IDHW v. Jane Doe

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 51005

In the Matter of: John Doe, A Child )
Under Eighteen (18) Years of Age. )
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF )
HEALTH AND WELFARE, ) Filed: November 28, 2023
)
Petitioner-Respondent, ) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
)
v. ) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
JANE DOE (2023-31), ) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
)
Respondent-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the Magistrate Division of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial
District, State of Idaho, Bannock County. Hon. Anson L. Call, II, Magistrate Judge.

Judgment terminating parental rights, affirmed.

David R. Martinez, Chief Bannock County Public Defender; Jessalyn R. Hopkin,
Deputy Public Defender, Pocatello, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Jason R. Chandler, Deputy Attorney
General, Pocatello, for respondent.
________________________________________________

MELANSON, Judge Pro Tem
Jane Doe (2023-31) appeals from the magistrate court’s judgment terminating her parental
rights to her minor child. We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Doe is the mother of a child who was born in January 2022. Doe experienced post-partum
depression and gave the child to a family friend to be cared for in Utah. At some point, the friend
relocated with the child to Colorado.1 Doe sought the return of the child, but the Department of

1
The record indicates the child was in Colorado for four days, but the total length of time
the child was in the friend’s care is unclear.

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Human Services in Colorado declared the child to be in imminent danger and took custody in
March 2022 pursuant to an emergency custody order. The Idaho Department of Health and
Welfare filed a petition under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act to
transfer jurisdiction to Idaho and a petition under the Idaho Child Protective Act for legal custody,
which were both granted. A shelter care hearing was scheduled, and the child was returned to
Idaho. The child was placed in foster care and a case plan was ordered by the magistrate court
with a goal of reunification and a concurrent goal of termination and adoption. The child has been
in foster care since being returned to Idaho. In August 2022, the child was placed in a relative
foster home. Review hearings and status review hearings were held, with the child remaining in
the legal custody of the Department. A status permanency hearing was set for March 23, 2023.
Prior to that hearing, the guardian ad litem filed a permanency report recommending termination
of parental rights and adoption. The Department then filed a progress report indicating that it
would “move forward with changing the permanency goal to first termination and adoption and
second reunification due to the continued lack of progress on the case plan, lack of motivation to
be present parents, and [the child] being in foster care for almost 12 months.” The Department
subsequently filed a petition for termination of parental rights.
A hearing on the petition was held on July 7, 2023, approximately sixteen months after the
Department took custody of the child. At the beginning of the hearing, Doe moved to stay the
proceedings pursuant to I.C. § 16-1622(2)(G)(i) or continue the termination trial, which the district
court denied. Following the trial, the magistrate court entered written findings of fact and
conclusions of law and ordered that Doe’s parental rights be terminated, concluding that clear and
convincing evidence showed that Doe had neglected the child and termination is in the best
interests of the child.2 Doe appeals.
II.
ANALYSIS
Doe argues the magistrate court erred in denying her motion to stay the proceedings or
continue the termination trial. She also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
magistrate court’s findings that Doe neglected the child and that termination is in the child’s best

2
The magistrate court also terminated the father’s parental rights. The decision to terminate
the father’s parental rights is not at issue in this appeal.

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interests.3 The Department responds that substantial and competent evidence supports the
magistrate court’s judgment terminating Doe’s parental rights.
A. Motion to Stay or Continue
Prior to the first witness being called at the termination trial, Doe made what was referred
to as a motion for compelling circumstances under I.C. § 16-1622(2)(g)(i). This was intended as
a motion to continue or stay the proceedings. That statute does not provide a basis for such relief.
Rather, the statute requires the Department to file a petition to terminate if the child has been in
the temporary or legal custody of the Department for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months
unless the trial court finds that: (1) the child is placed with a relative; (2) there are compelling
reasons why termination is not in the best interests of the child; or (3) the Department has failed
to provide reasonable efforts to reunify the child with its family. The Idaho Supreme Court has
held that I.C. § 16-1622(2)(g) serves to impose a requirement on the Department, not any
determination made by the magistrate court. Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (2019-16), 166
Idaho 57, 64, 454 P.3d 1140, 1147 (2019). Specifically, the statute requires the Department to file
a petition to terminate parental rights if a child has been in their custody for fifteen of the most
recent twenty-two months without reunification occurring. Id. Section 16-1622(2)(g)(i) serves as
an exception to that rule, relieving the Department of the requirement if the child has been placed
with a relative. Id. In other words, the exception gives the Department the option of declining to
file a petition to terminate parental rights under certain circumstances and does not have any
bearing on any decision made by the magistrate court. Id. Therefore, Doe’s argument that a stay
or continuance should have been granted based upon I.C. § 16-1622(2)(g) is misplaced.
Even if we consider Doe’s argument on grounds other than I.C. § 16-1622(2)(g), i.e., as a
request to continue the termination trial, we conclude there was no error in the magistrate court’s
denial of the motion. A motion for a continuance is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial
court and will not be overturned on appeal absent a showing of abuse of that discretion. Dep’t of

3
We note that, contrary to I.A.R. 35(d), Doe’s opening brief and reply brief include a
reference to the child by name; the rule requires all references to a minor be by initials or a
designation other than the minor’s name. We also note that there are no citations to the record in
the argument section of Doe’s brief. This does not comply with I.A.R. 35(a)(6) which requires
citations to the record in the argument section of the brief. Accordingly, the factual assertions in
Doe’s argument section lack supporting citations to the record. This Court will not search the
record on appeal for error. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 150 Idaho 103, 113, 244 P.3d
247, 257 (Ct. App. 2010).

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Health & Welfare v. Altman, 122 Idaho 1004, 1009, 842 P.2d 683, 688 (1992). When a trial court’s
discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to
determine whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted
within the boundaries of such discretion; (3) acted consistently with any legal standards applicable
to the specific choices before it; and (4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Lunneborg
v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018).
The record reflects that the magistrate court correctly perceived that it had the discretion
to decide whether to grant or deny the motion and acted within the bounds of that discretion. The
magistrate court heard argument from the parties, acknowledged the merits of each, weighed the
potential harm and benefit of proceeding with the hearing, and found that it was in the best interests
of the child to deny the motion to continue. Thus, the magistrate court did not abuse its discretion.
B. Grounds for Termination
A parent has a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining a relationship with his or her
child. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Doe v. State, 137 Idaho 758, 760, 53 P.3d 341,
343 (2002). This interest is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. State v. Doe, 144 Idaho 839, 842, 172 P.3d 1114, 1117 (2007). Implicit in the
Termination of Parent and Child Relationship Act is the philosophy that, wherever possible, family
life should be strengthened and preserved. I.C. § 16-2001(2). Therefore, the requisites of due
process must be met when terminating the parent-child relationship. State v. Doe, 143 Idaho 383,
386, 146 P.3d 649, 652 (2006). Due process requires that the grounds for terminating a
parent-child relationship be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Id. Because a fundamental
liberty interest is at stake, the United States Supreme Court has determined that a court may
terminate a parent-child relationship only if that decision is supported by clear and convincing
evidence. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982); see also I.C. § 16-2009; Doe v. Dep’t of
Health & Welfare, 146 Idaho 759, 761-62, 203 P.3d 689, 691-92 (2009); Doe, 143 Idaho at 386,
146 P.3d at 652. Statutory grounds for termination of parental rights include: (a) abandonment;
(b) neglect or abuse; (c) lack of a biological relationship between the child and a presumptive
parent; (d) inability to discharge parental responsibilities for a prolonged period, which will be
injurious to the health, morals, or well-being of the child; or (e) incarceration for a substantial
period of time during the child’s minority. I.C. § 16-2005. Upon finding a statutory ground for
termination, the trial court must also find that it is in the best interests of the child to terminate the

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parent-child relationship. I.C. § 16-2005(1). Both findings must be established by clear and
convincing evidence.
1. Neglect
Idaho Code Section 16-2002(3)(a) defines “neglect” as any conduct included in I.C.
§ 16-1602(31). Section 16-1602(31)(a) provides, in pertinent part, that a child is neglected when
the child is without proper parental care and control, or subsistence, medical or other care or control
necessary for his or her well-being because of the conduct or omission of his or her parents,
guardian, or other custodian or their neglect or refusal to provide them. Neglect also exists where
the parent has failed to comply with the court’s orders or the case plan in a Child Protective Act
case and the Department has had temporary or legal custody of the child for fifteen of the most
recent twenty-two months and reunification has not been accomplished by the last day of the
fifteenth month in which the child has been in the temporary or legal custody of the Department.
I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b). Neglect also exists when a parent is unable to discharge the responsibilities
to and for the child and, as a result of such inability, the child lacks the parental care necessary for
his or her health, safety, or well-being. I.C. § 16-1602(31)(b).
The magistrate court found Doe neglected the child by failing to comply with the case plan
and achieving reunification in a timely manner. The case plan required Doe to participate in
counseling, complete a mental health assessment, complete a Department-approved parenting
class, attend the child’s medical appointments, obtain stable housing, and complete drug testing as
deemed necessary by the Department. The magistrate court found Doe attended counseling, but
only after a slow start, and did not stay enrolled for long as the sessions ended because of a change
in residence that caused transportation issues. The magistrate court also found that Doe
inconsistently attended visitation sessions and medical appointments, even when transportation
was provided by the Department. The reasons offered for missed visitations and appointments
varied between oversleeping, scheduling conflicts, and illness. Doe’s employment varied, with
periods of unemployment, and she did not finish her nurturing parenting class as required. The
magistrate court determined Doe did not have stable housing and did not understand what stable
housing meant. This determination was based on the condition of the multiple residences Doe
lived in leading up to the termination trial and her own lack of understanding of the meaning of
stable housing. The child was in the legal custody of the Department for sixteen months and
reunification had not been accomplished.

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The magistrate court also found neglect based on Doe’s inability to discharge her parental
responsibilities. The magistrate court found that Doe failed to demonstrate that she has even a
basic understanding of the child’s needs. During visitations, Doe relied on the child’s father to
interact with the child. Doe failed to recognize when the father failed to meet the child’s needs
and did not step in to care for those needs. Some visitations ended early because of verbal
arguments between Doe and the father regarding who should care for the child even in the
controlled environment of supervised visits. Further, Doe concealed that she was again pregnant,4
even when directly questioned by the Department. Finally, the magistrate court found the child
was thriving in foster care.
Doe asserts the magistrate court’s reasoning in finding neglect “rests solely on [her]
poverty.”5 She also contends she was never given a chance to demonstrate she could meet the
child’s needs. This argument is unavailing, however, because it does not address Doe’s actions
(irrespective of her poverty) during the supervised visits, her reluctance and unwillingness to
complete the case plan, or that the visitation schedule did not advance to home visits because of
Doe’s struggles with supervised visitation. The magistrate court also found that the Department
offered gas vouchers and that transportation was provided on multiple occasions.
Doe also contends that the magistrate court failed to recognize that she did attend some
counseling; that she did not test positive for controlled substances; that she had housing;6 and that,
at the beginning of the child’s life, Doe did provide clothing, food and housing and attended
medical appointments. Doe provides no legal authority to support her position that, under

4
Doe became pregnant and gave birth to another child while this case was pending. At the
time of the hearing, that child was in the custody of the Department. The magistrate court noted
that Doe’s compliance with the case plan diminished after the birth of that child.
5
At the termination hearing, counsel for Doe argued that Doe should not be punished for
her poverty. The record reflects that Doe and the father of the child were experiencing poverty
during the case. Doe was seldom employed and the father only sporadically at low-paying jobs.
As noted by counsel for the Department at the termination hearing--inexperience and lack of
resources were not the reasons the Department sought termination and those factors could have
been overcome had the parents shown “at least a little bit of initiative . . . but they didn’t follow
through with anything.” While the magistrate court made no specific findings regarding Doe’s
poverty, the findings do reflect a lack of follow through and initiative by Doe in completing the
case plan, irrespective of her poverty.
6
The magistrate court found that Doe failed to provide housing suitable for a child.

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I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b), some compliance without completion of a case plan prevents a finding of
neglect. This Court generally does not address issues not supported by cogent argument and
citation to legal authority, even in a case terminating parental rights. See Idaho Dep’t of Health &
Welfare v. Doe (2015-01), 158 Idaho 764, 768-69, 351 P.3d 1222, 1226-27 (2015) (declining to
consider parent’s argument “that he ‘substantially complied’ with the case plan” because he failed
to provide legal authority).
The record in this case reflects that the findings of the magistrate court are supported by
substantial competent evidence of neglect based on Doe’s failure to comply with the case plan, her
inability to provide for the child, and Doe’s inability to discharge her parental responsibilities.
Doe has failed to show that the magistrate court abused its discretion in finding neglect.
2. Best interests of the child
Once a statutory ground for termination has been established, the trial court must next
determine whether it is in the best interests of the child to terminate the parent-child relationship.
Tanner v. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 120 Idaho 606, 611, 818 P.2d 310, 315 (1991). When
determining whether termination is in the child’s best interests, the trial court may consider the
parent’s history with substance abuse, the stability and permanency of the home, the
unemployment of the parent, the financial contribution of the parent to the child’s care after the
child is placed in protective custody, the improvement of the child while in foster care, the parent’s
efforts to improve his or her situation, and the parent’s continuing problems with the law. Doe
(2015-03) v. Doe, 159 Idaho 192, 198, 358 P.3d 77, 83 (2015); Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare
v. Doe, 156 Idaho 103, 111, 320 P.3d 1262, 1270 (2014). A finding that it is in the best interests
of the child to terminate parental rights must still be made upon objective grounds. Idaho Dep’t
of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 152 Idaho 953, 956-57, 277 P.3d 400, 403-04 (Ct. App. 2012).
The magistrate court found that termination is in the child’s best interests because Doe
failed to develop the necessary skills to appropriately parent the child and that the child had been
in the care of others for nearly the child’s entire life. The magistrate court also found that the child
had some bond with Doe, but there was not an appropriate parent-child relationship and even that
bond appeared extremely limited by Does inability to recognize the child’s basic needs. The
magistrate court further found that the child was thriving in foster care with a relative identified as
a permanency option. The record reflects that the magistrate court’s determination that termination
is in the best interests of the child is supported by substantial competent evidence. Doe has failed

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to demonstrate the magistrate court abused its discretion in concluding that termination is in the
best interests of the child.
III.
CONCLUSION
Doe has failed to show that the magistrate court erred in denying her motion to stay the
proceedings or continue the termination trial. The magistrate court’s findings that Doe neglected
the child and that termination is in the child’s best interests are supported by substantial and
competent evidence. Doe has failed to show error in the magistrate court’s decision to terminate
her parental rights. Accordingly, the judgment terminating Doe’s parental rights is affirmed.
Chief Judge LORELLO and Judge GRATTON, CONCUR.

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