State v. PENTICO

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 37834

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) 2011 Opinion No. 60
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Filed: October 17, 2011
v. )
) Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
CHRISTOPHER A. PENTICO, )
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada
County. Hon. Kathryn A. Sticklen, District Judge. Hon. Kevin Swain,
Magistrate.

Order of the district court, on appeal from the magistrate, affirming order
withholding judgment for trespass, affirmed.

Gordon Law Offices, Boise, for appellant. Heidi M. Tolman and Bruce S.
Bistline argued.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy
Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued.
________________________________________________
MELANSON, Judge
Christopher A. Pentico appeals from the district court’s intermediate appellate decision
affirming the magistrate’s order withholding judgment for trespass. For the reasons set forth
below, we affirm.
I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURE
Beginning in 2007, the Idaho Capitol closed to the public for renovation and the
Governor’s office was temporarily moved to the third floor of the nearby Borah Building. On
March 25, 2008, an officer stopped Pentico on state property, in the vicinity of the Capitol
Annex, and informed Pentico that he was no longer authorized to be at the Capitol Annex, the

1
third and fourth floors of the Borah Building, and the department of education. 1 On April 2,
2008, Pentico visited the Governor’s office on the third floor of the Borah Building. After
Pentico left the Borah Building, he was cited for trespass in violation of I.C. § 18-7011. 2 Months
later, the state filed an amended complaint charging Pentico with trespass in violation of I.C. §
18-7008. Pentico filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint and a motion in limine.
At the hearing on Pentico’s motion to dismiss, Pentico argued the amended complaint
should be dismissed because it did not recite all of the elements of trespass required by I.C. § 18-
7008(A)(8) because it alleged only that, on April 2, Pentico willfully trespassed upon the
property of the State of Idaho by entering the Governor’s office in the Borah Building. The state
then moved to file a second amended complaint which provided that, on April 2, Pentico
willfully trespassed upon the property of the State of Idaho by returning and entering the
Governor’s office in the Borah Building without permission or invitation, after being verbally
notified within the previous year not to do so, by an authorized agent of the State. The
magistrate granted the state’s motion to amend and denied Pentico’s motion to dismiss on that
ground.
In further support of his motion to dismiss, however, Pentico cited to a recent Idaho
Supreme Court decision for the proposition that I.C. § 18-7008(A)(8) could be challenged as
being unconstitutional as applied to a person on public property who is exercising his or her free
speech rights. See State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 715-16, 69 P.3d 126, 135-36 (2003). After
hearing argument on the constitutional issue, the magistrate denied Pentico’s motion to dismiss,
holding that I.C. § 18-7008(A)(8) placed reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and manner

1
The record is somewhat sparse as to the reason for Pentico’s exclusion from those
properties. This is so, in part, because the magistrate granted Pentico’s motion in limine,
prohibiting references to other crimes, wrongs, or acts of Pentico. We note, too, that such
evidence was ruled irrelevant by the magistrate because of a determination that I.C. § 18-
7008(A)(8) was not unconstitutional as applied. On a portion of a video recording, the officer
referred (outside of Pentico’s presence) to Pentico as having been “harassing people at the
Governor’s office.” This part of the recording was disregarded by the magistrate at Pentico’s
request. At sentencing, there were references to Pentico having been involved in causing a
disturbance at the department of education and that he had recently become persistent in
contacting members of the Governor’s staff regarding his issue with the department of education.
2
Idaho Code Section 18-7011 deals with property enclosed by fences or posted with no
trespassing signs.

2
in which constitutional rights could be exercised and Pentico was being prosecuted for his
conduct and not the content of his communication. Following this determination, the magistrate
addressed and granted Pentico’s motion in limine which sought to limit any testimony regarding
other crimes, wrongs, or acts of Pentico. Based on the foregoing, the magistrate determined that
the content of the communication and prior dealings Pentico may have had with other
government officials was not relevant to the case and limited testimony to what occurred on
April 2 when Pentico was cited for trespass. 3
The parties waived trial by a jury. At trial before the magistrate, in accordance with its
previous ruling, Pentico was not allowed to present testimony regarding his communication and
prior dealings with government officials or assert that his actions were justified under the First
Amendment. At the conclusion of trial, the magistrate determined that the state proved all of the
elements required by I.C. § 18-7008(A)(8) beyond a reasonable doubt--that Pentico was properly
notified he could not be present at certain locations and that he was thereafter physically present
at those locations within a year of such notice. The magistrate found Pentico guilty of trespass,
entered a withheld judgment, and placed Pentico on probation for thirty days. Pentico appealed.
On appeal to the district court, Pentico argued that the state did not prove all of the
elements of trespass required by the statute. Specifically, Pentico alleged that the state failed to
prove that Pentico had not been invited to return to the Borah Building and also failed to prove
that he had been asked specifically to leave the Borah Building. Pentico also argued that the
statute was unconstitutional as applied to him. The district court concluded that the state proved
all of the elements of trespass required by the statute. As to the constitutional challenges, the
district court determined that the only issue preserved for appeal was whether Pentico engaged in
constitutionally-protected activity on April 2 because Pentico did not argue before the magistrate
that he was engaged in constitutionally-protected conduct that was infringed by the notice
banning him from government property on March 25. The district court concluded that the
statute was not unconstitutional as applied to Pentico on April 2 and affirmed the magistrate’s
order withholding judgment. Pentico again appeals, arguing that the state failed to prove all of

3
At trial, the magistrate clarified that testimony regarding whether Pentico was given
notice on March 25 that he could not be present at specified state properties would also be
allowed.

3
the elements of trespass required by I.C. § 18-7008(A)(8), that the statute was unconstitutional as
applied to him, and that that the magistrate erred by precluding evidence.
II.
ANALYSIS
On review of a decision of the district court, rendered in its appellate capacity, we review
the decision of the district court directly. State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217
(Ct. App. 2008). We examine the magistrate record to determine whether there is substantial and
competent evidence to support the magistrate’s findings of fact and whether the magistrate’s
conclusions of law follow from those findings. Id. If those findings are so supported and the
conclusions follow therefrom and if the district court affirmed the magistrate’s decision, we
affirm the district court’s decision as a matter of procedure. Id.
A. Statutory Interpretation
Pentico argues that he could not be convicted of trespass because the state did not prove
all of the elements required by the statute. Idaho Code Section 18-7008(A) provides that every
person is guilty of a misdemeanor who willfully commits any trespass by:
(8) . . . being first notified in writing, or verbally by the owner or
authorized agent of the owner of real property, to immediately depart from the
same and who refuses to so depart, or who, without permission or invitation,
returns and enters said property within a year, after being so notified . . . .

This Court exercises free review over the application and construction of statutes. State
v. Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 505, 80 P.3d 1103, 1106 (Ct. App. 2003). Where the language of a
statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court must give effect to the statute as written, without
engaging in statutory construction. State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 685, 688
(1999); State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214, 219 (1999); State v. Escobar, 134
Idaho 387, 389, 3 P.3d 65, 67 (Ct. App. 2000). The language of the statute is to be given its
plain, obvious, and rational meaning. Burnight, 132 Idaho at 659, 978 P.2d at 219. If the
language is clear and unambiguous, there is no occasion for the court to resort to legislative
history, or rules of statutory interpretation. Escobar, 134 Idaho at 389, 3 P.3d at 67. When this
Court must engage in statutory construction, it has the duty to ascertain the legislative intent and
give effect to that intent. Rhode, 133 Idaho at 462, 988 P.2d at 688. To ascertain the intent of
the legislature, not only must the literal words of the statute be examined, but also the context of
those words, the public policy behind the statute and its legislative history. Id. It is incumbent

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upon a court to give a statute an interpretation which will not render it a nullity. State v. Beard,
135 Idaho 641, 646, 22 P.3d 116, 121 (Ct. App. 2001). Constructions of a statute that would
lead to an absurd result are disfavored. State v. Doe, 140 Idaho 271, 275, 92 P.3d 521, 525
(2004); State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 690, 85 P.3d 656, 666 (2004).
Pentico first argues that the statute required the state to prove that he was not permitted or
invited to return to the third floor of the Borah Building. Alternatively, Pentico argues that, even
if such permission or invitation was not an element required by the statute, it was an affirmative
defense and the magistrate erred by precluding him from presenting testimony about the alleged
invitation. At the pretrial hearing, Pentico asserted that, by way of an offer of proof, on
March 11, 2008, he asked the Governor for a meeting and the Governor responded that a meeting
might be possible after the legislative session was over. It is not necessary to decide here
whether permission or invitation was an element of the statute or a matter to be raised as an
affirmative defense. Even if what the Governor allegedly said on March 11 could somehow be
construed as permission or an invitation, such permission or invitation became irrelevant on
March 25 when the officer notified Pentico that he was no longer authorized to be at the third
floor of the Borah Building and thereby superseded any alleged permission or invitation by the
Governor. Further, Pentico prevented presentation of evidence regarding communication and
prior dealings he had with government officials when he filed, and the court granted, his motion
in limine which sought to limit any testimony regarding Pentico’s other crimes, wrongs, or acts.
Therefore, the magistrate did not err by concluding that the state was not required to prove lack
of permission or invitation as an element of trespass under these circumstances or by precluding
evidence of Pentico’s alleged permission or invitation.
Pentico also argues that, because public property was involved, the statute required the
state to show a reason for excluding Pentico from the Capitol Annex, the third and fourth floors
of the Borah Building, and the department of education. However, the statute does not
distinguish between public and private property and does not require the owner or authorized
agent of the owner of real property to identify (or even have) a reason to ask a person to leave.
Further, while Pentico asserts that only an inappropriately-behaved citizen who has no legitimate
business at a public office can be asked to leave and then be arrested for refusing to do so, Idaho
courts have construed the statute to not require that public or private property owners provide a
reason for asking a person to leave their land. Korsen, 138 Idaho at 716, 69 P.3d at 136; State v.

5
Missamore, 119 Idaho 27, 31, 803 P.2d 528, 532 (1990); State v. Bowman, 124 Idaho 936, 945,
866 P.2d 193, 202 (Ct. App. 1993). Therefore, the magistrate did not err by concluding that
Pentico had been properly asked to leave state property without an identified reason. 4
Pentico finally asserts that the plain language of the statute requires that the person being
properly notified to leave property must be physically present on such property at the time of the
notice and then return to the same property within a year. Pentico argues that, because he was
physically present at the Captiol Annex when he was told he was no longer authorized to be at
other state properties, he could only be cited for trespass if he returned to the Capitol Annex.
This construction of the statute would lead to an absurd result. If a real property owner or
authorized agent notifies an individual that he or she is no longer authorized to be on
specifically-identified properties owned by that owner, the owner or agent is not required to
physically catch and notify the individual on each identified property to gain protection under the
statute. Therefore, the magistrate did not err when it determined Pentico could be convicted
based upon his entry onto the third floor of the Borah Building.
Accordingly, we agree with the magistrate that the statute required the state to prove two
elements under the circumstances of this case--that Pentico was properly notified that he could
not be present at certain locations and that he was thereafter physically present at those locations
within a year of such notice. Having found that the state proved these two elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, the magistrate did not err by concluding that Pentico was guilty of trespass
under I.C. § 18-7008(A)(8).
B. Constitutional Challenges
Pentico argues that I.C. § 18-7008(A)(8) violated his due process rights because it was
unconstitutionally overbroad and vague as applied to him on March 25 when he was asked to
leave the Captiol Annex and on April 2 when he was charged with trespass after visiting the
Governor’s office. Where a defendant claims that his or her right to due process was violated,
we defer to the trial court’s findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence. State v. Smith,
135 Idaho 712, 720, 23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001). However, we freely review the
application of constitutional principles to those facts found. Id. Further, issues not raised below

4
We note here, as did the magistrate at sentencing, that our function is not to make law. If
it would be sound policy to require the state to identify a specific reason for excluding someone
from state property, then it is a matter for the legislature to consider.

6
generally may not be considered for the first time on appeal. State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 195,
824 P.2d 123, 126 (1992). Therefore, the threshold inquiry is whether Pentico raised his
constitutional challenges before the magistrate to preserve them for appeal.
1. Challenges preserved for appeal
At the pretrial motion hearing, Pentico cited Korsen, 138 Idaho at 715-16, 69 P.3d at
135-36, for the proposition that I.C. § 18-7008(A)(8) could be challenged as being
unconstitutional as applied to a person on public property who is exercising his or her free
speech rights. The state argued that, while Pentico had a right to drop off a letter at the
Governor’s office on April 2, he was cited for trespass for his conduct of going to that office
after he had been notified he was not allowed to do so and not for the content of any
communication. In response, Pentico argued that “to whittle away a citizen’s right to grieve
government actions or to free speech by saying the methods and manner in which they can do
this is somewhat chilling.” Pentico then asserted that any statute that attempted to restrict public
access to public areas must be strictly construed. Finally, Pentico argued that there was no basis
to justify imposition of the statute, and he described the grievances contained in the letter he
delivered to the Governor’s office on April 2. After hearing this argument on the constitutional
issue, the magistrate denied Pentico’s motion to dismiss, holding that I.C. § 18-7008(A)(8)
placed reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and manner in which constitutional rights could
be exercised and that Pentico was being prosecuted for his conduct and not the content of his
communication. In his closing argument at trial, Pentico argued that, “to trespass in the first
place, there has to be some reason, . . . otherwise a police officer can tell any of our citizens
don’t go to numerous public buildings, and if they go, they’re subject to criminal trespass.”
As such, while Pentico asserted before the magistrate that by delivering a letter to the
Governor’s office he was engaged in constitutionally-protected conduct on April 2 and the
statute infringed upon that right, he did not allege that he was engaged in any
constitutionally-protected conduct that the statute infringed upon on March 25. As stated above,
Korsen indicates that I.C. § 18-7008(A)(8) may be challenged as being unconstitutional as
applied to a person on public property who is exercising his or her free speech rights. Korsen,
138 Idaho at 715-16, 69 P.3d at 135-36. As just described, however, Pentico did not allege he
was engaged in any constitutionally-protected conduct on March 25. Further, the record is
devoid of any evidence that would lead to such a conclusion. Therefore, the only challenge

7
preserved for appeal is whether the statute was unconstitutional as applied to Pentico on April 2
when he delivered a letter to the Governor’s office.
Pentico argues that, even if he did not preserve his challenge to the constitutionality of
the statute as applied to him on March 25, this Court should review it based on fundamental
error. Idaho decisional law has long allowed appellate courts to consider a claim of error to
which no objection was made below if the issue presented rises to the level of fundamental error.
See State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571, 165 P.3d 273, 285 (2007); State v. Haggard, 94 Idaho
249, 251, 486 P.2d 260, 262 (1971). Recently, the Idaho Supreme Court abandoned the
definitions it had previously utilized to describe what may constitute fundamental error. State v.
Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961 (2010). The Court held that an appellate court should
reverse an unobjected-to error when the defendant persuades the court that the alleged error:
(1) violates one or more of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights; (2) the error is clear or
obvious without the need for reference to any additional information not contained in the
appellate record; and (3) the error affected the outcome of the trial proceedings. Id. at 221, 245
P.3d at 978.
Assuming Perry applies in these circumstances and, as Pentico asserts, an unwaived
constitutional right was violated on March 25, Pentico fails under the second prong of Perry
because it is not clear or obvious from the record that an error was made at trial that violated
Pentico’s constitutional right without the need for reference to any additional information not
contained in the appellate record. Pentico was given ample opportunity to present all of his
constitutional arguments to the magistrate before the magistrate limited trial testimony to the
events of April 2. Further, by filing a motion in limine to limit any testimony regarding other
crimes, wrongs or acts of Pentico, Pentico himself prevented evidence from coming in regarding
the events that led up to his being asked to leave the Capitol Annex on March 25. Accordingly,
we decline to review Pentico’s due process challenge to the statute as it was applied to him on
March 25 on the basis of fundamental error.
Pentico also argues that we should review the statute as it was applied to him on
March 25 when he was asked to leave the Capitol Annex, even though not preserved, because he
received ineffective assistance of counsel. Ordinarily we do not address claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel on direct appeal because the record is rarely adequate for review of such
claims. Sparks v. State, 140 Idaho 292, 296, 92 P.3d 542, 546 (Ct. App. 2004); State v. Hayes,

8
138 Idaho 761, 766, 69 P.3d 181, 186 (Ct. App. 2003). They are more appropriately presented
through post-conviction relief proceedings where an evidentiary record can be developed. State
v. Mitchell, 124 Idaho 374, 376, 859 P.2d 972, 974 (Ct. App. 1993). However, even if
addressed, to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Pentico must show that the
attorney’s performance was deficient, and that he was prejudiced by the deficiency. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 313, 316, 900 P.2d 221,
224 (Ct. App. 1995). To establish a deficiency, the applicant has the burden of showing that the
attorney’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Aragon v. State,
114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). This Court has long adhered to the proposition
that tactical or strategic decisions of trial counsel will not be second-guessed on appeal unless
those decisions are based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law or other
shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. Howard v. State, 126 Idaho 231, 233, 880 P.2d
261, 263 (Ct. App. 1994). We evaluate an attorney’s performance at the time of the alleged
error, not in hindsight, and presume that trial counsel was competent and that trial tactics were
based on sound legal strategy. State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 791-92, 948 P.2d 127, 146-47
(1997).
Pentico asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to adequately raise
Pentico’s constitutional challenge to the statute as it applied to him on March 25. When
Pentico’s trial counsel filed a motion in limine to limit any testimony regarding other crimes,
wrongs or acts of Pentico, he thereby prevented evidence from coming in regarding the events
that led up to his being asked to leave the Capitol Annex on March 25. Filing this motion may
have been a tactical or strategic decision of trial counsel, but there is no evidence in the record.
Similarly, there is no evidence in the record, and Pentico does not assert, that his counsel’s
decision was based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings
capable of objective evaluation. The record is not adequate to allow us to review Pentico’s claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel, and we decline to do so.
2. Challenge to the statute as applied to Pentico on April 2
As discussed above, Pentico preserved his constitutional challenge to I.C. § 18-
7008(A)(8) as applied to him on April 2 when he was cited for trespass. Accordingly, we will
next address this challenge. If a statute is challenged by a defendant as being overbroad as
applied, the first issue to be decided is whether the statute regulates constitutionally-protected

9
conduct. Korsen, 138 Idaho at 713, 69 P.3d at 133; State v. Bitt, 118 Idaho 584, 589, 798 P.2d
43, 48 (1990). If so, the next issue to be decided is whether the statute precludes such
constitutionally-protected conduct. State v. Poe, 139 Idaho 885, 892-93, 88 P.3d 704, 711-12
(2004). In Korsen, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded that Idaho’s trespass statute is not aimed
at regulating speech or communication in any form. Korsen, 138 Idaho at 715, 69 P.3d at 135.
Further, the as-applied analysis requires an examination of the statute as it applied to Pentico’s
particular conduct on April 2 and the facts of this case do not provide a situation where the
exercise of free speech was impinged. On April 2, Pentico went to the Governor’s office on the
third floor of the Borah Building to deliver a letter. After Pentico delivered the letter, the
purpose of his visit to the Governor’s office came to an end. After leaving the Borah Building,
Pentico was cited with trespass for his conduct of visiting the third floor of the Borah Building in
violation of the notice banning him from that building, not for the content of any
communication. 5 Additionally, physical presence, even in a public building dedicated to public
uses for the purpose of communicating ideas, is not “pure speech” and may not be protected by
the First Amendment. Korsen, 138 Idaho at 715, 69 P.3d at 135. Accordingly, because the
statute, as applied, did not regulate constitutionally-protected conduct and Pentico was cited for
trespass because of his conduct of visiting a public building on April 2 in violation of the notice
banning him from that building and not the content of any communication, the statute was not
unconstitutionally overbroad as applied to Pentico on April 2.
Pentico also argues that the statute was unconstitutionally vague as applied to him on
April 2. To prevail on such a challenge, a defendant must show that the statute, as applied to the
defendant’s conduct, failed to provide fair notice that the defendant’s conduct was proscribed or
failed to provide sufficient guidelines such that the police had unbridled discretion in
determining whether to arrest the defendant. Korsen, 138 Idaho at 712, 69 P.3d at 132.
However, because Pentico did not assert before the magistrate that he was not given fair notice
that his return to the third floor of the Borah Building was prohibited or that the officer had
unbridled discretion in determining whether to arrest Pentico, he did not preserve this issue for
appeal. Therefore, we need not review Pentico’s challenge that the statute was
unconstitutionally vague as applied to him on April 2. However, even if the issue had been

5
The letter apparently dealt, at least in part, with Pentico having been excluded from state
property. After he was cited, Pentico delivered a similar letter to the attorney general’s office.

10
preserved for appeal, the statute indicated that, if a person is told to leave property by the owner
or authorized agent and that person comes back to the same property within a year without
permission or invitation, he or she will be guilty of trespass. The statute provided fair notice to
Pentico that, after he was properly notified that he was not authorized to be at specified state
properties, his return to such properties without permission or invitation within a year would
constitute trespass. As to Pentico’s claim that the police had unbridled discretion in determining
whether to cite Pentico for trespass, this argument is without merit because the statute indicated
that a person could only be cited for trespass for failure to leave or upon return to property within
a year after receiving proper notice to depart.
C. Preclusion of Evidence
Finally, Pentico argues that, while he did what he could to raise all of his as-applied
constitutional challenges, he was prevented from adequately doing so because the magistrate
limited testimony to the events of April 2 and erroneously precluded Pentico from presenting
evidence regarding the events that led up to his being asked to leave the Capitol Annex on
March 25. In order to preserve an evidentiary ruling for appellate review, the party assigning
error to the ruling must make a sufficient record from which an appellate court can adequately
determine whether there was error, and also whether the rights of such party have been
prejudiced. State v. Schoonover, 125 Idaho 953, 954, 877 P.2d 924, 925 (Ct. App.
1994). Without any record of the nature of the evidence that was excluded, we cannot determine
whether its exclusion, even if erroneous, was harmless or was prejudicial to Pentico’s case. See
id. at 955, 877 P.2d at 926. As discussed above, it was only after hearing argument on the
constitutional issue that the magistrate limited the focus of Pentico’s trial to the events of April 2.
As such, the magistrate did not prevent Pentico from raising all of his constitutional challenges to
the statute by presenting evidence regarding the events that led up to his being asked to leave the
Capitol Annex on March 25. Pentico did not raise the challenge and present evidence to the
magistrate when given the opportunity to do so. Further, even after the magistrate’s ruling
limiting testimony to the events of April 2, Pentico still had the burden to preserve a record of his
challenge for appellate review. Pentico did not make a sufficient record from which we can
determine whether there was error.
Additionally, the doctrine of invited error applies to estop a party from asserting an error
when his or her own conduct induces the commission of the error. State v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho

11
816, 819, 864 P.2d 654, 657 (Ct. App. 1993). One may not complain of errors one has consented
to or acquiesced in. State v. Caudill, 109 Idaho 222, 226, 706 P.2d 456, 460 (1985); State v. Lee,
131 Idaho 600, 605, 961 P.2d 1203, 1208 (Ct. App. 1998). In short, invited errors are not
reversible. State v. Gittins, 129 Idaho 54, 58, 921 P.2d 754, 758 (Ct. App. 1996). This doctrine
applies to sentencing decisions as well as rulings made during trial. State v. Griffith, 110 Idaho
613, 614, 716 P.2d 1385, 1386 (Ct. App. 1986). As such, by filing a motion in limine which
sought to limit any testimony regarding other crimes, wrongs or acts of Pentico, Pentico himself
prevented evidence from coming in regarding the events that led up to his being asked to leave
the Capitol Annex on March 25. Therefore, even assuming it was error for the magistrate to
preclude Pentico from presenting evidence regarding the events that led up to his being asked to
leave the Capitol Annex on March 25, such error is not reversible.
III.
CONCLUSION
The magistrate did not err when it found Pentico guilty of trespass under I.C. § 18-
7008(A)(8). There was substantial evidence to support the finding of guilt. To the extent that
challenges were preserved for appeal, the statute was not unconstitutional as applied to Pentico
and the magistrate did not err by precluding evidence. Therefore, the district court’s
intermediate appellate decision upholding the magistrate’s order withholding judgment for
trespass is affirmed.
Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge GUTIERREZ, CONCUR.

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