Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1981-032

1981-032Kanag

Testo completo

February 3, 1981
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 81-32
Honorable Homer E. Jarchow
State Representative, 95th District
Room 273-W, State Capitol
Topeka, Kansas 66612
Re: Kansas Constitution--Finance and Taxation--Uniform
and Equal Rate of Assessment
Kansas Constitution--Legislature--Approval or
Veto of Bills by the Governor
Synopsis: The provisions of subsection (b) of K.S.A. 1980 Supp.
79-331 violate the provisions of Article 11, Section 1
of the Kansas Constitution and are void.
The provisions of 1979 House Bill No. 2456, as
amended and passed by the House of Representatives
and the Senate, are not the same provisions contained
in 1979 House Bill No. 2456, as enrolled and signed
by Governor Carlin, which appear at Chapter 310
of the 1979 Session Laws of Kansas and K.S.A. 1980
Supp. 79-331. Thus, said provisions are void.
Cited herein: K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 79-331; L. 1979,
Ch. 310, §1 (1979 House Bill No. 2456); Kan. Const.,
Art. 2, §14, Art. 11, §1.
*
Dear Representative Jarchow:
You request our opinion as to whether the method of appraisal
prescribed in subsection (b) of K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 79-331, as
limited by the provisions of subsection (c) thereof, is violative
of the provisions of Article 11, Section 1 of the Kansas
Constitution.
In response to your inquiry concerning the constitutionality
of these provisions, we begin by stating certain basic principles
of property taxation under Article 11, Section 1 of the Kansas
Constitution, and by making certain observations relative to
the provisions of K.S.A. 79-329 et seq.
First, as stated by the Court in State, ex rel., Stephan v.
Martin, 227 Kan. 456 (1980), "Article 11, §1 of the Kansas Con-
stitution requires that '[t]he legislature shall provide for a
uniform and equal rate of assessment and taxation,' except that
the legislature may classify or exempt constitutionally specified
property for tax purposes." (Emphasis added.) Id. at Syl. 52.
One kind of property which the constitution permits the legislature
to classify for tax purposes is "mineral products." (Kan. Const.,
Art. 11, §1.) However, while the constitution permits the clas-
sification of mineral products, and the taxation thereof uniformly
as to class, it does not require such separate classification and
taxation. Thus, while property may be such that it could be
separately classified and taxed, if the legislature has not so
classified it, or has not exempted it from taxation, then the
property must be taxed under the uniform and equal clause of
Article 11, Section 1 of the Kansas Constitution. See Wheeler v.
Weightman, 96 Kan. 50 (1915) and Sumner County v. Wellington,
66 Kan. 590 (1903). Said clause "requires the legislature to
provide for uniformity in the basis of assessment as well as
in the rate of taxation." State, ex rel., Stephan v. Martin,
supra, at Syl. 53.
Second, notwithstanding the constitutional prohibition of
nonuniform or unequal assessment or taxation, the constitution
"does not compel the use of but a single mode or method of
assessment." Francis, Treas. v. A.T. & S.F. Rid. Co., 19 Kan.
303, 307 (2d ed.) (1877). See, also: Bank v. Geary County, 102
Kan. 334, 348 (1918) and Hunt v. Allen County, 82 Kan. 824, 828
(1910). Thus, the legislature properly may prescribe different
methods of appraisal for different classes of property. However,
any method of appraisal must be designed to result in the achieve-
ment of "the ultimate goal of valuing all property upon an
equal basis . . . . Article 11, §1 of the Kansas Constitution
prohibits favoritism, and requires uniformity in valuing
property for assessment purposes so that the burden of taxation
will be equal." (Emphasis added.) State, ex rel., Stephan v.
Martin, supra, at Syl. ¶117, 10.
Third, the provision of K.S.A. 79-329, et seq., including those
of K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 79-331, relate to the valuation and taxation
of all oil and gas leases and all oil and gas wells producing,
or capable of producing, oil or gas in paying quantities, together
with all casing, tubing or other material therein, and all
other equipment and material used in operating the same. In
addition, all such property is "declared to be personal property"
and is required to be "assessed and taxed as such." K.S.A. 79-329.
Fourth, it must be realized that the legislature, by the provisions
of K.S.A. 79-329 et seq., has not classified oil and gas leases
or property within the constitutional meaning of "classification
and . . . taxation uniformly as to class." (Kan. Const., Art. 11,
§1.) That is, under the exception clause of Article 11, Section 1,
the legislature, with regard to "motor vehicles, mineral products,
money, mortgages, notes and other evidence of debt," may segregate
the same from other classes of property and either (1) provide for
a lower rate of taxation to be applied to that class than is applied
to property which cannot be classified (see Hunt v. Eddy, 150
Kan. 1 (1939) and Voran v. Wright, 129 Kan. 1 (1929), op. on reh.,
129 Kan. 601 (1939)1, or (2) provide that a higher or lower rate
of valuation is to be determined for that class of property than
is determined for unclassifiable property [see Commercial National
Bank v. Board of County Commissioners, 201 Kan. 280 (1968)], or (3)
both of the above. However, the legislature has exercised none of
these constitutionally authorized alternatives in regard to oil
and gas leases or property. Instead, such property is classified
as personal property and is "required to be assessed and taxed as
such." K.S.A. 79-329.
By the provisions of K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 79-331, the legislature has
merely prescribed two methods of assessment for such property.
Subsection (a) thereof prescribes one method, and subsection (b)
thereof sets forth another, with the provisions of subsection (c)
limiting the property to which the method prescribed in subsection (b)
applies. Thus, the provisions of 79-331 simply set forth the means
of valuing oil and gas leases and property for purposes of taxation.
However, those provisions do not separately classify all oil and
gas leases and property and tax all such property uniformly as to
class. Rather, the provisions thereof are ostensibly set forth
for the purpose of prescribing methods of appraisal which will
result in oil and gas leases and property being valued upon the same
basis of assessment as all other personal property subject to general
property taxation. K.S.A. 79-329. Therefore, the method of
appraisal prescribed in subsection (b) of the statute must be
scrutinized to determine whether the same is designed to achieve
"the ultimate goal of valuing all property upon an equal basis."
State, ex rel., Stephan v. Martin, supra.
Fifth, the legislature, in responding to the requirement of
Article 11, Section 1, that it provide for a uniform and equal
rate of assessment and taxation, has provided that all property
subject to general property taxation be valued on an equal basis.
The equal basis currently provided by the legislature is "fair
market value in money." See, State, ex rel., Stephan v. Martin,
supra at Syl. ¶5.
In K.S.A. 79-503, the legislature defines "fair market value
in money" to mean
"the amount of money that a well informed
buyer is justified in paying and a well
informed seller is justified in accepting,
assuming that the parties thereto are acting
without undue compulsion and that the property
has been offered at the market place for a
reasonable length of time."
This definition of "fair market value" is in substantially the same
language as the Kansas Supreme Court has defined it, and as it is
generally understood and accepted. See, State, ex rel., Stephan v.
Martin, supra at Syl. 116.
Based upon the foregoing principles, your inquiry properly can
be restated as whether the method of appraisal prescribed in
subsection (b) of K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 79-331, as limited by the
provisions of subsection (c) thereof, is violative of the
provisions of Article 11, Section 1 of the Kansas Constitution,
which require the legislature to provide for a uniform and equal
rate of assessment and taxation. These subsections read as follows:
"(b) The valuation of the working interest
and royalty interest, except valuation of
equipment, of any original base lease or
property producing oil or gas for the first
time in economic quantities on and after
July 1 of the calendar year preceding the
year in which such property is first assessed
shall be determined for the year in which
such property is first assessed by determin-
ing the quantity of oil or gas such property
would have produced during the entire year
preceding the year in which such property
is first assessed upon the basis of the
actual production in such year and by multiplying
the income and expenses that would have been
attributable to such property at such production
level, excluding equipment valuation thereof,
if it had actually produced said entire year
preceding the year in which such property is
first assessed by sixty percent (60%).
"(c) The provisions of subsection (b) of this
section shall not apply in the case of any
production from any direct offset well or any
subsequent well on the same lease." (Emphasis added.)
In our judgment, the provisions of subsection (b) of 79-331,
as limited by the provisions of subsection (c) thereof, violate
constitutional requirements in two respects. First, these
statutory provisions, on their face, reflect invidious discrimination,
inconsistent with Article 11, Section 1. Second, these provisions
prescribe an unsatisfactory method of appraisal, in that said
method of appraisal is not designed to result in the achievement
of the ultimate goal of valuing all property upon an equal basis.
The first constitutional infirmity of this statute is that it
results in invidious discrimination. By the provisions of subsection
(c) of 79-331, the legislature expressly limits the application of
the method of appraisal prescribed in subsection (b). Subsection
(c) provides: "The provisions of subsection (b) of this section
shall not apply in the case of any production from any direct
offset well or any subsequent well on the same lease." (Emphasis
added.) While there may exist a rational basis for distinguishing
"direct offset wells" from "original producing wells," that is,
wells "producing oil or gas for the first time in economic quantities
on and after July 1 of the calendar year preceding the year in which
such property is first assessed" [K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 79-331 (b)],
we can discern no rational basis for valuing the first original
producing well on a lease upon a basis different than that used
to value the second and subsequent producing wells on the same
lease. If the method of appraisal prescribed in subsection (b)
is designed to determine the fair market value in money of original
producing wells, that method of appraisal should be equally applicable
to all such wells whether they be the first well on a lease or a
subsequent well thereon. Such discrimination is inconsistent with
Article 11, Section 1 of the Kansas Constitution. State, ex rel.,
Stephan v. Martin, supra, 227 Kan. at 467; Topeka Cemetery Ass'n v.
Schnellbacher, 218 Kan. 39, 44 (1975); and Wheeler v. Weightman,
96 Kan. 50, 58 (1915).
The second constitutional infirmity of K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 79-331(b)
is that the provisions thereof are an unsatisfactory method of
assessing oil and gas leases, since they may result in either a
gross and arbitrary undervaluation of property, or a gross and
arbitrary overvaluation of property. That is, under subsection (b),
the only factors to be considered in valuing the property specified
therein are (1) "the quantity of oil or gas such property would
have produced during the entire year preceding the year in which
such property is first assessed upon the basis of the actual
production in such year," and (2) a flat, across-the-board forty
percent (40%) reduction of the total income and expenses that would
have been attributable to such property at such production level.
Notably, the following factors are not to be considered: (1) the
quality of the oil or gas being produced, (2) the nearness of the
wells to market, (3) the character, extent and permanency of the
market, (4) the probable life of the wells, or (5) any other facts
as may be known by the appraiser to affect the value of the lease
or property. Note, however, that each of these factors is required
to be considered in valuing oil and gas properties under the pro-
visions of subsection (a) of K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 79-331. Surely, if
these latter factors are relevant to a proper determination of the
fair market value in money of some oil and gas wells, they should
be considered in valuing all oil and gas wells.
One factor omitted from consideration under the provisions of
subsection (b) that is highly relevant to the valuation of oil
and gas properties is "the probable life of the wells." So
important is this factor that the Kansas Supreme Court, in
Angle v. Board of County Commissioners, 214 Kan. 708 (1974),
struck down an assessment of oil and gas property for the sole
reason that the appraiser "had deliberately failed to give
appropriate consideration" to this factor. Id. at Syl. ¶3.
Based upon the omission of this vital factor, and all the other
factors listed above, it is readily apparent that this method
of appraisal was not "designed by the legislature to achieve the
ultimate goal of valuing all property upon an equal basis," as
is required by Article 11, Section 1 of the Kansas Constitution.
State, ex rel., Stephan v. Martin, supra.
In addition, the provision of this statute calling for a flat,
across-the-board reduction of forty percent (40%) of the income
and expenses attributable to the wells specified in subsections
(b) and (c) of this statute exhibits the same arbitrariness as was
provided for in the provisions of K.S.A. 1979 Supp. 79-342,
which provisions were struck down by the Supreme Court in State,
ex rel., Stephan v. Martin, supra. Said reduction is to be applied
to all leases and property that qualify under the provisions of
subsections (b) and (c) of the statute, irrespective of facts
and circumstances which may affect the income or expenses of a
particular well. This fact also makes it apparent that the
provisions of subsection (b) of K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 79-331 were
not designed to achieve the ultimate goal of valuing all property
upon an equal basis.
Article 11, Section 1 of the Kansas Constitution prohibits
favoritism, and requires uniformity in valuing property for
assessment purposes so that the burden of taxation will be
equal. In our judgment, the provisions of subsection (b) of
K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 79-331 destroy the uniformity and equality
in the rate of assessment of all property required by Article 11,
Section 1 of the Kansas Constitution. Thus, we are of the opinion
that those provisions are unconstitutional and void. Moreover,
the combined provisions of subsections (b) and (c) of K.S.A. 1980
Supp. 79-331 result in invidious discrimination, inconsistent with
Article 11, Section 1 of the Kansas Constitution and, thus, for
this additional reason, are void.
In addition to the foregoing conclusions, it is our opinion that
this statute is invalid for the further reason that the enactment
thereof did not comply with the requirements of Article 2,
Section 14 of the Kansas Constitution. This section of our
Constitution, in pertinent part, provides:
"Within ten days after passage, every bill
shall be signed by the presiding officers
and presented to the governor. If the
governor approves a bill, he shall sign it.
If the governor does not approve a bill,
the governor shall veto it by returning the
bill, with a veto message of the objections,
to the house of origin of the bill. Whenever
a veto message is so received, the message
shall be entered in the journal and in not
more than thirty calendar days (excluding the
day received), the house of origin shall
reconsider the bill. . . ."
Although this section was modified by an amendment approved by
the people of this state in 1974, and its provisions, therefore,
are somewhat different than the provisions of this section as
they existed in 1947, in our judgment, the following statements
of the Court in State, ex rel., v. Robb, 163 Kan. 502 (1947),
continue to be appropriate:
"This section [Art. 2, §14] is clear. There
can be no doubt but that each bill passed
must be presented to the governor, and if
he approves it he shall sign it, and if not
he shall return it with his reasons. The
rest of the section deals with the power
of the legislature to override a veto by
vote of two-thirds.
"The judiciary is merely one of the three
branches of the state government. It should be
slow to approve any action which even has the
semblance of permitting one branch to act
toward another in a manner contrary to the
terms and provisions of the constitution."
(Emphasis added.) Id. at 517.
Likewise, we believe the' Court's holdings in Harris v. Shanahan,
192 Kan. 183 (1963), a case in which the Court quotes extensively
from, and relies heavily upon, the Robb decision, are also
applicable to the case at hand. In Harris, the Court held:
"Pursuant to Article 2, Section 14 of the
Constitution of Kansas, the legislature and
the governor exercise co-ordinate functions
in enacting laws, and the governor is an
essential part of the legislation. Until a
bill has the final consideration of the
three law-making powers, that is, the house,
the senate, and the governor, it is not a
law, and the requirements of this provision
are mandatory that the governor sign the
same bill which passed the legislature.
"The rule that an enrolled bill imports
absolute verity and is conclusive evidence
of its passage and of its validity cannot be
used for the purpose of upholding a bill where
the legislative records show beyond any doubt
that the enrolled bill the governor signed was
not the bill passed by the house of representatives
and the senate.
"Generally speaking, courts have no right to
correct errors made in an enrolled bill but
will ordinarily take the bill as they find it,
and if not constitutionally enacted, will declare
it void." (Emphasis added.) Id. at Syl. ¶ ¶
1, 3, 4.
In Harris, the Court also stated:
"Before an enrolled bill can be impeached
successfully by the journals of the legisla-
ture, the latter must show affirmatively,
clearly, conclusively, and beyond all doubt
that the bill as enrolled was not the bill
passed." Id. at Syl. ¶2.
We have carefully examined the journals of the 1979 Kansas
Legislature, and said journals show affirmatively, clearly, con-
clusively, and beyond all doubt that 1979 House Bill No. 2456
(L. 1979, ch. 310, §1), as enrolled and signed by Governor Carlin,
was not the bill passed by the legislature. Thus, this bill was
not constitutionally enacted, and is void. Harris v. Shanahan,
supra; State, ex rel., v. Robb, supra; and Ziegler v. Junction
City, 90 Kan. 856 (1913).
The journals indicate, positively, that 1979 House Bill No. 2456,
as passed by the Senate and House of Representatives provided, in
relevant part:
"The valuation of the working interest and
royalty interest, except valuation of equip-
ment, of any original base lease or property
producing oil or gas for the first time in
economic quantities on or after July 1 of the
calendar year preceding the year in which such
property is first assessed . . . ." (Emphasis
added.)
However, the enrolled bill signed by the Governor, a certified
copy of which we obtained from the Office of the Secretary of State,
reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
"The valuation of the working interest
and royalty interest, except valuation of
equipment, of any original base lease or
property producing oil or gas for the first
time in economic quantities on and after
July 1 of the calendar year preceding the
year in which such property is first
assessed . . . ." (Emphasis added.) See
L. 1979, ch. 310, §1 and K.S.A. 1980 Supp.
79-331(b).
Of course, as passed by both houses of the Legislature, the
law, in pertinent part, read "on or after July 1." (Emphasis
added.)
From the foregoing, it appears the minds of the House and Senate
met in common agreement that 1979 House Bill No. 2456, as amended,
should be passed. However, after passage of the bill by both
houses, a variation appeared in the language of the bill relating
to a very essential part of the enactment---the provision establishing
the time at which a lease must first produce minerals in order to
qualify for the special appraisal method. The variation, of
course, was the substitution of the conjunctive "and" for the
disjunctive "or." If the special method of appraisal is to apply
only to "any original base lease or property producing oil or gas
for the first time in economic quantities on and after July 1 of the
calendar year preceding the year in which such property is first
assessed" (emphasis added), then only those leases or property
producing oil or gas for the first time in economic quantities on
July 1 of the appropriate calendar year, and which continue to
produce oil or gas thereafter, qualify under the statute. Thus,
any lease or property which produced oil or gas for the first time
in economic quantities only after July 1 of the calendar year would
not qualify under the statute. Of course, the result would be
otherwise if the requirement was "on or after July 1."
In light of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that the above
indicated variation is of major significance and that, in this
case, the conditions which must exist in order to impeach a
published statute are fully met. The journals of the legislature
establish positively that the bill, in the form shown by the enroll-
ment, did not pass the Senate nor the House of Representatives.
Such is shown affirmatively, clearly, conclusively and beyond
all doubt. Thus, it is our opinion the published statute is not
a valid law.
In response to any contention that the variance between the bill
passed by the legislature and the enrolled bill signed by the
governor is ever-so-slight, or is "clearly" a clerical error,
and that the variance would be amended by "judicial construction"
if the validity of the statute was challenged in a court of law,
we note that in State, ex rel., v. Robb, supra, the Court had
occasion to discuss two Arkansas cases which involved the validity
of an enactment of that state wherein, after passage by the
legislature, the word "or" was substituted for the word "and."
The cases were Chicot County et al. v. Davies and Burks v. Jefferson
County, 40 Ark. 200 (1882), which were heard and decided together.
The Kansas Court explains these Arkansas cases as follows:
"The bill in question conferred power on
counties to subscribe to stock in rail-
roads upon certain conditions. As
originally introduced, it provided, that
upon application of the company 'and'
a hundred voters of the county, a popular
vote should be had to determine whether the
county should buy stock in the company. In
the house an attempt was made to amend the
bill by substituting the word 'or' for 'and,'
so that had the bill been passed and signed
by the governor in that form the election
could have been called if either one of
those contingencies occurred. The wording
of the house amendment was such, however,
that it was not intelligible. As the bill
was finally enrolled and passed by both
houses and signed by the governor the word
'and' was used so that both contingencies
must happen in order to have the election.
The argument was made that the bill was
invalid because as passed by the house with
the amendment in, it was not the bill that
was signed by the governor. The constitution
of Arkansas did not require amendments to
bills to be entered upon the journals. The
court to uphold the act held that it would
presume that the house receded from its amend-
ment and that the enrolled bill was finally
passed by the house." 163 Kan. at 510.
In Robb, the Court also discussed other cases from the State
of Arkansas, as well as cases from Nebraska and Wyoming, wherein
the courts had upheld the validity of enactments, although,
in each case, the bill signed by the governor was not the same
bill that had been passed by the state legislature. The Court
then said:
"The foregoing are the authorities upon
which plaintiffs rely. We shall consider
whether they compel a judgment for plaintiffs.
They seem to fall into two classifications,
one where a typographical or clerical error
was corrected--the other where by signing a
bill with a large figure in it the governor
was held to have in effect approved a bill
with a smaller figure. The fact is, these
opinions, most of them seem to have been
based on reasons of expediency rather than
any well-reasoned philosophy of constitutional
law. The Arkansas cases are a good illustration
of what happens when the first step is taken
in constitutional law for reasons of expediency.
In Haney v. The State, supra, the change was
small and was easily made. When it came to
Rice v. Road Imp. Dist., supra, and Athletic
Min. & Smelt. Co. v. Sharp, supra, many years
later, using the early case as a precedent
an act quite different from the one approved
by the governor was declared to be the law.
In all of them the difference between the bill
that was enrolled and signed by the governor
and the bill that passed both houses and was
held to be the law was only incidental to the
provisions of the bill itself.
"In the making of laws under our constitution
the governor and the legislature are coordinate
branches. That is the way the writers of the
constitution intended it should be. The one
is about as important as the other. The court
will not for reasons of expediency reach a
conclusion that will enable either one to bypass
the other." (Emphasis added.) 163 Kan. at
515-516.
Moreover, in Harris v. Shanahan, 192 Kan. 183 (1963), the Court
was called upon to determine the constitutional validity of the
enactment of 1963 Senate Bill No. 440 (L. 1963, ch. 13), ap-
portioning the state into 40 senatorial districts. There the
enrolled bill signed by the governor did not contain the words
"the city of Leawood in Johnson County, all of the territory
in", which had been included in the bill passed by both the
House and Senate. The Court said:
"Counsel for both parties assert that this
court has not only the power but also the
duty to sustain the constitutionality of
the act by supplying the words 'the city of
Leawood in Johnson county, all of the
territory in' as the same appears in line 49
of senate bill 440 and as passed by both
houses but omitted therefrom when the bill
was engrossed and enrolled." Id. at 194.
In rejecting counsel's assertion, the Court stated:
"Generally speaking, courts have no right to
correct errors made in an enrolled bill and
they will ordinarily take the latter as they
find it, and if not constitutionally enacted,
will declare it void. (50 Am.Jur., Statutes,
§§97, 232, 234, pp. 103, 219, 221; 82 C.J.S.,
Statutes, §60b, p. 94.) Nearly all the cases
holding that errors and mistakes may be cor-
rected deal with errors and mistakes apparent
on the face of the legislative enactment,
either standing by itself or in connection
with other well-known facts. Very few of such
cases deal with the question whether the
procedural steps in enacting the law have been
followed; that is, whether the act signed by
the governor was the act passed by the
legislature. In other words, such cases deal
in the main with the construction of the
legislative enactment rather than the validity
of the procedure or steps of its enactment.
(State v. Wright, 62 Wyo. 112, 163 P.2d 190.)
In State v. Hill, 189 Kan. 403, 369 P.2d 365,
91 A.L.R.2d 750, it was held that the construction
of a statute, the function of a court to ascertain
its scope and meaning, is not to be confused with
the duty of determining its validity when
measured by constitutional guaranties.
"We think that what was said and held in
State, ex rel., v. Robb, 163 Kan. 502, 183
P.2d 223, is decisive of the question.
"There, as here, it was argued that where
the legislative records clearly show the
legislative intent and affirmatively show
the action taken was to include the amend-
ment--in the instant case to include that
part of the original bill pertaining to the
city of Leawood--the enrolled bill can be
impeached successfully to show that it was
the intention of both houses and the governor
that the bill as passed by the legislature
should be construed to be the effective bill,
otherwise a clerical employee or printer can
effectively thwart the purpose of the legis-
lature and the governor and give to such
errant and unknown clerk or printer the power
to veto legislation.
"The contention overlooks the fact that in
the Robb case as well as in the instant
case, a duly constituted committee of the
legislature reported the bill, in the former
case, to be correctly enrolled, and in the
instant case, to be correctly engrossed and
enrolled, when in truth and in fact they
were not. Despite the fact that the mechanical
working of engrossing bills is performed by clerical
employees, the duly constituted committees of
each body of the legislature cannot escape the
responsibility of carefully examining all
engrossed and enrolled bills. Had the com-
mittees done so in the Robb case and in the
instant case, the omissions would have been
discovered and timely corrected." (Emphasis
added.) 192 Kan. at 196-198.
Likewise, in this case, had proper care been taken, the error
could have been discovered and timely corrected. Thus, here, like
in Robb and Shanahan, we are of the opinion the Court would again
reject the assertion advanced in those cases.
Moreover, the following statements from Harris, supra, reveal the
Court also rejected other assertions advanced by counsel. The
Court said:
"Efforts to distinguish the Robb case from
the instant case because there the omission
'was an amendment,' because it 'dealt with an
enactment--which would amend the general
bonded debt limitation law' and 'was purely
within the discretion of the legislature,'
whereas in the instant case, 'the legislature
was under a constitutional mandate to reapportion
the senate,' or, because the omission left the
original bill in the instant case less clear
and effective 'for the purpose for which it
was introduced,' are not well taken. Both
cases deal with acts of the legislature which
are subject to the requirements of the Constitution.
The long and short of this case is that the bill
passed by both houses of the legislature was not
the bill approved and signed by the governor
and this court has no authority to insert what
was omitted. The requirements of Article 2,
Section 14, are mandatory that the governor
sign the same bill which passed the legislature.
It follows that the enrolled bill the governor
signed (Laws 1963, Ch. 13) was not made into law
in the form and manner prescribed, and is a void
enactment." (Emphasis added.) 192 Kan. at 200.
In this case, like in the cases of Robb and Harris, we are dealing
with an act of the legislature which is "subject to the requirements
of the Constitution." The "long and short" of this case is that
the bill passed by both houses of the 1979 Kansas Legislature
was not the bill approved and signed by Governor Carlin. As the
Governor did not sign the same bill which passed the legislature,
the same bill never having been presented to him, the enrolled
bill signed by the Governor (L. 1979, ch. 310, now appearing at
K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 79-331), was not "made into law in the form
and manner prescribed, and is a void enactment." Harris v.
Shanahan, supra.
Finally, the Court in Harris makes an observation that, in our
judgment, while perhaps being dicta, bears repetition herein:
"Due to the nature of senate bill 440 and
its importance to the people of the state,
we have examined the question somewhat at
length. It is to be deeply regretted that
as important a law as this, covering a subject
of great public interest, should, because of
gross carelessness of someone, be wiped
bodily from the statute book. But the court
is not responsible for this; nor can it usurp
the functions of the legislature or the governor,
and, by shutting its eyes to the undisputed
legislative record, declare a bill as passed
by both houses of the legislature, which was
never presented to the governor nor approved
by him, to be a valid law. It is lamentable
that error on the part of engrossing clerks
and legislative committees should defeat the
action of the legislature. But the strict rule
calling for full compliance with constitutional
requirements is, in the long run, a good one.
In some cases it may work a hardship, but, by
and large, it is beneficial to our republican
form of government. (State ex rel. Foster v.
Naftalin, supra.)" (Emphasis added.) 192 Kan.
at 200.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
Rodney J. Bieker
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:BJS:RJB:jm

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