State of Idaho v. Jacob Levi Smith

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 52159

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Filed: May 13, 2026
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
JACOB LEVI SMITH, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Defendant-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada
County. Hon. Lynn G. Norton, District Judge.

Judgment of conviction for destruction, alteration, or concealment of evidence and
being a persistent violator, affirmed.

Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Andrea W. Reynolds, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender; Katherine C. Ball, Joshua Bruce Holmstead, and Faith
E. Quigley, University of Idaho Legal Aid Clinic, Boise, for appellant. Faith E.
Quigley argued.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; T. Michael MacEgan, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent. T. Michael MacEgan argued.
________________________________________________

LORELLO, Judge
Jacob Levi Smith appeals from his judgment of conviction for destruction, alteration, or
concealment of evidence and being a persistent violator. We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Officers responded to a vacant dirt lot behind a local business after receiving a tip from an
identified caller reporting suspicious behavior. The caller had a cargo trailer that was kept in the
vacant lot with expensive equipment inside and reported that he had been watching a group, who
was being “super shady.” The caller described multiple individuals huddled around a vehicle,

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sorting through backpacks, and additional vehicles coming and going. The caller reported that one
individual had a handgun on his hip and wore a red sweater with a marijuana leaf and the word
“addicted” on it. The call was reported to officers as possible drug activity.
When officers arrived, they saw Smith sitting in a vehicle and asked him to exit. Smith
complied by exiting the vehicle with his hands raised. The officers saw Smith had a handgun on
his hip, explained they were responding to a report of a person with a handgun, and asked Smith
to step away from the vehicle so they could talk to him. In response, Smith fled the scene and hid
in a storage shed at a nearby residence. Smith eventually surrendered and was taken into custody.
Shortly after apprehending Smith, an officer discovered the handgun hidden in a bush near the
vacant lot. Smith was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm, concealment of evidence,
unlawful entry, and two counts of resisting arrest. The State also charged Smith with a persistent
violator sentencing enhancement.
Smith filed a motion to suppress, arguing the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to
conduct an investigative stop based on the tip received from the caller. The district court denied
the motion, finding that the officers had reasonable suspicion to perform a brief investigative stop
based on the observations reported by the caller. The district court also found the duration of the
stop was not unreasonable. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Smith entered a conditional guilty plea
to destruction, alteration, or concealment of evidence (I.C. § 18-2603) and the persistent violator
sentencing enhancement (I.C. § 19-2514), reserving his right to challenge the denial of his motion
to suppress. The State dismissed the remaining charges. Smith appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion
to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by
substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts
as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a
suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts,
weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina,
127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d
659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999).

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III.
ANALYSIS
Smith argues the caller’s tip did not provide reasonable suspicion to perform an
investigative stop because no articulable facts demonstrated that Smith was engaged in criminal
activity. Smith further contends that officers could not establish reasonable suspicion to detain
him based on the dispatch notes reporting a possible narcotics violation. The State responds that
Smith has failed to show the district court erred in denying the motion to suppress because the
officers had reasonable suspicion to support an investigative stop. We hold that the facts found by
the district court and the applicable law support the district court’s conclusion that the officers had
reasonable articulable suspicion for an investigatory detention.
A warrantless detention is justified if there is a reasonable and articulable suspicion that
the individual has committed or is about to commit a crime. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498
(1983); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968); State v. Fairchild, 164 Idaho 336, 341, 429 P.3d 877,
882 (Ct. App. 2018). Reasonable suspicion requires more than a hunch, it must be based on
specific, articulable facts and the rational inferences that can be drawn from those facts. Fairchild,
164 Idaho at 341, 429 P.3d at 882. An officer’s rational inferences may be drawn from the officer’s
experience and law enforcement training. Id. Reasonable suspicion may also be based on
information reported by a citizen about suspected criminal activity. State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho
804, 811, 203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009). To justify an investigative detention, however, the
information must bear sufficient indicia of reliability in light of the totality of the circumstances.
Id. Factors indicative of reliability include whether: the reporting party reveals his or her identity
and the basis of his or her knowledge; the location of the reporting party is known; the information
was based on firsthand observations of events as they were occurring; the information the reporting
party provided was subject to immediate confirmation or corroboration by police; the reporting
party has previously provided reliable information; the reporting party provides predictive
information; and the reporting party could be held criminally liable if the report was discovered to
be false. Id. at 812, 203 P.3d at 1211. Information from an identified reporting party is generally
reliable for purposes of determining reasonable suspicion. Id. The reasonable suspicion
determination is based on an evaluation of the totality of the circumstances. Fairchild, 164 Idaho
at 341, 429 P.3d at 882.

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At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the State stipulated that Smith’s brief detention
by the officers was a warrantless seizure. As such, the State was required to present evidence that
the officers had reasonable articulable suspicion to support the detention. The district court, in its
order denying the motion to suppress, found: the reporting party identified a group of people and
vehicles gathered around a green vehicle; the caller provided his name and contact information to
dispatch; the group was going through backpacks; and the group was in an unpaved parking lot
behind a local business. The district court further found that the officers had been told to respond
to a suspicious vehicle, a man with a handgun, and the possible presence of narcotics. When the
officers arrived, they saw Smith sitting in the vehicle that matched the description and license plate
provided by the caller. The officers asked Smith to step out of his vehicle, identified themselves
as officers, and told him they were responding to a call about someone with a handgun. The
officers testified that, in their view, Smith was being detained for a drug investigation. Smith got
out of his vehicle with his hands in the air, asked the officers why he was being asked to speak
with them, and was again told about the dispatch call. Smith slowly moved further out of the
vehicle and around the door until the officers could see the handgun on his hip before he ran away
from the officers to the opposite side of the empty lot. The officers testified that it was unusual
for a person to run from them immediately upon being asked to step out of a vehicle. Smith was
apprehended after the officers searched the surrounding neighborhood. Smith’s handgun was
found in a bush in the area where he fled.
Based on the foregoing findings, the district court concluded there was sufficient
reasonable suspicion to support Smith’s investigative detention. We agree. The caller provided
his name and contact information, the exact location of the empty lot, and his own firsthand
observations as they were occurring and had just occurred. The caller gave a detailed description
of Smith’s clothing, including the handgun attached to his hip. The caller requested that officers
come to the empty lot because the conduct was “super shady.” On appeal, Smith does not
challenge the reliability of the information provided by the caller but, instead, contends the
information was insufficient to satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard, equating instead to a
hunch based on a subjective characterization of “super shady” behavior. The caller’s
characterization of the activity does not, however, render the factual basis for that opinion
irrelevant. Instead, the facts reported by the caller, which were corroborated by the officers upon

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arriving at the scene, coupled with the officer’s training and experience related to illegal drug
activity, support the district court’s reasonable suspicion determination. See Fairchild, 164 Idaho
at 341-42, 429 P.3d at 882-83 (holding that citizen’s report of defendant’s “odd behavior”
connected to parking his vehicle on a dead-end road, in addition to information obtained by law
enforcement that the owner of the vehicle had a history of drug use provided reasonable suspicion
for a detention).
Similar to Fairchild, the totality of the circumstances found by the district court justified
an investigatory detention of Smith. While there may be an innocent explanation for some of the
circumstances, taken together, the circumstances warranted further investigation. See Terry, 392
U.S. at 22 (explaining that “a series of acts, each of them perhaps innocent . . . taken together
warranted further investigation”). Smith has failed to show the district court erred in denying his
motion to suppress.
IV.
CONCLUSION
The officers had reasonable articulable suspicion supporting their detention of Smith.
Smith has failed to show the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Accordingly,
Smith’s judgment of conviction for destruction, alteration, or concealment of evidence and being
a persistent violator is affirmed.
Chief Judge TRIBE and Judge HUSKEY, CONCUR.

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