State v. Ewing

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 51368

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Filed: December 31, 2025
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
)
DAHLIN J. EWING, )
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada
County. Hon. Lynn G. Norton, District Judge.

Order revoking probation and directing execution of previously suspended
sentence, affirmed.

Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Jacob L. Westerfield, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Mark W. Olson, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________

LORELLO, Judge
Dahlin J. Ewing appeals from the district court’s order revoking his probation and directing
execution of his previously suspended sentence. We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Dahlin J. Ewing pled guilty to enticing a child through the use of the internet or other
communication device. I.C. § 18-1509A. In exchange for his guilty plea, an additional charge
was dismissed. The district court sentenced Ewing to a unified term of fifteen years, with a
minimum period of confinement of five years, but after a period of retained jurisdiction, suspended
the sentence and placed Ewing on probation. Approximately four months into Ewing’s
probationary period, the State filed a report and motion for probation violation. In the report of

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violation, Ewing’s probation officer alleged that Ewing violated his probation by contacting
multiple juvenile females via social media, accessing pornography on his smartphone, failing to
surrender the smartphone after purchasing a flip phone, and failing to pay court-ordered fines, fees,
and costs. At the probation violation hearing, Ewing admitted to violating his probation by failing
to pay fines, fees, and costs. Pursuant to a disposition agreement, the State dismissed the remaining
allegations but retained the right to “argue all facts” in support of its sentencing recommendation.
At the disposition hearing, the district court heard argument concerning the dismissed allegations,
including Ewing’s alleged online contact with minors and possession of explicit material. The
State recommended that the district court revoke Ewing’s probation and impose the underlying
sentence. The district court acknowledged that Ewing admitted to a single violation but found that
there was substantial evidence supporting the State’s dismissed allegations. As a result, the district
court revoked Ewing’s probation and ordered execution of the original sentence. Ewing filed an
I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of his sentence, which the district court denied. Ewing appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The decision to revoke probation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Rose, 144
Idaho 762, 765, 171 P.3d 253, 256 (2007). When a trial court’s discretionary decision is reviewed
on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine whether the trial court:
(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries of such
discretion; (3) acted consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before
it; and (4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270, 429
P.3d 149, 158 (2018).
III.
ANALYSIS
Ewing argues the district court abused its discretion when it revoked his probation
“primarily based on allegations that the State chose not to pursue.” Ewing further asserts that, “in
light of the mitigating information presented,” the district court “did not exercise reason, and thus
abused its discretion, by revoking his probation.” The State responds that the record and applicable
law support the district court’s revocation of Ewing’s probation because there was substantial

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evidence that he violated his probation. We hold that Ewing has failed to show the district court
erred in revoking his probation.
The decision to revoke probation is a two-step, discretionary decision. State v. Garner,
161 Idaho 708, 710, 390 P.3d 434, 436 (2017); State v. Chavez, 134 Idaho 308, 312, 1 P.3d 809,
813 (Ct. App. 2000). The trial court must first determine whether the probationer violated the
terms of probation. State v. Gale, 171 Idaho 550, 552, 524 P.3d 52, 54 (Ct. App. 2022). The State
bears the burden of proving such a violation by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. The trial
court’s factual findings in a probation revocation proceeding, including a finding that a violation
has been proven, will be upheld if they are supported by substantial evidence. Id. After a probation
violation has been proven, it is within the discretion of the trial court to revoke probation and
impose sentence. State v. Roy, 113 Idaho 388, 392, 744 P.2d 116, 120 (Ct. App. 1987). Probation
may not be revoked unless the probation violation was willful. I.C.R. 33(f); see State v. Ross, 170
Idaho 58, 62, 507 P.3d 545, 549 (2022); Garner, 161 Idaho at 711, 390 P.3d at 437.
In this case, the State filed a motion for probation violation, alleging Ewing violated his
probation by: (1) contacting multiple juvenile females through social media; (2) accessing
pornography; (3) possessing a smartphone; and (4) failing to pay fines, fees, and costs. Thereafter,
the record shows a number of hearings were continued because the Internet Crimes Against
Children Task Force (ICAC) of the Idaho Attorney General’s Office was contemplating filing new
criminal charges based on Ewing’s conduct underlying his probation violation allegations. As a
result, the parties entered into an agreement whereby Ewing agreed to admit to the fourth allegation
(that he failed to pay required fines, fees, and costs) and the State agreed to dismiss the remaining
allegations. However, the State retained the right to argue the underlying facts associated with
those dismissed claims at the disposition hearing. Prior to Ewing admitting he violated his
probation, he acknowledged his understanding of the terms of the agreement, including that the
State “reserved the right to argue the facts” underlying the dismissed allegations. At the disposition
hearing, the State recommended that the district court impose Ewing’s underlying sentence, while
he asked to be placed back on probation or given a second period of retained jurisdiction.
Alternatively, Ewing sought a reduction of his sentence.
Ultimately, the district court determined that Ewing violated his probation. The district
court began by noting certain terms and conditions of Ewing’s probation, “which included the

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standard agreement of supervision” that “curtail[ed] his contact with minors” According to the
district court, the terms restricting Ewing’s contact with minors were “specifically put in place to
protect society while [Ewing] was undergoing additional sex offender treatment.” The district
court acknowledged that Ewing admitted to violating terms of his probation by not paying his
fines, fees, and costs. However, the district court also recognized that the State reserved “the right
to argue all of the allegations that [were] contained in the report of violation.” The district court
found that, despite the ICAC electing to not file additional charges based on the probation violation
allegations, Ewing’s contact with “those minors was a violation of the standard agreement of
supervision and the special terms and conditions of probation that were put in place to ensure” the
public’s safety. Additionally, because Ewing demonstrated during the sentencing hearing for his
underlying case that he was “bright,” “capable” and “had a lot of support, in spite of [his] criminal
conduct,” the district court found that Ewing “understood [the terms of supervision] and violated
[them] anyway.” As a result, the district court revoked Ewing’s probation and ordered execution
of the underlying sentence.
Contrary to Ewing’s argument, the record does not indicate that the State declined to pursue
the dismissed probation violation allegations. Instead, the record shows that the State and Ewing
negotiated a resolution allowing the State to present evidence of Ewing’s alleged probation
violations while protecting him from making admissions that could be used in any potential
criminal proceeding arising from the ICAC investigation. To the extent Ewing argues the district
court should not have been able to consider facts relating to allegations that were ultimately
dismissed pursuant to the parties’ agreement, his argument is contrary to law. See State v. Lafferty,
125 Idaho 378, 382 n.2, 870 P.2d 1337, 1341 n.2 (Ct. App. 1994) (holding that, once a probation
violation is shown, trial courts can consider other incidents of probation violations which have not
been formally charged in determining whether to revoke or continue probation).
Moreover, the doctrine of invited error precludes Ewing from challenging on appeal a
decision he acquiesced to. The doctrine of invited error applies to estop a party from asserting an
error when that party’s conduct induces the commission of the error. State v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho
816, 819, 864 P.2d 654, 657 (Ct. App. 1993). The purpose of the doctrine is to prevent a party
who caused or played an important role in prompting the trial court to take action from later
challenging that decision on appeal. State v. Barr, 166 Idaho 783, 786, 463 P.3d 1286, 1289

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(2020). In short, invited errors are not reversible. State v. Gittins, 129 Idaho 54, 58, 921 P.2d 754,
758 (Ct. App. 1996).
Ewing formally admitted to one probation violation allegation (failing to pay court-ordered
fines, fees, and costs) while agreeing that the State could argue the underlying facts of the
dismissed allegations at the disposition hearing. The parties presented the disposition agreement
to the district court, and Ewing acknowledged his understanding of its terms on the record.
Because Ewing played a central role in the district court accepting the agreement, and because he
agreed the State could argue the facts related to the dismissed probation violation allegations, he
cannot now claim error based on that to which he agreed. If, as Ewing argues, he wished to subject
the allegations to the “crucible of cross-examination,” his opportunity to do so was at the probation
violation hearing, which he waived by entering into the disposition agreement. Moreover, nothing
precluded Ewing from presenting evidence or argument at the disposition hearing in response to
the allegations he agreed could be considered at that juncture.
Finally, Ewing’s argument that the district court “did not exercise reason by revoking his
probation based on the mitigating information presented during the proceedings” is unpersuasive.
In support of his argument, Ewing highlights his probation officer’s report which indicated Ewing
“appeared to be doing well during supervision,” his participation in sex-offender treatment, the
support his family members offer him, and that he “was in the process of starting a business.”
These mitigating factors, Ewing maintains, showed he “could potentially succeed in the
community through further treatment and programming.” Ewing’s compliance with the terms of
his probation does not establish that the district court erred in revoking his probation. Moreover,
the record shows that the district court considered these mitigating factors and determined revoking
Ewing’s probation was nevertheless appropriate. Ewing has failed to show the district court
abused its discretion when it revoked his probation.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Ewing has failed to show the district court abused its discretion in either revoking probation
or in ordering execution of his sentence. The district court’s order revoking probation and directing
execution of Ewing’s previously suspended sentence is affirmed.
Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge TRIBE, CONCUR.

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