Kansas declare an act or omission by
law to be a felony, municipalities are without
authority to proscribe misdemeanor sanctions
for the same conduct."
We affirm the conclusion reached therein, with the result that
a city ordinance covering the offenses proscribed by K.S.A.
1981 Supp. 8-262 and 8-1568 must contain the same penalties found
in the statutes. However, we see no reason why the principles
enunciated in Ludwig v. Massachusetts, supra, would not apply to
convictions in municipal court on either K.S.A. 1981 Supp.
8-262 or 8-1568. While the imposition of a sentence commen-
surate with a class E felony would clearly exceed the six
month limit of Baldwin v. New York, supra, the availability
of a de novo trial by jury as a matter of right removes the
constitutional defects from the proceedings.
In conclusion, K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 8-1567, as amended by 1982
Senate Bill No. 699, establishes stricter penalties for those
persons who are convicted a second, third or subsequent time
for driving a vehicle under the influence of alcohol. The
new penalties can involve maximum imprisonment of up to one
year and fines of up to $2,500, both of which are beyond the
penalties which may be imposed without a right to a jury trial
being afforded to a defendant. As trials for violations of
municipal ordinances are to the court, a potential conflict
is created. However, as the legislature has authorized cities
to adopt lesser maximum penalties than those of the statute,
this problem may be avoided by a city when it drafts an
ordinance on this subject. Furthermore, even if the maximum
penalties of the statute are adopted by a city, a defendant's
right to a de novo trial before a jury at the district court
level sufficiently protects the constitutional right to trial
by jury.
K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 8-262 (driving while license canceled, sus-
pended or revoked) and 8-1568 (fleeing or attempting to elude
a police officer) provide that persons convicted of a third
offense shall be guilty of a class E felony. In the absence
of any statutory provision to the contrary, a city is without
the power to classify such conduct by ordinance as a misde-
meanor. Again, however, the right to a trial de novo by a
jury at the district court level avoids the denial of the con-
stitutional right of the defendant to a jury trial. Attorney
General Opinion No. 81-222 is reaffirmed.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS
"Jeffrey S. Southard
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:BJS:JSS:hle:jm

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