State v. Dozal

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 52586

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Filed: April 7, 2026
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
JESUS OMAR DOZAL, JR., ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Defendant-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District, State of Idaho, Canyon
County. Hon. Matthew J. Roker, District Judge. Hon. Thomas A. Sullivan,
Magistrate.

Decision of the district court, on intermediate appeal from the magistrate court,
affirming judgment of conviction for resisting or obstructing a peace officer,
affirmed.

Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Andrea W. Reynolds, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Neil Paterson, Deputy Attorney General,
Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________

LORELLO, Judge
Jesus Omar Dozal, Jr., appeals from the decision of the district court, on intermediate
appeal from the magistrate court, affirming his judgment of conviction for resisting or obstructing
a peace officer. We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
An officer initiated a traffic stop after observing a nonfunctioning headlight on Dozal’s
vehicle. The officer requested Dozal’s driver’s license, vehicle registration, and proof of
insurance. Initially, Dozal did not comply with the officer’s requests and questioned the basis for

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the stop. Dozal ultimately provided his driver’s license and proof of insurance but was unable to
locate his vehicle registration. While Dozal searched for the registration, the officer radioed
dispatch and asked whether a canine unit officer was available to assist with the stop. Thereafter,
the officer returned to Dozal’s vehicle and asked if he had given up looking for the registration.
Dozal indicated he had not given up and continued searching. The officer returned to his patrol
vehicle and began preparing a citation for the nonfunctioning headlight. After confirming with
Dozal that he had not located the registration, the officer again returned to his vehicle to add a
second citation for failure to carry proof of registration. While the officer was completing the
citations, a canine unit officer arrived at the scene with a drug dog and deployed the dog to perform
a drug-detection sniff of the vehicle. Ultimately, the drug dog alerted to the presence of narcotics
in Dozal’s vehicle. The officer informed Dozal that the drug dog alerted and requested that Dozal
exit the vehicle. Dozal refused. After multiple commands, officers removed Dozal from the
vehicle and took him into custody. A subsequent search of the vehicle yielded no illegal
substances.
The State charged Dozal with resisting or obstructing a peace officer. Dozal filed a motion
to suppress, arguing the officer unlawfully extended the traffic stop by delaying the citation process
to allow time for the canine unit officer to arrive and conduct the drug-detection sniff. The
magistrate court denied the motion, finding the officer’s testimony credible and concluding any
delay was not caused by the request for a canine unit officer. Following a jury trial, Dozal was
found guilty of resisting or obstructing a peace officer. I.C. § 18-705. Dozal appealed to the
district court, arguing the magistrate court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the stop
was unlawfully extended. The district court affirmed, and Dozal again appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
For an appeal from the district court, sitting in its appellate capacity over a case from the
magistrate court, we review the record to determine whether there is substantial and competent
evidence to support the magistrate court’s findings of fact and whether the magistrate court’s
conclusions of law follow from those findings. State v. Korn, 148 Idaho 413, 415, 224 P.3d 480,
482 (2009). However, as a matter of appellate procedure, our disposition of the appeal will affirm
or reverse the decision of the district court. State v. Trusdall, 155 Idaho 965, 968, 318 P.3d 955,

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958 (Ct. App. 2014). Thus, we review the magistrate court’s findings and conclusions, whether
the district court affirmed or reversed the magistrate court and the basis therefor, and either affirm
or reverse the district court.
III.
ANALYSIS
“Mindful of” State v. Pylican, 167 Idaho 745, 477 P.3d 180 (2020), Dozal argues the
district court erred in affirming the magistrate court’s denial of his motion to suppress because the
traffic stop was unlawfully extended when the “officer delayed writing a citation to permit a drug
dog to sniff the exterior of his vehicle.” The State responds that the district court was correct in
affirming the magistrate court because any delay in completing the traffic stop was caused by
Dozal’s own conduct. We hold that Dozal has failed to show the district court erred in affirming
the magistrate court’s denial of his motion to suppress.
A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle’s occupants and implicates
the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct.
App. 1996). Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer may stop a vehicle to investigate possible
criminal behavior if there is a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven
contrary to traffic laws. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981); State v. Flowers, 131
Idaho 205, 208, 953 P.2d 645, 648 (Ct. App. 1998). In the traffic stop context, authority for a
seizure ends when the tasks related to the stop are, or reasonably should have been, completed.
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005). Tasks related to a traffic stop include addressing
the traffic violation that precipitated the stop; determining whether to issue a traffic ticket; and
making inquiries incident to the traffic stop, such as checking the driver’s license, inspecting the
vehicle’s proof of insurance and registration, and conducting a criminal record check of the driver.
Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354-55 (2015); State v. Hale, 168 Idaho 863, 867, 489
P.3d 450, 454 (2021). Officers may not deviate from the purpose of a traffic stop by investigating
(or taking safety precautions incident to investigating) other crimes without reasonable suspicion.
See Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 356.
In this case, the magistrate court denied Dozal’s motion to suppress after concluding that
any delay in the traffic stop was caused by Dozal’s “inability to provide legally required

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documents.” The magistrate court also found credible the officer’s testimony that he “did not
delay the business of the traffic stop to obtain the presence of” the drug dog. On intermediate
appeal, the district court affirmed the denial of Dozal’s motion, concluding the magistrate court’s
findings of fact and conclusions of law were supported by substantial and competent evidence.
The district court also agreed with the magistrate court that any delay in completing the traffic stop
was ultimately the consequence of Dozal’s own conduct.
On appeal, Dozal argues the district court erred in affirming the magistrate court’s denial
of his motion to suppress. Specifically, Dozal contends the traffic stop “was unlawfully extended,
in violation of” State v. Karst, 170 Idaho 219, 509 P.3d 1148 (2022), because “the officer delayed
writing a citation in order to permit a drug dog to sniff the exterior of his vehicle.” Dozal asserts
as much, “mindful of the magistrate [court’s] finding that the officer delayed writing the citation
to permit time for [Dozal] to locate his registration.” Neither the record nor the applicable law
support Dozal’s argument.
The officer testified that his intention was to start a citation for the headlight and then add
a second infraction for failure to carry registration if Dozal’s continued effort to locate the
registration proved unsuccessful. When the officer asked if Dozal had given up looking for the
registration, he stated he had not. In order to provide Dozal with more time to continue his search
for the registration, the officer returned to his patrol vehicle and began the citation for the headlight
violation while Dozal continued searching. We agree with the magistrate court’s finding that
Dozal was given this additional time as a courtesy to avoid a second citation. When Dozal
ultimately failed to locate the registration, the officer again returned to his vehicle and began the
second citation. As the officer was “adding the second infraction charge” and “printing out the
citation,” the drug dog performed the drug-detection sniff and ultimately alerted on Dozal’s
vehicle. The magistrate court therefore concluded that “neither the call for the canine, nor the
sniff, caused any delay.” Dozal does not challenge these findings of fact and conclusions of law
on appeal, and we will not presume error.
Moreover, Dozal cannot claim the traffic stop was unconstitutionally prolonged when any
delay was a consequence of his own conduct. See Pylican, 167 Idaho at 755, 477 P.3d at 190
(holding that a defendant cannot claim that a stop was unconstitutionally prolonged by the State
when any delay was a consequence of the defendant’s own conduct). The magistrate court found,

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and the district court agreed, that any delay in completing the traffic stop was caused by Dozal’s
continued effort to locate his registration and by the officer’s accommodation of that request.
While the officer did request a canine unit during the traffic stop, the magistrate court credited the
officer’s testimony that this request did not cause any delay in completing the traffic stop. We
agree with the magistrate court that the time the officer spent in his patrol vehicle was used to
prepare the citations and that the canine unit officer and drug dog arrived while the officer was
completing the citation. Dozal has failed to show the district court erred in affirming the magistrate
court’s denial of his motion to suppress.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Substantial and competent evidence supports the magistrate court’s denial of Dozal’s
motion to suppress. Dozal has failed to show error in the district court’s decision affirming the
magistrate court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. Accordingly, the district court’s
decision, on intermediate appeal from the magistrate court, affirming Dozal’s judgment of
conviction for resisting or obstructing a peace officer is affirmed.
Judge HUSKEY and Judge Pro Tem MELANSON, CONCUR.

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