Medical Recovery Services, LLC v. Baird

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 51169

MEDICAL RECOVERY SERVICES, )
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company, ) Filed: December 18, 2024
)
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
)
v. ) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
MICHAEL BAIRD, ) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
)
Defendant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, State of Idaho,
Franklin County. Hon. Mitchell W. Brown, District Judge.1

Judgment reducing award of recovery, vacated; and case remanded.

Smith, Driscoll & Associates, PLLC; Bryan N. Zollinger, Idaho Falls, for appellant.

Michael Baird; Preston, did not participate.
________________________________________________

HUSKEY, Judge
Medical Recovery Services, LLC (MRS) appeals from the district court’s judgment
awarding, but reducing, its amount of recovery. MRS argues the district court erred because it was
legally bound to enforce the terms of the stipulated settlement between the parties and failed to do
so. The district court abused its discretion in reducing MRS’s award of recovery. We vacate the
judgment awarding, but reducing, MRS’s recovery and remand for proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
MRS filed a complaint alleging that Michael Baird failed to pay for medical services he
received from a medical provider. Subsequently, the parties filed a stipulated judgment in the

1
Contrary to Idaho Appellate Rule 36, the name of the district judge was not included on
the cover page of the appellant’s brief.
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district court, in which Baird admitted and stipulated that he was liable to MRS for unpaid medical
services. The stipulation outlined the total amount due, $24,456.62, and the complaint broke down
the stipulated amount as follows: principal amount owing, $12,250.00; prejudgment interest,
$5,936.38; and attorney fees, $6,001.50. The stipulation also indicated that Baird could make
monthly payments of $150.00 on the account. Both parties signed the stipulation, although Baird
signed electronically. The district court held a hearing on the matter.
During the hearing, the court was presented with an affidavit that indicated Baird had
agreed to sign the stipulation electronically. The district court was concerned that Baird did not
properly understand the terms of the stipulation. For example, during the hearing the district court
explained to Baird that because the applicable interest rate was 7.375 percent, the $150.00 monthly
payments would only apply to the interest so Baird would never pay down the principal owing.
The district court also explained that if Baird allowed the district court to enter a default judgment,
the court would impose only $1,225.00 in attorney fees instead of the $6,001.50 that Baird agreed
to pay in the stipulation. The district court then asked Baird whether he wanted the district court
to sign the judgment. Baird expressed some confusion about his options, explained that he did not
understand how it was set up, could barely afford the $150.00 payment, was disabled, and was
trying to get his Social Security disability payments started. Counsel for MRS stated:
Your Honor, Mr. Baird, my office all the time discounts interest or freezes
interest if people ask, or if there’s hardships.
And so that’s not the end all be all, Mr. Baird, especially if you’re seeking
disability. The court is correct, that paying 150 would just be paying interest. But
I’m always open to settlement down the road, to discounting all the interest that’s
accrued, anything like that, based on your circumstance.
And I hope--you and I haven’t spoken, but I hope that my paralegal told you
that down the road settlement is possible or stuff like that. So it’s not as bleak as--
you know, obviously, if you can pay more, you can. That 150 is a minimum as
well. Because the court is correct, at 150 a month that’s just covering the interest
that’s accruing. But I would just tell you, we discount interest all the time. If
there’s ever an issue, give us a call.
Baird then indicated that he wanted the district court to sign the judgment; the district court
indicated it would do so.
A month later, the district court entered a judgment in the amount of $19,679.38. In the
court minutes, the district court included a footnote which stated the amount of attorney fees was
reduced in accordance with the factors outlined in Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 54(e)(3) and
Sixth District Court Local Rule 8.1 from $6,001.50 to $1,225.00. MRS appealed.

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II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion for the enforcement of a settlement agreement is treated as a motion for summary
judgment when no evidentiary hearing has been conducted. Estate of Holland v. Metro. Prop. &
Cas. Ins. Co., 153 Idaho 94, 100, 279 P.3d 80, 86 (2012). Thus, the “Court freely reviews the
entire record that was before the district court to determine whether either side was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law and whether inferences drawn by the district court are reasonably
supported by the record.” Borley v. Smith, 149 Idaho 171, 177, 233 P.3d 102 108 (2010).
III.
ANALYSIS
MRS argues the district court erred by failing to honor the parties’ contract and arbitrarily
reducing the agreed upon amount of attorney fees.2 MRS’s position is that because the parties’
agreement was unambiguous, the district court was legally bound to enforce the terms of the
contract. Baird, who appeared pro se in district court, did not participate in the appeal.
This Court has held:
When parties settle and compromise their disputed obligations, the
settlement is binding on the parties. Stipulations are a form of judicial admission.
A judicial admission obviates the necessity for proof of facts within the ambit of a
distinct and unequivocal admission or stipulation so made.
Perry v. Schaumann, 110 Idaho 596, 598, 716 P.2d 1368, 1370 (Ct. App. 1986) (internal quotations
and citations omitted). A settlement agreement stands on the same footing as any other contract
and is governed by the same rules and principles as are applicable to contracts generally.
Vanderford Co., Inc. v. Knudson, 150 Idaho 664, 672, 249 P.3d 857, 865 (2011). All contracts
“must be complete, definite and certain in all [their] material terms, or contain provisions which
are capable in themselves of being reduced to certainty.” Seward v. Musick Auction, LLC, 164
Idaho 149, 158-59, 426 P.3d 1249, 1258-59 (2018) (quoting Unifund CCR, LLC v. Lowe, 159
Idaho 750, 753, 367 P.3d 145, 148 (2016)).
In this case, the district court clarified the relevant terms of the stipulation with MRS and
Baird, and Baird agreed with both the amount of the stipulated judgment and that the district court

2
Counsel for MRS is reminded that, pursuant to I.A.R. 35(e), references to the transcript
and the record should be included in the body of the brief “and shall not be included as footnotes or
endnotes.”
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could enter the judgment. When the district court stated that it would sign the judgment, the court
agreed to enter judgment in the amount of $24,456.62, and the parties were entitled to rely on that
representation. A month later, however, the district court reduced the amount of attorney fees the
parties agreed to and awarded judgment in the amount of $19,679.38. The court minutes for the
hearing read, in part: “[T]he Court indicated that it would sign the Stipulated Judgment.” To that
sentence, the district court added a footnote, which reads:
Following the hearing in this matter, the Court has determined, in
accordance with I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) and Sixth District Court Local Rule 8.1, that it
will enter judgment consistent with said local rule. Further, the Court concludes
that such an award is consistent with the factors outlined in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3).
Should the parties wish to abide by their separate agreement on attorney fees that
will be [a] decision that they make independent of this Court’s judgment.
The district court erred in arbitrarily reducing the amount of attorney fees after the parties
stipulated to the amount of the judgment and the district court indicated it would sign the judgment.
The stipulation between the parties is unambiguous and binding upon them. It appears the district
court, upon reflection, believed that applicable rules precluded the court from entering judgment
which included attorney fees that the court believed exceeded those allowable under the
circumstances. The district court erred in this regard. In doing so, the district court relied upon
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3); however, that rule is not applicable in this case. Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(e)(3) requires the district court to consider certain factors in determining whether an
award of attorney fees is reasonable. Lettunich v. Lettunich, 145 Idaho 746, 749-50, 185 P.3d 258,
261-62 (2008). In this case, there was no need for the district court to determine an amount of
reasonable attorney fees because the parties stipulated to an amount. That stipulation was
confirmed on the record, and the district court agreed to sign the stipulated judgment for that
amount. While the district court’s concern regarding the amount of attorney fees is evident from
the record, because Baird agreed to pay that amount in attorney fees, the district court had no role
in determining the attorney fee award. Cf. Tricore Investments, LLC v. Estate of Warren, 168
Idaho 596, 626-27, 485 P.3d 92, 122-23 (2021) (affirming award of attorney fees authorized by
contract and I.C. § 12-120(3)).
The district court also cited Sixth District Court Local Rule 8.1. As above, the application
of the local rule is not applicable in the instance where the parties have stipulated to an amount of
attorney fees. But even if the local rules were applicable, the district court nonetheless erred. First,
the local rules were amended the day before the judgment was entered in this case. Thus, Local

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Rule 8.1 is no longer the rule that deals with attorney fees on default judgments. The current rule
that deals with such fees is Sixth District Court Local Rule 6.1, which addresses the imposition of
attorney fees in the entry of a default judgment. The rule is entitled “Attorney Fees Guidelines on
Default Judgments,” and states, in relevant part: “In [civil] claims exceeding $10,000.00 attorney
fees will be granted in an amount not to exceed 10% of the principal at filing.” Here, because
there was no default judgment, Sixth District Court Local Rule 6.1 is inapplicable.
MRS does not seek attorney fees and costs on appeal; Baird did not file a brief.
Consequently, we will not award attorney fees or costs to either party.
IV.
CONCLUSION
The district court erred by reducing the stipulated amount of attorney fees. Thus, the
judgment reducing MRS’s award of recovery is vacated, and the case is remanded for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge LORELLO, CONCUR.

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