IDHW v. John Doe

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 52814

In the Matter of Jane Doe I, A Child )
Under Eighteen (18) Years of Age. )
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF ) Filed: July 16, 2025
HEALTH & WELFARE, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
Petitioner-Respondent, )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
v. ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
JOHN DOE (2025-12), )
)
Respondent-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the Magistrate Division of the District Court of the Second Judicial
District, State of Idaho, Nez Perce County. Hon. Karin Seubert, Magistrate.

Judgment terminating parental rights, affirmed.

Joanna McFarland, Lewiston, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Brianna Allen, Deputy Attorney
General, Lewiston, for respondent.
________________________________________________

LORELLO, Judge
John Doe (2025-12) appeals from the judgment terminating his parental rights. We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Doe is the father of the minor child involved in this action. The child was born in 2013.
Due to Doe’s inability to provide a safe and stable home for the child, the child was removed from
her father. The Idaho Department of Health and Welfare was awarded legal custody of the child.
The child was subsequently placed into a non-relative foster home for three months and was then
entrusted into the care of her paternal grandmother and her husband. Prior to the child’s placement
into the foster home, the magistrate court approved a case plan for Doe. Doe was incarcerated in

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2024, and the magistrate court found that he failed to make meaningful progress on his case plan
following his release from custody. The Department subsequently filed a petition to terminate
Doe’s parental rights. After finding by clear and convincing evidence that Doe neglected the child
and that termination is in the child’s best interests, the magistrate court terminated Doe’s parental
rights. Doe appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
On appeal from a decision terminating parental rights, this Court examines whether the
decision is supported by substantial and competent evidence, which means such evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Doe v. Doe, 148 Idaho 243,
245-46, 220 P.3d 1062, 1064-65 (2009). The appellate court will indulge all reasonable inferences
in support of the trial court’s judgment when reviewing an order that parental rights be terminated.
Id. The Idaho Supreme Court has also said that the substantial evidence test requires a greater
quantum of evidence in cases where the trial court’s finding must be supported by clear and
convincing evidence than in cases where a mere preponderance is required. State v. Doe, 143
Idaho 343, 346, 144 P.3d 597, 600 (2006). Clear and convincing evidence is generally understood
to be evidence indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain. Roe
v. Doe, 143 Idaho 188, 191, 141 P.3d 1057, 1060 (2006). Further, the trial court’s decision must
be supported by objectively supportable grounds. Doe, 143 Idaho at 346, 144 P.3d at 600.
III.
ANALYSIS
Doe challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the magistrate court’s findings
of neglect, his inability to discharge his parental responsibilities, and that termination is in the
child’s best interests. The Department responds that substantial and competent evidence supports
the magistrate court’s termination decision. Because the magistrate court’s findings are supported
by substantial and competent evidence, we affirm the termination of Doe’s parental rights.
A. Statutory Basis for Termination
A parent has a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining a relationship with his or her
child. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Doe v. State, 137 Idaho 758, 760, 53 P.3d 341,
343 (2002). This interest is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

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Constitution. State v. Doe, 144 Idaho 839, 842, 172 P.3d 1114, 1117 (2007). Implicit in the
Termination of Parent and Child Relationship Act is the philosophy that, wherever possible, family
life should be strengthened and preserved. I.C. § 16-2001(2). Therefore, the requisites of due
process must be met when terminating the parent-child relationship. State v. Doe, 143 Idaho 383,
386, 146 P.3d 649, 652 (2006). Due process requires that the grounds for terminating a
parent-child relationship be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Id. Because a fundamental
liberty interest is at stake, the United States Supreme Court has determined that a court may
terminate a parent-child relationship only if that decision is supported by clear and convincing
evidence. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982); see also I.C. § 16-2009; Doe v. Dep’t of
Health & Welfare, 146 Idaho 759, 761-62, 203 P.3d 689, 691-92 (2009); Doe, 143 Idaho at 386,
146 P.3d at 652.
Idaho Code Section 16-2005 permits a party to petition the court for termination of the
parent-child relationship when it is in the child’s best interests and any one of the following five
factors exist: (a) abandonment; (b) neglect or abuse; (c) lack of a biological relationship between
the child and a presumptive parent; (d) the parent is unable to discharge parental responsibilities
for a prolonged period that will be injurious to the health, morals, or well-being of the child; or (e)
the parent is incarcerated and will remain incarcerated for a substantial period of time. Each
statutory ground is an independent basis for termination. Doe, 144 Idaho at 842, 172 P.3d at 1117.
In this case, the magistrate court terminated Doe’s parental rights on the grounds of neglect.
Idaho Code Section 16-2002(3)(a) defines “neglect” as any conduct included in
I.C. § 16-1602(31). Section 16-1602(31)(a) provides, in pertinent part, that a child is neglected
when the child is without proper parental care and control, or subsistence, medical or other care or
control necessary for his or her well-being because of the conduct or omission of his or her parents,
guardian, or other custodian or their neglect or refusal to provide them. Neglect also exists where
the parent has failed to comply with the court’s orders or the case plan in a Child Protective Act
case and the Department has had temporary or legal custody of the child for fifteen of the most
recent twenty-two months and reunification has not been accomplished by the last day of the
fifteenth month in which the child has been in the temporary or legal custody of the Department.
I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b).

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The magistrate court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that Doe neglected the child
under I.C. § 16-1602(31) by failing to maintain sobriety, failing to establish a positive parent-child
relationship with the child, failing to secure stable housing for the child, and failing to comply with his
court-ordered case plan tasks. In November 2023, Doe was charged with felony possession of a
controlled substance. Shortly thereafter, Doe made arrangements to enter a ninety-day inpatient
substance abuse treatment facility; however, the magistrate court determined that Doe was not
meaningfully engaged in the program for any substantial period of time. Doe admitted to the
magistrate court that, from December 2023 until his arrest in February 2024, he was actively using
illegal substances and living on the streets. In April 2024, Doe was sentenced on the possession
of a controlled substance charge; the district court retained jurisdiction and Doe participated in the
“rider” program. In September 2024, Doe was placed on probation after successful completion of
the program but continued to struggle with substance use while on probation.
The magistrate court found that, despite support from probation officers and weekly
counseling, Doe continued to use methamphetamine approximately every three days as a way to
manage withdrawal symptoms. Between December 2023 and February 2024, Doe had no contact
with the child. Between entering custody in February 2024 and completing the rider program in
September 2024, Does’s contact with the child consisted of two video visits. Since being placed
on probation, Doe’s only contact with the child was a short encounter in December 2024 when
they gave each other a hug and exchanged gifts. Since then, Doe has not attended any supervised
or therapeutic visitation he was invited to with the child, asserting that his work schedule prevented
him from doing so. In hearings conducted as part of the underlying proceedings at which Doe and
the child were both present, Doe did not utilize any limited opportunities to engage with the child.
The magistrate court also found Doe failed to attend any of the child’s medical, dental, vision, or
education appointments. The magistrate court further noted that Doe’s residence consisted of a
motel room with a private bathroom, which Doe acknowledged was not a suitable residence for
the child. Doe also admits that the child’s best interests are served by remaining with her current
caretakers.
The second basis for the magistrate court’s termination decision was based on the finding
that Doe was unable to discharge parental responsibilities. The magistrate court stated that
termination on this basis was appropriate because Doe: (1) had not established a parent-child bond

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with the child throughout this case; (2) had not gained sobriety; (3) was unable to balance his work
schedule with attending therapeutic visits with the child; and (4) admits his housing was inadequate
for childcare.
On appeal, Doe contends that the magistrate court erred in making this finding because
other evidence shows Doe provided care for the child. Specifically, Doe asserts he utilized state
programs to provide for the child’s needs, scheduled eye and dental programs for the child,
enrolled the child in school and arranged for her special education needs, and was building a
community of support around the child. Doe further asserts he was actively involved in community
treatment, had maintained sufficient employment, and had housing. Doe claims that, as a result,
he created a home for the child to return to his care and that he satisfied his obligation to discharge
his parental duties. Despite these efforts, the record indicates that Doe failed to achieve sobriety
after completing institutional rehabilitation, failed in the past to meaningfully engage with
rehabilitation programs, and failed to achieve sobriety while on parole. Further, Doe admits his
current residence is not suitable for the child and that the child’s best interests are served by
remaining with her current caretakers. Doe asks this Court to reweigh the evidence in this case,
which this Court will not do. See, e.g., Doe, 148 Idaho at 245-46, 220 P.3d at 1064-65. This
Court’s review is limited to whether substantial and competent evidence supports the magistrate
court’s decision. Id. Applying this standard, Doe has failed to show that the magistrate court erred
in finding neglect under I.C. § 16-1602(31)(a).
Doe further asserts, in conclusory fashion, that he “met the goals of the case plan tasks.”
He also asserts, without citation to any legal authority, that the Department accepted Doe’s efforts
as adequate compliance given its lack of communication with him. Conclusory allegations and
assertions of fact, without valid legal foundation, are not sufficient to support an argument on
appeal. I.A.R. 35(a)(6); In re Doe, 166 Idaho 720, 727, 462 P.3d 1184, 1191 (Ct. App. 2020).
Moreover, as the Department notes, Doe admitted that he failed to complete his case plan tasks.
Specifically, Doe admitted he had not been sober for ninety days as required by his first case plan
task. Doe also admitted he failed to attend medical, dental, vision, or school appointments for the
child as required by his third case plan task. Doe also agreed he did not complete his court-ordered
case plan by the last day of the fifteenth month the child spent in foster care. As such, Doe has
failed to show that the magistrate court erred in finding that he failed to comply with the case plan;

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consequently, substantial and competent evidence supports the magistrate court’s finding that Doe
neglected the child as defined in I.C. § 16-6002(3)(b). There is likewise substantial and competent
evidence to support the magistrate court’s finding that Doe “is unable to discharge parental
responsibilities and such inability will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period and will be
injurious to the health, morals or well-being of the child” as defined in I.C. § 16-2005(1)(d).
B. Best Interests of the Child
Once a statutory ground for termination has been established, the trial court must next
determine whether it is in the best interests of the child to terminate the parent-child relationship.
Tanner v. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 120 Idaho 606, 611, 818 P.2d 310, 315 (1991). When
determining whether termination is in the child’s best interests, the trial court may consider the
parent’s history with substance abuse, the stability and permanency of the home, the
unemployment of the parent, the financial contribution of the parent to the child’s care after the
child is placed in protective custody, the improvement of the child while in foster care, the parent’s
efforts to improve his or her situation, and the parent’s continuing problems with the law. Doe
(2015-03) v. Doe, 159 Idaho 192, 198, 358 P.3d 77, 83 (2015); Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare
v. Doe, 156 Idaho 103, 111, 320 P.3d 1262, 1270 (2014). A finding that it is in the best interests
of the child to terminate parental rights must still be made upon objective grounds. Idaho Dep’t
of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 152 Idaho 953, 956-57, 277 P.3d 400, 403-04 (Ct. App. 2012).
The magistrate court found that termination is in the child’s best interests because: (1) Doe
has failed to engage in planned visitation or establish a healthy parent-child bond; (2) Doe has not
achieved sobriety; (3) Doe has rejected communication and support from the child’s case worker;
and (4) the child has improved and thrived with her current caretakers. As discussed, there is
substantial and competent evidence that Doe has failed to achieve sobriety despite multiple
opportunities to do so, continually uses methamphetamine, and has failed to attend therapeutic
visits and education and health appointments with the child that would help establish a healthy
parent-child relationship. Further, the magistrate court found that the child is currently in a stable
home with her caretakers. Under their care, the child is reading at a third-grade level and beginning
to transition into a fifth-grade classroom with her peers. The child’s physical and emotional health
needs are being met through routine appointments with doctors and counselors. The child is
involved in extracurricular activities such as swimming. Substantial and competent evidence

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supports the magistrate court’s finding that the child has improved and thrived under her current
caretakers.
Doe asserts the caseworker impeded case plan progress by lying to him, which allegedly
explained a strain in communication and a rejection of the caseworker’s support. Doe cites to no
evidence in the record to support this assertion. Contrary to Doe’s claim of obstruction, the
caseworker took considerable efforts to communicate and collaborate with Doe by arranging
meetings with Doe’s attorney present (as Doe required) and by communicating with Doe monthly
by letters, phone calls, texts, or emails. Doe also argues that he needs more time with the child to
be the father the child deserves. However, Doe has actively rejected opportunities to engage with
the child throughout this case and despite the efforts of the caseworker.
In sum, there is substantial and competent evidence supporting the magistrate court’s
finding that termination is in the child’s best interests. Doe has failed to show error in this finding.
IV.
CONCLUSION
The magistrate court’s findings that Doe neglected the child, that Doe was unable to
discharge his parental responsibilities, and that termination is in the child’s best interests are
supported by substantial and competent evidence. Doe has failed to show error in the magistrate
court’s decision to terminate his parental rights. Accordingly, the judgment terminating Doe’s
parental rights is affirmed.
Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge TRIBE, CONCUR.

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