State v. Ghotbi

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 50923

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Filed: July 31, 2024
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
MASOUD GHOTBI, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Defendant-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Twin
Falls County. Hon. Roger B. Harris, District Judge. Hon. Benjamin Harmer,
Magistrate.

Decision of the district court, on intermediate appeal from the magistrate court,
affirming order withholding judgment for violation of a protection order, affirmed.

Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Jenny C. Swinford, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Kacey L. Jones, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________
TRIBE, Judge
Masoud Ghotbi appeals from a decision of the district court, on intermediate appeal from
the magistrate court, affirming an order withholding judgment for violation of a protection order.
We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Ghotbi and the complaining witness share a child together. A civil protection order was
entered against Ghotbi naming the complaining witness as the protected party. Soon after, Ghotbi
moved for a modification of the civil protection order. A modified civil protection order was
entered to allow for communication via text and email for the care of their child and custody

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exchanges.1 All custody exchanges were to occur at the police station. The complaining witness
alleged that, during one of these exchanges, Ghotbi engaged in direct verbal communication with
her and discussed information outside the scope of that permitted in the modified civil protection
order. A jury found Ghotbi guilty of violating the civil protection order, and the magistrate court
entered a withheld judgment.
Ghotbi filed an appeal, which was dismissed as being untimely. He then filed a petition
for post-conviction relief arguing that his trial counsel failed to appeal Ghotbi’s withheld judgment
as requested. The magistrate court granted Ghotbi post-conviction relief by re-entering the
withheld judgment so that he could then file a timely appeal. He appealed to the district court,
arguing that the magistrate court erred by upholding the enforceability of the civil protection order
and that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find him guilty at trial. The district court
affirmed. Ghotbi again appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
For an appeal from the district court, sitting in its appellate capacity over a case from the
magistrate court, we review the record to determine whether there is substantial and competent
evidence to support the magistrate court’s findings of fact and whether the magistrate court’s
conclusions of law follow from those findings. State v. Korn, 148 Idaho 413, 415, 224 P.3d 480,
482 (2009). However, as a matter of appellate procedure, our disposition of the appeal will affirm
or reverse the decision of the district court. State v. Trusdall, 155 Idaho 965, 968, 318 P.3d 955,
958 (Ct. App. 2014). Thus, we review the magistrate court’s findings and conclusions, whether
the district court affirmed or reversed the magistrate court’s decision and the basis therefor, and
either affirm or reverse the district court’s decision.
Appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited in scope. A finding of guilt
will not be overturned on appeal where there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier
of fact could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the essential elements
of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Herrera-Brito, 131 Idaho 383, 385, 957 P.2d 1099,

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The magistrate court entered an “Order Modifying Terms of Civil Protection Order” then
entered an order of modification of the original civil protection order. The latter being a
handwritten order and the former being drafted by the attorney for Ghotbi. All relevant and
substantive information in both orders are identical and therefore are referred to collectively as
“modified civil protection orders” unless otherwise indicated.
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1101 (Ct. App. 1998); State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 104, 822 P.2d 998, 1001 (Ct. App. 1991).
We will not substitute our view for that of the trier of fact as to the credibility of the witnesses, the
weight to be given to the testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.
Knutson, 121 Idaho at 104, 822 P.2d at 1001; State v. Decker, 108 Idaho 683, 684, 701 P.2d 303,
304 (Ct. App. 1985). Moreover, we will consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution. Herrera-Brito, 131 Idaho at 385, 957 P.2d at 1101; Knutson, 121 Idaho at 104, 822
P.2d at 1001.
III.
ANALYSIS
Ghotbi argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that he violated the civil
protection order and that the modified civil protection order provided insufficient notice due to a
purported ambiguity. The State argues that there was sufficient evidence presented that Ghotbi
had direct verbal communication with the complaining witness and that such verbal
communication was prohibited by the civil protection order. The State further argues that there
was sufficient evidence that Ghotbi had notice of the terms of the original protection order and the
unambiguous modified civil protection order. On intermediate appeal the district court held that
the terms of the modified civil protection order were unambiguous, thereby providing sufficient
notice of the terms, and that the State presented sufficient evidence for the jury to find Ghotbi
violated the terms of the civil protection order.
First, we address Ghotbi’s notice argument. This argument relies on his assertion that the
language of the modified civil protection order was ambiguous and thereby failed to instruct
Ghotbi that in-person verbal communication during custody exchanges would violate the order.2
The basis of Ghotbi’s argument is that the language allowing the parties to “communicate via text

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Ghotbi argues that ambiguity with the provision is enhanced for nonnative English
speakers like himself. However, the record indicates that Ghotbi understands and speaks English
well. Ghotbi testified that he speaks several languages including English. He testified that he
speaks these languages for his job of twenty years. Also, Ghotbi’s testimony does not include
grammatical inaccuracies or solely simple phrases which might lead a jury to believe Ghotbi
struggles with English grammar.

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message or email only about the care of the Child or custody exchanges”3 is ambiguous as the term
“custody exchanges” could either be a second object of the preposition “via” or a second object of
the preposition “about.” Ghotbi asks this Court to acknowledge the possibility of reading the
provision as “parties can communicate via . . . custody exchanges.” In essence, Ghotbi asks us to
hold that the civil protection order was ambiguous because it could have been understood to allow
communication between him and the protected party “via text message or email only about the
care of the child” and allow any communication during “custody exchanges.” We decline to do
so.
Ghotbi and the complaining witness each testified that Ghotbi was present when the
original civil protection order and the modified civil protection order were entered. Ghotbi also
signed the typed order. The district court concluded that the provision was express in its limitation
of both the allowable manner (via text message or email) and subject of communication (only
about the care of the child and custody exchanges) between the parties.4 We agree with the district
court that the terms of the civil protection order as modified were not ambiguous. Specifically,
the word “only” served as a modifier for the list of subjects following the word. Therefore, the
provision is unambiguously read as allowing the subjects of the text messages and emails to be
“only about the care of the Child or custody exchanges.” Because the modified civil protection
order provided to Ghotbi was not ambiguous, he fails to show that he was not provided sufficient

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The duplicative orders mentioned in footnote 1 mirror each other in all relevant substantive
aspects. For example, the typed version reads, “The parties shall be allowed to communicate via
text message or email only about the care of the Child or custody exchanges.” Meanwhile, the
handwritten version reads, “Parties can communicate via text or email about the care of the child
and custody exchanges.” The only differences are nonessential terminology that are not in
opposition.
4
Ghotbi asks this Court to omit a portion of the provision. Ghotbi’s proposal that the
provision may be read as “parties can communicate via . . . custody exchanges,” provides no
explanation for the subject matter limitation. In other words, Ghotbi’s argument would have this
Court read the provision as permitting a limited subject matter when communicating over text and
email but permitting unlimited subject matter when the parties are performing custody exchanges
in person. Contrary to Ghotbi’s assertion, it would be an unreasonable reading of the order to
understand that the parties are unlimited in permissible communication topics so long as they are
making a custody exchange in person but are much more restricted when communicating
electronically.
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notice that his in-person communication with the complaining witness at the police station was in
violation of the civil protection order.
Next, we address Ghotbi’s argument that the State did not present sufficient evidence to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he violated the terms of the modified civil protection order.
The State presented the original civil protection order to the jury, which read:
[Ghotbi] shall not contact or attempt to contact the protected person(s) in any
manner, including in person or through another person, or in writing or through any
electronic means, including telephone, email, text, through social networking, or
facsimile. [Ghotbi] shall not harass, stalk, threaten; use, attempt to use or threaten
use of physical force; or engage in any other conduct that would place the protected
person(s) in reasonable fear of bodily injury. However, [Ghotbi] may participate
in legal proceedings involving the protected person(s) and may communicate
through attorneys about legal issues involving the protected person(s).
Additionally, Ghotbi presented the modified civil protection order to the jury that created
exceptions, which read:
1. The Civil Protection order entered on or about Friday, January 3, 2020 shall
remain in full force and effect with the following changes:
2. The parties shall be allowed to communicate via text message or email only
about the care of the Child or custody exchanges.
3. Custody exchanges shall take place at the Twin Falls City Police Station in
the lobby and may be done by the parties or by designee of the Mother.
Therefore, the jury saw that the modified civil protection order gave full force and effect to the
original civil protection order restricting all communication while also allowing communication
via text message or email only about the care of the child or custody exchanges. The jury also
listened to a recording in which Ghotbi can be heard verbally communicating with the complaining
witness, and Ghotbi and the complaining witness each testified that Ghotbi verbally communicated
with the complaining witness in person while the protection order was in effect.
The jury saw the original protection order, saw its modification restricting communication
except through text and email, and heard testimony and evidence that Ghotbi verbally
communicated with the complaining witness. All this evidence, taken together, undermines
Ghotbi’s assertion that the State did not present sufficient evidence for a competent jury to find
beyond a reasonable doubt that he violated the civil protection order. Therefore, viewing the
evidence in light most favorable to the prosecution, Ghotbi has failed to meet his burden to show
that there was insufficient evidence that he had notice of the terms of the civil protection order and
that he violated the terms of the civil protection order.

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IV.
CONCLUSION
Ghotbi failed to meet his burden to show that the State presented insufficient evidence that
he had notice of conduct that violated the civil protection order and that he violated the civil
protection order. Therefore, the district court’s decision affirming the magistrate court’s order
withholding judgment for violation of a protection order, is affirmed.
Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge LORELLO, CONCUR.

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