Termination: S B v. Indiana Department of Child Services, et al.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-JT-1173 | October 15, 2026 	Page 1 of 13
Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not take
any action in reliance upon this memorandum decision until it is certified.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not
binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value
or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
I N 	T H E
Court of Appeals of Indiana
In the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of:
C.H. (Minor Child), and S.B. (Father),
Appellant-Respondent
v.
Indiana Department of Child Services,
Appellee-Petitioner
and
Kids’ Voice of Indiana,
Appellee-Guardian ad Litem
October 15, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
26A-JT-1173
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court
The Honorable Geoffrey A. Gaither, Judge
The Honorable Rosanne Ang, Magistrate

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-JT-1173 | October 15, 2026 	Page 2 of 13
Trial Court Cause No.
49D09-2507-JT-7232
Memorandum Decision by Judge Brown
Judges Kenworthy and Scheele concur.
Brown, Judge.
[1] 	S.B. (“Father”) appeals the involuntary termination of his parental rights to his
minor child, C.H. (“Child”). We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] 	Father and Ch.H. (“Mother,” and together with Father, “Parents”)1 have a long
history with the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) dating back to
August 2019 when DCS petitioned to adjudicate their three children, N.H.,
born in September 2006, V.H., born in February 2008, and B.B., born in
November 2011 (collectively “Siblings”), as children in need of services
(“CHINS”). The court adjudicated Siblings as CHINS, in part, due to Father’s
admission that he was incarcerated in the Indiana Department of Correction
(“DOC”) and was unable to parent Siblings. During the pendency of the
CHINS cases involving Siblings, in March 2024, Mother gave birth to Child.
1 The court also terminated Mother’s parental rights to Child, but she does not participate in this appeal.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-JT-1173 | October 15, 2026 	Page 3 of 13
[3] 	On June 18, 2024, DCS filed a petition alleging that Child was a CHINS. The
court held an initial hearing that same day. Father did not appear for the
hearing, and Child was removed from both Parents’ care and placed in foster
care. On June 21, 2024, DCS filed an amended CHINS petition based on
concerns for Mother’s use of illicit substances and Father’s inability to provide
for Child due to being incarcerated. The court held a pretrial conference on
July 10, 2024, and Father appeared via video. The court conducted an initial
hearing for Father, and Father indicated that, upon his scheduled release from
incarceration in December 2024, he would be residing at “19 N Hendricks.”
Exhibits Volume I at 25. The court ordered supervised parenting time with
Child for Father. The court appointed counsel for Father, and counsel filed an
appearance for Father that same date.
[4] 	On October 2, 2024, the court held a CHINS fact-finding hearing. Father
appeared with counsel. 	Mother admitted Child was a CHINS, Father waived
factfinding, and both Parents requested the court proceed to disposition. The
court entered a dispositional order requiring Father to “become engaged in a
program of father’s engagement as referred by the Family Case Manager and
follow all recommendations.” Id. at 33.
[5] 	On January 15, 2025, the court held a review hearing. Father, who had been
released from incarceration, failed to appear. Counsel appeared on his behalf
and indicated that she had “had no contact with [Father] since his release from
incarceration.” Id. at 36. DCS reported that Child was “thriving” in his current
placement. Id. The permanency plan for Child remained reunification.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-JT-1173 | October 15, 2026 	Page 4 of 13
[6] 	The court held another review hearing on March 26, 2025. Father again failed
to appear, but counsel appeared on his behalf. Reports indicated that Child was
doing “very well in placement” and had “made huge advances – he went from
nearly needing a g-tube to eating solids, and is hitting all his milestones.” Id. at
40. DCS reported that it had “had no contact with [P]arents, and [P]arents
have not engaged in any services or visits since the last hearing.” Id. The court
found that DCS had “made reasonable efforts to offer services” and “to provide
services.” Id.
[7] 	Father’s counsel filed a motion to withdraw appearance on April 8, 2025, and
the court granted the motion on April 10, 2025. The court held a permanency
hearing on June 11, 2025. Father failed to appear. As of that hearing date, the
record revealed that “both [P]arents were not engaging in court order[ed]
services and the current location of both [P]arents [was] unknown to DCS.”
Transcript Volume II at 17. There was “also an open [CHINS] case for another
child of [Parents] . . . [B.B.]” Id.2 The court found that Parents had “failed to
engage in services throughout this case” and “failed to engage in services of
previous cases involving their older children as well.” Exhibits Volume I at 42.
The court found that Father had “not visited with [Child] since this case
opened.” Id. The court found that “Father has not appeared in Court since
October, and Mother has not attended since January 2025.” Id. The court
2 The record indicates that, during the pendency of Child’s CHINS case, Child and B.B. were placed together
with B.B. being ultimately adopted by Child’s pre-adoptive placement.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-JT-1173 | October 15, 2026 	Page 5 of 13
ordered that Child’s permanency plan be changed from reunification to
adoption, with a projected adoption date of December 11, 2025.
[8] 	On July 21, 2025, DCS filed a petition for the involuntary termination of both
Parents’ parental rights. On August 4, 2025, Father was personally served with
the summons and termination petition. Father did not contact DCS. On
August 19, 2025, the court issued an order appointing counsel for both Father
and Mother. Father’s counsel filed an appearance on the same date. The court
held a review hearing on September 24, 2025. Father failed to appear. DCS
Family Case Manager Isiaka Costa (“FCM Costa”) testified that he had “been
unable to get into contact with [P]arents,” that they had “been served for the
TPR” which was set for “January 8,” that there had been “no visits in nearly a
year,” and that Child “continues to do well in the foster home, which is the
same home that his brother [B.B.] was adopted into.” Id. at 45. Child’s foster
placement reported that Child “is growing by the day and progressing every
day” but was “likely headed toward an Autism diagnosis.” Id. at 45. The court
found that DCS had made “reasonable efforts to offer” and “to provide
services” to Parents. Id.
[9] 	On December 18, 2025, Father’s appointed counsel filed a Motion to Continue
Bench Trial Setting. The motion stated that the case “is currently scheduled for
bench trial on January 8, 2026,” that counsel “had not had any contact with
[Father] prior to this week,” that counsel and Father “would like a chance to
mediate prior to a trial,” that both “DCS and [Guardian ad Litem] oppose this
motion to continue,” and that the motion “is not made for purpose of delay.”

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-JT-1173 | October 15, 2026 	Page 6 of 13
Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 47. On December 22, 2025, the court
entered an order denying Father’s motion. On January 6, 2026, Mother filed a
motion to continue stating that she wished to “execute adoption consents” and
needed “more time” to sign the consents and avoid the necessity of a contested
trial. Id. at 53. Father’s counsel joined in Mother’s motion. The motion
provided that “DCS, by counsel, objects” and “Guardian [a]d Litem takes no
position.” Id. 	The court denied the motion that same day.
[10] 	On January 8, 2026, the court held a termination fact-finding hearing. Parents
failed to appear, but each of their counsel appeared on their behalf. At the
outset of the hearing, Mother’s counsel moved to continue the hearing, alleging
that he did not have “good sufficient contact with [M]other to prepare for trial.”
Transcript Volume II at 4. Father’s counsel stated, “Same. I also would renew
my motion for a continuance.” Id. Counsel for both DCS and the Guardian ad
Litem, Kids’ Voice of Indiana, objected. Counsel for the Guardian ad Litem
argued, “the [P]arents have been in contact to some degree with their counsels .
. . have been informed of today’s hearing,” and “[w]ould have had an
opportunity to appear here today . . . so given that . . . I would be objecting.”
Id. at 4-5. The court ruled, “[a]fter reviewing the record and the previous
motions for continuance filed, I am going to show the oral motions denied.”
Id. at 5.
[11] 	DCS presented testimony from FCM Costa and Guardian ad Litem Brittany
Lismon (“GAL Lismon”). FCM Costa testified that neither Parent had
remedied the conditions that led to Child’s removal from their care. He noted

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-JT-1173 | October 15, 2026 	Page 7 of 13
that “since DCS involvement, [P]arents have not been engaging in court
ordered services and . . . they have not visited [Child].” Id. at 19. FCM Costa
did not believe that Child would even “recognize” either Parent due to the
length of time he had been removed from their care and because neither Parent
had engaged in visitation. Id. at 21. FCM Costa stated that he had gone to
great lengths to contact Parents and schedule team meetings with them, but he
had been unable to reach them at numbers DCS had on file. He explained that
in situations such as this when DCS is unable to locate a parent, because the
parent knows he or she has “kids in the system,” the parents usually “reach out
to – DCS.” Id. at 27. He stated that in the seven months he had been assigned
to the case, neither Parent had ever attempted to contact DCS in any way. He
stated that Child was very bonded with his placement and that it was “very
important” that he be able to “maintain a relationship with his full blood
biological sibling” who was already adopted by the same placement. Id. at 22.
[12] 	GAL Lismon testified that Child “has what’s called Level 3 autism, so it’s a
pretty severe case of autism.” Id. at 32. She testified that Child was placed in
the same home with B.B., that he was “doing well in placement,” and that he is
“very well-bonded” with placement. Id. at 33. GAL Lismon opined that
termination of both Parents’ rights and adoption by his current foster family
was in his best interests as “[P]arents don’t have a home” and they “have not
completed or engaged in any court ordered services or any parenting time with
[Child].” Id. at 34. GAL Lismon stated that she did not believe that either
Parent “should be given additional time to complete services in order to reunify

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-JT-1173 | October 15, 2026 	Page 8 of 13
with Child.” Id. at 35. At the conclusion of the hearing, Father’s counsel asked
the court to deny the termination petition, arguing that “DCS failed in its
burden to make reasonable efforts” to locate Parents “to help them be involved
in services.” Id. at 38. The court took the matter under advisement.
[13] 	On April 9, 2026, the court entered its findings of fact, conclusions thereon and
order terminating Parents’ parental rights. Specifically, the court found that
there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child’s
removal or continued placement outside Parents’ care will not be remedied;
continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to Child’s well-
being; termination of Parents’ parental rights is in Child’s best interests; and
there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of Child, that being
adoption by his current foster care placement. The court found that “[n]either
[P]arent has expressed any interest whatsoever in parenting [Child],” they
“have been under order to engage in services under two [CHINS] cases,” the
“earliest of these orders was issued over five years ago,” and neither Parent
“has utilized this time to reunify with their older children or [Child].”
Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 60.
Discussion
[14] 	Father challenges the termination of his parental rights. We recognize that the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the
traditional rights of parents to establish a home and raise their children. In re
K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013). “[A] parent’s interest in the
upbringing of [his or her] child is ‘perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-JT-1173 | October 15, 2026 	Page 9 of 13
interests recognized by this Court.’” Id. (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S.
57, 65, 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000)). Parental rights, however, are not absolute and
must be subordinated to the child’s best interests when determining the proper
disposition of a petition to terminate parental rights. Id.; see also In re Ma.H.,
134 N.E.3d 41, 45 (Ind. 2019) (“Parents have a fundamental right to raise their
children—but this right is not absolute.”). “When parents are unwilling to meet
their parental responsibilities, their parental rights may be terminated.” Ma.H.,
134 N.E.3d at 45-46.
[15] 	As an initial matter, we note that Father does not challenge the trial court’s
findings of fact and conclusions thereon as clearly erroneous. Accordingly,
Father has waived any arguments relating to the unchallenged findings and, by
his failure to challenge the trial court’s conclusions, Father “has conceded that
DCS proved, by clear and convincing evidence, the allegations in the petition to
terminate h[is] parental rights.” See Matter of C.C., 170 N.E.3d 669, 675 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2021) (concluding that mother’s failure to challenge the trial court’s
conclusions supporting termination of her parental rights pursuant to Ind. Code
§ 31-35-2-4 resulted in waiver of any argument that those conclusions were
clearly erroneous and were a concession by mother that DCS met its burden of
proof).
I. Motion to Continue
[16] 	We first address Father’s assertion that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying his motion to continue the termination fact-finding hearing. Generally,
“a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to continue is subject to abuse

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-JT-1173 | October 15, 2026 	Page 10 of 13
of discretion review.” In re K.W., 12 N.E.3d 241, 243-244 (Ind. 2014) (citing
Rowlett v. Vanderburgh Cnty. Office of Fam. & Child., 841 N.E.2d 615, 619 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied). When a trial court denies a party’s motion for a
continuance, there is a strong presumption that the trial court properly
exercised its discretion. In re N.K., 249 N.E.3d 607, 615 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024).
[17] 	Motions to continue are governed by Ind. Trial Rule 7(D) which provides:
(1) A party must file a motion for continuance as soon after the
cause for continuance or delay is discovered by the party seeking
the same.
(2) Any written motion to continue a matter must be filed
pursuant to subdivision (B) and must include:
(a) A statement that the opposing party has no objection;
(b) A statement that the opposing party objects; or
(c) A statement that the opposing party’s position is
unknown, and the date, time, and method by which the
moving party filing the motion attempted to obtain
agreement and the result, or why such outreach was not
possible.
(3) If a party did not comply with subdivision (D)(2), a court may
grant a motion for continuance only if the moving party certifies
to the court, in writing, the efforts made to give notice and the
reasons supporting the moving party’s claim that actual notice
should not be required.
(4) A party’s motion must include:
(a) the approximate amount of time needed to elapse before
the matter can be heard, and,

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-JT-1173 | October 15, 2026 	Page 11 of 13
(b) a good faith estimate of the time needed for the
rescheduled hearing or trial.
Unlike its predecessor, former Ind. Trial Rule 53.5,3 Ind. Trial Rule 7(D)
contains no reference to requiring the moving party to show “good cause,” but
“it appears to leave continuances to the discretion of the trial court, so long as
the procedural requirements of the rule are met.” Matter of C.J.B., 281 N.E.3d
615, 621 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026) (citing Ind. Trial Rule 7(D)(3) which provides
that the trial court “may” grant a motion for continuance if the movant satisfies
certain conditions).
[18] 	Here, Father’s written motion to continue did not comply with Ind. Trial Rule
7(D) because it did not include the mandatory requirements of subsection (4):
the approximate amount of time needed to elapse before the matter can be
heard, and, a good faith estimate of the time needed for the rescheduled
hearing. Indeed, as observed by DCS, when Father’s counsel orally renewed
the motion to continue at the outset of the termination fact-finding hearing,
counsel did not mention a specific date or necessary timeframe for the
continuance. Under the circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court
abused its discretion in denying the motion to continue pursuant to Ind. Trial
Rule 7(D).4 See id. (concluding trial court did not abuse its discretion in
3 Ind. Trial Rule 53.5 “was repealed effective January 1, 2025,” and motions to continue “are now addressed
in Trial Rule 7.” Matter of O.M., 266 N.E.3d 326, 330 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025).
4 Although Father’s counsel argued to the trial court that the denial of the motion to continue violated
Father’s due process rights, Father does not make that argument on appeal.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-JT-1173 | October 15, 2026 	Page 12 of 13
denying father’s motion to continue termination of parental rights fact-finding
hearing because the “last minute oral motion” “did not identify DCS’s position
on the continuance, and did not indicate when [f]ather would be available” as
required by Ind. Trial Rule 7(D)).
II. Due Process
[19] 	Father next asserts that he was denied due process “because DCS did not make
reasonable efforts to preserve or reunify the family unit.” Appellant’s Brief at
16. Specifically, he asserts that he “was released from incarceration by January
of 2025, and nothing in the record indicates what efforts DCS took to preserve
or reunify the family.” Id. at 17.5 DCS urges that Father waived his due
process argument because he raises it for the first time on appeal. This Court
has previously concluded that “a parent may waive a due-process claim in a
CHINS or termination proceeding by raising that claim for the first time on
appeal.” S.L. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 997 N.E.2d 1114, 1120 (Ind. Ct. App.
2013) (citing McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 798 N.E.2d 185, 194-
195 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)). We agree with DCS that Father has waived his due
process claim for failure to raise it below and we decline to address it.6 Cf.,
Te.R. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 284 N.E.3d. 1083, 1092 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026)
5 Contrary to this assertion, the record indicates that FCM Costa attempted multiple times to contact Father
following his release from incarceration but he was nonresponsive and his whereabouts were unknown.
Moreover, the record reveals that Father failed to maintain contact with DCS and never attempted or
requested to participate in reunification services, including visitation with Child.
6 Although Father’s counsel argued at the end of the termination hearing that “DCS failed in its burden to
make reasonable efforts,” Transcript Volume II at 38, we cannot say that this was sufficient to preserve a due

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-JT-1173 | October 15, 2026 	Page 13 of 13
[20] 	(declining to find that the father waived his due process claim because his
counsel specifically argued to the trial court that DCS’s failure to make
reasonable reunification efforts violated “the due process clause of the federal
and state constitutions” and the record indicated that the father successfully
participated in ordered services with the only barrier to reunification being his
inability to secure stable housing despite his relentless efforts and specific
requests for DCS’s help).
[21] 	For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s termination order.
[22] 	Affirmed.
Kenworthy, J., and Scheele, J., concur.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Talisha Griffin
Timothy Morgan
Marion County Public Defender Agency
Appellate Division
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Attorney General of Indiana
David E. Corey
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
process claim. To the extent Father cites D.H. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 119 N.E.3d 578, 586 (Ind. Ct. App.
2019), aff’d as modified on reh’g, 122 N.E.3d 832, trans. denied, for the proposition that this Court has
“discretion to address such claims, especially when they involve constitutional rights, the violation of which
would be fundamental error,” in light of the record before us, we decline to do so here.