Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1981-089

1981-089Kanag

Testo completo

April 10, 1981
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 81-89
Steven E. Worcester
Graham Count , Attorney
413 North Pomeroy Ave.
Hill City, Kansas 67642
Re: Automobiles -- Registration of Vehicles -- Exemp-
tion for Municipally-owned Fire Trucks; County
Qualifies as Municipality
Synopsis: Under the provisions of 1980 Supp. 8-128(a),
"municipally owned fire trucks" are exempt from
motor vehicle registration requirements. In light
of the meaning commonly given to the term "minici-
pality" by Kansas statutes, this exemption includes
fire trucks owned by a county, as well as those
owned by a city. Cited herein: K.S.A. 1980 Supp.
8-128(a), K.S.A. 10-1101(a), K.S.A. 1980 Supp.
12-105a(a), 12-110a, K.S.A. 12-726(a), 12-1218(a),
12-1679(a)(1), 12-3102(b), K.S.A. 1980 Supp.
31-132(c), K.S.A. 68-2101(a).
* *
Dear Mr. Worcester:
As County Attorney for Graham County, you request the opinion
of this office on a matter involving the fire trucks which
the county currently owns and operates. Specifically, you
wish to know whether these vehicles must be registered pur-
suant to K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 8-126 et seq., or whether they are
exempt under the provisions of K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 8-128(a).
The latter statute states in pertinent part:
"Farm tractors, all self-propelled farm imple-
ments including fertilizers and spreaders de-
signed and used exclusively for dispensing
liquid or dust fertilizer, road rollers and
road machinery temporarily operated or moved
upon the highways, municipally owned fire
trucks, and school buses owned and operated by
a school district or nonpublic school which
have the name of the municipality, school dis-
trict or nonpublic school plainly painted
thereon need not be registered under this act."
(Emphasis added.)
Your inquiry, then, is one of whether a county can be con-
sidered a "municipality" for the purposes of owning such
equipment.
In the task of construing a statute, the basic rule of con-
struction, to which all other rules are subordinate, is that
the purpose and intent of the legislature governs when that
intent can be determined from the wording of the statute.
City of Salina v. Jaggers, 228 Kan. 155 (1980). Where the
language used is plain and unambiguous and also appropriate
to an obvious purpose, the meaning given to the statute must
give effect to such language. Underwood v. Allmon, 215 Kan.
201 (1974). In addition, it is to be presumed that the legis-
lature both understood the meaning of the words it used and
intended to use them and that it used the words in their
ordinary and common meaning. Rogers v. Shanahan, 221 Kan.
221 (1976). Finally, in the absence of anything in the con-
text of the statute to indicate otherwise, the same word used
in different statutes relating to the same subject is inter-
preted as having the same meaning. Callaway v. City of
Overland Park, 211 Kan. 646 (1973).
Unlike a number of other Kansas acts, the term "municipality"
is not defined anywhere in K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 8-126 et seq.
However, as there also appears nothing to indicate that any
special meaning is to be attached to the term, it is reason-
able to look to the other Kansas statutes in which the term
is specifically defined. Our review of these statutes, while
no means exhaustive, has disclosed no less than eight differ-
ent statutes in which "municipality" has been defined to
include counties, as well as cities and various other local
governmental units. These include: K.S.A. 10-1101(a) (Cash
Basis Law); K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 12-105a(a) (payment of claims
against governmental units); K.S.A. 12-726(c) (planned unit
developments); K.S.A. 12-1218(a) (libraries); K.S.A. 12-1679(a)(1)
(licensing of private security police); K.S.A. 12-3102(b)
(control of water pollution); K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 31-132(c)
(fire safety and prevention); and K.S.A. 68-2101(d) (repair
of highways and roads). The sole exception to the above was
found at K.S.A. 12-2701(a), which defines the term to include
only certain cities, townships or improvement districts lo-
cated within certain counties, a fact which leaves the defini-
tion of little bearing on this inquiry.
In reading K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 8-128(a), we can see no reason
why "municipality" should be interpreted differently than in
the great majority of statutes cited above where an express
definition is set out. Additionally, we see no indication
that it was the intent of the legislature to treat fire trucks
owned by a city differently than those owned by a county,
since both entities clearly possess the power to purchase,
repair or replace such equipment. See, e.g. K.S.A. 1980 Supp.
12-110a. Nor, in our opinion, does there appear to be any
public policy which can be served by making such a distinc-
tion. Accordingly, it would be our opinion that the exemp-
tion provided by K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 8-128(a) extends to fire
trucks owned by a county as well as those owned by a city.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
Jeffrey S. Southard
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:BJS:JSS:hle

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