State of Iowa v. Jeffrey Leroy Larson

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 21-1850
Filed March 8, 2023

STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

JEFFREY LEROY LARSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Bremer County, Peter B. Newell,

District Associate Judge.

Jeffrey Leroy Larson appeals the denial of his motion to suppress.

AFFIRMED.

Matthew G. Sease of Sease & Wadding, Des Moines, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Thomas J. Ogden, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., Tabor, J., and Scott, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2023).
2

SCOTT, Senior Judge.

After a trial on the minutes of evidence, Jeffrey Leroy Larson was convicted

of first-offense possession of marijuana, in violation of Iowa Code section

124.401(5) (2020). On appeal, Larson challenges the denial of his motion to

suppress, asserting the state trooper unreasonably prolonged the traffic stop. We

affirm.

At about 3:30 p.m. on December 19, 2020, Iowa State Patrol Trooper John

Iriarte stopped Larson’s vehicle, which was traveling eighty-three miles per hour in

a sixty-five mile per hour zone. Larson, his wife, and their dog were in the vehicle.

Trooper Iriarte asked Larson to bring his license and registration to the patrol

vehicle where Larson sat in the trooper’s front passenger seat while the officer

prepared a speeding citation. After about seven minutes, Trooper Iriarte—still

working on the citation—asked Larson questions about whether there was

anything illegal in Larson’s vehicle—weapons, drugs, marijuana, meth, heroine, or

“prescription pills that aren’t yours?” Larson said no. Trooper Iriarte than asked,

“If I wanted to search your vehicle, could I?” and Larson said, “Absolutely.”

A couple minutes later, the officer completed inputting information in his

patrol vehicle computer system, asked for Larson’s signature, and explained how

to take care of the speeding citation. Trooper Iriarte then gave Larson the citation

and stated, “If you don’t mind, I’m going to go ahead and just search your vehicle

if it’s okay with you still.” Larson said, “Well, we’d like to get on the road but I can

get the dog . . . .” Trooper Iriarte found marijuana when searching Larson’s

vehicle.
3

Larson challenged the search of his vehicle in the district court, asserting

the trooper unlawfully prolonged the traffic stop and his consent was not voluntary.

Trooper Iriarte testified at a hearing on the motion, and the patrol vehicle

recordings of the traffic stop were admitted. The district court denied Larson’s

motion to suppress, finding the stop was not impermissibly extended and Larson’s

consent was voluntary. Larson appeals.

We review constitutional issues de novo. In re Prop. Seized from Pardee,

872 N.W.2d 384, 390 (Iowa 2015). In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress,

we make “an independent evaluation of the totality of the circumstances as shown

by the entire record.” Id. (citation omitted). “We give deference to the district

court’s fact findings due to its opportunity to assess the credibility of witnesses, but

we are not bound by those findings.” Id. (citation omitted).

“‘[I]t is well settled that a traffic violation, however minor, gives an officer

probable cause to stop a motorist’ and is therefore a reasonable seizure.” State v.

Salcedo, 935 N.W.2d 572, 577 (Iowa 2019) (quoting State v. Aderholdt, 545

N.W.2d 559, 563–64 (Iowa 1996)).

Once lawfully stopped, inquiries reasonably related to the
mission of addressing the traffic infraction “and attend[ing] to related
safety concerns” are permissible. This court has recognized, “[A]
reasonable investigation includes asking for the driver’s license and
registration, requesting that the driver sit in the patrol car, and asking
the driver about his destination and purpose.”

Id. at 577–78 (alterations in original) (internal citations omitted).1

1 Larson attempts to show his traffic stop was overly long by comparing it to a stop
Trooper Iriarte made just prior. There, the trooper pulled someone over for heavily
tinted windows, did not ask the driver to exit the vehicle, and issued a warning; that
stop lasted about six minutes. Yet, in watching the patrol car video, we learn that
during that stop, Trooper Iriarte is also alerted to a vehicle traveling at eighty-three
4

Authority for a traffic seizure “ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction

are—or reasonably should have been—completed.” Rodriguez v. United

States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015). “Because addressing the infraction is the

purpose of the stop, it may ‘last no longer than is necessary to effectuate th[at]

purpose.’” Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted). The Salcedo court noted:

“Rodriguez made clear the Fourth Amendment will tolerate certain unrelated

investigations that do not extend the roadside stop, but the stop will remain lawful

only ‘so long as [unrelated] inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the

stop.’” 935 N.W.2d at 579.

On our de novo review, we find Larson’s detention lasted no longer than

necessary to prepare and issue the traffic citation. It is true Trooper Iriarte asked

Larson questions during that time period concerning Larson’s destination and

purpose and the existence of weapons or drugs in the vehicle, but those questions

did not measurably extend the duration of the stop.

While Trooper Iriarte was preparing the traffic citation, Larson informed the

trooper he could “absolutely” search the vehicle—the trooper had not yet

completed issuing the citation. When the trooper handed the citation to Larson,

Larson again consented—admittedly less enthusiastically—to the search.

“[C]onsensual searches are a well-established exception to the warrant

requirement and do not violate the Federal or State Constitution.” State v.

miles per hour. He appears more concerned about the speeding vehicle than the
tinted windows, noting the occupants of the stopped vehicle had already received
an earlier warning. As soon as he issued the warning, he pursued the speeding
vehicle, which turned out to be Larson who had continued to speed. We are not
convinced the length of that earlier traffic stop provides an apt benchmark.
5

Hauge, 973 N.W.2d 453, 461 (Iowa 2022). Larson, however, contends the

circumstances of his traffic stop require a finding that Larson’s consent was not

voluntary. He relies on State v. Pals, 805 N.W.2d 767 (Iowa 2011), claiming almost

identical circumstances exist here. We cannot agree.

Our supreme court has recently described the circumstances that led to the

Pals court finding the consent was not voluntary:

There, a law enforcement officer conducted a traffic stop of
Pals to enforce a municipal ordinance. When Pals was unable to
produce proof of insurance, the officer asked Pals to come back to
his patrol car. The officer subjected Pals to a pat-down search before
detaining Pals in the patrol car, where Pals sat in the front passenger
seat while the officer informed Pals that he needed to update the
address on his driver’s license, warned him about the municipal
infraction he had violated, and instructed him to call the sheriff’s
office with his insurance policy information to alleviate the need for a
no-insurance ticket. After Pals agreed to do so, the officer asked
Pals, “Say you don’t have anything, any weapons or drugs or
anything like that in your vehicle, do you? Do you care if I take a
look?” Pals responded, “[S]ure, go ahead.” The search of the
vehicle revealed marijuana, which led to Pals’s conviction for
possession of a controlled substance after the district court denied
his motion to suppress the evidence.
On appeal, a majority of our court concluded that Pals did not
voluntarily consent to the search of his vehicle under article I, section
8 of the Iowa Constitution. The majority considered four factors,
including the “projected authority” the officer exerted over Pals during
the pat-down search and the “inherently coercive” setting of Pals’s
detainment in the police vehicle on the side of a public highway.
Additionally, it observed that the officer had not advised Pals that the
officer had “concluded business related to the stop at the time he
asked for consent,” which would have made the stop “a less coercive
voluntary encounter,” and the “lack of closure of the original purpose
of this stop makes the request for consent more threatening.” Finally,
the majority asserted,
The lack of any statement that Pals was free to leave
or that he could decline to give his consent to the
search in this case is, at a minimum, a strong factor
cutting against the voluntariness of the search,
particularly in the context of a traffic stop where the
individual is seized in the front seat of a police car. A
6

warning of rights would serve to significantly neutralize
the coercive setting in this case.

Hauge, 973 N.W.2d at 466–67 (internal citations omitted).

Trooper Iriarte asked Larson to join him in the patrol vehicle, which is

recognized as part of a reasonable investigation. See Salcedo, 935 N.W.2d

at 577. Larson was not subjected to a pat-down search before he entered the

patrol vehicle. He sat in the front passenger seat while the trooper worked on his

computer next to him. The time between when the trooper made the traffic stop

and when he asked Larson for consent to search was only a matter of a few

minutes. During their interaction, Larson made small talk, asked questions of the

trooper, and laughed on occasion. The trooper was conversational and calm.

Nothing in the record suggests Larson was not of sound mind or too impaired to

consent. See Hauge, 973 N.W.2d at 469. Viewing the totality of the

circumstances, Larson’s behavior was consistent with consent, and the interaction

between Larson and Trooper Iriarte was “fairly benign leading up to the request to

search.” See id. We agree with the district court, Larson’s consent was given

voluntarily. There was no error in denying the motion to suppress.

AFFIRMED.

Vaitheswaran, P.J., concurs; Tabor, J., dissents.
7

TABOR, Judge (dissenting).
In deciding whether consent to search is voluntary, “account must be taken

of subtly coercive police questions.” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412

U.S. 218, 229 (1973). Because the majority’s analysis does not do that, I

respectfully dissent.

The State has the burden to prove that Larson gave his consent to search

“freely and voluntarily.” See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968);

see also State v. Howard, 509 N.W.2d 764, 767 (Iowa 1993) (noting consent must

be “unequivocal” and “specific”). The State can’t discharge its burden by showing

that Larson merely submitted to the trooper’s cleverly phrased questions. Cf.

Bumper, 391 U.S. at 548–49 (“This burden cannot be discharged by showing no

more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority.”). And we must remember

that the trooper is asking questions within “the ‘inherently coercive’ setting of a

traffic stop.” State v. Lowe, 812 N.W.2d 554, 575 n.11 (Iowa 2012) (citations

omitted).

Moving to those questions. The first inquiry was hypothetical on its face: “If

I wanted to search your vehicle, could I?” The word “if” usually means “in the event

that” or “on the condition that.” If, Meriam-Webster.com, https://www.merriam-

webster.com/dictionary/if (last visited Feb. 14, 2023); see Bruesewitz v. Wyeth

LLC, 562 U.S. 223, 233 (2011) (noting word “if” is a “conditional term” in construing

statute). The trooper did not say: “I would like to search your car; do I have your

consent?” See U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commn. v. S. Tr. Metals,

Inc., 894 F.3d 1313, 1321 (11th Cir. 2018) (differentiating between direct

statement, “I would like to deliver metal” and abstract inquiry, “If I wanted to deliver
8

metal, can you arrange it?”). Instead, the trooper’s question was conditional and

did not secure voluntary consent.

Yet the majority seems convinced by Larson’s immediate response:

“Absolutely.” But what did Larson think the trooper was asking? Viewed under the

totality of circumstances, a reasonable layperson in Larson’s position might have

believed the trooper was probing Larson’s understanding of the trooper’s authority

to search (“if I wanted to, could I?”), rather than seeking Larson’s consent. The

wording of the question did not refer to Larson at all. Cf. State v. Hauge, 973

N.W.2d 453, 456 (Iowa 2022) (“Can I check you for weapons real quick?”)

(emphasis added); State v. Pals, 805 N.W.2d 767, 770 (Iowa 2011) (“Do you care

if I take a look?”) (emphasis added). And context is important here. The trooper

had just exerted his authority over the out-of-state Larson in several ways: by

stopping Larson’s car, by removing Larson from his own car and detaining him in

the patrol car, and by questioning where Larson was going and whether he had

controlled substances in his car.2 See In re Prop. Seized from Pardee, 872

N.W.2d 384, 396 (Iowa 2015) (denouncing practice of “blending” drug interdiction

questions with the routine processing of a traffic stop). It would be reasonable for

a layperson to believe that given the trooper’s control over the stop that he was

just verifying that Larson knew he had authority to search “if he wanted to.” Indeed,

“[s]ubtle coercion, in the form of an assertion of authority . . . by the law

enforcement officers [can] make what appears to be a voluntary act an involuntary

2Larson told the trooper that he and his wife and their four-year-old chocolate lab
were traveling from west central Minnesota to visit their adult children in South
Carolina and Florida. Larson denied having any illegal drugs in the car.
9

one.” State v. Reinier, 628 N.W.2d 460, 468 (Iowa 2001) (alterations in original)

(citations omitted).

Even if, as the majority believes, Larson “absolutely” gave the trooper

consent to search the car—if the trooper wanted to—the trooper didn’t want to at

that point. The question’s conditional language confuses its meaning. Larson may

have understood the phrase “if I wanted to, could I” to mean that the trooper would

first manifest a “want” to do so before asking Larson to consent. Cf. Belmont

Constructors, Inc. v. Lyondell Petrochemical Co., 896 S.W.2d 352, 357 (Tex.

App. 1995) (explaining “[c]onditional language, such as ‘if’” conveys a “condition

precedent” when interpreting city charter). But not until four minutes later did the

trooper revisit the idea of a search.3

Which brings me to his second question: “Um, if you don’t mind, I’m going

to go ahead and just search your vehicle, if that’s okay with you, still?” This

question assumed consent was a fait accompli. And unlike Larson’s unreserved

response to the first hypothetical question, he hesitated after hearing the trooper’s

declaration that he was “going to go ahead and just search.” Larson did not confirm

that he had previously given consent and did not give affirmative consent in

response to that second question. Instead, Larson told the trooper: “I guess we’d

like to get on the road, but, ah, the dog’s in there like I said, but I can bring her

out.” This is not an unequivocal answer. See Howard, 509 N.W.2d at 767.

Under the totality-of-circumstances test dictated by Schneckloth and

Hauge, the State did not prove that Larson voluntarily consented to the search of

3During those four minutes, the trooper finished issuing the speeding citation to
Larson. And he asked Larson if his dog was kenneled or loose in the car.
10

his car. Schneckloth requires us to “carefully scrutinize[]” the conditions that led

to the consent in determining whether it was voluntary. 412 U.S. at 248. One of

those conditions is the “projected authority” that the officer displays over the

citizen. Hauge, 973 N.W.2d at 466 (quoting Pals, 805 N.W.2d at 782). Our

supreme court found it significant that the deputy “displayed limited authority over

Hauge prior to asking him if he had any weapons on him and whether he could

check Hauge for weapons.” Id. at 468. By contrast, the trooper detained Larson

in his patrol car and quizzed him about his itinerary and whether he had contraband

in his car. See State v. Lane, 726 N.W.2d 371, 379 (Iowa 2007) (considering

length of detention and questioning when deciding whether consent was

voluntary). Before completing the citation process and while still detaining Larson,

the trooper asked if he could search Larson’s car “if he wanted to” and secured

Larson’s positive response to that hypothetical question.

After issuing the speeding ticket, the trooper did not tell Larson he was free

to go or could decline to give consent. That lack of notice is another factor in

assessing voluntariness. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 249 (noting “subject’s

knowledge of a right to refuse is a factor to be taken into account”). Instead, after

handing Larson the ticket, the trooper unveiled his plan to search the car: “[I]f that’s

okay with you, still.” That phrasing put Larson in the position of contradicting the

trooper who just professed to having authority to continue the road-side seizure.

In response, Larson neither confirmed nor contradicted the trooper’s plan to

search. His compliance did not signal unequivocal consent. These circumstances

are “at a minimum, a strong factor cutting against the voluntariness of the search,
11

particularly in the context of a traffic stop where the individual is seized in the front

seat of a police car.” Pals, 805 N.W.2d at 783 (emphasis added).

The majority finds no coercion in the trooper’s questions because “[d]uring

their interaction, Larson made small talk, asked questions of the trooper, and

laughed on occasion.” But the superficial bonhomie of the encounter did not

excuse the trooper’s calculated effort to extract consent without truly asking for it.

“[N]o matter how subtly the coercion was applied, the resulting ‘consent’ would be

no more than a pretext for the unjustified police intrusion against which the Fourth

Amendment is directed.” Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 228.

Here, the coercion came in the form of a two-step strategy. Cf. Missouri v.

Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 616 (2004) (finding Miranda violated by police technique to

conduct interrogation in two phases, one unwarned and one warned). The

trooper’s first question enticed Larson to answer yes because it carried no

immediate consequences. The trooper’s second question banked on the

motorist’s reluctance to deny the trooper’s assertion that he had already

consented. Cf. id. at 613 (“[W]ith one confession in hand before the warnings, the

interrogator can count on getting its duplicate, with trifling additional trouble.”). Our

record does not show if the trooper’s technique stemmed from training. But I hope

not. In analyzing consent searches, we try to strike a balance between the

competing interests of legitimate, effective police practices and “society’s deep

fundamental belief that the criminal law cannot be used unfairly.” Hauge, 973

N.W.2d at 464 (quoting Lowe, 812 N.W.2d at 572). Posing questions to trick a

motorist into giving consent is an unfair use of the criminal law.
12

It is our duty as a court to be “watchful of the constitutional rights of the

citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon.” See Schneckloth, 412

U.S. at 229 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886)). When

citizens consent to a police search, they forgo a constitutional right. Id. at 245. I

believe that the trooper’s method of obtaining consent to search was a stealthy

encroachment on Larson’s constitutional right. Because the State failed to show

that Larson voluntarily consented to the search of his car, I would reverse the

denial of his motion to suppress.