IDHW v. Jane Doe and John Doe (2025-39)

CourtListener 10770592Idahoctapp7 gen 2026

Testo completo

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 53297

In the Matter of John Doe I, A Child
)
Under Eighteen (18) Years of Age.)
)
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF )
HEALTH & WELFARE, ) Filed: January 7, 2026
)
Petitioner-Respondent, ) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
)
v. ) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
JANE DOE and JOHN DOE (2025-39), ) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
)
Respondents-Appellants. )
)

Appeal from the Magistrate Division of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial
District, State of Idaho, Ada County. Hon. Andrew Ellis, Magistrate.

Judgments terminating parental rights, affirmed.

Krista L. Howard, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Jessica L. Partridge, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________

LORELLO, Judge
Jane Doe and John Doe (2025-39) appeal from the judgments terminating their parental
rights. We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In September 2022, a four-year-old child was admitted to the hospital due to severe
malnourishment. While hospitalized, the child rapidly gained weight and was discharged after a
few days. In October, the child was hospitalized a second time for frequent vomiting and weight
loss. The child underwent a scan which showed he had collections of cerebral spinal fluid that can

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develop from trauma or other causes. The child was again able to gain weight during his stay at
the hospital and was discharged. In November 2022, the child was hospitalized a third time for
vomiting and a severe headache. The child underwent additional scans which showed acute
bleeding in various areas of his brain and a rib fracture. The child was declared to be in imminent
danger. The child was living with his aunt and uncle, who held themselves out to be his parents;
however, a genetic test revealed there was no biological connection between the aunt and the child.
The Idaho Department of Health and Welfare took custody of the child. The Department
investigated and ultimately located Jane and John Doe, the child’s biological parents, living in
Afghanistan. After providing a copy of the child’s Afghanistan birth certificate, Jane and John
were added to this case.
During the Department’s investigation and subsequent conversations with Jane and John,
it was discovered that they had “given” the child to his aunt and uncle, who did not have children
of their own. Afghanistan does not currently, and did not previously, have a legal process to adopt
a child. However, Jane, John, the aunt, the uncle, and the child all continued to live in the same
“family compound” in Afghanistan, with Jane and John still engaged in the child’s daily life. In
August 2021, the government in Afghanistan was overthrown by the Taliban. The family
attempted to flee the country, but Jane and John were separated from the aunt and uncle during a
bombing attack at the Kabul, Afghanistan airport. Jane and John lost consciousness, and when
they awoke, they could not locate the child, aunt, or uncle. Jane and John were unable to board
any of the planes leaving for the United States and ultimately returned to their home in
Afghanistan. Eventually, the uncle was able to contact John and share that the uncle, aunt, and
child had successfully boarded a plane taking refugees from Afghanistan to the United States. The
uncle explained that the refugee resettlement program placed them in Boise, Idaho. From August
2021 to November 2022, Jane and John communicated with the uncle and the child on a weekly
basis by phone and video calls.
After the Department took custody of the child, he was placed in foster care. During this
time, the Department obtained a translator and attempted to explain to Jane and John the full extent
of the abuse the child had suffered while living with the aunt and uncle. The Department reported
that Jane and John showed little reaction to this information. The Department also had
documentation describing the abuse translated to Jane and John’s native language. The

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Department filled out and made an application for a family reunification visa to allow Jane and
John to immigrate to the United States. After a year and a half, the application was still listed as
“pending.” The Department was informed that, because of the June 4, 2025, travel ban put in place
by the United States federal government, all individuals from Afghanistan are no longer eligible
for visas.1 The Department also considered Jane and John’s request that the child be returned to
them, but the United States government has a “do not travel” advisory in effect for United States
citizens regarding Afghanistan, and thus it would be unsafe for a Department social worker to
escort the child back to Afghanistan. John also shared with the Department that he has been
persecuted simply because it was known that he had a child living in the United States. Jane and
John expressed a desire for the child to be returned to his aunt and uncle, which the Department
denied.
During this time, the Department arranged video visits for the child with Jane, John, and a
translator, but those visits were ultimately suspended due to concerns that the visits were
negatively impacting the child’s mental health. Jane and John have not had contact with the child
since April 2024. In December 2024, the Department filed a petition for termination of Jane and
John’s parental rights. A termination trial was held on July 1; July 15; and August 19, 2025, with
Jane and John appearing via video with an interpreter. Following the hearing, the magistrate court
found by clear and convincing evidence that Jane and John had neglected the child and that
termination is in the child’s best interests. As a result, the magistrate court terminated Jane and
John’s parental rights. Jane and John appeal.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
On appeal from a decision terminating parental rights, this Court examines whether the
decision is supported by substantial and competent evidence, which means such evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Doe v. Doe, 148 Idaho 243,
245-46, 220 P.3d 1062, 1064-65 (2009). The appellate court will indulge all reasonable inferences
in support of the trial court’s judgment when reviewing an order that parental rights be terminated.

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There is one exception for Afghan citizens who assisted the United States government prior
to the Taliban’s takeover, but this exception does not apply to Jane and John.

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Id. The substantial evidence test requires a greater quantum of evidence in cases where the trial
court’s finding must be supported by clear and convincing evidence than in cases where a mere
preponderance is required. State v. Doe, 143 Idaho 343, 346, 144 P.3d 597, 600 (2006). Clear
and convincing evidence is generally understood to be evidence indicating that the thing to be
proved is highly probable or reasonably certain. Roe v. Doe, 143 Idaho 188, 191, 141 P.3d 1057,
1060 (2006). Further, the trial court’s decision must be supported by objectively supportable
grounds. Doe, 143 Idaho at 346, 144 P.3d at 600.
III.
ANALYSIS
Jane and John assert that the magistrate court erred in finding that termination of their
parental rights is in the best interests of the child. The Department responds that clear and
convincing evidence exists that termination is in the best interests of the child. We hold that the
magistrate court’s best interests finding is supported by substantial and competent evidence.
A. Statutory Basis for Termination
The magistrate court terminated Jane and John’s parental rights on the basis of neglect.
Idaho Code Section 16-2002(3)(a) defines “neglect” as any conduct included in I.C.
§ 16-1602(31). Section 16-1602(31)(a) provides, in pertinent part, that a child is neglected when
the child is without proper parental care and control, or subsistence, medical or other care or control
necessary for his or her well-being because of the conduct or omission of his or her parents,
guardian, or other custodian or their neglect or refusal to provide them. Neglect also exists where
the parent has failed to comply with the court’s orders or the case plan in a Child Protective Act
case and the Department has had temporary or legal custody of the child for fifteen of the most
recent twenty-two months and reunification has not been accomplished by the last day of the
fifteenth month2 in which the child has been in the temporary or legal custody of the Department.
I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b).

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At the time the Department filed the petition to terminate Jane and John’s parental rights,
the statutory timeframe under I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b) was fifteen out of the most recent twenty-two
months. Subsequently, the statute was amended to twelve of the most recent twenty-two months.

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The Department alleged one count of neglect against both Jane and John, one count of
neglect against Jane, and one count of neglect against John. The magistrate court dismissed the
count of neglect alleged against both Jane and John based on impossibility as a defense. The
magistrate court found that, while the child had been in the custody of the Department for the
previous thirty-three months, Jane and John could not have complied with their case plans because
they were in Afghanistan for the entirety of the child protection case. The magistrate court
recognized that Jane and John were not permitted to immigrate to the United States. Therefore,
despite reunification not occurring by the last day of the fifteenth month that the child was in the
Department’s custody, the magistrate court found this was not the fault of Jane and John.
Instead, the magistrate court found that the Department had proven that Jane and John
neglected the child because the child was “without proper parental care and control, or subsistence,
education, medical or other care and control necessary for [his] well-being because of the conduct
or omission” of Jane and John. The magistrate court found that Jane resides permanently in
another country, is unable to immigrate to the United States to care for the child, and entrusted the
child “to unsafe caretakers who abused, starved, and neglected him and despite being informed of
these things, requested that he be returned to these same caretakers.” The magistrate court found
the Department had proven the same to be true regarding John. For these reasons, the magistrate
court found there was clear and convincing evidence that Jane and John neglected the child.
Jane and John do not challenge the magistrate court’s finding that there is a statutory basis
for termination. Because Jane and John do not address the statutory basis for termination of their
parental rights, that aspect of the magistrate court’s decision is affirmed.
B. Best Interests
Once a statutory ground for termination has been established, the trial court must next
determine whether it is in the best interests of the child to terminate the parent-child relationship.
Tanner v. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 120 Idaho 606, 611, 818 P.2d 310, 315 (1991). When
determining whether termination is in the child’s best interests, the trial court may consider the
parent’s history with substance abuse, the stability and permanency of the home, the
unemployment of the parent, the financial contribution of the parent to the child’s care after the
child is placed in protective custody, the improvement of the child while in foster care, the parent’s
efforts to improve his or her situation, and the parent’s continuing problems with the law. Doe

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(2015-03) v. Doe, 159 Idaho 192, 198, 358 P.3d 77, 83 (2015); Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare
v. Doe, 156 Idaho 103, 111, 320 P.3d 1262, 1270 (2014). A finding that it is in the best interests
of the child to terminate parental rights must still be made upon objective grounds. Idaho Dep’t
of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 152 Idaho 953, 956-57, 277 P.3d 400, 403-04 (Ct. App. 2012).
On appeal, Jane and John argue that the magistrate court’s decision terminating their
parental rights is not in the best interests of the child. Jane and John contend that the magistrate
court failed to consider the nature of the parent-child relationship under Afghan culture and the
bond that existed between Jane, John, and the child while the family was still together in
Afghanistan. The Department asserts that the magistrate court’s decision that termination is in the
child’s best interests is supported by substantial and competent evidence.
In the decision terminating parental rights, the magistrate court acknowledged “that the
depths of tragedy reflected by this unique case is unfathomable.” The magistrate court found that
it will not be possible for Jane and John to immigrate to the United States during the child’s youth.
The magistrate court further found that it is not possible, or ethical, to return the child to
Afghanistan. Even if it was possible to return the child to Afghanistan, the child would not be
provided the medical services he receives in Idaho for his special needs, including treatment for
post-traumatic stress disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, nightmares, night terrors,
and hearing loss resulting from the physical abuse he suffered to his head. The child is currently
enrolled in play therapy, occupational therapy, behavioral intervention services, medication
management, and wrap-around services. Additionally, due to the travel ban, it is not possible for
the Department to send an escort with the child to ensure a safe delivery back to Jane and John in
Afghanistan. Furthermore, even if Jane and John could come to the United States and complete a
case plan, their lack of concern regarding the abuse the child suffered at the hands of his aunt and
uncle “deeply troubled” the magistrate court. The magistrate court found that the child had no
video contact with Jane and John in fourteen months. Video visits between Jane and John and
child were suspended because the visits “became so emotionally damaging” for the child, and the
child had “excessive tantrums before and after visits.”
Finally, the magistrate court found that, if parental rights were not terminated, the child
could not be legally adopted in the United States. The magistrate court stated:

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It is certainly not in [the child’s] best interest[s] to make him remain in foster care
for the next eleven (11) years without certainty or permanency. Long-term foster
care would be enormously emotionally damaging to [the child]. To make matters
worse, upon his 18th birthday, [the child] would have no legal status in the United
States and be at high risk of deportation to whichever country the United States is
sending Afghan nationals to in the year 2036. Termination of parental rights
affords [the child] two (2) pathways to legal permanent residence in the United
States.
Accordingly, the magistrate court determined that it is in the best interests of the child to
terminate Jane and John’s parental rights. We agree. Jane and John have not shown error in the
magistrate court’s finding that termination is in the child’s best interests.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Substantial and competent evidence supports the magistrate court’s findings that Jane and
John neglected the child and that terminating their parental rights is in the child’s best interests.
Jane and John have failed to show error in the magistrate court’s decision to terminate their parental
rights. Accordingly, the judgments terminating Jane and John Doe’s parental rights are affirmed.
Judge GRATTON and Judge HUSKEY, CONCUR.

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