M B v. State of Indiana

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-JV-1392 | October 20, 2026 Page 1 of 11
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not
take any action in reliance upon this memorandum decision until it is
certified.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not
binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value
or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
I N T H E
Court of Appeals of Indiana
M.B.,
Appellant-Respondent
v.
State of Indiana,
Appellee-Petitioner
October 20, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
26A-JV-1392
Appeal from the St. Joseph Probate Court
The Honorable Rachel J. Luken, Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
71J01-2510-JD-239
Memorandum Decision by Judge Bradford

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Judges Bailey and Altice concur.
Bradford, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] On Saturday, October 4, 2025, after observing a traffic infraction, South Bend
police initiated a traffic stop of a vehicle in an area in which, it had been
reported, there had recently been gunfire during home Notre Dame football
games. M.B. and three other juveniles were in the vehicle at the time of the
traffic stop. Officers conducted a warrantless search of the vehicle after
observing what appeared to be drug remnants in plain sight on the floorboard
near the driver’s seat and furtive movements by one of the backseat passengers
that were consistent with an attempt to hide contraband. Officers ultimately
recovered suspected marijuana and three firearms from the vehicle. One of the
firearms, an AR-style pistol with a brass catcher attached, was found in a
backpack that had been at M.B.’s feet in the front passenger seat.
[2] M.B. was alleged to be a delinquent child for dangerously possessing a firearm
in violation of Indiana Code section 35-47-10-5(a). M.B. moved to suppress the
evidence recovered from the vehicle, arguing that the search had not been
warranted under either the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution (the “Fourth Amendment”) or Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana
Constitution (“Article I, Section 11”). The case proceeded to an evidentiary
hearing after the juvenile court denied M.B.’s motion. M.B. renewed his

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objection to the admissibility of the evidence during the evidentiary hearing.
The juvenile court admitted the challenged evidence. At the conclusion of the
evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court found M.B. to be a delinquent child and
ordered that he be placed on probation, complete a day-reporting program, and
participate in any recommended treatment. M.B. contends that the juvenile
court abused its discretion by admitting the challenged evidence. Because we
disagree, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] In the late afternoon or early evening of October 4, 2025, South Bend police
officers Steven Spadafora, Ryan Rush, and Drake Pauwels were patrolling “the
Eddy Street Commons area” where “there had been some recent gun violence
… on [the day of] Notre Dame home” football games. Tr. Vol. II p. 150. As
part of the Strategic Focus Unit, Officer Spadafora and the other officers were
patrolling the area in a golf cart, “conducting focus deterrence patrols, which is
basically, we go into these areas, we saturate them with traffic stops, pedestrian
stops, any small infractions we can enforce just to be seen, try to turn on the
lights more, try to deter any violence from occurring.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 150–51.
The officers were traveling behind a silver Impala when they observed the
Impala “cross the double yellow lines” before returning to its lane. Tr. Vol. II
p. 151. Having observed a traffic infraction, the officers “initiated [a] traffic
stop on that vehicle.” Tr. Vol. II p. 151.

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[4] Upon approaching the vehicle and “[w]hile speaking with the driver, [Officer
Spadafora] observed what [he] believe[d] to be the remnants of marijuana on
the ground.” Tr. Vol. II p. 151. Officer Spadafora’s belief that the remnants,
which were in plain sight, were marijuana was based on his “law enforcement
training and experience[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 55. As Officers Rush and Pauwels
approached the vehicle, they observed furtive movements by one of the
backseat passengers, which, in their training and experience, were consistent
with an attempt to hide contraband. Out of concern for their safety, the officers
removed the four juveniles from the vehicle. M.B. had been sitting in the front
passenger seat with a backpack on the floorboard between his legs.
[5] Although the driver had indicated to Officer Spadafora that there were no
firearms in the vehicle, the officers recovered three firearms and a package of
suspected marijuana from the “front center console area” following a search of
the vehicle. Tr. Vol. II p. 184. Officer Pauwels recovered a “black handgun …
that had an extended magazine and had duct tape taped around the … hand
grip” from the floorboard area near where the “rear right passenger” had been
making furtive movements. Tr. Vol. II p. 181. A Glock handgun with a
“switch”1 and a fully-loaded drum magazine was recovered from the trunk. Tr.
Vol. II p. 185. Officers recovered a third firearm, an “AR-style pistol with a
brass catcher attached to it[,]” from the backpack that had been between M.B.’s
1 A “switch” is a term for a “machine gun conversion device” which “allow[ed] the handgun to go from
semi-automatic gunfire to fully automatic.” Tr. Vol. II p. 185.

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legs. Tr. Vol. II p. 184. A brass catcher is an attachment that “covers the
ejection port so that whenever a round is fired, that shell casing gets collected
by [the] brass catcher. So it basically eliminates … evidence of a crime” by
collecting spent shell casings and preventing them from “being scattered around
after being fired.” Tr. Vol. II p. 184. DNA swabs taken from different parts of
the AR-style pistol contained profile mixtures that excluded the other occupants
of the vehicle and were “at least one trillion times more likely” to have
originated from M.B. Tr. Vol. III p. 17.
[6] On October 10, 2025, the State petitioned to have M.B. found to be delinquent
for dangerously possessing of a firearm in violation of Indiana Code section 35-
47-10-5(a). M.B. moved to suppress the evidence recovered during the search
of the vehicle, claiming that “[t]he seizure of the property was in violation of
[his] rights secured by the Constitution of the United States under the Fourth
Amendment and under … Article [I, Section] 11 of the Indiana Constitution[.]”
Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 109. The juvenile court denied M.B.’s motion to
suppress following a suppression hearing. The matter proceeded to an
evidentiary hearing, during which M.B. renewed his objection to the admission
of the evidence recovered during the search of the vehicle. The juvenile court
admitted the challenged evidence. The juvenile court adjudicated M.B.
“delinquent for having committed the following: Dangerous Possession of a
Firearm” and ordered him to be placed on probation, complete a day-reporting
program, and participate in any recommended treatment. Appellant’s App.
Vol. II p. 155.

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Discussion and Decision
[7] M.B. challenged the admissibility of the evidence recovered from the vehicle by
moving to suppress the evidence and, after that motion had been denied,
objecting to admission during the evidentiary hearing. Because M.B.’s case
proceeded to an evidentiary hearing, his argument on appeal is “framed as a
request to review the trial court’s ruling on its admissibility.” Guilmette v. State,
14 N.E.3d 38, 40 (Ind. 2014).
[8] The admission of evidence is a matter that we generally “leave to the discretion
of the [juvenile] court.” Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 259–60 (Ind. 2013).
“We review these determinations for abuse of that discretion and reverse only
when admission is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and
circumstances and the error affects a party’s substantial rights.” Id. at 260.
“We will not reweigh the evidence and will resolve all conflicts in favor of the
[juvenile] court’s ruling.” Schnitzmeyer v. State, 168 N.E.3d 1041, 1044 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2021). Furthermore, “we will not reverse the decision to admit or exclude
evidence if that decision is sustainable on any ground.” Carpenter v. State, 15
N.E.3d 1075, 1078 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. “[W]hen reviewing
suppression issues, appellate courts, like trial courts, can consider evidence from
both the suppression hearing and” the evidentiary hearing. Ramos-Osario v.
State, 280 N.E.3d 784, 792 (Ind. 2026).

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[9] M.B. argues that the evidence recovered from the vehicle should have been
excluded under the Fourth Amendment.2 The Fourth Amendment provides as
follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
“Accordingly, a warrantless search or seizure is per se unreasonable, and the
State bears the burden to show that one of the well-delineated exceptions to the
warrant requirement applies.” M.O. v. State, 63 N.E.3d 329, 331 (Ind. 2016)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
[10] One of the well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement is the
automobile exception. A search falls within the automobile exception “when a
vehicle is readily mobile and there is probable cause to believe it contains
contraband or evidence of a crime.” Meister v. State, 933 N.E.2d 875, 878–79
2 The State argues that M.B. has waived his Fourth-Amendment argument by failing to support it with
cogent reasoning, as is required by Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). Given our preference for deciding
cases on the merits, we reject the State’s claim of waiver and proceed to the merits of M.B.’s argument.
However, we agree with the State that M.B. has waived his Article I, Section 11 claim because he failed to
make a separate argument regarding the Indiana Constitution at either the suppression or evidentiary
hearing. See Turner v. State, 183 N.E.3d 346, 359 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (providing that a party may not present
an argument on appeal that is not raised before the trial court), trans. denied; Francis v. State, 764 N.E.2d 641,
647 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (providing that defendant’s failure to provide an analysis of his Indiana
constitutional claim separate from the federal analysis resulted in waiver of the Indiana constitutional claim).

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(Ind. 2010). In Myers v. State, with respect to the mobility requirement, the
Indiana Supreme Court held that
[i]n light of the [United States] Supreme Court’s recent emphatic
statement in [Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467 (1999)], we
conclude that this exception to the warrant requirement under
the Fourth Amendment does not require any additional
consideration of the likelihood, under the circumstances, of a
vehicle being driven away. Rather, we understand the “ready
mobility” requirement of the automobile exception to mean that
all operational, or potentially operational, motor vehicles are
inherently mobile, and thus a vehicle that is temporarily in police
control or otherwise confined is generally considered to be
readily mobile and subject to the automobile exception to the
warrant requirement if probable cause is present. This broad
understanding of “readily mobile” is also consistent with the
recognition that, for Fourth Amendment purposes, an individual
is deemed to have a reduced expectation of privacy in an
automobile.
839 N.E.2d 1146, 1152 (Ind. 2005). Applying Myers, we conclude that the
vehicle in which M.B. was a passenger was readily mobile and was therefore
eligible for the automobile exception.
[11] The automobile exception to the warrant requirement allows
police to search a vehicle without obtaining a warrant if they
have probable cause to believe evidence of a crime will be found
in the vehicle. This doctrine is grounded in two notions: 1) a
vehicle is readily moved and therefore the evidence may
disappear while a warrant is being obtained, and 2) citizens have
lower expectations of privacy in their vehicles than in their
homes. One reason for this diminished expectation of privacy in
a car and its contents is that cars travel along public highways
and are subject to pervasive government regulation. Most cases

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addressing the automobile exception arise in the context of an
arrest or an investigatory stop of a motorist that gives rise to
probable cause, but the exception is grounded in the mobility of
the vehicle and its location in a public area, not on whether the
issue arises in the context of an arrest or a traffic stop.
State v. Hobbs, 933 N.E.2d 1281, 1285 (Ind. 2010) (internal quotations and
citations omitted).
[12] Where there is probable cause to search a vehicle, a search is not
unreasonable if it is based on facts that would justify the issuance
of a warrant, even though a warrant has not been obtained. The
United States Supreme Court has stated that when there is
probable cause that a vehicle contains evidence of a crime, a
warrantless search of the vehicle does not violate the Fourth
Amendment because of the existence of exigent circumstances
arising out of the likely disappearance of the vehicle. Moreover,
if a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it
contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment thus permits police
to search the vehicle without more.
Meister, 933 N.E.2d at 879 (internal brackets, citations, and quotation omitted).
“Facts necessary to demonstrate the existence of probable cause for a
warrantless search are not materially different from those which would
authorize the issuance of a warrant if presented to a magistrate.” Id. (internal
quotation omitted). “Probable cause to issue a search warrant exists where the
facts and circumstances would lead a reasonably prudent person to believe that
a search would uncover evidence of a crime.” Id.
[13] We have little trouble concluding that probable cause existed here, as Officer
Spadafora observed “in plain sight the remnants of what [he] suspected through

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[his] law enforcement training and experience to be marijuana” on the
floorboard near the driver’s seat. Tr. Vol. II p. 55. Additionally, Officers Rush
and Pauwels observed furtive movements by one of the backseat passengers,
which, in their training and experience, were consistent with an attempt to hide
contraband. The officers’ observations were sufficient to establish probable
cause as they would reasonably lead a prudent person to believe that a search of
the vehicle would uncover evidence of a crime. See Meister, 933 N.E.2d at 879.
The warrantless search of the vehicle was therefore justified under the
automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment. See Myers, 839 N.E.2d at
1152.
[14] Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has held that “[i]f probable
cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of
every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the
search.” U.S. v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982). This includes any container
“within [the vehicle] where they have probable cause to believe contraband or
evidence is contained.” California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991). “A
passenger’s personal belongings, just like the driver’s belongings or containers
attached to the car like a glove compartment, are ‘in’ the car, and the officer has
probable cause to search for contraband in the car.” Wyoming v. Houghton, 526
U.S. 295, 302 (1999) (emphasis omitted). As such, because the warrantless
search of the vehicle was justified, the officers also had the authority to search
M.B.’s backpack, in which they recovered the firearm in question. We are
unpersuaded by M.B.’s assertion that the search was impermissible under the

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Fourth Amendment. As such, we conclude that the juvenile court did not
abuse its discretion in admitting the challenged evidence.
[15] The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.
Bailey, J., and Altice, J., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Marielena Duerring
South Bend, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Indiana Attorney General
Daylon L. Welliver
Supervising Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana