State v. Pickens

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 51947

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Filed: September 9, 2025
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
CHANCE JORDAN PICKENS, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Defendant-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, State of Idaho,
Bannock County. Hon. Robert C. Naftz, District Judge.

Order denying motion to suppress, affirmed; judgment of conviction, affirmed.

Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Jenny C. Swinford, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Kacey L. Jones, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________

HUSKEY, Judge
Chance Jordan Pickens appeals from his judgment of conviction for felony driving under
the influence (DUI). Pickens argues that mindful of relevant authority, the district court erred in
denying his motion to suppress because Officer Boyd lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct an
investigative detention. The State argues the district court properly concluded that the totality of
the circumstances gave rise to reasonable suspicion. We hold the district court did not err in
denying the motion to suppress. The district court’s order denying Pickens’ motion to suppress
and Pickens’ judgment of conviction are affirmed.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
During an early morning patrol, Officer Boyd observed a man, later identified as Pickens,
laid back in the driver’s seat of a vehicle parked in a trailhead parking lot. Concerned that Pickens
was not breathing because of the way his body was slumped over, Officer Boyd began knocking

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on the driver’s side window of the vehicle. Officer Boyd heard Pickens moaning through the door
and asked Pickens if he was okay, but did not get a response. Because Pickens did not respond,
Officer Boyd opened the door; once the door was open, Officer Boyd smelled a strong odor of
alcohol coming from the vehicle. Pickens told Officer Boyd he was planning to sleep in his vehicle
and Officer Boyd advised him not to drive or he could be arrested for DUI. Officer Boyd then
ended the encounter and went back to his traffic patrol duties.
Approximately ten to fifteen minutes later, Officer Boyd returned to the trailhead
parking lot and observed that the same vehicle from before had moved, and the engine was running.
At that point, Officer Boyd turned on his overhead emergency lights and approached the driver’s
side door, which Pickens had already opened. Officer Boyd told Pickens he was going to be placed
under arrest for DUI and asked Pickens to perform field sobriety tests, which Pickens refused.
Officer Boyd also asked Pickens to submit to two breath tests, which Pickens also refused. Pickens
then refused to exit his vehicle. Officer Boyd called for backup.
After the additional officers arrived, Pickens still refused to exit his vehicle but told the
officers to look through the driver’s side window to verify that his keys were not in the ignition.
When an officer went to the passenger side window to check, the officer observed a firearm on the
passenger seat and open containers of alcohol inside the vehicle. Another officer then observed
Pickens reach toward the firearm, so she instructed Officer Boyd to remove Pickens from the
vehicle. After a brief altercation with the officers, Pickens was placed under arrest for suspicion
of DUI. Officer Boyd took photographs of the firearm and the open containers in Pickens’ vehicle.
Pickens was charged with felony DUI, Idaho Code §§ 18-8004, -8005(6); two counts of
misdemeanor resisting, delaying, and obstructing an officer, I.C. § 18-705; and possession of an
open container of alcohol, I.C. § 23-505(2). Pickens filed a motion to suppress all evidence seized
during the encounter arguing that the evidence was obtained from an unlawful seizure. Pickens
argued Officer Boyd did not have a reasonable and articulable suspicion to conduct an
investigatory stop as required by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article 1, section 17 of the Idaho Constitution. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Pickens
stipulated that the only issue before the district court was whether Officer Boyd had sufficient
reasonable suspicion to detain Pickens during the second encounter. The State argued that because
it had only been about ten to fifteen minutes between the initial encounter and the second
encounter, reasonable suspicion of DUI from the first encounter still existed. Following the

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hearing, the district court issued a written memorandum decision and order denying Pickens’
motion to suppress. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Pickens entered a conditional guilty plea to
felony DUI and the State dismissed the misdemeanor resisting, obstructing, delaying an officer,
and the open container charges. Pickens appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion
to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by
substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts
as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a
suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts,
weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina,
127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d
659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999).
III.
ANALYSIS
Pickens argues that mindful of relevant authority, the district court erred in denying his
motion to suppress. In his memorandum in support of his motion to suppress, Pickens asserted the
first encounter did not give Officer Boyd reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigative
detention. Specifically, Pickens argued the only information Officer Boyd possessed at the time
of the first encounter was that an individual was allegedly unresponsive in the driver’s seat of a
vehicle that was not running and did not have keys in the ignition. Pickens further argued that
because Officer Boyd did not ask Pickens to perform standardized field sobriety tests during the
first encounter, Officer Boyd did not gain enough information to support his suspicion of
intoxication that he relied on to arrest Pickens during the subsequent encounter.
On appeal, Pickens asserts the odor of alcohol, being unresponsive, and mumbling is
insufficient to give rise to reasonable suspicion to conduct a DUI investigation. He requests that
this Court reverse the district court and suppress all evidence obtained during and after the
encounter as fruits of the poisonous tree.
The State argues the district court properly denied Pickens’ motion to suppress, and that
Pickens fails to show the district court erred. The district court found that Officer Boyd was acting

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pursuant to the community caretaking function during his initial encounter with Pickens.1 During
the subsequent encounter, the district court found that, based on the totality of the circumstances,
Officer Boyd had the requisite reasonable suspicion to detain Pickens and investigate for a possible
DUI. Specifically, the district court considered how Officer Boyd testified at the suppression
hearing that Pickens was slow to respond to the officer’s knocking and the vehicle “reeked” of
alcohol when Pickens opened his door during the first encounter. Approximately fifteen minutes
later, when Officer Boyd returned to the parking lot, Pickens’ vehicle had been moved, and the
engine was running.
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures by
the government or its agents. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a
seizure of the vehicle’s occupants and implicates the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); Atkinson, 128
Idaho at 561, 916 P.2d at 1286. However, an officer may make a brief investigative stop of an
individual if the officer reasonably suspects that the person has committed or is about to commit a
crime without violating the Fourth Amendment. State v. Huntley, 170 Idaho 521, 526, 513 P.3d
1141, 1146 (2022). Reasonable suspicion requires less than probable cause but more than
speculation or a hunch on the part of the police officer. State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811, 203
P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009); State v. Evans, 134 Idaho 560, 563, 6 P.3d 416, 419 (Ct. App. 2000).
Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific articulable facts. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21
(1968). The reasonableness of the officer’s suspicion is evaluated based upon the totality of the
circumstances at the time of the seizure. State v. Bonner, 167 Idaho 88, 94, 467 P.3d 452, 458
(2020); Evans, 134 Idaho at 563, 6 P.3d at 419.
The district court correctly concluded that Officer Boyd possessed reasonable suspicion.
In State v. Wigginton, 142 Idaho 180, 183, 125 P.3d 356, 539 (Ct. App. 2005), this Court held that
an “overwhelming” odor of alcohol emanating from a vehicle combined with the fact that the
driver of the vehicle had hit a rock was sufficient to establish probable cause to search the vehicle.
Likewise, in State v. Thornley, 141 Idaho 898, 900-01, 120 P.3d 286, 288-89 (Ct. App. 2005), this
Court held that the strong smell of alcohol emitting from an individual who then began operating
a vehicle was sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion to conduct further investigation.

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Pickens does not challenge the district court’s finding that Officer Boyd was acting
pursuant to the community caretaker function.
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Here, Officer Boyd observed Pickens unconscious in his vehicle at approximately 4:30 in
the morning. When Officer Boyd inquired as to Pickens’ condition, Pickens’ responses were slow,
and Officer Boyd could smell the strong odor of alcohol emanating from the vehicle. The district
court noted the similarities between this case and Thornley, and thus held that pursuant to Thornley,
Officer Boyd had reasonable suspicion that Pickens was driving under the influence of alcohol.
Pickens argues the smell of alcohol combined with his slow reactions was insufficient to
establish reasonable suspicion for Officer Boyd to conduct an investigative detention. We
disagree. “An officer may draw reasonable inferences from the facts in his or her possession, and
those inferences may be drawn from the officer’s experience and law enforcement training.” State
v. Bordeaux, 148 Idaho 1, 7, 217 P.3d 1, 7 (Ct. App. 2009) (quoting State v. Montague, 114 Idaho
319, 321, 756 P.2d 1083, 1085 (Ct. App. 1988)). In this case, Officer Boyd testified at the
suppression hearing that based upon his training and experience, the fact that it was difficult to
awaken Pickens, combined with Pickens’ slow and mumbled responses and the strong odor of
alcohol, made Officer Boyd concerned that Pickens was under the influence of alcohol or illicit
substances. Like in Thornley, this was sufficient to establish probable cause for an investigative
detention. Thus, the district court did not err in denying the motion to suppress.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Officer Boyd had reasonable and articulable suspicion to believe that Pickens was
operating his vehicle while under the influence of alcohol based on the totality of the
circumstances. The district court did not err in denying Pickens’ motion to suppress. Therefore,
the district court’s order denying Pickens’ motion to suppress and Pickens’ judgment of conviction
are affirmed.
Judge TRIBE and Judge Pro Tem MELANSON, CONCUR.

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