Logan Jeffrey Shoemaker v. State of Iowa

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 22-2107
Filed May 22, 2024

LOGAN JEFFREY SHOEMAKER,
Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Patrick A. McElyea,

Judge.

An applicant appeals the denial of his application for postconviction relief.

AFFIRMED.

Debra S. De Jong, Orange City, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Timothy M. Hau, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

Considered by Bower, C.J., and Greer and Chicchelly, JJ.
2

GREER, Judge.

“Did I hit him? Did I hit the officer?” After asking about the results of his

collision of a stolen garbage truck with a police cruiser, Logan Shoemaker was

brought to trial and convicted of multiple charges, including attempted murder of a

police officer. Now in postconviction-relief (PCR) proceedings, Shoemaker raises

several challenges to the denial of his PCR application based on ineffective

assistance of his trial counsel. Following our de novo review, we affirm.

I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings.

Shoemaker went on a “multiple-day spree of criminal activity in September

2017.” State v. Shoemaker, No. 18-1382, 2019 WL 5067177, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App.

Oct. 9, 2019). This activity included repeatedly calling and texting a woman named

Katie, refusing to leave her home, using “a truck he stole as a battering ram,

purposefully crashing into vehicles parked near Katie’s home,” fighting Katie and

beating her up, using “an instrument to break windows out of vehicles,” fleeing in

the stolen truck—a red Dodge Ram—and crashing “into the back of a stopped

garbage truck,” threatening its driver with a gun and threatening to shoot him if he

did not exit the vehicle, continuing “to flee in the garbage truck,” and finally crashing

the garbage truck into Police Chief Terry Behning’s service vehicle, seriously

injuring Chief Behning. Id. at *1–2.

In October, the State charged Shoemaker via trial information with thirteen

counts based on his activities the previous month.1 In June 2018, Shoemaker pled

1 The charges were attempted murder in violation of Iowa Code section 707.11(1)

(2017); serious injury by vehicle in violation of section 707.6A(4); eluding or
attempting to elude while participating in a felony or resulting in bodily injury in
violation of section 321.279(3); willful injury causing serious injury in violation of
3

guilty to eight of the charges,2 proceeding to trial on only five (which related to

actions after Shoemaker took the garbage truck): attempted murder, serious injury

by vehicle, eluding or attempting to elude while participating in a felony or resulting

in bodily injury, willful injury resulting in serious injury, and first-degree robbery.

After Shoemaker moved in limine, the parties agreed prior to trial that the State

could offer limited evidence of Katie’s interactions with Shoemaker in September

2017 and law enforcement could testify to their observations.

The case came to jury trial the same month. During voir dire—either in a

written pre-trial questionnaire or during in-person questioning—four jurors that

were eventually seated on the jury admitted to prior knowledge of the case or of

Chief Behning. L.S. stated that she had heard of the case through television and

radio coverage the morning of voir dire. When asked if anything she heard or saw

would make it difficult for her to be fair and impartial, she said “I don’t think so . . . .

I mean, it was on the news, but that was it.” When asked if she could reach a

verdict based just on the evidence presented during trial, she responded, “Well, I

would hope so.” M.D. had seen news and social media coverage about Chief

Behning and fundraisers for him. In response to being asked if there was “anything

section 708.4(1); first-degree robbery in violation of sections 711.1(1) and 711.2;
two counts of second-degree theft in violation of section 714.2(2); stalking with a
dangerous weapon in violation of section 708.11(b)(2); three counts of second-
degree criminal mischief in violation of section 716.4(1); assault while displaying a
dangerous weapon in violation of section 708.2(3); and fourth-degree criminal
mischief in violation of section 716.6(1)(a)(1).
2 Shoemaker pled guilty to two counts of second-degree theft, stalking with a

dangerous weapon, three counts of second-degree criminal mischief, assault while
displaying a dangerous weapon, and fourth-degree criminal mischief. He filed
written guilty pleas to assault while displaying a dangerous weapon and fourth-
degree criminal mischief; the others were handled in person at the final pretrial
conference.
4

about the things that you read or saw that would make it difficult for you to be fair

and impartial in this case” she answered, “I don’t think so.” She also agreed that

she could reach a verdict based just on the evidence she heard in the courtroom

and would follow the law as the judge instructed her. M.N. saw news coverage of

the events while he was in school. He was asked if he would be willing to wait to

make a decision until all of the evidence was in and he was instructed on the law,

he answered, “Yes.” He also agreed that he had not made up his mind solidly yet.

Lastly, C.G. answered that she had seen Chief Behning and his injury in person.

However, she agreed that seeing him would have no impact on her ability to be a

fair and impartial juror. Trial counsel did not move for a change of venue.

At trial, during his opening statement, trial counsel said, “Shoemaker did a

lot of bad, horrible things in September of 2017. He did steal multiple cars. He

rammed cars into other cars to damage them because he was upset. . . . He did

all of those things and more, many of which are crimes.” He added that Shoemaker

“was strung out on methamphetamine that day.” And he told the jury that

Shoemaker both completely destroyed the truck that he drove first and totaled the

garbage truck that he drove second. Then he asked the jury to return a verdict of

guilty on the charges of serious injury by vehicle and eluding or attempting to elude

while participating in a felony or resulting in bodily injury and to return a verdict of

guilty on the lesser-included second-degree robbery charge. However, he insisted

that Shoemaker was “not guilty of attempted murder. He was not trying to hit Chief

Behning. He is not guilty of willful injury because he wasn’t trying to hurt Chief
5

Behning.” The State introduced video evidence of almost all the events through

either dashboard camera, body camera, or rear-facing camera footage.3

After the State rested its case, Shoemaker moved for a judgment of

acquittal on the charges of attempted murder; willful injury resulting in serious

injury; and first-degree robbery, which the court denied. Shoemaker testified and

admitted that he stole two pickup trucks, rammed multiple cars, smashed out car

windows, and stalked Katie. He added that he had been using methamphetamine

that week and that methamphetamine impaired his thinking and made him “think

on impulse . . . without thinking of the outcome.” While he also admitted that he

was driving at least one hundred miles per hour, “totaled out” the red Dodge Ram,

and threatened to shoot the driver of the garbage truck if he did not get out, he

insisted that he did not have a gun and was not intending to kill Chief Behning. At

the close of the evidence, Shoemaker again moved for a judgment of acquittal on

the same counts, and the court denied the motion. In closing arguments,

Shoemaker insisted that he did not know Chief Behning was next to the police

vehicle before he collided with it. But he did not contest the serious-injury-by-

vehicle or eluding charges, instead admitting to them. He also admitted that he

“specifically intended to commit a theft.”

The jury found Shoemaker guilty of four of the counts: attempted murder,

eluding or attempting to elude while participating in a felony or resulting in bodily

injury, willful injury resulting in serious injury, and first-degree robbery; they

3 State’s Exhibits 3, 4, 5, 9, 10A, and 11A captured Shoemaker’s actions from the

time he was at Katie’s home damaging vehicles through fleeing in the garbage
truck and eventually speaking with officers after hitting Chief Behning’s vehicle.
Defendant’s exhibits A, B, and C show substantially the same.
6

acquitted Shoemaker of serious injury by vehicle. The jury also found that Chief

Behning was a peace officer, and thus the sentencing requirements of Iowa Code

section 707.11(5) applied.4 In total, the court sentenced Shoemaker to a total term

of imprisonment not to exceed fifty-eight years. Our court affirmed the convictions

for attempted murder, willful injury causing serious injury, and first-degree robbery

on direct appeal. Shoemaker, 2019 WL 5067177, at *5 Shoemaker applied for

further review, our supreme court denied the application, and procedendo issued

in December 2019.

Shoemaker filed this PCR application in February 2020, alleging ineffective

assistance of trial counsel. The PCR court held a hearing in September 2022. At

the hearing, Shoemaker’s trial counsel testified that he “didn’t file a motion [for

change of venue] because I didn’t think it would be successful.” He opined “we

were able to get a fair and impartial jury.” He submitted exhibits of eleven news

articles—seven published nine months before and four published after trial began.

As to the other strategic decisions involved in the case, trial counsel detailed

specific reasons addressing Shoemaker’s complaints about his representation.

First, he believed that evidence of Shoemaker’s prior theft conviction was

admissible, so he did not challenge its admission. Trial counsel explained that he

did not challenge the admission of evidence related to the charges for which

Shoemaker pled guilty because they “were ultimately related. It was essentially

one long incident.” He further said that they were “all one large transaction.” He

4 “If the fact finder determines the attempt to commit murder was against a peace

officer . . . , the person shall serve one hundred percent of the term of confinement
imposed and shall be denied parole, work release, or other early release.” Iowa
Code § 707.11(5)(c).
7

explained that he argued at trial that Shoemaker was guilty of third-degree robbery

and asked the jury to find him guilty of that crime because “intent to criminally

deprive with respect to a stolen vehicle to escape from police can be the basis or

can be found from the way they’re operating the vehicle.” He did not move for a

judgment of acquittal or request a jury instruction defining theft as opposed to

operating a vehicle without the owner’s consent for the same reason. Lastly, trial

counsel testified that he did not rely on the intoxication defense or find an expert

to testify on its applicability because it “wouldn’t be applicable. . . . It was very

apparent from factual circumstances of the case that [Shoemaker] was able to form

specific intent for a bunch of things. He was making conscious choices.”

The PCR court denied the application in December, finding that trial

counsel’s strategy during trial was largely “centered on limiting the witnesses the

State presented and narrowing the jury’s focus to intent rather than the egregious

conduct by Shoemaker.” In reviewing trial counsel’s strategy, the PCR court

concluded that “[t]he record during the trial and the record made during the PCR

trial do not provide sufficient evidence that [trial counsel] should have moved for a

change of venue based on pretrial publicity.” Then, the PCR court found that it

was not a breach of duty to fail to prevent the jury from hearing evidence of other

crimes, wrongs, or acts because that evidence was most likely admissible as it

was inextricably linked with other admissible evidence and also likely admissible

as evidence of intent. The PCR court also found that it was a reasonable trial

strategy to admit to theft “hoping the jury might take [Shoemaker] at [his] word and

bypass any greater offense presuming [he has] accepted responsibility for [his]

actions.” Lastly, the PCR court determined that it would have been inconsistent to
8

argue the defense of intoxication as to the charges that Shoemaker pled not guilty

to but not for the charges for which he pled guilty and that the evidence did not

support submission of a diminished responsibility defense. Shoemaker appeals.

II. Standard of Review.

We review ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims de novo. Sothman

v. State, 967 N.W.2d 512, 522 (Iowa 2021); Hernandez Ruiz v. State, 912 N.W.2d

435, 439 (Iowa 2018) (“[W]e do so . . . because such claims are constitutional in

nature.”).

III. Analysis.

Shoemaker alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective in four respects (1)

failing to move for a change of venue; (2) failing to limit evidence of other crimes,

wrongs, or acts; (3) admitting to theft, failing to move for judgment of acquittal on

the first-degree-robbery count, and failing to submit jury instructions on theft versus

operating vehicle without owner’s consent; and (4) failing to present a defense of

diminished capacity and intoxication.

“[T]o succeed on an ineffective-assistance claim, a PCR applicant must

establish that counsel breached a duty and prejudice resulted, and the claim fails

if either element is lacking.” Lusk v. State, No. 18-1125, 2019 WL 1953461, at *1

(Iowa Ct. App. May 1, 2019) (citing Lamasters v. State, 821 N.W.2d 856, 866 (Iowa

2012)); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). “Both elements must

be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.” Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d

134, 142 (Iowa 2001).

Regarding the performance prong, we presume that counsel acted

competently; that presumption is overcome if we find counsel’s performance falls
9

below the normal range of competency. Krogmann v. State, 914 N.W.2d 293, 306

(Iowa 2018). In looking at the normal range of competency, “claims of ineffective

assistance involving tactical or strategic decisions of counsel must be examined in

light of all the circumstances to ascertain whether the actions were a product of

tactics or inattention to the responsibilities of an attorney guaranteed a defendant

under the Sixth Amendment.” Ledezma, 626 N.W.2d at 143. “[S]trategic decisions

made after ‘thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options

are virtually unchallengeable,’ [but] strategic decisions made after a ‘less than

complete investigation’ must be based on reasonable professional judgments

which support the particular level of investigation conducted.” Id. (citation omitted).

“[W]e require more than a showing that trial strategy backfired or that another

attorney would have prepared and tried the case somewhat differently.” Taylor v.

State, 352 N.W.2d 683, 685 (Iowa 1984).

Regarding the prejudice prong, “an applicant must meet ‘the burden of

showing that the decision reached would reasonably likely have been different

absent the errors.’” Ledezma, 626 N.W.2d at 143–44 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 696). In other words, the applicant must show “the reasonable probability of a

different verdict, or that the fact finder would have possessed reasonable doubt.”

Id. at 144. This showing must be “sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome.” Bowman v. State, 710 N.W.2d 200, 206 (Iowa 2006) (citation omitted).

A. Change of Venue.

First, Shoemaker argues that the publicity of this case was so extensive and

inflammatory that prejudice to him must be presumed or there was actual prejudice
10

on the part of the jury.5 When “such degree of prejudice exists in the county in

which the trial is to be had that there is a substantial likelihood a fair and impartial

trial cannot be preserved with a jury selected from that county,” the court must

either order that trial be transferred to or that the jury be impaneled in and

transferred from another county. Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.11(10)(b) (2018). A party may

establish this level of prejudice by demonstrating that either “(1) publicity attending

the trial that is so pervasive and inflammatory that prejudice must be presumed, or

(2) actual prejudice on the part of the jury.” State v. Siemer, 454 N.W.2d 857, 860

(Iowa 1990).

In looking at the publicity, we examine “the nature, tone, and accuracy of

the articles; their timing in relation to the trial; and the impact of the publicity on the

jurors as revealed through voir dire.” Id. At the same time, “mere exposure to

news accounts will not create a presumption of prejudice.” Id. at 861. In Siemer,

where none of the publicity indicated that the defendant was guilty and “[t]he press

reports consisted largely of facts which were ultimately introduced at trial,” our

supreme court concluded prejudice could not be presumed. Id. Similarly, when

there was no evidence of actual prejudice resulting from media coverage, we have

found that trial counsel breached no duty and was not ineffective for failing to move

for a change of venue. See Borushaski v. State, No. 01-1683, 2003 WL 183284,

at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2003).

5 Shoemaker also raised a concern that venue should have been changed
because Chief Behning’s dad was the bailiff supervisor for the Scott County
Courthouse at the time of trial, but in the jury selection interviews we find no basis
to address this concern and so we do not address it.
11

Here, Shoemaker has failed to demonstrate the level of prejudice in the jury

that would have made a change of venue necessary; thus, counsel did not breach

an essential duty in failing to raise the issue. See State v. Tompkins, 859 N.W.2d

631, 637 (Iowa 2015) (“[W]here a claimant alleges counsel’s failure to pursue a

particular course breached an essential duty, there is no such duty when the

suggested course would have been meritless.”) During voir dire, the trial court

heard from several jurors about their knowledge of the facts and of potential

witnesses and did release some with possible preconceived bias. As to those

identified by Shoemaker here, those jurors agreed that they would listen to the

evidence as it came in, would be impartial, and would follow the law as instructed

by the judge. Although C.G. had seen Chief Behning’s injury in person, evidence

of his injury was admitted at trial in both video and photographs; thus, she would

have had the same awareness of the extent of his injuries at the end of the trial

even without her prior knowledge. And the news coverage contained facts that

were both introduced at trial and, in part, admitted to by Shoemaker; the coverage

was also from nine months prior to trial or after the jury was already empaneled.

Thus, trial counsel did not breach an essential duty by not moving for a change of

venue, which ends our analysis on this claim.

B. Evidence of Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts.

Next, Shoemaker asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

object to testimony about the crimes to which Shoemaker had already pled guilty

specifically counts involving his theft of the red Dodge Ram Shoemaker was driving

until he stole the garbage truck, damage he inflicted on other property, and his

actions towards Katie. Trial counsel moved in limine to exclude much of this
12

evidence. But trial counsel and the prosecutor entered into an agreement about

what could be discussed. Part of Shoemaker’s criminal spree occurred on

September 24 and then ended on September 25. So, trial counsel believed most

of the testimony and evidence developed at trial was likely admissible under the

inextricably-linked doctrine, as “other crimes, wrongs, or acts evidence that is

inextricably intertwined with the crime charged is not extrinsic evidence but, rather,

intrinsic evidence that is inseparable from the crime charged.” State v. Nelson,

791 N.W.2d 414, 420 (Iowa 2010). That inextricably-linked evidence is admissible

“based on a special relationship between this evidence and the charged crime”

and because it provides the jury with context for the charged crime and is not

subject to the prohibition of such evidence in Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.404(b). Id.

at 420–21. Put another way, Iowa courts may “allow such evidence to complete

the story of what happened when the other crimes, wrongs, or acts evidence is so

closely related in time and place and so intimately connected to the crime charged

that it forms a continuous transaction.” Id.; see also State v. Harrington,

No. 11-0646, 2013 WL 1749911, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2013) (finding

evidence from a few hours earlier than the charged crimes was admissible

because it “formed a continuous transaction”).

As the State argued in its brief, “[s]evering any discussion of the prior counts

would have required the State to present an eye-opening tale—that on

September 25 after simply observing Shoemaker’s vehicle, Davenport police

disregarded their policy of non-pursuit to chase Shoemaker at high speeds for an

undisclosed reason.” Evidence of Shoemaker’s ramming the stolen Dodge Ram

into vehicles along with his threats towards Katie provided the jury with context for
13

why law enforcement was pursuing him and why his ramming the garbage truck

into the service vehicle was not an accident. Trial counsel limited testimony

knowing the other evidence of Shoemaker’s actions was most likely admissible

and he would have had limited success in objecting to it. “Counsel is not required

to make meritless objections.” Kirkland v. State, No. 16-0642, 2017 WL 4049321,

at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2017).

And under trial counsel’s strategy, some of the otherwise admissible

evidence was not presented to the jury pursuant to agreement with the State to

minimize the full extent of Shoemaker’s crime spree. The PCR court saw this

same tension and the benefit of trial counsel’s strategy:

[Trial counsel] and Shoemaker were between a rock and a
hard place when it came to the State’s case. Either they contest all
the charges and allow the State to present their case in its entirety,
or they plead guilty to some offenses and attempt to limit the State’s
presentation through agreement. If [trial counsel] and Shoemaker
had chosen to contest all of the charges, their defense centered on
intent would have likely been lost on the jury as they listened to
Shoemaker’s crime spree. That said, by employing the strategy that
they did, and acknowledging wrongdoing, there was hope that the
jury’s focus could turn to the issue of intent and mitigate some of the
damage. Simply because this tactic did not succeed does not make
it a poor strategy given the facts of this case.

Thus, Shoemaker has failed to demonstrate the breach of duty necessary for

ineffective assistance on this claim.

C. Theft Admission.

As the PCR court noted, Shoemaker and his trial counsel made a strategic

decision to admit to third-degree robbery at trial “to direct the jury to a lesser-

included offense” under the charge of first-degree robbery. That meant

Shoemaker admitted he committed a theft of the garbage truck. But Shoemaker
14

now claims that his trial counsel should not have counseled him to admit to a theft.

Instead, he argues trial counsel should have both moved for a judgment of acquittal

on the robbery charge and submitted jury instructions on theft and on operating

vehicle without owner’s consent. Shoemaker maintains the State could not show

he took the garbage truck with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of the

vehicle, urging he simply took it without the owner’s consent, an offense separate

and distinct from a theft.

As for the duty to move for judgment of acquittal to challenge the sufficiency

of the evidence before the district court submits a criminal case to the jury, to do

so here would have been unsuccessful. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.19(8)(a); State v.

Serrato, 787 N.W.2d 462, 465 (Iowa 2010). First, the evidence of a theft with intent

to deprive the owner of the vehicle was overwhelming. Shoemaker drove

erratically, avoided spike strips by driving off of the road, and—as the investigator

testified—made no evasive maneuvers before slamming into the police vehicle.

The reckless operation of a get-away vehicle can satisfy the intent element of theft.

In State v. Miller, under similar facts, we found substantial evidence to

support a charge of theft rather than operating a vehicle without owner’s consent.

No. 16-2110, 2018 WL 1099580, at *6–7 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 21, 2018) (requiring

an examination of the record for facts and circumstances supporting the inference

that the defendant intended to permanently deprive the owners of the trucks).

Compare Iowa Code § 714.1(1) (theft), with id. § 714.7 (operating vehicle without

owner’s consent). We so held because Miller had committed other crimes prior to

stealing the vehicle, “took [the] vehicle in the owner’s physical presence and

against his obvious wishes,” and “fled on foot and seized a second getaway
15

vehicle” after crashing the first. Miller, 2018 WL 1099580, at *5. And, ultimately,

because Miller “disposed of the [vehicle] in a manner that made it unlikely [its]

owner[] would recover [it] with any remaining economic value” we concluded that

a jury could have found that he had intent to permanently deprive the owner of the

vehicle. Id. at *7. Thus, the trial court would not have granted a judgment on

acquittal under these facts. Intent to commit a theft is also part of a robbery charge.

See Iowa Code § 711.1(1). Because trial counsel was unlikely to succeed on a

motion for judgment of acquittal on the robbery charge as there was evidence of

intent to commit a theft, it was not deficient performance to fail to do so.

Similarly, admitting to elements of lesser charges to limit the likelihood that

the jury would find a defendant guilty of the original charges and to build credibility

with the jury is a legitimate trial strategy. See, e.g., Pettes v. State, 418 N.W.2d

53, 56 (Iowa 1988); Brown v. State, No. 14-1646, 2016 WL 351459, at *4–5, *9–

10 (finding no breach of duty despite counsel stating that the defendant was guilty

during opening statements and a bad man and guilty of a couple of crimes during

closing statements because doing so was a trial strategy that fell within normal

competency). Trial counsel explained that as part of the trial strategy developed

with Shoemaker, Shoemaker agreed to plead guilty to the theft of the garbage truck

to bolster Shoemaker’s credibility. The goal was for Shoemaker to gain credibility

so that the jury would give more credence to his assertion he had no intent to

attempt to cause a death or serious injury. This is a strategy that falls within the

normal range of competency. See Krogmann, 914 N.W.2d at 306. Under these

facts, we find this strategy to be reasonable. See Brown, 2016 WL 351459, at *9–

10. There was no breach of duty of trial counsel on this theory.
16

Finally, regarding Shoemaker’s robbery charge and his claim involving jury

instructions, trial counsel was not required to submit jury instructions for theft as it

is not a lesser-included charge of robbery. See McCullough v. State, No. 12-1028,

2013 WL 5760582, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2013) (“Theft is not a lesser-

included offense of robbery, since theft requires an element of taking, an element

not needed to constitute robbery.”). The same is true for an instruction on

operating vehicle without owner’s consent. Id. (“[W]hile operating without the

owner’s consent is a lesser-included offense of theft, it is not a lesser-included

offense of robbery. . . . A theft instruction was not given to the jury. Consequently,

[the defendant] was not entitled to a[n] operating without owner’s consent

instruction.”). Therefore, we find Shoemaker failed to establish trial counsel

breached a duty; this claim fails.

D. Intoxication Defense.

Lastly, Shoemaker asserts that his trial counsel should have investigated a

defense of diminished responsibility or intoxication which, in his opinion, would

have required hiring an expert.. See Iowa Code § 701.5 (defining the intoxication

defense); State v. Collins, 305 N.W.2d 434, 436 (Iowa 1981) (defining the

diminished responsibility defense as “where an accused, because of a limited

capacity to think, is unable to form a necessary criminal intent”). And at the PCR

trial, Shoemaker called a witness, Dr. James O’Donnell, a pharmacology and

toxicology expert. But O’Donnell only read Shoemaker’s testimony from the trial,

never interviewed him, and did not view the video evidence of the events, so he

did not have a basis to dispute trial counsel’s opinion of the specific intent

Shoemaker exhibited during the video footage. O’Donnell conceded that
17

Shoemaker’s actions evidenced his specific intent to steal the vehicles and try and

escape, albeit with the goal of seeking more methamphetamine. And to that point,

O’Donnell was unable to dispute trial counsel’s observations of Shoemaker’s

intentional conduct revealed in the law enforcement videos. Thus, Shoemaker

failed to demonstrate how an earlier investigation by a different expert might have

led to the submission of either of these defenses at trial.

Even so, to prevail under an intoxication defense, a defendant must

demonstrate that they were “incapable of formulating or possessing the specific

intent to commit the crime.” State v. Guerrero Cordero, 861 N.W.2d 253, 261 (Iowa

2015), overruled on other grounds by Alcala v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 880 N.W.2d 699,

708 (Iowa 2016). “[D]iminished responsibility may be offered as a defense where

an accused, because of a limited capacity to think, is unable to form a necessary

criminal intent.” Collins, 305 N.W.2d at 436. They are not defenses to general

intent crimes. Guerrero Cordero, 861 N.W.2d at 259. “[I]ntent required by the

statute ‘may be inferred from the defendant’s actions and circumstances of the

transaction . . . .’” State v. Keeton, 710 N.W.2d 531, 534 (Iowa 2006) (quoting 21

Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 128, at 214-15 (1998)). Shoemaker’s trial counsel was

not required to assert meritless defenses. See State v. Brothern, 832 N.W.2d 187,

192 (Iowa 2013); Powell v. State, No. 18-0542, 2019 WL 2524264, at *3 (Iowa Ct.

App. June 19, 2019). The PCR court noted that trial counsel explored these

defenses with Shoemaker, but counsel felt the evidence of Shoemaker’s intent

precluded their use. Recognizing Shoemaker’s judgment might have been

impaired, trial counsel explained why he did not pursue the intoxication defense:
18

The intoxication defense wouldn’t be applicable. Intoxication
is only a defense if it prevents someone from being capable of
forming a specific intent to commit a crime. It was very apparent from
factual circumstances of the case that Mr. Shoemaker was able to
form specific intent for a bunch of things. He was making conscious
choices.

At trial, video evidence supported Shoemaker’s ability to complete his crime spree,

even maneuvering the large garbage truck around vehicles and spike strips.

Likewise, Shoemaker admitted to having the intent to commit a theft and the intent

to elude law enforcement. Furthermore, threatening the garbage truck driver and

driving the garbage truck towards Chief Behning without applying its brakes also

demonstrated specific intent to cause harm. See Shoemaker, 2019 WL 5067177

at *3; see also Troupe v. State, No. 15-0678, 2016 WL 1681728, at *3 (Iowa Ct.

App. Apr. 27, 2016) (finding testimony at trial did not support intoxication defense

given the intent that could be inferred from defendant’s actions). Finding no legal

justification for the assertion of either diminished responsibility or intoxication

defenses, Shoemaker’s trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to try to assert

those at trial.

IV. Conclusion.

Shoemaker did not meet his burden to prove a breach of duty and prejudice.

Because we find that trial counsel was not required to bring meritless motions for

a change of venue or judgment of acquittal, object to evidence that was inextricably

linked with other admissible evidence, or to jury instructions not supported by

caselaw, we affirm the PCR court’s denial of these ineffective-assistance-of-trial-

counsel claims.

AFFIRMED.