Guy Dell Sudduth v. State of Iowa

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 24-1429
Filed May 13, 2026
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Guy Dell Sudduth,
Applicant–Appellant,
v.
State of Iowa,
Respondent–Appellee.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County,
The Honorable Alan Heavens, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Ella M. Newell (argued),
Assistant Appellate Defender, attorneys for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Aaron Rogers (argued), Assistant
Attorney General, attorneys for appellee.
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Heard at oral argument
by Greer, P.J., and Schumacher and Chicchelly, JJ.
Opinion by Chicchelly, J. Bower, S.J., takes no part.

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CHICCHELLY, Judge.

Guy Dell Sudduth Jr. appeals the summary disposition of his
application for postconviction relief (PCR) from his 2005 convictions for
criminal transmission of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). He
challenges the factual basis for his guilty plea, arguing that the Iowa Supreme
Court’s holding in Rhoades v. State, 848 N.W.2d 22 (Iowa 2014), applies
retroactively. For the first time on appeal, Sudduth also claims that his actual
innocence makes his sentence unconstitutional. We affirm on both claims.

BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
In 2005, the State charged Sudduth with two counts of criminal
transmission of HIV, in violation of Iowa Code section 709C.1 (2005),1 and
seven counts of third-degree sexual abuse that occurred between August
2004 and March 2005. The counts of criminal transmission of HIV involved
separate victims. Although the victims’ memories were incomplete because
they were incapacitated from drugs or alcohol, the minutes of testimony
recount what each could recall. The first victim alleged that Sudduth
engaged in anal sex as the receptive partner, tried to receive oral sex, and
twice performed oral sex. The second victim alleged that Sudduth
performed oral sex.

To convict Sudduth of criminal transmission of HIV, the State had to
prove that Sudduth “[e]ngage[d] in intimate contact with another person”
knowing that he was HIV positive. Iowa Code § 709C.1(1)(a). “Intimate
contact” was defined as “intentional exposure of the body of one person to a

1
The legislature has since repealed section 709C.1 and replaced it with
section 709D.3, which criminalizes the act of exposing an uninfected person to a
contagious or infectious disease with the intent of transmitting it to the uninfected person.
See 2014 Iowa Acts ch. 1119, §§ 3, 9 (effective May 30, 2014).

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body fluid of another person in a manner that could result in the transmission
of [HIV].” Id. § 709C.1(2)(b). To prove HIV “could” be transmitted, the
State had to show “that transmission of the HIV from the infected person to
the exposed person was possible considering the circumstances.” State v.
Keene, 629 N.W.2d 360, 365 (Iowa 2001).

Sudduth entered Alford pleas2 to both counts of criminal transmission
of HIV and three of the counts of third-degree sexual abuse, and the State
dismissed the remaining charges. At the plea hearing, the court explained
what the State had to prove for a jury to find him guilty of criminal
transmission of HIV:
COURT: The State would be required to prove that between
August 2004 and March 2005, in this county and state, you knew that you
had a human immunodeficiency virus status and that you engaged in an
intimate relationship with another person. Do you understand that?

DEFENDANT: Yes.

The law at the time allowed the court to “take judicial notice of the fact that
the HIV may be transmitted through contact with an infected individual’s
blood, semen or vaginal fluid, and that sexual intercourse is one of the most
common methods of passing the virus.” Id. at 365–66. So based on
Sudduth’s statements and the minutes of testimony, the court found there
was a factual basis for Sudduth’s pleas. It sentenced Sudduth to twenty-five-
year terms of incarceration for each criminal-transmission conviction and
ten-year terms of incarceration for each sexual-abuse conviction, ordering

2
An Alford plea allows a defendant to consent to the imposition of a sentence
without admitting participation in the crime. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37
(1970).

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that Sudduth serve the sentences consecutively for a total of eighty years in
prison.

The supreme court changed the court’s ability to take judicial notice
of facts not appearing in the record in finding a factual basis for a guilty plea
to criminal transmission of HIV when it decided Rhoades in 2014. 848
N.W.2d at 25. The appellant in Rhoades pled guilty to criminal transmission
of HIV for a sexual encounter that occurred in 2008. Id. He unsuccessfully
applied for PCR, claiming his trial attorney was ineffective for not challenging
the factual basis for his guilty plea. Id. at 26. On appeal, the supreme court
held that transmission “must be reasonably possible under the facts and
circumstances of the case” rather than theoretical. Id. at 28. It also found
that evidence from Rhoades’s PCR hearing showed there had been “great
strides in the treatment and the prevention of the spread of HIV from 2003
to 2008.” Id. at 32. As a result, it held that it could no longer “take judicial
notice that an infected individual can transmit HIV when an infected person
engages in protected anal sex with another person or unprotected oral sex,
regardless of the infected person’s viral load.” Id.

Sudduth applied for PCR in October 2014, challenging the factual
basis for his plea in the wake of Rhoades. The district court dismissed the
application as time-barred because Sudduth filed it beyond the three-year
limitation period set out in section 822.3. Sudduth appealed, arguing that for
the statute-of-limitations purposes, Rhoades created new law that he could
not have raised within the limitation period. Sudduth v. State, No. 15-1816,
2017 WL 1278239, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2017). Agreeing that
Sudduth’s claim fell under the “ground of law” exception to the three-year
limitation period, we reversed the dismissal of his application and remanded
for a PCR hearing. Id. at *2.

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After remand, Sudduth amended his PCR application to add a claim
of actual innocence. Due to a series of requested continuances, the PCR
action was not resolved until almost five years later when the court granted
the State’s motion for summary disposition and dismissed Sudduth’s
petition with prejudice.

SCOPE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review PCR applications for errors at law. Moon v. State, 911
N.W.2d 137, 142 (Iowa 2018). But when a PCR applicant alleges a
constitutional violation, our review is de novo. Id.

In reviewing summary disposition of a PCR action, we use the same
standards applied in reviewing summary judgment. Id. In other words,
summary disposition is proper when there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Id. As the moving party, the State bears the burden of showing there is no
genuine dispute as to the material facts. See id. We review the evidence in
the light most favorable to Sudduth and draw all legitimate inferences from
the record in his favor. See id. at 142–43.

DISCUSSION
In challenging the order granting summary disposition of his PCR
application, Sudduth raises two claims. First, he contends he is entitled to
PCR because there was no factual basis for his pleas based on Rhoades, which
must be applied retroactively. Second, he renews his claim of actual
innocence, albeit on a different ground than argued below.

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I. Does Rhoades invalidate the factual basis for Sudduth’s Alford
pleas?

When Sudduth entered his pleas in 2005, the law allowed the court to
take judicial notice that an infected person could spread HIV through
protected anal sex or unprotected oral sex, regardless of the viral load. See
Rhoades, 848 N.W.2d at 32. Taking judicial notice of this fact, the minutes of
evidence provided a factual basis for Sudduth’s pleas. The supreme court
has since held that medical advances between 2003 and 2008 raise questions
about whether that was still true in 2009. Id. at 32–33. Sudduth contends
that this holding applies retroactively, undercutting the factual basis for his
own pleas.

“[T]he threshold question in considering whether federal due process
requires a judicial decision be applied to postconviction relief proceedings is
whether the decision is substantive or procedural.” Goosman v. State, 764
N.W.2d 539, 542 (Iowa 2009). If substantive, we ask whether it clarified or
changed the law. Id. Decisions clarifying existing law apply retroactively. Id.
Changes in the law apply prospectively only. Id.

This court has addressed whether Rhoades applies retroactively.3
Jimmy Stevens unsuccessfully applied for PCR from a 2004 conviction for
criminal transmission of HIV. Stevens III, 2018 WL 5843527, at *1. After
Rhoades, Stevens filed a second PCR application, which the district court
dismissed on statute-of-limitation grounds. Stevens II, 2016 WL 1696909, at

3
A trio of appeals addressed Jimmy Stevens’s conviction for criminal transmission
of HIV: State v. Stevens (Stevens I), 719 N.W.2d 547, 548–52 (Iowa 2006) (direct appeal),
Stevens v. State (Stevens II), No. 15-1033, 2016 WL 1696909, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 27,
2016) (first PCR dismissal), and Stevens v. State (Stevens III), No. 16-2112, 2018 WL
5843527, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 7, 2018) (second PCR dismissal).

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*3. This court held that although Rhoades never expressly overruled the
decisions allowing the court to take judicial notice of how HIV may be
transmitted, “it was not merely ʻa clarification of the law’ or ʻan application
of preexisting law.’” Id. at *3.
The Rhoades decision was a change in the law regarding the evidence the
State needed to offer to meet its burden of proof to sustain a conviction for
criminal transmission of HIV. In addition, this change affects the validity
of Stevens’s conviction. What the jury was once able to accept as common
knowledge with no further proof required from the State now requires the
State to offer expert medical testimony on the likelihood of transmission of
HIV. Until the Rhoades decision was issued, it was established law that oral
sex is a manner of transmission of HIV and the State did not need to offer
further proof to establish the “intimate contact” element of the crime.

Id. (cleaned up). Because Rhoades changed the law and could not have been
raised within the three-year period for filing for PCR, this court held that the
time bar did not apply and reversed the dismissal of Stevens’s PCR
application. Id. Because the parties had not addressed whether Rhoades
should be retroactively applied to Stevens, the court remanded the case to
allow the district court to answer that question.4 Id. at *4.

On remand, the district court found that Rhoades did not retroactively
apply to Stevens and again dismissed his PCR application. Stevens III, 2018
WL 5843527, at *1. Stevens appealed, arguing that “the due process clause
of the state constitution and the equal protection clauses of the federal and
state constitutions” require retroactive application of Rhoades. Id. at *2. This
court affirmed the dismissal on appeal, holding that due process did not
mandate retroactive application of Rhoades. Id. at *6.

4
This court relied on Stevens II in reversing the dismissal of Sudduth’s PCR action
in his first appeal. Sudduth, 2017 WL 1278239, at *2.

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Because the Rhoades case falls squarely within the class of cases for
which federal courts have decided due process does not require
retroactivity, we find no compelling reason to depart from the federal
analysis the supreme court used in Goosman and subsequently applied in
interpreting the state due process clause in Nguyen. [See Nguyen v. State,
828 N.W.2d 744, 756 (Iowa 2016)]. To the extent Stevens provides us with
an alternative framework, we find the federal framework more compelling.
See id. We therefore hold the due process clause of the Iowa Constitution
does not require the retroactive application of Rhoades to individuals whose
direct appeals were final prior to the decision.

Id. at *3. The court also held that prospective application of Rhoades did not
violate Stevens’s equal protection rights under the state or federal
constitution. Id. at *4.

Sudduth contends that the due process protections afforded by our
state and federal constitutions require retroactive application of Rhoades.
The district court rejected this argument based on Stevens III.
The problem for Sudduth is that Stevens III concluded that Rhoades
does not apply retroactively. While Stevens is only persuasive authority (as
opposed to binding authority), Sudduth does not attack the reasoning used
in the case, or any of the binding precedent referenced throughout the
analysis. Instead, Sudduth points out differences between his case and
Stevens’s such as when their petitions were filed. Those are distinctions
that don’t make any difference.

Sudduth has given this court no legitimate reason not to apply
Stevens III to his case. And courts do not play a “partisan role.” So this
court cannot create reasons to avoid the application of Stevens III that
Sudduth didn’t advance. The bottom line is that Rhoades doesn’t apply
retroactively.

(Footnotes omitted.)

Sudduth argues that Rhoades applies retroactively because it clarified
two points of law: (1) the kind of behavior that qualifies as “intimate contact”
and (2) the court’s ability to take judicial notice of that fact. Assuming that

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Sudduth is correct on the first point, Rhoades changed the court’s ability to
take judicial notice of that fact. In other words, the holding in Rhoades is a
change in process, not a clarification of the law. This court rejected
retroactive application of Rhoades in Stevens III. As the district court noted,
Sudduth has not advanced any reason to reject our prior holding. We
therefore affirm.

II. Are claims of actual innocence subject to the statute of limitations?

Sudduth also contends he should be granted PCR because of his actual
innocence. Although he raised a claim of actual innocence below, Sudduth
concedes that he is not relying on any of the grounds he argued in district
court. Instead, Sudduth claims for the first time on appeal that he is factually
innocent of one count of criminal transmission of HIV by performing oral sex
on the victim because HIV cannot be spread by exposure to saliva.

“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must
ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we will
decide them on appeal.” Lamasters v. State, 821 N.W.2d 856, 862 (Iowa 2012)
(citation omitted). Sudduth argues that his claim is that of an illegal sentence,
which can be raised at any time. See State v. Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862, 872
(Iowa 2009) (allowing a claim that a sentence is inherently illegal based on
constitution or statute to be brought at any time). But not all constitutional
claims violations result in illegal sentences. Id. at 871. Litigants cannot
reassert or raise constitutional challenges to their underlying conviction for
the first time on appeal. Id. Because Sudduth’s claim that his sentence is
illegal because he is innocent challenges his underlying conviction, it is not
preserved for the court’s review.

Even setting aside the error-preservation concerns, there are other
impediments to Sudduth’s claim. First, it presumes that Rhoades applies

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retroactively, an argument we reject in part I. Second, the claim falls outside
the three-year limitation period of section 822.3. See Schmidt v. State, 909
N.W.2d 778, 798–99 (Iowa 2018) (recognizing that actual-innocence claims
are limited by the requirements of section 822.3). Sudduth claims that his
PCR attorney was ineffective by not raising the issue of applying the statute
of limitations to free-standing claims of actual innocence below and seeking
partial reversal of Schmidt. Even if PCR counsel had done so, only the Iowa
Supreme Court is at liberty to overrule its prior holdings. Bomgaars v. State,
967 N.W.2d 41, 48 n.4 (Iowa 2021) (“[L]ower courts in Iowa are [not] at
liberty to anticipatorily overrule this court’s precedent.”).

CONCLUSION
Because the Rhoades holding does not apply retroactively to Sudduth,
the district court properly granted summary disposition of his PCR
application. Sudduth has not preserved error for the actual-innocence claim
he raises on appeal. We therefore affirm.

AFFIRMED.

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