Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1981-045

1981-045Kanag

Testo completo

February 16, 1981
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 81- 45
Dennis W. Moore, District Attorney
Johnson County Courthouse
P.O. Box 728
6th Floor Tower
Olathe, Kansas 66061
Re: Counties and County Officers--Election Commissioners--
Simultaneous Holding of Office of Mayor of Second Class
City
Synopsis: There are no statutory obstacles to an election commissioner
also holding the office of mayor of a city of the second
class. Moreover, the common law doctrine of incompatibility
of offices does not preclude such simultaneous incumbencies.
*
Dear Mr. Moore:
You have asked whether there are any legal problems regarding one
person simultaneously holding the offices of election commissioner
and mayor of a city of the second class. You indicate that the present
Johnson County Election Commissioner has filed for election to the office
of Mayor of the city of Roeland Park, and he has requested you to
seek our opinion as to whether he may hold both offices, should he
be elected mayor.
We have discovered no statutory provision bearing upon this proposition,
nor have we found any judicial decisions which have addressed this
particular question. Moreover, our records reflect that this question
has not been considered in any prior opinion of this office, although we
have noted the February 7, 1969, letter opinion of Attorney General
Kent Frizzell in which he concluded that one person could simultaneously
hold the office of mayor of Roeland Park and the position of programmer
in the Johnson County election commissioner's office.
Therefore, absent any legal authorities dealing specifically with
the question you have posed, resolution of your inquiry requires a
determination of whether the offices of election commissioner and
mayor of a second-class city are incompatible.
There are two principal Kansas cases concerning the incompatibility
of offices. In Abry v. Gray, 58 Kan. 148 (1897), the Court adopted
the essential language of 19 American and English Encyclopedia of Law,
562, as follows:
"'The incompatibility which will operate to
vacate the first office must be something more
than the mere physical impossibility of the
performance of the duties of the two offices
by one person, and may be said to arise where
the nature and duties of the two offices are
such as to render it improper, from considerations
of public policy, for one person to retain bath.'"
Subsequently, in Dyche v. Davis, 92 Kan. 971 (1914), the Court held:
"Offices are incompatible when the performance
of the duties of one in some way interferes with
the performance of the duties of the other . . . .
It is an inconsistency in the functions of the two
offices." Id. at 977.
Thus, in reading these cases together, it is apparent that the Kansas
Supreme Court has determined that incompatibility of offices requires
more than a physical impossibility to discharge the duties of both offices
at the same time. There must be an inconsistency in the functions of
the two offices, to the extent that a performance of the duties of one
office in some way interferes with the performance of the duties of the
other, thus making it improper, from a public policy standpoint, for one
person to retain both offices. This rule is in accord with general
authorities. In 89 A.L.R. 2d 632, it is stated:
"It is to be found in the character of the offices
and their relation to each other, in subordination
of the one to the other, and in the nature of the
duties and functions which attach to them, and exist
where the performance of the duties of the one interferes
with the performance of the duties of the other. The
offices are generally considered incompatible where such
duties and functions are inherently inconsistent and
repugnant, so that because of the contrariety and
antagonism which would result from the attempt of
one person to discharge faithfully, impartially-, and
efficiently the duties of both offices, considerations
of public policy render it improper for an incumbent to
retain both." (Citations omitted.) Id. at 633.
Further, general authorities provide assistance in determining when the
nature and duties of two offices are inconsistent, so as to render them
incompatible. For example:
"[A] conflict of interest exists where one office
is subordinate to the other, and subject in some
degree to the supervisory power of its incumbent,
or where the incumbent of one of the offices has the
power of appointment as to the other office, or has the
power to remove the incumbent of the other or to punish
the other. Furthermore, a conflict of interest may be
demonstrated by the power to regulate the compensation of
the other, or to audit his accounts." 67 C.J.S. Officers
§27.
In applying the foregoing principles to your inquiry, we have
concluded that the common law doctrine of incompatibility of offices
does not preclude one person from simultaneously holding the offices of
election commissioner and mayor of a city of the second class. Certainly
neither of such offices is vested with any supervisory power over the
other, and a comparison of the powers, duties and functions of these
two offices has provided no basis for concluding that they are inherently
inconsistent and repugnant, to the extent that one person cannot faithful
impartially and efficiently discharge the duties of both offices.
The only instance where we have discerned the possibility of a conflict
regards the duty of the election commissioner to conduct the city
election at which he is a candidate for mayor. However, we must conclude
as did Attorney General Frizzell in the opinion letter noted previously
herein, that there is no more conflict present in this situation than
there is for any of the 101 county clerks who are statutorily required
to conduct elections in which they are candidates. Moreover, it should
be recognized that this is not a situation in which the powers, duties
and functions of the two offices are in conflict, thereby precluding the
incumbent of both offices from acting in the best interests of the
respective constituencies of these offices. Rather, it is a circumstance
in which there are no powers, duties or functions of the mayor involved,
and while it may be an instance that invites public scrutiny of the
election commissioner's ability to faithfully and impartially discharge
his statutory duties, it is not a situation that may be seized upon
as compelling a finding that these offices are incompatible.
In summary, it is our opinion that there are no statutory obstacles to
an election commissioner also holding the office of mayor of a city of
the second class. Moreover, the common law doctrine of incompatibility
of offices does not preclude such simultaneous incumbencies.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
W. Robert Alderson
First Deputy Attorney General
RTS:WRA:phf

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