Termination: S S, et al. v. Indiana Department of Child Services

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-JT-1310 | October 15, 2026 Page 1 of 17
Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not take
any action in reliance upon this memorandum decision until it is certified.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not
binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value
or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
I N T H E
Court of Appeals of Indiana
In re the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child
Relationship of M.S. and S.H. (Minor Children), and S.A.
(Mother), S.S. (Father-M.S.), and T.H. (Father-S.H.),
Appellants-Respondents
v.
Indiana Department of Child Services,
Appellee-Petitioner
October 15, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
26A-JT-1310
Appeal from the Wayne Superior Court
The Honorable Darrin M. Dolehanty, Senior Judge
Trial Court Cause Nos.
89D03-2511-JT-53
89D03-2511-JT-54

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Memorandum Decision by Judge Mathias
Judges Pyle and Weissmann concur.
Mathias, Judge.
[1] S.A. (“Mother”) and S.S. are the parents of M.S., and Mother and T.H. are the
parents of S.H. Mother, S.S., and T.H. (collectively, “Parents”) appeal the
Wayne Superior Court’s termination of their parental rights over their minor
children. Parents present the following issues for our review:
1. Whether S.S. was denied his right to due process.
2. Whether the trial court clearly erred when it terminated the
parental rights of Mother and T.H.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] Mother and S.S. have one child together, M.S., born November 3, 2018, and
Mother and T.H. have one child together, S.H., born October 22, 2021. In
August 2022, Mother and T.H. were arrested, and officers found evidence of
methamphetamine use in their home. S.S. was incarcerated in Alabama at that
time. The Department of Child Services (“DCS”) removed the children from
Mother and T.H.’s care, and the children were determined to be Children in
Need of Services (“CHINS”).

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[4] In September, the family case manager (“FCM”), Michelle Perkins, met with
T.H., but S.S. remained incarcerated in Alabama, and Mother had also recently
been incarcerated in Alabama. Mother returned to Indiana in December.
Mother and T.H. participated in services and visits with the children. In
December 2023, DCS closed the CHINS cases.
[5] In October 2024, DCS received a report that Mother and the children were
homeless. Two weeks later, Hannah Toschlog, the DCS assessment worker,
was able to find them. After Mother was unable to verify that she had housing,
DCS removed the children from her care. Toschlog contacted T.H., who was
unable to care for S.H. And Toschlog contacted S.S., who told her that he was
“working on a plan” to care for M.S. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 78.
[6] On October 30, DCS filed petitions alleging that the children were again
CHINS, and they filed amended petitions in November and March 2025.
Mother and S.S. admitted that the children were CHINS, and the trial court
adjudicated them as CHINS following a hearing. In April, the trial court issued
dispositional orders for Mother, S.S., and T.H. And in July, DCS created a case
plan regarding M.S. and sent it by email to S.S.
[7] FCM Whitney Vickers arranged the following services for Mother: home-based
case management, a substance use disorder assessment, a parenting assessment,
and random drug screens. As the trial court later found,
Mother rarely visited her daughters, continued using
methamphetamine for the next several months, and largely
ignored all efforts made by the DCS and service providers to

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reunify her with her children. She moved from place to place,
and avoided contact with the DCS. By August 2025, Mother was
still in active drug use. She considered, but did not attend
inpatient treatment. She continued to ignore service providers.
Through October 2025, Mother was still using
methamphetamine, and staying with various friends.
Appellant T.H.’s App. Vol. 2, p. 31.
[8] In the meantime, Vickers spoke with T.H. by phone. T.H. stated that he did not
have housing in Alabama, but that he “would be interested in getting [S.H.]
placed in his care . . . .” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 120. Vickers told T.H. to contact the
Alabama Department of Human Resources (“DHR”) to “arrange for
reunification services,” and she gave him contact information for a drug screen
provider. Appellant T.H.’s App. Vol. 2, p. 21. T.H. did not reach out to any
service provider.
[9] Vickers also spoke with S.S., who
stated that he would be interested in having [M.S.] placed in his
care, down in Alabama. He stated he had housing, employment,
and transportation. So [Vickers] contacted Alabama [Department
of Human Resources (“DHR”)], and they informed [her] they
would go to [S.S.’s] home to do a home assessment, and see if
the home environment was appropriate; get proof of income,
things like that. [S.S.] reported that they did not come out to his
home after several weeks. So [Vickers] provided him the DHR
contact information as well, to follow up with them and get that
scheduled; and he never contacted them.
Tr. Vol. 2, p. 120.

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[10] The children have lived with foster parents Ch.P. and Co.P. (“foster parents”)
since October 2025. In December, Mother had another baby, S., and she also
went to live with foster parents and the children. The children are thriving in
foster parents’ home, and they call them “mom” and “dad.” Appellant T.H.’s
App. Vol. 2, p. 27. Foster parents are willing to adopt the children.
[11] In November 2025, DCS filed petitions to terminate the parental rights of
Mother, S.S., and T.H. over their respective children. Following a three-day
fact-finding hearing, the trial court issued findings and conclusions to support
the termination of each parent’s parental rights over the children. In support of
its conclusion that termination of Parents’ parental rights is in the children’s
best interests, the trial court found as follows:
Both children were removed from home in late August, 2022.
The children had been living with Mother and [T.H.], both of
whom were arrested, and deeply involved in methamphetamine
abuse. [S.S.] was incarcerated in another state. M.S. was located
with two individuals who had no food in their home, and no
money to get food. S.H. was found at a different location and
also taken into protective custody. CHINS petitions were filed
and sustained. The DCS put reunification services in place for
the parents, while the children remain placed out-of-home. In
September 2022, Mother and [S.S.] were both incarcerated. [S.S.]
remained incarcerated in Alabama. Mother reported domestic
violence between herself and [T.H.] [T.H.] did not participate in
reunification services, missed many of his visits with his daughter
S.H., and continued using methamphetamine. When Mother
returned to Indiana in December 2022, she participated in
therapy, and home-based services, and cooperated with drug
screening. Mother and [T.H.] moved from place to place, and
stayed on [T.H.’s] father’s front porch for a while, and then with

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an aunt. Mother became pregnant again, and moved to Alabama
in September 2023. The state of Alabama denied placement of
the children. Mother set up services for herself in Alabama,
participated in those services, and stopped using
methamphetamine. She returned to Indiana, took custody of
M.S. and S.H., and returned to Alabama. The first set of CHINS
cases were closed in December 2023.
Sometime within the next nine (9) months, Mother returned to
Indiana with M.S. and S.H., leaving her infant child in Alabama.
She was evicted from a Richmond apartment in September 2024,
and came to the DCS’s attention again in October, by way of a
“homelessness” report. M.S. and S.H. were again taken into
protective custody, and the second set of CHINS cases were
opened on October 30, 2024. The children have not been
returned to the care of a parent in the seventeen (17) months that
have followed. The CHINS petitions were sustained, and the
children were adjudicated CHINS for the second time in March
2025. Reunification services were again ordered for the children
and parents. [T.H.] and [S.S.] have lived out-of-state for the
duration of the CHINS cases, and have declined to participate in
reunification services. Neither [T.H.] nor [S.S.] saw their child in
person, and sporadically “visited” by video. As set out in the
above findings, Mother rarely visited her daughters, continued
using methamphetamine for the next several months, and largely
ignored all efforts made by the DCS and service providers to
reunify her with her children. She moved from place to place,
and [she] avoided contact with the DCS. By August 2025,
Mother was still in active drug use. She considered, but did not
attend inpatient treatment. She continued to ignore service
providers. Through October 2025, Mother was still using
methamphetamine, and staying with various friends. The
children were placed with [foster parents]. Mother moved to
Shelbyville. [T.H.] and [S.S.] remained out of state. Mother gave
“clean” drug screens in November and December 2025. No drug
screens were presented to show whether she has remained
abstinent since then, and the Court does not assume nor

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conclude she continued to use. She had another child . . . on
December 22, 2025, and that child was immediately removed
from her care as well. Mother moved back to Alabama in early
January 2026, less than two (2) weeks after delivering [her baby]
and is again living with [T.H.] She has participated in some half-
day service programs in Alabama, and during the course of this
trial, made contact with a DCS-referred service provider, offering
“virtual” parenting education.
Since the children were removed from parental care in August
2024, their respective fathers have remained out of state, have not
seen the children in person, and have declined to participate in
services. As summarized above, Mother remained in active drug
use for several months, bounced from place to place, and ignored
the DCS’s efforts to provide her with reunification services. The
TPR petitions were filed in mid-November. Mother provided
clean drug screens the rest of that month and in December, but
then gave birth to another child, had that child removed from her
care, moved back to Alabama, and has remained there since. For
more than seventeen (17) months, S.H. and M.S. have remained
wards of the DCS, have rarely seen Mother in person, and have
“visited” with their biological fathers by video a few times. In
sum, the evidence very clearly and very convincingly shows that
termination of parental rights is in the best interest of both S.H.
and M.S., making way for permanency with an adoptive family.
Appellant T.H.’s App. Vol. 2, pp. 31-32.
[12] The trial court also concluded that: it is reasonably probable that the conditions
that resulted in the children’s removal and led to their continued placement
outside of Parents’ homes will not be remedied; that the children had been
adjudicated to be CHINS twice; and that DCS had a satisfactory plan for the
care of the children, namely, adoption. This appeal ensued.

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Discussion and Decision
Standard of Review
[13] Indiana appellate courts have long adhered to a highly deferential standard of
review in cases involving the termination of parental rights. In re S.K., 124
N.E.3d 1225, 1230-31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). In analyzing the trial court’s
decision, we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess witness credibility. Id. We
consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences favorable to the court’s
judgment. Id. In deference to the trial court’s unique position to assess the
evidence, we will set aside a judgment terminating a parent-child relationship
only if it is clearly erroneous. Id.
[14] To determine whether a termination decision is clearly erroneous, we apply a
two-tiered standard of review to the trial court’s findings of facts and
conclusions of law. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147
(Ind. 2005). First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings;
second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. “Findings
are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them
either directly or by inference.” In re A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1156 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2013), trans. denied. If the evidence and inferences support the court’s
termination decision, we must affirm. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1999), trans. denied. We will accept unchallenged factual findings as true.
See In re S.S., 120 N.E.3d 605, 614 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

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Issue One: Due Process
[15] S.S. argues that he was deprived of due process because DCS did not timely file
a case plan that included statutorily required information and because DCS did
not make reasonable efforts to reunify him with M.S. But S.S. did not raise a
due process challenge at the fact-finding hearing. This Court has previously
held that “a parent may waive a due process claim in a CHINS or termination
proceeding by raising that claim for the first time on appeal.” S.L. v. Ind. Dep’t of
Child Servs., 997 N.E.2d 1114, 1120 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (citing McBride v.
Monroe Cnty. Off. of Fam & Child., 798 N.E.2d 185, 194-95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)).
S.S. has therefore waived his due process claim.1
[16] Waiver notwithstanding, S.S. has not shown that he was denied due process.
As this Court has explained,
[t]he State must satisfy the requirements of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution when it seeks to terminate the parent-child
relationship. In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d [874,] 878[ (Ind. Ct. App.
2004)]. “Due process requires notice, an opportunity to be heard,
and an opportunity to confront witnesses.” In re M.L.K., 751
N.E.2d 293, 295-96 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). Before an action
affecting a party’s interest in life, liberty, or property protected by
the Due Process Clause proceeds, the State, at a minimum, must
provide notice reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the
action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.
1 To the extent S.S. refers to the fundamental error doctrine in his brief on appeal, he does not make cogent
argument on that issue, and we do not address it.

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Id. at 296 (citing Yoder v. Elkhart County Auditor, 632 N.E.2d 369,
372 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)).
Castro v. State Off. of Fam. & Child., 842 N.E.2d 367, 375 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006),
trans. denied.
[17] First, while DCS failed to comply with some of the statutory requirements
regarding case plans, the case plans were ultimately completed. As this Court
observed in Castro, “two important purposes of a case plan are to notify parents
of conduct that could lead to the termination of parental rights and to inform
parents of the steps they need to take in order to facilitate reunification with the
child.” Id. at 376. S.S. makes no contention on appeal that he was uninformed
on either point. We cannot say that the technical statutory violations deprived
S.S. of due process. See id.
[18] Second, S.S. has not shown that DCS failed to make reasonable efforts to
reunify him with M.S. S.S. blames DCS for his failure to participate in services
after M.S. was removed from Mother’s home. However, “[a] parent may not sit
idly by without asserting a need or desire for services and then successfully
argue that he was denied services to assist him with his parenting.” In re B.D.J.,
728 N.E.2d 195, 201 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). S.S. attended the dispositional
hearing, and he was represented by counsel. DCS presented evidence that the
family case managers had maintained contact with S.S. and told him how to
contact DHR in Alabama to obtain services, which he did not do. S.S. did not
attend family case meetings, and his video visits with M.S. were sporadic, at
best. We reject S.S.’s argument on this issue.

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Issue Two: Termination of Parental Rights
[19] Mother and T.H. contend that the trial court’s order terminating their parental
rights is clearly erroneous. It is well-settled that the parent-child relationship is
one of society’s most cherished relationships. See, e.g., In re A.G., 45 N.E.3d
471, 475 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. Indiana law thus sets a high bar to
sever that relationship. Before an involuntary termination of parental rights can
occur in Indiana, DCS is required, in relevant part, to prove
(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the
child; and
(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the
child’s best interests.
Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(2)-(3) (2024).
[20] In addition, DCS must prove the existence of one or more of the following
circumstances relevant here:
(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that
resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement
outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.
* * *
(5) That the child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been
adjudicated a child in need of services.
I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d)(3), (5).

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[21] Clear and convincing evidence need not establish that the continued custody of
a parent is wholly inadequate for a child’s very survival. Bester, 839 N.E.2d at
148. It is instead sufficient to show that “the child’s emotional and physical
development are threatened” by the parent’s custody. Id. (citation omitted). If
the court finds the allegations in a petition are true, the court shall terminate the
parent-child relationship. I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a).
[22] Mother and T.H. raise two issues on appeal, namely, whether the trial court
erred when it concluded that (1) there is a reasonable probability that the
conditions that resulted in the children’s removal or the reasons for placement
outside of their homes will not be remedied (I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d)(3)) and (2) that
termination of their parental rights is in the children’s best interests (I.C. § 31-
35-2-4(c)(3)). Initially, we note that, as DCS correctly points out, on the first
issue it only needed to prove either Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d)(3) or (5),
and the trial court concluded that both elements were proven. Because Mother
and T.H. make no argument under subsection 4(d)(5), they have waived that
issue. Waiver notwithstanding, we address both arguments in turn.
Reasons for Removal and Continued Placement Outside of Parents’ Homes
[23] Consideration of this argument involves a two-step analysis: first, identifying
the conditions that led to removal, and second, determining whether there is a
reasonable probability those conditions will be remedied. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d
636, 642-43 (Ind. 2014). In the second step, the trial court determines a parent’s
fitness at the time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration
evidence of changed conditions; in other words, the court must balance a

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parent’s recent improvements against habitual patterns of conduct to determine
whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. Id. In
conducting its analysis, the trial court may also consider the reasons for the
child’s continued placement outside the home. In re N.Q., 996 N.E.2d 385, 392
(Ind. Ct. App. 2013).
[24] Mother argues that she has remedied the conditions that led to the children’s
removal from her care, namely, her substance abuse and lack of housing. In
support, she directs us to the evidence that: she is sober, employed, and has
stable housing; she has completed classes in parenting skills and life skills; she
completed a substance abuse assessment; and she has reliable transportation.
But Mother’s argument amounts to a request that we reweigh the evidence,
which we will not do on appeal.
[25] The State presented evidence to support the trial court’s finding that, “after the
children were removed in late October 2024, Mother continued abusing
methamphetamine and ignored all reunification efforts until the TPR petitions
were filed, over twelve (12) months later.” Appellant T.H.’s App. Vol. 2, p. 32.
The trial court found that Mother’s “history of extensive, abusive, and chronic
use of methamphetamine . . . rendered her incapable of caring for” the children.
Id. at 33. And the court found that Mother had “refused or failed to complete
available treatment for controlled substance use during the two (2) year period
immediately preceding the filing date of the TPR petitions.” Id. We cannot say
that the trial court erred when it balanced Mother’s recent improvements

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against habitual patterns of conduct and determined that there is a substantial
probability of future neglect or deprivation. See In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643.
[26] T.H. argues that, despite a history of unstable housing, he has had stable
housing since January 2026. And he maintains that, despite a long history of
drug abuse, DCS did not present evidence that he continues to abuse drugs.
Like Mother’s argument, T.H.’s argument is a request that we reweigh the
evidence.
[27] The trial court found that T.H. had abused methamphetamine since age
thirteen. And the court found that, when the children were removed from
Mother’s care in 2022, both Mother and T.H. were “deeply involved in
methamphetamine abuse.” Appellant T.H.’s App. Vol. 2, p. 31. T.H.’s most
recent drug screens in October 2022 were positive for methamphetamine. T.H.
has not participated in any services pursuant to the dispositional order,
including drug screens. The court noted that T.H. had testified that he had been
sober for six months at the time of the fact-finding hearing, but there was no
corroborating evidence, and the court did not have to credit T.H.’s testimony.
We cannot say that the trial court erred when it considered the evidence,
including T.H.’s history of unstable housing and drug abuse, and determined
that there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. See In re
E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643.

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Best Interests
[28] Mother and T.H. also contend that the trial court’s best-interests determination
is clearly erroneous. Mother does not make cogent argument on this issue. But
T.H. argues that his failure to participate in services and the Court Appointed
Special Advocate’s (“CASA’s”) opinion are, without more, insufficient to
support this conclusion.
[29] Looking at the record as a whole and considering our deferential standard of
review, we cannot say that the court’s best-interests determination was clearly
erroneous. When determining the best interests of a child, the trial court must
consider the totality of the evidence. In re J.C., 994 N.E.2d 278, 289-90 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2013). “In so doing, the trial court must subordinate the interests of the
parent to those of the child” and “need not wait until a child is harmed
irreversibly before terminating the parent-child relationship.” Id. at 290. The
recommendations of the FCM and the CASA, together with evidence that the
conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, are sufficient to establish
by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child’s best interests.
Id.
[30] Here, the CASA, Karen Bowen, testified that it is in the children’s best interests
if Parents’ parental rights are terminated and the children are adopted. In
support, Bowen testified that she had “never seen [T.H.] pursue any of the
services” necessary for him to reunite with S.H. Tr. Vol. 3, p. 32. Bowen
testified that T.H. “does what he wants to do, when he wants to do it; and if he
doesn’t want to, he doesn’t. And he is not mindful of [S.H.’s] feelings, and how

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it might feel to her if he doesn’t attend a visit. . . .” Id. Bowen also testified that
Mother had “never provided a stable house” for the children. Id. And she
testified that the children needed “to be in homes [that] are drug free.” Id. at 33.
In addition, FCM Jessica Strayer testified that it is in the children’s best
interests that they be adopted by foster parents.
[31] At the time of the fact-finding hearing, T.H. had not seen S.H. in more than
seventeen months, and T.H. had only visited with S.H. by video “a few times.”
Appellant T.H.’s App. Vol. 2, p. 32. Mother’s visits with children have always
been supervised, and she has gone months at a time without visits. And, again,
the evidence shows that Mother and T.H. have a long history of
methamphetamine abuse.
[32] In sum, we will not disturb the court’s assessment of the evidence, and its
determination that termination was in the children’s best interests is not clearly
erroneous.
Conclusion
[33] Waiver notwithstanding, S.S.’s due process claim fails. We are also
unpersuaded by Mother and T.H.’s challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the termination of their parental rights.
[34] Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating Parents’ parental
rights over their respective children.
[35] Affirmed.

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Pyle, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT S.A.
Ana M. Quirk
Muncie, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT S.S.
Jessica L. Richert
Richmond, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT T.H.
Kayla C. Short
Richmond, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Attorney General of Indiana
Aaron G. Corn
Supervising Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana