CourtListener 10879504•In the Interest of L.C., M.C., R.C., and L.C., Minor Children
In the Interest of L.C., M.C., R.C., and L.C., Minor Children
CourtListener 10879504Iowactapp24 giu 2026
Testo completo
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
_______________
No. 25-1860
Filed June 24, 2026
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In the Interest of L.C., M.C., R.C., and L.C., Minor Children,
J.C., Father,
Appellant,
B.K., Mother,
Appellant.
_______________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County,
The Honorable Christine Dalton, Judge.
_______________
AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS
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Patricia Rolfstad, Davenport, attorney for appellant father.
Barbara E. Maness, Davenport, attorney for appellant mother.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Tamara Knight, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee State.
Jean Capdevila, Davenport, attorney and guardian ad litem
for minor children.
_______________
Considered without oral argument
by Tabor, C.J., and Chicchelly and Sandy, JJ.
Opinion by Tabor, C.J.
1
TABOR, Chief Judge.
Brook and Jay,1 a mother and father, separately appeal following the
juvenile court order terminating their parental rights to four children under
the age of four. The Iowa Department of Health and Human Services
removed the children based on concerns that Brook and Jay lacked parenting
skills and struggled with substance use, homelessness, and domestic
violence. On appeal, neither parent disputes that the State proved the
grounds for termination. Rather, they argue termination is not in the
children’s best interests.
After independently reviewing the record, we reach the same
conclusion as the juvenile court regarding the termination of parental rights.
Neither parent can provide a stable home or meet the children’s needs. The
children’s interests in a secure future are best served by termination.
I. Facts and Prior Proceedings
Brook and Jay have four young daughters. At the time of the
termination hearing, R.C. and M.C., the twins, were three years old; Le.C.
was nearly two years old, and Lo.C. was nine months old.
The department removed R.C., M.C., and Le.C. from their parents’
custody in August 2024. The family was unhoused and squatting in an
apartment with no utilities. There was no food, formula, diapers, clean
clothes, or other supplies for the children in the apartment.
At removal, Le.C. was eight months old and weighed only 13 pounds.
The department found her in a car seat; she was “lethargic with limp arms
1
We use pseudonyms for the parents’ names, as allowed under Iowa Court
Rule 21.25.
2
and legs” and was “unable to move her head or engage.” 2 R.C. had an eye
condition and an ear infection that required attention. All three children were
“very dirty giving an appearance of long term need for bathing.” The parents
acknowledged that they were unable to meet the children’s basic needs,
though neither recognized why the children were being removed from their
care.
The youngest child, Lo.C., tested positive for cocaine and marijuana
at birth. The department removed her from the parents’ custody in
December 2024 when she was just two days old. The juvenile court
adjudicated the three eldest girls as children in need of assistance (CINA) in
October 2024 and adjudicated the youngest as CINA in February 2025. R.C.,
M.C., and Lo.C. live together in a foster home. Because of her medical needs,
the department placed Le.C. in a separate foster home. The foster families
coordinate sibling visits to maintain the bonds among all four children.
After removing the four children, the department offered Brook and
Jay many services, including family-centered services, transportation and bus
passes, mental health services, housing assistance, and substance-use
treatment. The parents did not participate in those services. The juvenile
court ordered both parents to take drug tests and enter treatment in
September 2024, but neither complied with the order. The department
offered the parents two two-hour visits with the children every week. But the
parents only attended about half of those scheduled interactions. Then, in
2
Le.C. has had lasting impacts from spending so much time in the car seat. She
struggled to extend her legs or put weight on them, so a doctor referred her to physical
therapy. Because she was so underweight at removal, her caregivers needed to pay special
attention to her weight gain.
3
July 2025, both parents cut off contact with their children without notifying
the department or the court of their whereabouts.
They reappeared at the termination hearing3 in September 2025,
stating they had entered a treatment program in Arizona.4 As of the hearing
date, Brook and Jay had been enrolled in the program for seventeen days. The
guardian ad litem (GAL) aptly summarized the dilemma facing the court,
“I’m really glad that the parents are in programming in Arizona. . . . I hope
they stay in those services. I hope they can go on and be successful from this
point . . . . [But t]hey just are not ready to have the children at this point.”
In its termination order, the juvenile court noted that “both [parents]
looked and sounded much healthier than during past hearings, and more able
to communicate,” but “the court wishe[d] they had taken this step earlier.”
The court viewed termination as “a difficult decision” because it did “not
have a crystal ball to predict whether or not [ Jay or Brook] will be able to
succeed in getting sober and reaching a stability that allows them to parent.”
The juvenile court ordered termination of both parents’ rights to all four
children, noting that the children need a full-time and stable parent now:
“The harm to the young children is waiting longer only to have the parents
fail to follow through again. . . . While the parents have taken steps to resume
the care and custody of their children, they didn’t start until September []
3
Both parents appeared remotely at the termination hearing.
4
Phoenix Rescue Mission is marketed as a comprehensive program that helps with
homelessness, substance use, and poverty. In his testimony, Jay described the program as
an “18-month crisis center intensive residency program. It’s for people [who are] seeking
recovery from chemical dependency and other life controlling problems.” Brook and Jay
said they felt they had to go to Arizona because no program like that existed in Iowa. But
the juvenile court noted that similar programs did exist closer to home and that the
department offered Brook and Jay referrals to those programs.
4
2025, over a year after the offer of services by [the department].” The parents
appeal separately.
II. Scope and Standard of Review
We review termination orders de novo. In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40
(Iowa 2010). Generally, we follow a three-step analysis. In re A.B., 957
N.W.2d 280, 294 (Iowa 2021). First, we examine whether the State has
proven statutory grounds for termination under Iowa Code
section 232.116(1) (2025). Id. Second, we analyze whether termination was
in the best interests of the children. Id. Finally, we determine whether a
permissive exception under section 232.116(3) applies which would preclude
termination. Id. We need not address any step not raised by a parent. In re
L.A., 20 N.W.3d 529, 532 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025) (en banc).
Neither Brook nor Jay disputes that the State proved the statutory
grounds for termination of their parental rights. Instead, they both argue that
termination was not in the best interests of the children. Brook and Jay also
mention the possibility of additional time for reunification or establishing a
guardianship, but the State argues that such passing references without
factual argument or legal citation are insufficient to raise the issue for appeal.
We agree with the State on those issues. See In re J.R., No. 22-1470, 2023
WL 2148760, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2023) (reaffirming that “scattered
references” to an issue without detail or authority is insufficient to raise the
issue). Thus, we address only the best-interests argument.
III. Best Interests Analysis
When considering whether to terminate the rights of a parent, we give
primary consideration to the children’s safety, to the best placement for
furthering the children’s long-term nurturing and growth, and to their
5
physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs. Iowa Code
§ 232.116(2).
Brook contends termination was not in the children’s best interests
because both parents are making “radical changes” to facilitate reunification.
Similarly, Jay argues that the Arizona program was “changing his life” and
“he was making . . . a genuine and sincere commitment to regain custody of
his children.” Indeed, the juvenile court recognized the parents’ progress in
addressing their substance use and life skills. And we commend them for that
effort. But it has come too late. We cannot “gamble with the children’s
future” as they wait an indeterminate amount of time for a stable home. In re
D.W., 385 N.W.2d 570, 578 (Iowa 1986) (citation omitted). At the time of
termination, Brook and Jay were still new to their programs, and we, like the
juvenile court, have no way of predicting their prognosis. We also agree with
the juvenile court’s assertion that, even if Brook and Jay succeed in Arizona,
it could take months for them to establish a home and assume the role of
being parents again.5
Truth is, Brook and Jay had over a year to address their issues through
the options offered by the department. But they waited until just before the
termination hearing to start treatment. “[A] parent cannot wait until the eve
of termination . . . to begin to express an interest in parenting.” In re C.B., 611
5
At the termination hearing, Brook and Jay requested that the children be moved
to Arizona to live with them. Brook’s program at the facility allows children to live with
their mothers while on-site. The GAL feared that this move would cause the children
more trauma without providing permanency. Another drawback to that plan was that the
department needed to evaluate the program and living facility before approving transfer
of the children to Arizona, which could take months to finalize.
6
N.W.2d 489, 495 (Iowa 2000). These children are young and need stable
homes with reliable caregivers.
And for children in foster care, the juvenile court may consider
“whether the child has become integrated into the foster family to the extent
that the child’s familial identity is with the foster family, and whether the
foster family is able and willing to permanently integrate the child into the
foster family.” Iowa Code § 232.116(2)(b). Here, three of the children (R.C.,
M.C., and Lo.C.) are placed together in a foster home. They are progressing
well, appear happy and healthy, and are on track with developmental
milestones. Le.C. is also happy and healthy in her placement and is
progressing well for her age. Both foster families are willing to adopt the
children and plan to continue facilitating visits between the siblings. The
foster parents have been attentive to the medical, social, and developmental
needs of the girls.6 During the termination hearing, the department
caseworker reported that the older girls refer to their foster mothers as
“mom,” showing that their familial identities lie with their foster families.7 It
is clear to us that all of the girls are making tremendous progress at their
foster homes, and that these homes are offering the stability that Brook and
Jay cannot readily offer. The record reflects that these foster placements are
the best possible places for these young girls to continue to thrive.
6
For example, one of the twins requires special services at school. The family has
been timely in getting her evaluated and securing proper educational services. As noted,
Le.C. has had ongoing medical problems because of her condition at removal, and the
foster family has addressed her development. In yet another example, one of the twins has
eyesight trouble and the foster family took her to eye appointments and obtained
eyeglasses to assist with her sight.
7
This is particularly true for Lo.C., who has only known her foster family since
her birth.
7
After our review of the record, we affirm the juvenile court and find
that termination of both parents’ parental rights is in the best interests of all
four children. We acknowledge the progress made by Brook and Jay.
Although this decision is not what these parents sought, we hope they
continue to pursue healthy and stable lives.
AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.
8
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