Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1982-131

1982-131Kanag

Testo completo

June 17, 1982
A'TT'ORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 82-131
Tim Karstetter
McPherson County Attorney
Walnut at Marlin
McPherson, Kansas 67450
Re: Crimes and Punishments -- Crimes Against Property --
Giving a Worthless Check
Synopsis: In a prosecution for the crime of giving a worthless check,
the presumption of notice that results when the holder of a
Check that has been returned by the drawee sends written
notice in compliance with K.S.A. 21-3707(2) is a conclusive
presumption. Actual receipt of the written notice need not
be shown by the prosecution, if the holder has satisfied the
requirements of K.S.A. 21-3707(2). However, evidence that
defendant did not receive the formal written notice is
admissible pursuant to K.S.A. 60-460(m), as an exception to
the hearsay rule of evidence, but merely as mitigating
evidence at the time of sentencing. Cited herein: K.S.A.
8-255, 21-3707, 60-460.
*
Dear Mr. Karstetter:
You have requested our opinion on three related questions, each of which
concerns the statutory presumption of notice that is to be given by the
holder to the drawer or maker of a check, order or draft payment that
has been refused by a drawee on account of insufficient funds.
Your first question is whether the presumption of notice that arises,
if the procedural requirements of K.S.A. 21-3707(2) are satisfied, is
successfully rebutted when the letter giving formal notice of the returned
check has been returned by the United States Post Office as "unclaimed,"
"refused," or "moved, left no forwarding address."
K.S.A. 21-3707 creates the crime of "giving a worthless check," and it
provides, in part, in subsection (2):
"In any prosecution against the maker or drawer of a check,
order or draft payment, of which has been refused by the
drawee on account of insufficient funds, the making, drawing,
issuing or delivering of such check shall be prima facie
evidence of intent to defraud and of knowledge of insufficient
funds in, or on deposit with, the drawee unless the maker or
drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon and a
service charge not exceeding $3 for each check, within seven
days after notice has been given to the maker or drawer that
such check, draft or order has not been paid by the drawee.
As used in this section, 'notice' includes oral or written
notice to the person entitled thereto. Written notice shall
be presumed to have been given when deposited as restricted
matter in the United States mail, addressed to the person
to be given notice at such person's address as it appears
on such check, draft or order."
After reviewing this section it is apparent that the legislature has
provided that two separate presumptions will arise in a prosecution for
the crime of giving a worthless check. The first presumption mentioned is
the clearly rebuttable presumption of intent to defraud and of knowledge of
insufficient funds. The Kansas Supreme Court has discussed and upheld
this rebuttable presumption in State v. Calhoun, 224 Kan. 579, 581 (1978)
and State v. Haremza, 213 Kan. 201, 206,207 (1973).
The second presumption contained within K.S.A. 21-3707(2) is a presumption
of notice, i.e., the defendant was properly notified that the check was
returned to the holder by the drawee bank for insufficient funds. This
is an irrebuttable presumption which is based on language within the statute
that is patently different from the preceding presumption of intent to
defraud and knowledge of insufficient funds.
The threshold
the nature of
categories of
Washington v.
discussed the
presumptions,
in considering the effect of these provisions is to determine
the prescannotn discussed. A brief sumrary of the three
presumptions will be of assistance to this discussion. In
Harris, 502 F.Supp. 1267 (S.D. N.Y., 1980), the court
distinctions between the three major groups of evidentiary
as follows:
"A 'conclusive' presumption requires the jury to find an
ultimate fact to be true based upon proof of another fact,
and even the most persuasive evidence cafact rebut such a
presumption. A 'mandatory' presumption requires the jury to
find an ultimate fact to be true based upon proof of another
fact unless they are otherwise persuaded by evidence offered
in rebuttal. An 'inference,' sometimes referred to as a
'permissive' presumption, allows, but does not require, the
jury to find an ultimate fact to be true based upon proof
of another faCt if upon consideration of all the circumstances
revealed by the evidence they are satisfied that the ultimate
fact is more likely than not to follow from the fact proved."
[Citations omitted, emphasis supplied.] Id. at 1271-72.
See, also, Stumbo, Presumptions: A View At Chaos, 3 W.L.J. 182,
186-195 (1964).
From the preceding, it is clear that the presumption of notice contained
within K.S.A. 21-3707(2) is a conclusive or irreresponsibilityumption.
At this point it is significant to note that this conclusive presumption of
notice does not pertain to any element of the crime of giving a worthless
check. It merely represents a legislative intent to make prosecution of
worthless check cases more expedient in the interests of public policy.
The prosecution, as in all criminal cases, is still charged with the
responsiblity of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, the essential elements
of the offense with which the accused is charged. If the prosecution
fails to establish all of the essential elements necessary to constitute
the giving of aauthority, the defendant is entitled to an acquittal.
Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358
(1970); United States v. Tecumseh, 630 F.2d 749 (10th Cir. 1980) cert.
denied 449 U.S. 961.
The Kansas Supreme Court in a recent opinion, State v. Jones, No. 53,813
(filed May 8, 1982), was asked to consider a statute, K.S.A. 8-255, which
provides the authopresumption division of vehiclesummaryspend a person's
driver's license. Subsection (b) of that statute requires the division to
notify the licensee of the fact of the license suspension or revocation.
The court held in relevant part:
"The State is entitled to rely upon its record of all
licensees' addresses, and it is also entitled to rely upon
the presumption that letters, sent by ordinary mail postage
prepaid, are received by the addressee in the ordinary course
of the mails. The use of certified mail, return receipt
requested, would be preferable but is not required. Once
the State has complied with the mandatory notice requirement
of K.S.A. 8-255(b) by mailing, the presumption of receipt
arises and is not rebuttable. Evidence of non-receipt may,
however, be introduced by the accused in mitigation at time
of sentencing.
"We hold . . . that in a prosecution under K.S.A. 1981
Supp. 8-262, the State need not prove actual receipt of
the notice . . . "
A
You also inquire whether the Supreme Court of Kansas in State v. Calhoun,
supra, in its discussion of K.S.A. 21-3707(2), was referring to the
mandatory presumption of intent to defraud and knowledge of insufficient
funds or to the conclusive presumption of notice. The question was resolved
by the Kansas Court of Appeals in Kopp's Rug Co. v. Talbot, 5 Kan.App.2d
565, 568 (1980), in which the court stated in pertinent part: " Calhoun
dealt with a presumption of intent in a criminal case . . ."
Your final question concerns the situation in which the written notice
sent by the holder to the drawer pursuant to the terms of K.S.A. 21-3707(2)
is returned to the holder by the United States Post Office. Specifically,
you inquire as to whether the information that is stamped, printed or
written on the envelope by post office personnel is inadmissible during
trial as hearsay evidence. In our judgment, such information would be
admissible in a worthless check prosecution under the provisions of
K.S.A. 60-460(m), which provides an exception to the hearsay rule for
"[w]ritings offered as memoranda or records of acts,
conditions or events to prove the facts stated therein,
if the judge finds that they were made in the regular
course of a business at or about the time of the act,
condition or event recorded, and that the sources of
information from which made and the method and circumstances
of their preparation were such as to indicate their trust-
worthiness . . . ."
It is our opinion that such information is recorded in the regular course
of the post office's business and made under circumstances that indicate
reliability. Thus, we believe the information would be admissible as an
exception to the rule against hearsay evidence. However, since the
presumption of notice has been determined to be conclusive, such evidence
cannot be introduced by the defendant to rebut the presumption of notice,
but merely as evidence of a mitigating circumstance reducing the degree
of culpability, to be considered at time of sentencing by the trial court.
In conclusion, it is our opinion that in a prosecution for the crime
of giving a worthless check, the presumption of notice that results
when the holder of a check that has been returned by the drawee sends
written notice in compliance with K.S.A. 21-3707(2) is a conclusive
presumption. Actual receipt of the written notice need not be shown
by the prosecution, if the holder has satisfied the requirements of
K.S.A. 21-3707(2). However, evidence that defendant did not receive
the formal written notice is admissible pursuant to K.S.A. 60-460(m),
as an exception to the hearsay rule of evidence, but merely as mitigating
evidence at the time of sentencing.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
Joseph P1. Fast
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:JEF:JMF:may

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