State v. Jenks

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 51353

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Opinion Filed: June 24, 2025
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
)
RYAN DEWAYNE JENKS, )
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho,
Elmore County. Hon. Theodore J. Fleming, District Judge; Hon. David C. Epis,
Magistrate.

Decision of the district court, on intermediate appeal from the magistrate division,
affirmed.

Law Office of Jeffrey Brownson; Jeffrey Brownson, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Amy J. Lavin, Deputy Attorney General,
Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________

HUSKEY, Judge
Ryan Dewayne Jenks appeals from the district court’s decision, on intermediate appeal,
reversing the magistrate court’s order dismissing his case. Jenks argues the State either failed to
preserve any argument that the magistrate court should not have considered the underlying facts
in deciding Jenks’ motion to dismiss or invited the complained of error. Jenks claims the
magistrate court did not err in granting his Idaho Criminal Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss because
his conduct did not constitute resisting, delaying, or obstructing. Jenks also argues the State has
not demonstrated that the magistrate court erred in dismissing his case pursuant to I.C.R. 48. The
State argues Jenks failed to challenge the district court’s ruling that the magistrate court abused its
discretion when it dismissed Jenks’ case pursuant to I.C.R. 12(b). The State also argues the district
court did not err in reversing the magistrate court’s order of dismissal. For the reasons set forth

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below, the decision of the district court reversing the magistrate court’s order of dismissal is
affirmed.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Deputy Adam Searls responded to a reported car accident involving Jenks’ adult daughter,
Jordan. Prior to the deputy’s arrival, Jordan had contacted her parents. After a tow truck was
called, Jenks left the scene and went home. Jenks returned to the scene after Deputy Searls made
contact with Jenks’ wife and daughter. Deputy Searls told Jenks he needed to speak with Jordan,
and Jenks repeatedly told the deputy that he could not speak with Jordan without Jenks being
present. The encounter between Jenks and Deputy Searls was captured on Deputy Searls’ body
camera.
Thereafter, the State charged Jenks by uniform citation with resisting, delaying, or
obstructing, Idaho Code § 18-705.1 Jenks filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to I.C.R. 12(b),
arguing his conduct did not violate I.C. § 18-705 because he merely “passively resisted” Deputy
Searls’ instructions but did not resist, delay, or obstruct.2 The State opposed the motion. The
magistrate court determined that there were not sufficient facts to support the charge and dismissed
the case pursuant to Jenks’ motion to dismiss. The magistrate court also found that the interests
of justice supported dismissal pursuant to I.C.R. 48. The State appealed to the district court.
On intermediate appeal, the district court vacated the magistrate court’s order, holding that
the magistrate court abused its discretion in granting Jenks’ motions to dismiss pursuant to
I.C.R. 12(b) and 48. Jenks appeals from the district court’s decision.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“On appeal of a decision rendered by the district court while acting in its intermediate
appellate capacity, this Court directly reviews the district court’s decision.” State v. Phipps, 166
Idaho 1, 4, 454 P.3d 1084, 1087 (2019). However, to determine whether the district court erred in

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Jenks’ wife, Marissa Jenks, was also cited for violating Idaho Code § 18-705. That appeal
is pending in State v. Jenks, Docket No. 51354.
2
Idaho Code § 18-705 reads, in relevant part: “Every person who wilfully resists, delays,
or obstructs any public officer, in the discharge, or attempt to discharge, of any duty of his office
. . . is punishable by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), and imprisonment in the
county jail not exceeding one (1) year.” (Emphasis added.)
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reversing the magistrate court, we review the record before the magistrate court to determine
whether substantial and competent evidence supports the magistrate court’s findings of fact and
whether the magistrate court’s conclusions of law follow from those findings. State v. Korn, 148
Idaho 413, 415, 224 P.3d 480, 482 (2009). Additionally, “[i]n an appeal from a district court’s
determination of a case appealed to it from the magistrate court, we review the decision of the
district court to determine whether it correctly applied the applicable standard of appellate review.”
In re Guardianship of Doe, 157 Idaho 750, 753, 339 P.3d 1154, 1157 (2014).
III.
ANALYSIS
The parties make various arguments on appeal. Jenks argues the State either invited error
or failed to preserve its argument for appeal that the magistrate court improperly considered
evidence of the facts underlying the charge. Jenks claims the magistrate court did not err in
granting his I.C.R. 12(b) motion to dismiss because his conduct did not constitute either
obstructing or resisting. Jenks also argues the State failed to demonstrate the magistrate court
erred in dismissing the case pursuant to I.C.R. 48. The State argues Jenks failed to challenge the
district court’s ruling that the magistrate court abused its discretion when it dismissed his case
pursuant to I.C.R. 12(b). The State also argues the district court did not err in reversing the
magistrate court’s order of dismissal.
The Idaho Supreme Court and the Idaho Court of Appeals use the same standard of review
for a case in which there was an intermediate appeal, and as noted above, “directly reviews the
district court’s decision.” In re Estate of Peterson, 157 Idaho 827, 830, 340 P.3d 1143, 1146
(2014). Because we review the district court’s decision, the appellant has the burden to set forth
any alleged errors regarding the district court’s decision and provide the relevant standard of
review by which this Court is to review the district court’s decision.
On intermediate appeal, the district court reached three legal conclusions. First, Jenks
challenged the State’s argument that the magistrate court erred in evaluating evidence of the facts
underlying the charge in its ruling on Jenks’ motion to dismiss under I.C.R. 12(b). The district
court concluded that the argument raised by the State on intermediate appeal challenging the
magistrate court’s dismissal of the case was properly preserved. Second, the district court
concluded the magistrate court abused its discretion in granting Jenks’ I.C.R. 12(b) motion because
the magistrate court looked beyond what was alleged in the citation and made findings of fact

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based on evidence disclosed through the discovery process to determine that Jenks’ conduct did
not violate I.C. § 18-705. The district court reasoned that I.C.R. 12(b) requires the reviewing court
to look at the essential facts set forth in the charging document to determine if the alleged conduct
constituted a crime. Because Jenks was charged by citation, there was no formal charging
document, and thus, no facts set forth which the magistrate court could review to determine
whether the charged conduct constituted a crime. The district court further reasoned that Jenks’
motion and the magistrate court’s decision were “procedurally improper as [they] amounted to [a
motion] for summary judgment on a uniform citation.” The district court concluded that, where
no formal charging document is filed, the correct procedure is for the defendant to file an
I.C.R. 29(a) motion for judgment of acquittal because a defendant “may not force the State to make
its case in a pretrial proceeding.” Third, the district court concluded that the magistrate court erred
in granting Jenks’ motion to dismiss pursuant to I.C.R. 48 because I.C.R. 48 “does not authorize
the functional equivalent of a summary judgment motion where the Idaho Criminal Rules do not
have a provision comparable to that found in the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.”
Preliminarily, we first address a procedural issue. On review of a district court’s decision
as an intermediate appellate court, the appellant’s opening brief must generally provide a statement
of issues, standard of review, and argument and authority related to the district court’s decisions.
See I.A.R. 35(a)(4), 35(a)(6); Korn, 148 Idaho at 415, 224 P.3d at 482; State v. Trusdall, 155 Idaho
965, 968, 318 P.3d 955, 958 (Ct. App. 2014). Failure to identify the issue as error by the district
court (rather than the magistrate court), include or apply the correct standard of review, or provide
argument and authority relevant to the correct standard of review and claim on review will
ordinarily result in an unintentional waiver of the claims on appeal. State v. Byrum, 167 Idaho
735, 740, 476 P.3d 402, 407 (2020).
Although Jenks asks this Court to “procedurally reverse the district court,” Jenks makes no
argument regarding the district court’s conclusions on any of the three above-listed issues.
“Regardless of whether an issue is explicitly set forth in the party’s brief as one of the issues on
appeal, if the issue is only mentioned in passing and not supported by any cogent argument or
authority, it cannot be considered by this Court.” Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 790, 229 P.3d
1146, 1152 (2010)). Moreover, “[a] general attack on the findings and conclusions of the district
court, without specific reference to evidentiary or legal errors, is insufficient to preserve an issue.”
Id. Jenks’ opening brief does not reference the district court’s decision in his statement of issues

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or in the argument section, except to ask this Court to reverse the district court. Further, Jenks
fails to directly present argument or authority regarding the standard of review by which we assess
the district court’s decisions or that the district court’s factual or legal conclusions were incorrect.
This is problematic because the district court reversed the decision of the magistrate court. If the
district court was incorrect in either of its reasons for or its conclusions reversing the magistrate
court on any of the above-listed issues, Jenks had an obligation to assert that assignment of error
with particularity in his opening brief. Absent argument and authority explaining how the district
court erred and the standard of review applicable to the error, this Court has no basis on which to
assess the correctness of the district court’s reasoning or conclusions or whether the reasoning and
conclusions are supported by the record created in the magistrate court. See Byrum, 167 Idaho at
740, 476 P.3d at 407 (holding failure to challenge the district court’s decision, on intermediate
appeal, may result in a waiver of those claims on further appeal). A conclusory statement that this
Court should reverse the district court is nothing more than a general attack on the district court’s
findings and conclusions with no specific reference to any legal errors. Without a challenge to any
of the district court’s findings, reasoning, or conclusions, Jenks has waived any claim of error by
the district court and we will affirm the district court on any of the unchallenged bases.
A. Preservation of State’s Argument on Intermediate Appeal
Jenks argues the State’s argument on intermediate appeal was not preserved and points to
the State’s arguments in the magistrate court as support. However, Jenks does not argue, or show,
what legal or factual errors the district court made in concluding the argument was preserved and
fails to apply any relevant standard of review to the district court’s decision. Because Jenks does
not point to any error by the district court or provide argument in support, Jenks fails to explain
why this Court should reverse the district court’s conclusion. Where, as here, the district court
reverses the magistrate court on grounds that are alleged to be unpreserved, Jenks’ repeated
challenges to what occurred in the magistrate court fails to address the reasoning and conclusions
of the district court on this issue. Consequently, Jenks has waived any challenge to the district
court’s conclusion that the State’s argument on intermediate appeal is preserved.
B. Jenks Fails to Challenge the District Court’s Decision Reversing the Magistrate
Court’s Dismissal of the Case Pursuant to I.C.R. 12(b).
On appeal to this Court, Jenks fails to address either of the district court’s holdings that the
magistrate court’s decision was: (1) “procedurally improper as [it] amounted to [a motion] for
summary judgment on a uniform citation”; and (2) where no formal charging document is filed,
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the correct procedure is for the defendant to file an I.C.R. 29(a) motion for judgment of acquittal
because a defendant “may not force the State to make its case in a pretrial proceeding.” Jenks’
failure to challenge any of the district court’s factual or legal holdings results in a waiver of the
claim on appeal. Byrum, 167 Idaho at 740, 476 P.3d at 407.
C. Jenks Fails to Challenge the District Court’s Decision Reversing the Magistrate
Court’s Dismissal of the Case Pursuant to I.C.R. 48.
The magistrate court dismissed Jenks’ case pursuant to I.C.R. 48 because the case
represents an “unfortunate interaction between law enforcement and citizens that ended, I think,
poorly with handcuffs and an arrest . . . [and that] it didn’t really need to end up this way.” The
district court concluded that the magistrate court erred in granting Jenks’ motion to dismiss
pursuant to I.C.R. 48 because I.C.R. 48 “does not authorize the functional equivalent of a summary
judgment motion where the Idaho Criminal Rules do not have a provision comparable to that found
in the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.” Jenks’ failure to challenge any of the district court’s factual
or legal holdings results in a waiver of the claim on appeal. Byrum, 167 Idaho at 740, 476 P.3d at
407.
But even if preserved, Jenks acknowledges that it may be improper for a trial court to
engage in a Rule 48 review that is tantamount to a summary judgment motion when considering
the underlying facts but argues that it is a different question to ask if a magistrate court may
consider the underlying facts when determining if the ends of justice would be best suited by a
dismissal. Idaho Criminal Rule 48(a)(2) allows a court, after giving notice, to dismiss a criminal
action on the motion of a party or sua sponte for any reason if the court concludes that the dismissal
will “serve the ends of justice and the effective administration of the court’s business.” In State v.
Alley, 155 Idaho 972, 981, 318 P.3d 962, 971 (Ct. App. 2014), Alley sought dismissal of his
charges pursuant to I.C.R. 48. This Court held,
the Idaho Criminal Rules do not have a provision comparable to a motion for
summary judgment found in the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. A defendant may
not have a case dismissed before trial based on discovery responses indicating that
the state cannot prove the crime charged. Similarly, the defendant cannot prevail
on a pretrial motion to dismiss when the issue deals with an ultimate fact to be
proven at trial, thereby creating a form of summary judgment not provided for
under the Criminal Rules. The only somewhat comparable motion would be a
motion to dismiss on the ground that the evidence at the preliminary hearing did
not show probable cause to believe that the defendant had committed the felony
charged. Of course, that motion would require that there be a preliminary hearing,

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which is not appropriate when a defendant is charged by grand jury indictment, as
in this case.
Alley, 155 Idaho at 981, 318 P.3d 962 at 971 (internal citations omitted) (abrogated on other
grounds by State v. McKean, 159 Idaho 75, 356 P.3d 368 (2015)). Jenks argues that a necessary
part of an I.C.R. 48 motion is a review of the underlying conduct the State has prosecuted.
However, the magistrate court did more than just consider the basic factual underpinnings of this
case. The magistrate court noted it would have been helpful for the State to present additional
evidence, but in the absence of that evidence, nonetheless engaged in weighing and assessing the
evidence presented and concluded there was insufficient evidence to support the charges. This
was engaging in precisely the analysis that is prohibited in Alley.3
Consequently, the district court did not err in reversing the magistrate court’s dismissal of
Jenks’ case pursuant to I.C.R. 48.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Jenks fails to allege any error by the district court in reversing the magistrate court’s order
of dismissal. Thus, we affirm the district court’s order on the unchallenged bases. However, even
if preserved, the district court did not err. Therefore, the decision of the district court reversing
the magistrate court’s order of dismissal is affirmed.
Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge TRIBE, CONCUR.

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Additionally, although Jenks repeatedly argued that his statements did not give rise to
resisting or obstructing, there was evidence presented that Jenks resisted, delayed, or obstructed
any public officer, in the discharge, or attempt to discharge, of any duty of his office, which was a
not addressed by the magistrate court. The precedent cited by Jenks referenced whether verbal
statements could constitute resisting or obstructing but do not address whether statements can
constitute delay.
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