State of Iowa v. Brian Thomas Woods

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 22-1273
Filed April 26, 2023

STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

BRIAN THOMAS WOODS,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County, Mark T. Hostager,

District Associate Judge.

A defendant appeals his sentence for reckless use of fire. AFFIRMED.

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Robert P. Ranschau (until

withdrawal) and Bradley M. Bender, Assistant Appellate Defenders, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Thomas J. Ogden, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Schumacher and Ahlers, JJ.
2

TABOR, Presiding Judge.

Originally charged with arson, Brian Woods entered an Alford plea1 to

reckless use of fire. In turn, the State recommended that Woods receive a

sentence of time-served. But the district court sentenced Woods to 360 days in

jail with all but ninety days suspended, plus two years of unsupervised probation.

Woods appeals.2 He argues that the court should have imposed the State’s

recommended sentence. And that by failing to do so, the court abused its

discretion. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

On Christmas Eve 2021, police and firefighters responded to a house fire

on the north side of Dubuque. Flames were coming from a room that Woods

rented from homeowner Susan Alexander. It was not the first call about that

residence that night. Earlier, police received reports that Woods was there having

a mental-health emergency. After their investigation, police believed that Woods

intentionally started the fire in his bedroom “by pouring gasoline on the floor.” The

State charged him with second-degree arson, a class “C” felony, under Iowa Code

section 712.3 (2021).

1 “An Alford plea is a variation of a guilty plea.” State v. Burgess, 639 N.W.2d 564,
567 (Iowa 2001). Under the practice approved in North Carolina v. Alford, 400
U.S. 25, 37 (1970), Woods did not admit to starting the house on fire but pleaded
guilty because the evidence “strongly negate[d]” his claim of innocence. See State
v. Knight, 701 N.W.2d 83, 85 (Iowa 2005) (citation omitted).
2 Woods argues that we have jurisdiction despite his attorney’s untimely notice of

appeal. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.101(1)(b). “Failure to appeal on time is a
jurisdictional defect.” Jensen v. State, 312 N.W.2d 581, 582 (Iowa 1981). And
appellate courts have the inherent power to decide whether they have subject
matter jurisdiction over an appeal. State v. Davis, 969 N.W.2d 783, 785 (Iowa
2022). Woods notes that despite his attorney’s delay, he filed a timely pro se notice
of appeal. He asserts this shows he timely expressed “a good faith intent to appeal
before the deadline.” The State does not contest timeliness. We agree that Woods
is entitled to a delayed appeal. See id. at 788.
3

At first, Woods pleaded not guilty. And he gave notice of insanity and

diminished-capacity defenses. But later, he agreed to enter an Alford plea to

reckless use of fire, a serious misdemeanor. See Iowa Code § 712.5. In doing

so, Woods admitted that the State “could prove to a jury that [he] recklessly used

fire or any incendiary device or materials as to recklessly endanger the property of

another.” In exchange, the State agreed to recommend he be sentenced to time

served in jail. The parties originally conditioned the agreement on the court being

bound to follow that recommendation. See Iowa R. Crim P. 2.10(2).

But at the plea hearing, the court declined to accept the plea with a binding

recommendation. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.10(4). The court asked whether Woods

wanted “to go through with the plea on a nonbinding basis.” Woods confirmed he

did—even after the court cautioned that it “could sentence [him] to something

different than” the State’s recommendation “all the way up to the maximums.” The

court also told him the maximum punishment for a serious misdemeanor is up to

a year in jail and a $2560 fine. After Woods entered his plea, the court ordered a

presentence investigation (PSI) report.

According to that report, forty-three-year-old Woods had an adult criminal

history dating back to 1997. Many of his convictions involved substance abuse.

Woods told the PSI reporter that he first tried marijuana, cocaine, and

methamphetamine when he was fifteen years old. And he had a history of mental-

health issues, including diagnoses for bipolar and anti-social personality disorders.

The PSI recommended the district court sentence Woods to 360 days in jail.

Woods called Alexander, his landlady, to testify at his sentencing hearing.

She had known Woods for twenty years and was his mother’s best friend. She
4

told the court that she believed Woods “did not do it on purpose.” She lobbied for

leniency: “I don’t want to see him punished . . . . [N]ot because of the fire.

Absolutely not. You know, there’s other problems that rehabilitation would help

him with that he desperately is seeking.” She explained his “other problems”

included drug abuse. And she relayed his recent experience: “[H]e went to the

hospital to seek help and got screwed over that and thrown in jail.”3 Finally, she

reiterated that she did not want Woods to do jail time because of the fire at her

home.

Following her testimony, the State asked the court to follow the plea

agreement. Woods’s attorney agreed: “[A]s we all know, jail is just dead time.

There’s no rehabilitative efforts there. . . . [W]e would urge the court to impose any

kind of probation that requires him to get serious about his treatment.”

The district court said that it had considered the circumstances of the case,

Woods’s age, his adult criminal history, and the plea agreement. Based on these

considerations, the court told Woods that it would not follow that agreement.

I don’t see how that plea bargain which is time served, whatever that
is, and no probation, no other conditions—I don’t see how that
advances the sentencing goals of protection of the community and
rehabilitation of you. All right? And so I’m not going to follow that
plea bargain.

3 This statement may be referencing Woods’s two parole violations that June.
Woods tested positive for marijuana, benzodiazepines, methamphetamine,
amphetamine, and opioids during a random drug test. A few days later, he went
to a local hospital seeking treatment after using methamphetamine. Once
admitted, staff discovered Woods was armed with a knife and called police. The
State charged him with possessing a dangerous weapon while under the influence,
interfering with official acts, and being under the influence in public.
5

Highlighting the PSI report, Alexander’s testimony, and the attorneys’

arguments, the court imposed the minimum fine and sentenced Woods to 360 days

in jail, suspended 270 days, and placed Woods on two years of informal probation.

While on probation, Woods had to “obtain either a new or an updated substance

abuse evaluation” and follow through with any treatment recommendations.

Woods now appeals, claiming the district court’s deviation from the State’s

recommended sentence was an abuse of discretion.4 In contesting his sentence,

Woods insists: “As the case was progressing, the prosecutor must have realized

that the defendant was overcharged and decided to drop the charge from a class

‘C’ felony to a serious misdemeanor.”

We reject Woods’s claim. Under our rules of criminal procedure, a district

court may reject a plea agreement that purports to be binding. State v. Wenzel,

306 N.W.2d 769, 771 (Iowa 1981) (discussing what is now rule 2.10). Following

that rule, after rejecting the agreement, the court gave Woods a chance to

withdraw his plea and warned that his sentence could be “up to the maximums.”

See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.10(4). Still, Woods decided to go forward with his

misdemeanor plea. The court then properly weighed the relevant sentencing

factors, including Woods’s long criminal history and his “instances of unsuccessful

probation.” The court’s decision was neither unreasonable nor based on untenable

grounds. See Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at 725. So we will not disturb it.

AFFIRMED.

4 We review the sentencing order for the correction of legal error. See State v.
Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 103 (Iowa 2020). We will reverse if the prison term
reveals an abuse of discretion or arises from a defect in the sentencing procedure.
Id. (citing State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002)).