Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1981-082

1981-082Kanag

Testo completo

April 7, 1981
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 81- 82
The Honorable Paul Hess, Chairman
Senate Committee on Ways and Means
State Capitol, Room 123-S
BUILDING MAIL
Re: Statutes -- Appropriation Acts -- Line Item Veto
Synopsis: The item veto power granted the governor by Article
2, Section 14(b) of the Kansas Constitution extends
only to the disapproval of "items of appropriation
of money" in bills containing several such items of
appropriation, and such power does not permit the
governor to partially veto a bill by disapproving
a provision therein effecting a transfer of moneys
within the state treasury or imposing conditions,
limitations or qualifications on an appropriation
or constituting an independent statement of sub-
stantive law. Accordingly, Governor Carlin's pur-
ported item vetoes of provisions in section 1 of
1980 Senate Bill No. 896 and section 4 of 1980
House Bill No. 2813 were of no force or effect,
since neither of the vetoed provisions constituted
an item of appropriation. Cited herein: K.S.A.
75-3135; Kan. Const., Art. 2, 3314, 24; L. 1980,
ch. 17, 34, L. 1980, ch. 25, 331, 2.
*
Dear Senator Hess:
As Chairman of the Senate Committee on Ways and Means, you
have inquired on behalf of that Committee as to the governor's
authority to veto items of appropriation. Subsequent to
submitting your request, you provided us with two specific
instances where Governor Carlin had purported to exercise his
item veto power during the 1980 legislative session, and you
have asked whether the governor's -constitutional authority
had been validly exercised in these two instances.
The power of the governor to veto items of appropriation is
provided in Article 2, Section 14(b) of the Kansas Constitu-
tion, as follows:
"If any bill presented to the governor contains
several items of appropriation of money, one or
more of such items may be disapproved by the
governor while the other portion of the bill
is approved by the governor."
The foregoing represents the only authority the governor has
to veto less than an entire legislative enactment, and it is
clear that such authority is limited to the disapproval of
one or more items of appropriation among several items of
appropriation in a bill. Thus, it is essential to determine
the nature of an "item of appropriation" in order to consider
the nature and extent of the governor's authority.
The term "appropriation" is defined generally in 63 Am. Jur.
2d Public Funds §47 (1965) as follows:
"In specific terms, an appropriation may be
defined as an authority of the legislature,
given at the proper time and in legal form to
the proper officers, to apply a distinctly
specified sum from a designated fund out of
the treasury, in a given year, for a specified
object or demand against the state. In general
terms, an appropriation is the act of setting
money apart formally or officially for a spe-
cial use or purpose by the legislature in clear
and unequivocal terms in a duly enacted law."
(Footnotes omitted.)
In Kansas, moneys may not be drawn from the state treasury
"except in pursuance of a specific appropriation made by
law." (Emphasis added.) Kan. Const., Art.2, §24. The empha-
sized portion of the foregoing quote of our constitutional
requirement was construed in State, ex rel. v. Fadely, 180
Kan. 652 (1957), as meaning
"an authority of the legislature, given at the
proper time and in legal form to the proper
officials, to apply a distinctly specified sum
from out of the state treasury, in a given
period, for a specified objective or demand
against the state. In general terms a 'speci-
fic appropriation made by law' is the act of
setting money apart formally or officially for
a special use or purpose by the legislature in
clear and unequivocal terms in a duly enacted
law (42 Am. Jur. Public Funds, §43, p. 747; 81
C.J.S., States, §163, p. 1207, §164b, p. 1215
and §164c, p. 1217). Authorities in support
of this statement are Martin v. Francis, Trea-
surer, 13 Kan. 220, 227, 228; Evans v. McCarthy,
42 Kan. 426, 429, 430, 22 Pac. 631; Henderson
v. Hovey, 46 Kan. 691, 692, 27 Pac. 177; State
ex rel., v. Stover, 47 Kan. 119, 121, 27 Pac.
850. See, also, State, ex. v. Defenbacher, 158
Ohio St., 268, 91 N.E. 2d 512. Giving the words
used in Art. 2, §24 of the constitution their
common and ordinary meaning it seems reasonably
clear to this court that money belonging to the
state and rightfully in the state treasury and
over which the legislature has the rightful
control, cannot be withdrawn from the treasury
except in pursuance of an act passed by the
legislature setting apart or assigning such
money to a particular public use for a term
not longer than two years which must be speci-
fic in amount and specific in purpose to indi-
cate, with reasonable exactness, to the public
officials who are authorized to withdraw and
use, within such period, the sum so appropriated
or set apart to the objective, purpose or plan
sought to be accomplished by the appropriation,
and for no other purpose (Martin v. Francis,
Treasurer, supra; Evans v. McCarthy, supra;
Henderson v. Hovey, supra; State, ex rel., v.
Stover, supra; State, ex. v. Defenbacher,
supra)." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 661.
It is clear from the foregoing statement in Fadely, and from
our review of the Kansas cases cited by the Court therein,
that an appropriation is an authorization granted by the
legislature to designated public officials to withdraw from
the state treasury, within a particular period of time, a
stated sum of money for a specific purpose.
Our conclusion as to the meaning of "appropriation" is supported
by decisions from other jurisdictions having similar constitu-
tional provisions. For example, in Idaho the pertinent con-
stitutional requirement states: "No money shall be drawn from
the treasury, but in pursuance of appropriations made by law."
Idaho Const., Art. VII, §13. In summarizing its prior decisions
regarding the meaning of "appropriation" in this constitutional
•provision, the Supreme Court of Idaho stated:
"These cases define an appropriation as (1)
authority from the legislature, (2) expressly
given, (3) in legal form, (4) to proper officers,
(5) to pay from public monies, (6) a specified sum,
and no more, and (7) for a specified purpose, and
no other." Leonardson v. Moon, 92 Idaho 796,
451 P.2d 542, 550 (1969).
Although the Kansas cases cited and discussed herein have all
construed the provisions of Article 2, Section 24 of our con-
stitution, we are compelled to the conclusion that such inter-
pretation has application to Article 2, Section 14(b), as well.
The general rule is stated thusly:
"Unless it clearly appears, from the context
or otherwise, that a different meaning should
be applied, the same meaning attaches, or is
presumed to attach, to a given word or phrase
repeated in a constitution, wherever it occurs
therein." (Footnotes omitted.) 16 C.J.S.
Constitutional Law §19b.
There being nothing in Article 2, Section 14(b) to indicate
that the term "appropriation" used therein should have a
meaning different from its meaning in Article 2, Section 24,
it follows, then, that the Court's definition of "appropriation"
in Fadely applies with equal force in construing the object
of the governor's power to veto an item or items of appropri-
ation. However, even though Fadely has prescribed the ele-
ments of an appropriation, we are unaware of any Kansas cases
defining an "item of appropriation." Thus, seeking assistance
from decisions in other jurisdictions, we note that, in
People ex rel. State Board of Agriculture v. Brady, 277 Ill. 124,
115 N.E. 204 (1917), an "item" was found to be "a separate
particular in an enumeration of a total which is separate and
distinct from the other particulars or entries." 115 N.E. at 207.
To the same effect is Fairfield v. Foster, 25 Ariz. 146, 214
P.319 (1923), which relied upon a dictionary definition of
"item." However, we note that the most widely cited definition
is that found in Commonwealth v. Dodson, 176 Va. 281, 11 S.E.2d
120 (1940), where the court stated: "An item in an appropriation
bill is an indivisible sum of money dedicated to a stated pur-
pose." 11 S.E.2d at 127.
Considering these judicial definitions in conjunction with
Fadely, we believe that an "item of appropriation," subject
to the governor's veto power under Article 2, Section 14(b),
•is an authorization to disburse from the state treasury a
stated and indivisible sum of money for a specific purpose.
With these principles in mind we have considered the two
item vetoes of Governor Carlin about which you have inquired.
The first such item veto was exercised with respect to 1980
Senate Bill No. 896 (L. 1980, ch. 25), which contained several
items of appropriation. Governor Carlin vetoed section 2
thereof, which appropriated moneys in the University of Kansas
Hospital Fund to the University of Kansas Medical Center.
However, the governor also exercised his item veto power to
excise a portion of section 1 of that bill, which created
and specified the purposes of said fund. As it was presented
to the governor, section 1(a) of Senate Bill No. 896 read as
follows:
"(a) There is hereby created in the state
treasury the university of Kansas hospital
fund. On July 1, 1981, and quarterly there-
after through April 1, 1986, the director of
accounts and reports shall transfer $500,000
from the hospital revenue fund of the univer-
sity of Kansas medical center to the university
of Kansas hospital fund. On July 1, 1986, and
quarterly thereafter, the director of accounts
and reports shall transfer $150,000 from the
hospital revenue fund of the university of
Kansas medical center to the university of
Kansas hospital fund. All expenditures from
the university of Kansas hospital fund shall
be for renovation, reconstruction and mainten-
ance projects at the university of Kansas medi-
cal center at Kansas City, Kansas, and for the
acquisition and replacement of equipment at
the university of Kansas medical center and
shall be made in accordance with appropria-
tion acts upon warrants of the director of
accounts and reports issued pursuant to
vouchers approved by the chancellor of the
university of Kansas or by a person or per-
sons designated by the chancelor." (Emphasis
added.)
The emphasized portion of the above quoted provisions was
disapproved by Governor Carlin as an item veto. 1980 Session
Laws of Kansas at 1398, 1399. In our judgment, however, this
was an invalid exercise of the governor's constitutional
authority. Although the vetoed portion of this section had
the effect of setting aside in the state treasury a specific
sum of money for the purposes elsewhere provided in that
section, it does not, in our judgment, constitute an item of
appropriation of such moneys. The vetoed language required
the director of accounts and reports to transfer at specified
times moneys in the Hospital Revenue Fund of the University
of Kansas Medical Center to the newly-created University of
Kansas Hospital Fund. However, such action did not have the
effect of authorizing the withdrawal of funds from the state
treasury. It merely provided for the transfer of funds withinthestatetreasury.Theauthorizationtowithdrawordisburse
moneys in this fund was accomplished by section 2 of the bill,
and Governor Carlin's veto of that section was, in our judg-
ment, a proper exercise of his constitutional powers.
While we recognize that there is some authority to the effect
that the mere legislative action of "setting apart" moneys
for a specified purpose constitutes an appropriation, we do
not read Fadely or the cases cited therein as supporting that
proposition as a definitional statement of our constitutional
requirements. In our judgment, these cases require not only
that moneys be set apart within the state treasury, but that
there also be an authorization to withdraw such moneys, to be
used for a specified purpose. A transfer of moneys within
the treasury lacks the essential withdrawal authorization and
does not, in our judgment, constitute an appropriation. "An
'appropriation' is the legislative sanction for the disbursement
of public revenue." City of Reno v. McGowan, 439 P.2d 985, 986
(Nev. , 1968).
Therefore, although the governor could preclude the disburse-
ment of moneys from the University of Kansas Hospital Fund by
his item veto of the appropriation of these moneys in section
2 of Senate Bill No. 896, he could not, in our opinion, simi-
larly prevent the depletion of the Hospital Revenue Fund of
the University of Kansas Medical Center by the required trans-
fer of moneys therefrom into the University of Kansas Hospi-
tal Fund, pursuant to section 1 of that bill. Thus, even
though moneys in the University of Kansas Hospital Fund could
not be expended, the governor's item veto power could not pre-
vent the transfer of moneys into such fund, thereby precluding
the expenditure of such moneys for any purpose, unless and
until the legislature enacts and the governor approves an
appropriation thereof.
The other item veto by Governor Carlin to which you directed
our attention affected section 4 of 1980 House Bill No. 2813
(L. 1980, ch. 17, §4), which states:
"STATE BANK COMMISSIONER
"There is appropriated for the above agency
from the following special revenue funds all
moneys now or hereafter lawfully credited to
and available in such funds, except that ex-
penditures other than refunds authorized by
law shall not exceed the following:
Bank commissioner fee fund $1,181,865
'Provided, That expenditures from this fund for
the salary of the state bank commissioner for
1981 shall be not less than $32,600.'
Bank examination and investigation fund . .
No limit" (Emphasis added.)
The emphasized portion of the foregoing provisions was dis-
approved by Governor Carlin as a "line item veto." 1980 Session
Laws of Kansas, p. 1392. In order to be subject to the gover-
nor's item veto power, the above-emphasized language must
be determined to be an "item of appropriation of money." Kan.
Const., Art. 2, §14(b). However, on its face, we discern sev-
eral possible ways of perceiving said emphasized language.
First, it might be viewed as an "item of appropriation";
second, it might be considered as a condition or limitation
upon the appropriation of moneys from the bank commissioner
fee fund; or, third, it might be regarded as an independent
statement of substantive law that amends, by implication, the
provisions of K.S.A. 75-3135 authorizing the governor to fix
the annual salary of the bank commissioner. Of course, if it is
found to be the latter, it is immune from the governor's item
veto, since Article 2, Section 14(b) limits the exercise of such
power to "items of appropriation of money." Thus, if the lan-
guage in question is found to constitute nothing more than a
substantive law prescribing the minimum salary of the bank
commissioner, the govern's item veto was improperly exercised.
Similarly, if the language does nothing more than prescribe a
condition or restriction on the appropriation of moneys in the
bank commissioner fee fund, such interpretation also would render
the governor's veto inoperative. In Attorney General Opinion No.
76-168, Attorney General Curt Schneider concluded that the item
veto power of the governor does not extend to a condition, quali-
fication or limitation upon the expenditure of moneys. We concur
in that opinion, which was predicated in part on a decision to
that effect in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice, 299 U.S. 410,
57 S.Ct. 252, 81 L.Ed. 312 (1937). In Bengzon, the court quoted
with approval from Fulmore v. Lane, 104 Tex. 499, 140 S.W. 405
(1911) as follows:
"'Nowhere in the Constitution . . . is the
authority given the Governor to approve in
part and disapprove in part a bill. The
only additional authority to disapproving
a bill in whole is that given to object to
an item or items where a bill contains
several items of appropriation. It follows
conclusively that where the veto power is
attempted to be exercised to object to a
paragraph or portion of a bill other than
an item or items, or to language qualifying
an appropriation or directing the method
of its uses, he exceeds the constitutional
authority vested in him, and his objection
to such paragraph, or portion of a bill, or
language qualifying an appropriation, or
directing the method of its use, becomes
non-effective.'" (Emphasis added.) 299 U.S.
at 413, 414.
Of similar import is the following statement in Commonwealth v.
Dodson, supra:
"We think it is plain that the veto power does
not carry with it power to strike out conditions
or restrictions. That would be legislation.
Plainly, money devoted to one purpose can not
be used for another, and it is equally plain
that power to impose conditions before it can
become available is legislation.
"An item in an appropriation bill is an indi-
visible sum of money dedicated to a stated
purpose. It is something different from a
provision or condition, and where conditions
are attached, they must be observed; where
none are attached, none may be added." 11
S.E.2d at 127.
See, also, an opinion which dissented, in part, with the
majority opinion in State ex rel. Brotherton v. Blankenship,
207 S.E.2d 421 (W. Va., 1973), but which quoted the foregoing
with approval.
Thus, absent any pertinent Kansas case law, we believe the
preceding judicial statements from other jurisdictions provide
an appropriate basis for concluding that conditions, restrictions
or other qualifications placed on an appropriation by the
legislature may not be subjected to the governor's item veto.
Of pertinence here is the statement in State ex rel., v. Bennett,
222 Kan. 12 (1977):
"As pointed out in State, ex rel., (Anderson) v.
Fadely, supra, except as is restricted by the
constitution, the legislature has the exclusive
power to direct how, when, and for what purpose
the public funds shall be applied in carrying out
the objects of the state government." Id. at 18, 19.
Accordingly, it is our opinion that, while the governor may
disapprove an item of appropriation, he may not, through the
use of item veto, reject the legislature's determination as to
the manner or conditions under which an item of appropriation
may be expended.
However, in this instance, it is appropriate to note the following
statement of General Schneider in Opinion No. 76-168:
"Where an appropriation enumerates lesser sums
included therein to be paid to designated
officers or classes of employees, the lesser
sums have generally been held to be separate
items of appropriation subject to veto. See,
e.g., Green v. Rawls, 122 So.2d 10 (Fla. 1960);
Fairfield v. Foster, 214 Pac. 319 (Ariz. 1923)."
Therefore, only if the language excised by Governor Carlin
from House Bill No. 2813 can be characterized as an "item of
appropriation" was his item veto proper. In our judgment, however,
the language disapproved by the governor cannot be so characterized.
It lacks at least one of the essential elements of an item of
appropriation, in that the limitation imposed on the bank commissioner's
salary is not expressed as a specific sum of money. As previously
discussed herein, an appropriation must limit the moneys to be
withdrawn from the treasury. The money appropriated for use by a
public officer must be a specified sum, and no more.
In this instance, the sum specified for the bank commissioner's
salary does not limit the amount which can be withdrawn from the
state treasury for such purpose; it states only a minimum. Thus,
it did not restrict the governor from fixing the bank commissioner's
salary in excess of the specified sum, pursuant to K.S.A. 75-3135,
as long as the salary so fixed remained within the limitations of
the appropriations from the bank commissioner fee fund.
Having concluded that the language excised by Governor Carlin
from 1980 House Bill No. 2813 was not an "item of appropriation"
and, thus, not subject to his item veto, it is unnecessary to
consider whether such language constituted an independent
provision of substantive law or a condition, limitation or
qualification of the appropriation to which it is appended,
since we have previously concluded that neither would be subject
to an item veto.
In summary, therefore, it is our opinion that the item veto power
granted the governor by Article 2, Section 14(b) of the Kansas
.Constitution extends only to the disapproval of "items of
appropriation of money" in bills containing several such items
of appropriation, and such power does not permit the governor
to partially veto a bill by disapproving a provision therein
effecting a transfer of moneys within the state treasury or
imposing conditions, limitations or qualifications on an
appropriation or constituting an independent statement of
substantive law. Accordingly, Governor Carlin's purported item
vetoes of provisions in section 1 of 1980 Senate Bill No. 896
and section 4 of 1980 House Bill No. 2813 were of no force or
effect, since neither of the vetoed provisions constituted an
item of appropriation.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney	Generalof	Kansas
W. Robert Alderson
First Deputy Attorney General
RTS:WRA:he:jm

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