State v. Sean Anthony Thomas

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 43934

STATE OF IDAHO, ) 2017 Opinion No. 13
)
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) Filed: February 9, 2017
)
v. ) Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
)
SEAN ANTHONY THOMAS, )
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District, State of Idaho,
Canyon County. Hon. Bradly S. Ford, District Judge.

Order denying I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of sentence, affirmed.

Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Maya P. Waldron, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Mark W. Olson, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________

MELANSON, Judge
Sean Anthony Thomas appeals from the district court’s order denying Thomas’s
I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of sentence. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
Thomas pled guilty to lewd conduct for sexually abusing his daughter, who was under the
age of sixteen. I.C. § 18-1508. On June 2, 2014, the district court sentenced Thomas to a unified
term of fifteen years, with a minimum period of confinement of five years, but retained
jurisdiction for a period of 365 days. The district court filed the judgment of conviction ten days
later. On June 18, 2015, the district court entered an order confirming that Thomas’s period of
retained jurisdiction had automatically expired by operation of law because more than 365 days
had elapsed since Thomas’s sentence had been imposed. Thomas filed a motion requesting
appointment of counsel for the purpose of pursuing relief under Rule 35, which the district court

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granted. On October 8, 2015, Thomas filed his Rule 35(b) motion for reduction of sentence.
Following a hearing, the district court denied Thomas’s Rule 35(b) motion finding that it had
been filed more than 120 days after Thomas’s period of retained jurisdiction expired. Thomas
appeals.
A motion for reduction of sentence under Rule 35 is essentially a plea for leniency,
addressed to the sound discretion of the court. State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 319, 144 P.3d
23, 24 (2006); State v. Allbee, 115 Idaho 845, 846, 771 P.2d 66, 67 (Ct. App. 1989). The filing
limitations provided by Rule 35 are a jurisdictional limit on the authority of the court to consider
the motion and, unless filed within the period, a district court lacks jurisdiction to grant any
relief. State v. Sutton, 113 Idaho 832, 833, 748 P.2d 416, 417 (Ct. App. 1987).
Thomas argues the district court erred in finding that Thomas’s Rule 35 motion for
reduction of sentence was untimely. Specifically, Thomas contends that the district court
erroneously calculated the date on which Thomas’s period of retained jurisdiction expired by
using the date of the pronouncement of sentence to calculate the timeliness of the Rule 35
motion. In support, Thomas asserts that the relevant statute, I.C. § 19-2601(4), is ambiguous and
that legislative history and the statute’s underlying purpose show that a period of retained
jurisdiction runs from the filing of the written judgment of conviction and not from the date of
the pronouncement of sentence. Consequently, Thomas argues that, when properly calculated
from the judgment of conviction filing date, his period of retained jurisdiction expired 118 days
prior to his filing the Rule 35(b) motion, thus rendering his motion timely. Conversely, the State
argues the plain language of Rule 35(b) and I.C. § 19-2601(4) provide that a period of retained
jurisdiction expires 365 days after the district court pronounces sentence, not 365 days after a
sentencing court subsequently enters the judgment of conviction. Consequently, the State
contends the district court correctly found that Thomas’s period of retained jurisdiction
automatically expired on June 2, 2015, and that Thomas’s Rule 35(b) motion, filed 128 days
later, was untimely.
The relevant provisions at issue on appeal are I.C.R. 35(b) and I.C. § 19-2601(4). Idaho
Criminal Rule 35(b) provides that a district court has discretion to consider and act upon a
motion filed within 120 days after the filing of a judgment of conviction or within 120 days after
the court releases retained jurisdiction. Retained jurisdiction automatically terminates upon the

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expiration of the defined period specified in I.C. § 19-2601(4). See State v. Taylor, 142 Idaho
30, 31, 121 P.3d 961, 962 (2005); State v. Ward, 150 Idaho 446, 448, 247 P.3d 673, 675 (Ct.
App. 2010). As such, Thomas’s Rule 35(b) motion was required to be filed within 120 days of
the date on which his period of retained jurisdiction automatically expired.
Generally, a sentencing court’s jurisdiction ends once the sentencing court orders a
defendant into the custody of the Board of Correction. State v. Williams, 126 Idaho 39, 43, 878
P.2d 213, 217 (Ct. App. 1994). However, I.C. § 19-2601(4) creates an exception to the general
rule. Specifically, I.C. § 19-2601(4) provides, in relevant part:
Whenever any person shall have been convicted, or enter a plea of guilty,
in any district court of the state of Idaho, of or to any crime against the laws of the
state, except those of treason or murder, the court in its discretion may:
....
(4) Suspend the execution of the judgment at any time during the first
three hundred sixty-five (365) days of a sentence to the custody of the state board
of correction. The court shall retain jurisdiction over the prisoner for a period of
up to the first three hundred sixty-five (365) days. Except as provided for in
section 19-2601A, Idaho Code, during the period of retained jurisdiction, the state
board of correction shall be responsible for determining the placement of the
prisoner and such education, programming and treatment as it determines to be
appropriate. The prisoner will remain committed to the board of correction if not
affirmatively placed on probation by the court.
(Emphasis added.) 1
Thomas argues that I.C. § 19-2601(4) is ambiguous necessitating review of the statute’s
legislative history and purpose. Thomas asserts that the legislative history and purpose of
I.C. § 19-2601(4) support his contention that a period of retained jurisdiction commences on the
date the judgment of conviction was filed. We disagree. This Court exercises free review over
the application and construction of statutes. State v. Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 505, 80 P.3d 1103,
1106 (Ct. App. 2003). Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court
must give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction. State v.
Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214, 219 (1999); State v. Escobar, 134 Idaho 387, 389,

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In certain extraordinary circumstances, the sentencing court may also take up to an
additional thirty days to determine whether or not to place a defendant on probation at the end of
the 365-day period of retained jurisdiction. I.C. § 19-2601(4). Such an extension period is not
applicable in this case.

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3 P.3d 65, 67 (Ct. App. 2000). The language of the statute is to be given its plain, obvious, and
rational meaning. Burnight, 132 Idaho at 659, 978 P.2d at 219. If the language is clear and
unambiguous, there is no occasion for the court to resort to legislative history or rules of
statutory interpretation. Escobar, 134 Idaho at 389, 3 P.3d at 67. When this Court must engage
in statutory construction because an ambiguity exists, it has the duty to ascertain the legislative
intent and give effect to that intent. State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641, 646, 22 P.3d 116, 121 (Ct.
App. 2001). To ascertain such intent, not only must the literal words of the statute be examined,
but also the context of those words, the public policy behind the statute and its legislative history.
Id. It is incumbent upon a court to give an ambiguous statute an interpretation which will not
render it a nullity. Id. Constructions of an ambiguous statute that would lead to an absurd result
are disfavored. State v. Doe, 140 Idaho 271, 275, 92 P.3d 521, 525 (2004).
The plain language of I.C. § 19-2601(4) indicates that there is one 365-day period during
which the sentencing court may consider suspension of a judgment and that, during this period,
the sentencing court shall retain jurisdiction. The statute defines this period as “the first 365
days of a sentence.” The term “sentence” is defined as the “judgment that a court formally
pronounces after finding a criminal defendant guilty.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1569 (10th
ed. 2014); see also I.C. § 20-209A (a person’s term of confinement begins from the day of his or
her sentence); State v. Joyner, 121 Idaho 376, 379, 825 P.2d 99, 102 (Ct. App. 1992) (holding
that a sentence is considered imposed when it is orally pronounced).
This Court previously analyzed the plain language of I.C. § 19-2601(4) in order to
determine when a period of retained jurisdiction commenced in State v. Petersen, 149 Idaho 808,
241 P.3d 981 (Ct. App. 2010). There, Peterson argued that his period of retained jurisdiction did
not commence until he was physically placed into the custody of the Board of Correction. Id. at
813, 241 P.3d at 986. We rejected this argument and held:
A defendant’s sentence begins when it is imposed by the court. I.C. § 20-209A.
As such, the plain language of I.C. § 19-2601(4) contemplates that the time for
the . . . period of retained jurisdiction begins to run once the sentence is
pronounced, regardless of whether the defendant is transported to the Board [of
Correction] immediately or there is some delay.
Id. (emphasis added). On appeal, Thomas argues that this Court incorrectly decided Peterson.
Thomas contends that this Court was not asked to decide whether a period of retained

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jurisdiction runs from sentencing hearing or the judgment of conviction date. Thomas also
asserts that this Court incorrectly relied on I.C. § 20-209A to interpret the meaning of “sentence”
as used in I.C. § 19-2601(4). We disagree and decline to overrule Peterson. We hold that the
plain language of I.C. § 19-2601(4) necessarily requires a period of retained jurisdiction to run
from the pronouncement of sentence not from the date the judgment of conviction is entered.
The district court pronounced sentence and retained jurisdiction on June 2, 2014.
Thomas’s period of retained jurisdiction therefore began to run on June 2, 2014, and expired by
operation of law 365 days later on June 2, 2015. Thomas filed his Rule 35(b) motion 128 days
later on October 8, 2015, which was untimely. Consequently, Thomas has failed to show that the
district court erred in denying his motion. Accordingly, the district court’s order denying
Thomas’s I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of sentence is affirmed.
Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge HUSKEY, CONCUR.

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