Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1981-005

1981-005Kanag

Testo completo

January 7, 1981
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION 81- 5
Mr. Nick A. Tomasic
District Attorney
29th Judicial District
Wyandotte County Court House, First Floor
710 N. 7th
Kansas City, Kansas 66101
Re: Elections--Election Expenses of Candidates and Organizations--
Reporting of Receipts and Expenditures by Certain Organizations
Synopsis: The provisions of K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 25-901, requiring inter
alia the reporting of receipts and expenditures by organ-
izations promoting the adoption or defeat of any question
submitted at certain elections, does not apply to state
elections. Since the question of rejecting the non-partisan
method of selecting judges of the district court is a propo-
sition of state concern, an election held thereon is a state
election. Thus, a committee formed to promote the adoption
of such proposition is not subject to the provisions of K.S.A.
1980 Supp. 25-901. Cited herein: K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 20-301a,
20-2901, 25-101, 25-901, 25-1601, K.S.A. 25-2501, 25-2502,
K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 25-2503, 25-4101, 25-4102, 25-4135, Kan.
Const., Art. 2, §16; Art. 3, §l; Art. 4, §2.
Dear Mr. Tomasic:
You have inquired as to the application of K.S.A. 1980 Supp.
25-901. lit is our understanding that your request is predicated
on the fact that, at the immediately preceding general election, the
qualified electors of the twenty-ninth judicial district, the boundaries
of which are coextensive with the boundaries of Wyandotte County, voted
upon and approved a proposition to reject the then existing non-
partisan method of selecting judges of the district court, and to provide
for the subsequent election thereof. Said proposition was submitted
under authority of K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 20-2901.
Sometime prior to the election, a committee (Citizens Committee for
Qualified Judges) was formed for the purpose of promoting the adoption
of said proposition. You advise that "[f]unds were raised and expen-
ditures were made" by this committee "to promote the cause," and in
light of such action you have requested our opinion as to whether said
committee is subject to the provisions of K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 25-901,
which states in pertinent part:
"Every committee, club, organization, municipality or
association designed to promote or engaged in promoting
the success or defeat of any party or the election or defeat
of any candidate or candidates for any city, school district,
community junior college, township or county office, or
the adoption or defeat of any question submitted at any
city, school district, community junior college, township
or county election, shall have a treasurer, and shall cause
to be kept a detailed account of all moneys or property
or other thing of value received by it, and of the manner
in which the same shall be expended; and shall file annually
with the county election officer of the county in which such
committee, club, organization or association has its head-
quarters a statement of all its receipts and expenditures,
showing in detail from whom said moneys or property or other
thing of value were received, to whom said moneys or property
or other thing of value were paid, for what specific purposes
each payment was made, and the exact nature of the service
rendered in consideration thereof." (Emphasis added.)
Because of the emphasized portion of the foregoing statutory provisions,
we concur in your opinion that K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 25-901 does not apply
in the situation described above. In our judgment, the committee in
question is not a "committee . . . designed to promote or engaged
in promoting . . . the adoption or defeat of any question submitted
at any city, school district, community junior college, township or
county election." Although we recognize that a contrary argument can
be made that the proposition was submitted at a "county election,"
thereby invoking the requirements of 25-901, we do not believe such
argument is well-taken.
We note that K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 25-2503(c) defines "county election" as
meaning the "election of such county officers as are provided by law to
be elected." While there can be no question that county officers of
the several counties were elected at the immediately preceding "general
election" (see K.S.A. 25-2502), the same election at which the proposi-
tion was submitted, we do not believe such fact compels the conclusion
that it was submitted at a county election within the meaning of 25-901.
Initially, it is to be considered that the definition of "county election"
in 25-2503(c) has not been made explicitly applicable to 25-901. By
virtue of K.S.A. 25-2501, the definitions in 25-2503 are made applicable
to the provisions of the various sections of Chapter 406 of the 1968
Session Laws of Kansas, and 25-901 was not contained therein.
However, even disregarding this fact, it is pertinent that K.S.A.
1980 Supp. 20-2901(c) requires that the proposition for rejection of
the non-partisan method of selecting judges of the district court be
submitted at a "general election." Article 4, Section 2 of the Kansas
Constitution requires that "[g]eneral elections shall be held biennially
on the Tuesday succeeding the first Monday in November in even-numbered
years." An election held in conformity with these requirements is
defined in K.S.A. 25-2502(a) as being a "general election," and K.S.A.
1980 Supp. 25-101 provides that the election held on this constitu-
tionally-prescribed date is a "general election" to elect the officers
listed therein, including national, state and county officers. Also,
K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 25-1601 provides for the election of township officers
at this same time. Thus, while the election at which said proposition
was submitted to the voters of the twenty-ninth judicial district might
be described as a "county election," because county officers were elected
at that time, such election might also be described, by virtue of the
other definitions in K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 25-2503, as- being a "national
election" or "state election" or "township election," since national,
state and township officers also were elected at that time.
We think the foregoing creates considerable uncertainty as to the
legislature's intended meaning of "county election" in 25-901. Because
of such ambiguity, it is necessary to consider and apply rules of
statutory construction to ascertain legislative intent. Brown v.
Keill, 224 Kan. 195, 199 (1978). Where there is uncertainty as to
the meaning of a statutory provision that "is susceptible of more
than one construction it must be given that construction which, when
considered in its entirety, gives expression to its intent and purpose."
United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Armold, 218 Kan. 102, 107 (1975). As
stated in Brown v. Keill, supra at 200:
"In determining legislative intent, courts are not
limited to a mere consideration of the language used,
but look to the historical background of the enactment,
the circumstances attending its passage, the purpose to
be accomplished and the effect the statute may have under
the various constructions suggested. (State, ex rel., v.
City of Overland Park, 215 Kan. 700, Syl. ¶10, 527 P.2d
1340 [1974].) In order to ascertain the legislative intent,
courts are not permitted to consider only a certain isolated
part or parts of an act but are required to consider and
construe together all parts thereof in pari materia. When
the interpretation of some one section of an act according to
the exact and literal import of its words would contravene
the manifest purpose of the legislature, the entire act
should be construed according to its spirit and reason,
disregarding so far as may be necessary the literal import
of words or phrases which conflict with the manifest purpose
of the legislature. (Kansas Commission on Civil Rights v.
Howard, 218 Kan. 248, Syl. ¶2, 544 P.2d 791 [1975].)"
Applying these rules of construction to the provisions of K.S.A. 1980
Supp. 25-901, we have concluded that the legislature has intended to
exclude state elections from the purview of 25-901. Of pertinence to
this conclusion is K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 25-4135, which states: "The
provisions of K.S.A. 25-901 to 25-905, inclusive, shall not apply to
elections to which this act applies." The "act" referenced in 25-4135
is the Campaign Finance Act (K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 25-4101 et seq.), which,
by virtue of the definition of "election" in K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 25-4102(e)
applies only to elections for state offices. The thrust of 25-4135,
therefore,- is to exclude such state elections from the purview of
25-901.
While the intent and purpose of the legislature underlying 25-4135 is
clear, we note that, in Attorney General Opinion No. 75-150, Attorney
General Curt Schneider concluded that this statute was unconstitutional,
because it "effectively and substantially amends K.S.A. 25-901 through
-905" without complying with the requirements of Article 2, Section 16
of the Kansas Constitution regarding the amendment of statutes. Though
we find no basis for disagreeing with that prior opinion, the fact
remains that 25-4135 provides clear evidence of the legislature's intent
that 25-901 not apply to elections of state officers.
Moreover, we believe it relevant that in 1975, in apparent response to
General Schneider's opinion, the legislature amended 25-901, in
pertinent part as follows:
"Every committee, club, organization, municipality or
association designed to promote or engaged in promoting
the success or defeat of any party or the election or
defeat of any candidate or candidates [to political] for
any city, school district, community junior college, township
or county office, or the adoption or defeat of any [proposed
constitutional amendment or other] question submitted at
any city, school district, community junior college, township
or county election, shall have a treasurer, and shall cause
to be kept a detailed account of all moneys or property
or other thing of value received by it, and of the manner
in which the same shall be expended; and shall file annually
with the county election officer of the county in which such
committee, club, organization or association has its head-
quarters [, and in case the election or defeat of any candi-
date for state office or of a constitutional amendment was
involved shall also file with the secretary of state] a
statement of all its receipts and expenditures, showing in
detail from whom said moneys or property or other thing of
value were received, to whom said moneys or property or other
thing of value were paid, for what specific purposes each
payment was made, and the exact nature of the service rendered
in consideration thereof." L. 1975, ch. 209, §21.
In the foregoing quotation, the bracketed material was deleted by
the 1975 amendments, and the underscored material was inserted. As
can be seen from the above, prior to these amendments, this section
had application to all elections of persons to political offices and
to all elections wherein constitutional amendments or any other questions
were submitted. The amendments, however, greatly restricted the section's
scope, and considering the net effect thereof, it is clear that the
legislature intended to limit the purview of 25-901 to elections of
local concern only. Buttressed by the legislative intent expressed
by K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 25-4135, there can be little doubt that 25-901 is
no longer applicable to state elections.
In light of this obvious legislative intent, it is apparent that
the definitions of "county election" and "state election" in K.S.A.
1980 Supp. 25-2503 are of little utility in effectuating such intent,
since both elections occur at the same time and are but separate parts
of a "general election." Thus, having considered all of the provisions
of 25-901, so as to determine the context in which the term is used,
as well as considered this statute in conjunction with other statutes
in pari materia, we have concluded that, in using the term "county
election" in 25-901, the legislature has intended to prescribe more
than the type of election at which a proposition is submitted, i.e.,
the election at which county officers are elected, and it is our
opinion that such term also must be read as conveying the scope of
the matter to be considered, i.e., a matter of concern to the electors
of the county only. Accordingly, a question submitted at a "general
election" that is a matter of state concern (e.g., a constitutional
amendment) cannot be considered as being submitted at a county election
merely because county officers also are elected at said general election.
Applying this conclusion to the facts you have presented, it should
require little discussion to note that a judge of the district court
is a state officer. Article 3, Section 1 of the Kansas Constitution
provides in pertinent part:
"The judicial power of this state shall be vested
exclusively in one court of justice, which shall be
divided into one supreme court, district courts, and
such other courts as are provided by law . . . . The
supreme court shall have general administrative authority
over all courts in this state."
Clearly, therefore, the district courts are part of a state judicial
system, thus compelling the conclusion that the various judges thereof
are state officers. Moreover, the term "judge of the district court" is
defined by K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 20-301a as meaning "district judges, associ-
ate district judges and district magistrate judges," and K.S.A. 1980
Supp. 25-2503(b) defines "state election" as including the election of
"district judges, associate district judges, [and] district magistrate
judges." In our judgment, the conclusion that a judge of the district
court is a state officer is irresistible, and it requires no leap of
faith to further conclude that a proposition concerning the manner in
which judges of the district court are chosen is a question of state
rather than local concern. Consequently, an election on such proposition
must be regarded as a state election and beyond the scope of 25-901-
Some confusion may result from the fact that the boundaries of Wyandotte
County and the twenty-ninth judicial district are identical, but it
must be realized that the electorate to whom the proposition is submitted
are the qualified electors of the judicial district. K.S.A. 1980 Supp.
20-2901(c). The fact that these persons are at the same time qualified
electors of the county does not make an election on the proposition a
county election. The overriding consideration is that the proposition
does not posit a matter of concern to the county; because it concerns
the district court of the twenty-ninth judicial district it pertains
to the state judicial system, a matter of state concern.
A matter of some relevance to this issue was addressed by the Kansas
Supreme Court in Russell State Bank v. Steinle, 159 Kan. 293 (1944).
There the Court determined that, even though the board of county commis
sioners of Russell County had exercised its statutory authority to cause
a county court to be established in Russell County, the board had no
authority to abolish said court absent corresponding statutory authority
In so concluding, the Court stated:
"The mere fact this particular court was located within
the physical boundaries of Russell county did not make
it a tribunal for transacting the business affairs of
Russell county any more than the police court, the justice
of the peace courts or the district court of Russell county
are tribunals created for the transaction of the county's
business." Id. at 296.
Therefore, since the proposition submitted to the qualified electors
of the twenty-ninth judicial district at the immediately preceding
general election is a question of state concern, the election thereon
is a state election. Thus, as K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 25-901 does not
apply to state elections, the committee formed to promote the adoption
of said proposition is not subject to this statute's provisions.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
W. Robert Alderson
First Deputy Attorney General
RTS:WRA:phf

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